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Offering a engaging and accessible portrait of the current state of the field, A 
Companion to Naturaslim shows students how to think about the relation 
between Philosophy and Science, and why is both essencial and fascinating to 
do so. All the authors in this collection reconsider the core questions in 
Philosophical Naturalism in light of the challenges raised in Contemporary 
Philosophy. They explore how philosophical questions are connected to 
vigorous current debates - including complex questions about metaphysics, 
semantics, religion, intentionality, pragmatism, reductionism, ontology, 
metaethics, mind, science, belief and delusion, among others – showing how 
these issues, and philosopher’s attempts to answer them, matter in the 
Philosophy. In this sense, this collection is also compelling and illuminating 
reading for philosophers, philosophy students, and anyone interested in 
Naturalism and their place in current discussions.  
There are no formal divisions in this Companion, so the different essays are 
freestanding and can be read in isolation from the other. Nevertheless, the reader 
can view an informal line uniting the essays, with one topic naturally leading to 
the other. 
The editor thanks all the contributors to this volume, and makes special 
acknowledgment to the National Council to Scientific and Technological 
Development (CNPq) for financing this project. Thanks are offered also to 
Aristotelian Society for permission to reprint the text “Poverty Analysis” (by 
Prof. David Papineau). 
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RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT FREEDOM 
ADRIANO NAVES DE BRITO 
INTRODUCTION 
Relations between philosophy and sciences have been reworked. In the 20th 
century these relations were weakened, be it due to scientific specialization, be it 
because of the humanist vocation of philosophy which inspires it to take on a 
normativist bias, thus aimed more at prescription than at description. After, at 
the end of the 19th century and beginning of the last century, physics and 
mathematics had a great influence on philosophy, biology, neurosciences and 
psychology have more recently reintroduced sciences into the philosophical 
reflections, with consequences that are still only timidly taken up by academic 
philosophy. Especially with regard to the concept of personhood, the influence 
of those disciplines shall be disturbing, once the biological roots of the cultural 
nature of humans were deeper scrutinized.  
This text appreciates this new rapprochement and, in the precise sense that it 
espouses the idea that all phenomena of nature, be they physical or mental, can 
be explained only by natural forces, immanent to nature itself, it is naturalistic. It 
is also naturalistic in the sense that it does not deny the possibility that there are 
supernatural forces which determine the world. The denial of this possibility, as 
well as its affirmation, would go beyond the knowledge we can have of the 
world and would, therefore, be a transgression of the limits of naturalism. That 
possibility or its denial, however, do not add any explanatory value to the 
phenomena. Thus, they have no epistemic value and leave a frankly naturalized 
ontology untouched. In this sense, the naturalism that I advocate is ontological 
and epistemic, but not metaphysical, which means I am not concerned with 
entities beyond the limits of physics. From that metaphysical (i.e. transcendent) 
standpoint, the naturalism that I espouse has nothing to say. In the meaning that 
the term “critique” has for Kant’s mature, transcendental philosophy (1781), the 
naturalism espoused here may well be called “critical naturalism”. It is a 
naturalism that reaches until where possible experience reaches. Experience, it 
should be said, such as the sciences can handle.  
It is from the viewpoint of this naturalistic approach that I shall discuss ethics 
and personhood, especially the relationship between responsibility and freedom 
regarding the ethical dimension of personhood. My purpose is to defend the 
position that claims that we can get rid of freedom, understood in the strong 
Kantian sense, without jeopardizing the capacity of persons to bear 
responsibilities and, therefore, without jeopardizing personhood. That position 
RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT FREEDOM 
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might be considered compatibilistic, were it not for the fact that it denies 
freedom as a causality and, thus, voids the need to render it compatible with the 
forces of nature. For the same reason, this position cannot be classified within 
the scope of the incompatibilistic positions, since, if there is no causality by 
freedom, there is then nothing that might be incompatible with the natural 
determinations. Given that I begin with the denial of causality by freedom, 
which eliminates part of the problem to which I want to dedicate myself in this 
paper, its core task is to explain the second element of the problem, i.e. 
responsibility, without, however, taking recourse to freedom. 
DISPENSING WITH FREEDOM 
Before dispensing with freedom, it is useful to provide a better explanation of 
my ab ovo denial of it, so that the notion of responsibility which I have to 
account for will also become clearer. As regards freedom, I am considering 
positions that are well illustrated by those defended by Chisholm (1966) and 
Strawson (1994) and that sustain themselves due to the same background 
concept of metaphysics, namely the idea that responsibility implies the agent’s 
full autonomy, ergo, the agent’s capacity, in Kant’s terms, to start a causal chain 
by themselves. 
Let us first take Chisholm’s view. He says the following about the 
conditioning factors of responsibility: 
“If we are responsible … then we have a prerogative which some would 
attribute only to God: each of us, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved. In 
doing what we do, we cause certain things to happen, and nothing—or no 
one—causes us to cause these events to happen” (Chisholm, 1966). 
In order to establish a perspective for this position, it is worth noting that in the 
philosophy of Kant, but also in that of Descartes, it is precisely the property of 
our being free, in a metaphysical sense, that brings us closer to God. The theory 
of error proposed by Descartes (1641), for instance, is based on the assumption 
that our will is infinite, like that of God, but that our understanding is limited. 
The same, mutatis mutandis, applies to Kant (1788). As legislators of a 
Kingdom of Ends, we are like deities; but as knowing beings we are limited by 
the conditions of possibility of experience. Chisholm is, therefore, well inserted 
into a long line of thinkers who, in a consistent manner, think about freedom as 
an uncaused causality. I say consistent because only this strong, metaphysically 
charged notion solves the problem of responsibility without further gaps or 
difficulties. If persons are free in this divine sense, persons are responsible, and 
nothing else needs to be added to the topic. More recently Galen Strawson 
continued this metaphysical tradition with an argument that, although coming 
from the same metaphysical foundations as regards the relationship between 
freedom and responsibility, diverges from his predecessors regarding divinity, of 
human being or of any other being, and consequently derives a skeptical position 
regarding responsibility. He argues that 
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(i) Nothing can be causa sui—nothing can be the cause of itself  
(ii) In order to be truly morally responsible for one’s actions, one would have 
to be causa sui, at least in certain crucial mental respects.  
(iii) Therefore nothing can be truly morally responsible (Strawson, 1986). 
Strawson rules out the possibility that there may be some being that is, in a 
metaphysically relevant sense, causa sui and takes a position that coincides with 
metaphysical naturalism, namely, that it is impossible that there are supernatural 
forces that determine nature. On that basis, and on the basis of a notion of 
responsibility that coincides with the tradition that I highlighted above, nothing 
or nobody can be responsible. Thus, the skeptical position is likewise consistent 
with the notion of responsibility that it espouses and that, as I said, is the same as 
the tradition for which Kant is the paradigmatic representative for contemporary 
philosophers. Strawson’s position appears to add a further advantage thanks to 
the metaphysical naturalism that it incorporates, since it can play the same card 
as its respectable predecessors about responsibility, without, however, offending 
the scientific spirit of our times. In my view, this appearance is misleading. 
Strawson already offended the scientific spirit when he took on a metaphysical 
naturalism. I shall return to this point below. 
I disentangle myself from these positions without undoing the metaphysical 
knots with which they were woven. The type of naturalism that I espouse allows 
me to do this, without much trouble, although this move will charge its price not 
in the field of freedom, but in that of responsibility. Let me explain. If the 
conditions to attribute responsibility imply assertions on the metaphysical status 
of our species as peopled by individuals who are between gods and mortals, or 
else assertions about divine entities themselves, these conditions cannot be met 
by science or by any discipline that operates within the limits of immanence. 
The type of naturalism that I adopted, which is epistemic in character and 
committed to an immanent ontology, limits the scope of the investigation and 
the treatment of the problem, so that it forces me to dispense with freedom. The 
same critical naturalism leads us to reject, precisely for the same reasons, 
Strawson’s position which, as I made quite clear, must be committed to a 
statement of a metaphysical nature, even if naturalistic, but that goes beyond the 
limits of what the sciences can contribute, viz. that nothing can be causa sui. 
Now, no science can claim that there cannot be something that is causa sui. 
A direct consequence of the conjunction of a critical naturalism with the 
arguments of this line of thinkers would be skepticism regarding responsibility. 
The argument would be as follows: if we cannot decide whether there are or not 
beings that can be causa sui, or whether we ourselves, at least regarding 
morality, cause our own actions, then we can also not decide whether someone 
can or not be considered responsible for their actions. As I warned, the bill for 
the position I take is charged in the field of responsibility. How can one respond 
to this? There is no response if the terms of the problem are not changed. The 
skeptical conclusion is inevitable if the notion of responsibility is maintained 
just as the tradition—that I will call the tradition of Kant—conceives and accepts 
it. Do we have good reasons to maintain it? My answer is that we do not.  
RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT FREEDOM 
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Since the notion of responsibility with which the tradition of Kant operates 
depends on another notion that is equally metaphysically charged, namely that of 
a transcendent freedom, and which we have to dispense with from the 
explanation of the moral phenomenon in consonance with critical naturalism, the 
notion of responsibility must be also affected by this move of disentanglement. 
As regards responsibility, however, the point is not getting rid of it. On the 
contrary of freedom—taken as a sui generis causality and the denial of which 
has no consequence whatsoever for the explanation of innerworldly phenomena, 
which is a statement that is perfectly in consonance with epistemic naturalism—
the denial of responsibility unavoidably limits the explanation of morality. 
Without the notion of responsibility, morality makes no sense. And this is 
confirmed by human moral practices.  
Skepticism, as regards responsibility, may even interdict the metaphysical 
certainty regarding guilt, and which would require the assimilation of freedom, but 
it cannot limit the game of mutual evaluations that we humans play daily. Without 
the act of holding a person responsible, the dynamics of morality simply could not 
start to move. Consequently, even if in a non-metaphysical sense, we attribute 
responsibilities to ourselves (and even freedom in a non-metaphysical sense, but I 
shall return to this point only at the end). Responsibility, then, must be able to 
circulate in this world without its metaphysical counterpart, viz. freedom as 
causality, and a philosophical position that begins with this finding must offer a 
notion of responsibility, that, although it does not overload it metaphysically, 
cannot take away the role it plays in the moral phenomenon, i.e. its role as a 
foundation for the attribution of guilt. Moral skepticism may even motivate 
philosophers, but does not really affect ordinary life. 
MORALITY AND EVOLUTION 
Seen from an evolutionary perspective, morality is related to facilitating 
cooperation. It is, thus, a functional trait of collective human behavior that 
evolved from the behavior of the species that preceded us on the evolutionary 
line. Given its importance for the reciprocal control of the behavior of 
individuals in a group, and given the importance of group life for the homo 
sapiens sapiens species, morality is not only functional to it, but also gave it an 
advantage in dealing with natural selection. 
The control of the behavior of individuals for a sustainable life in a group 
implies both the selection of preferences appropriate to this kind of sociability—
as, for instance, the disposition to positive and negative affective reactions, such 
as indignation, guilt and moral approval vis-à-vis, respectively, the deviation of 
behavior or behavioral appropriateness—and the selection of neuronal structures 
that can correct individual behaviors. In a species with such a flexible menu of 
behaviors as is the human one, the mechanisms of adjustment of individuals’ 
behavior are decisive to ensure, at the same time, adaptability and functionality 
of the groups (Brito, 2014). Recent studies show that the neuronal structures are 
influenced by the threat of punishment in a process that reinforces the 
susceptibility of individuals to these threats and in this way favors the institution 
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of rules of conduct, whose result in turn would be an increment in the capacity 
of cooperation among groups. These studies illuminate the functionality of the 
modern systems of justice based on very primitive, but spectacularly efficient 
evolutionary processes. The study by J. W. Buckholtz and R. Marois (2012), 
“The roots of modern justice: cognitive and neuronal foundations of social 
norms and their enforcement”, goes in this direction.1 According to its authors, 
the bias created by the threat of punishment influences the reward-based 
decision-making mechanisms, so that the individuals would, because of this, 
have a greater propensity to behaviors appropriate to the rules prevailing in the 
group, which would make cooperation easier. This conclusion is by the authors 
of the study, who formulate it as follows: 
The research is consistent with the hypothesis that the evolution of norm-
based decision making mechanisms may have been facilitated by the 
presence of neural circuitry that supports domain-general cognitive processes 
for value-based action selection. Such processes may have been co-opted and 
expanded to operate in the social domain where they promote action 
selection according to higher-order action values linked to social rewards, 
such as reputation and trust, thereby facilitating cooperation (Buckholtz & 
Marois, 2012, p. 655). 
The relationship between neuronal structures and biases and decision-making is 
clear when human being is considered against the background of their biological 
condition.2 Insofar as we are animals, we are a body and a brain that make up the 
same whole that acts in a given direction, although it is not exhaustively 
determined. The direction is determined by the basic preferences that result from 
the traits that were reinforced in the natural selection process, because they 
allowed a better adaptation to the diversities of the evolutionary environment. 
One of them is sociability. The behavioral bias that is thus outlined, however, 
leaves a vast elbow room, in which the groups can move and organize their 
behavior in order to carry out the main tasks and challenges of an individual’s 
life, i.e. surviving and procreating.  
In the case of genus homo, thanks to its magnificent brain capacity, these 
tasks and challenges were broken down into a great number of other activities 
and could be efficiently performed and overcome in such varied ways that the 
elbow room in the most successful species, ours, broadened to the point of 
appearing to be free from the determinations of its animal nature. Despite the 
                                                 
1 “It is possible that the threat of punishment may increase cooperation by biasing reward-
related action selection mechanisms mediated by dorsal frontostriatal circuitry. In this 
context, punishment threat may change the reinforcement contingencies associated with 
potential responses, and increased corticostriatal fMRI signal in the punishment condition 
may reflect this updating process” (Buckholtz & Marois, 2012, p. 655.) 
2 For a recent discussion on the repercussions of neurosciences on law, see J. Greene & J. 
Cohen, 2004. 
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elbow room that our species has to organize its life as a group, we are animals, 
animals which end up having a personhood in a given culture.3 
As animals we are susceptible to the causal determinations that influence all 
living beings, but also to those determinations that are specific to us because of the 
type of behavior that we have to prefer in consonance with the traits that natural 
selection has reinforced in us. Everything according to a causal continuum that 
knows no exception, that is, without the need to consider any supernatural force to 
explain this process adequately. As Dennett explains: “Our brains have been 
designed by natural selection, and all the products of our brains have likewise been 
designed, on a much swifter timescale, by physical processes in which no exemption 
from causality can be discerned” (Dennett, 2003, p. 305). It is in this framework of 
causal determinations, in which we have our peculiarities as a species but no 
transcendent privilege, that responsibility must fit. And it does fit.  
Two conditions are required for it to make sense to attribute responsibility to an 
individual who is, as Aristotle (1997) defined it, a ζῷον πoλιτικόν, an animal with a 
social life, an animal adapted to urban life, in which interaction and cooperation 
among individuals is the rule. The conditions are as follows: (1) that they can act in 
another way, or, as we say about an action that has already been performed, that they 
could have acted differently from what they did, and (2) that they are susceptible to 
the influence of external moral pressure on their behavior. The concept of human 
being that I outlined above and these two conditions provide the core for a theory of 
responsibility that, within the limits of critical naturalism espoused here, dispenses 
with freedom as causality. Once freedom as causality has been dispensed with, it is 
not ruled out that, in the terms of Dennett (1994 and 2003), there is elbow room for 
different courses of action to take place, and that carrying one of them out implies an 
individual taken as a causal link of events, for whose consequences they can be held 
responsible given the conditions listed above. In the rest of this text, I explain these 
two conditions and show why they are compatible with what the judicial systems 
consider indispensable for imputability, just as they are compatible with the 
conditions that we take as indispensable to attribute responsibility to persons within 
the scope of morality.  
RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL OF BEHAVIOR 
The first condition to render an individual responsible is that which distinguishes 
a voluntary action from an involuntary one. The matter is not merely physical or 
biological—that is, whether the individual was causally implicated in the course 
of ongoing actions and had biological control of their actions—but also 
psychological in a subjective sense, that is, in the sense that the individual could 
exert influence, by their capacity to make choices and at the limits of a 
reasonable pressure, on the direction of the facts that conditioned their action. If 
the physical and biological conditioning factors imposed the action on the 
                                                 
3 Humans are animals in the precise sense proposed by the doctrine of animalism according to 
its best known advocate. Eric T. Olson says: “When I say that we are animals, I mean that 
each of us is numerically identical with an animal. There is a certain human organism and 
that organism is you. You and it are one and the same” (Olson, 2003, p. 1). 
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individual, or if the psychological pressures were so great that it would not be 
reasonable to expect individuals generally to resist them and act in another way, 
then the individual is non-imputable, meaning that it does not make sense to 
require from them that they should have acted in another way. If the limiting 
conditions that have just been presented are not given, then the individual is 
imputable. The reasoning, once the due adjustments have been made, can be 
applied to omission. An involuntary omission does not imply imputability, 
whereas a voluntary omission does. Voluntary, therefore, is not defined through 
a causality by freedom, but through natural causality. The development of facts 
required that an individual take action in the sense that they were a link in the 
causal chain and had elbow room available to choose more than one course of 
action, according to the forces that preponderated in it. 
The second condition is connected to the first as a specification of the type of 
requirement which pertains to responsibility, i.e. a moral requirement in the 
broad sense, that is, which also includes the legal requirements. If the individual 
could act in another way (also as regards omitting themselves or not) and if they 
were susceptible to moral pressures, in other words, if the prevailing normative 
requirements could preponderate in their decision, then they are responsible for 
their acts, and it makes sense to consider them responsible precisely because it 
made sense to demand of them that they should have acted in a specific manner 
and under the then prevailing moral—in a broad sense—constraints. Under these 
conditions, responsibility, as well as the will as I described it previously, do not 
demand causality by freedom but, conversely, they assume that the individual is 
willing to be determined. In other words, the disposition to have behavior guided 
by the moral pressure that the socially or legally constituted group exerts on 
them. Holding a person responsible is itself a fundamental part of the pressure 
that is exerted on the individual. It is because they anticipate its possibility that 
they guide their decisions appropriately, in a mechanism that may well be 
explained by the same neuronal structures and processes pointed out in the study 
by Buckholtz and Marois (2012) that I cited earlier. Paraphrasing another 
Strawson (1962), Peter, the practice of holding a person responsible does not 
only exploit our nature, it expresses it.4 
In brief, the responsibility of an individual depends on their action—
understood in a broad sense so as to include omission—being voluntary in a 
sense that does not imply freedom as causality, but takes into account the 
causalities involved in the circumstances of the action. An individual deliberated 
under the effect of the causalities which have an influence over their action, with 
or without an awareness of all of them, and the judgment as to whether their 
action can or not be considered their responsibility takes into account the force 
of these influences and not the individual’s capacity to start, without the 
concurrence of those influences, a causal chain through an act of freedom. Once 
the conditions are evaluated by those who judge the case—morally or legally—
                                                 
4 “What is wrong is to forget that these practices, and their reception, the reactions to them, 
really are expressions of our moral attitudes and not merely devices we calculatingly 
employ for regulative purposes. Our practices do not merely exploit our natures, they 
express them” (Strawson, 1962, p. 70). 
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if the action is considered involuntary, then the responsibility of the individual 
agent will be excluded. This evaluation is subjective, since it takes into account 
the agent’s intention; but it is also objective, and considers the facts and 
constraints that influenced or should have influenced the agent, including the 
very pressure of the then relevant and prevailing normative requirements. The 
objectivity of the evaluation highlights precisely the second condition to hold the 
agent responsible, i.e. that they have the disposition to be affected by the 
external requirements of other individuals or of the system of norms to which 
they are submitted. The idea that the agent should have been influenced 
differently by the circumstances is essential for holding them responsible, but 
the very act of holding responsible, or its possibility, is considered a factor that 
should have influenced and finally determined their action. In this way, even if 
the agent has a second order wish which is identical in content to the first order 
wish to commit an illegal or objectionable act, if the circumstances and her 
dispositions are such that she could have been influenced, concerning her second 
order desire too, differently by the circumstances, then it makes sense to 
consider her responsible. In this case, the agent’s bias to desire the reprovable 
desire is not an excuse for her not to be imputed. The point is that she should 
have been influenced differently also in her second order desire by social and 
legal norms. Here the burden of a mature personhood takes its price. This 
conclusion agrees with that of Frankfurt (1971), although it comes from a 
different meta-ethical position.  
Now, once the second condition exists, namely the disposition to be 
effectively affected by moral pressure in the broad sense, it is appropriate to 
evaluate the merit or demerit of the individual’s action in order to find to what 
extent imputability can be attributed to them; in other words, it should be 
determined to what extent their disposition is susceptible to pressures for a 
different behavior than the one they chose. Here one must find out whether there 
was deceitfulness or malice. If deceitfulness or malice cannot be found, the 
objective conditions may be suspended, since it is no longer possible to 
determine whether the agent could react as the current conditions, norms and 
pressures required them to act, which includes the possibility that they might be 
considered responsible for the result of the action. The mature capacity for 
deceitfulness and malice is also a sign of a mature personhood.  
I resort to paradigmatic cases of the legal system to explain this point. For 
instance, let us look at the case of juveniles. Although, when considering a given 
reprehensible result, one might suppose that they could, under those 
circumstances, have acted in another way, imputability is impaired by the 
uncertainty regarding the efficiency of social and moral pressure on them. The 
matter of deceitfulness or malice cannot be investigated, because the agent 
cannot yet be considered someone who can conjugate, as expected, the 
circumstances and normative requirements prevailing at the time of the action. 
Under these conditions, the evaluation of deceitfulness or malice is suspended 
and, therefore, also the evaluation of guilt. Considering the stage of neurological 
development of juveniles, the best explanation to diminish their responsibility is 
not the fact that they cannot freely start causal chains, but the fact that they are 
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still poorly guided under moral pressure. This means that the moral pressure 
exerted by the social group on the juveniles can result in behaviors different 
from expected, without it being possible to determine the guilt of individuals as 
regards this result, so that investigating guilt also loses its object, i.e. an 
objective ensemble of circumstances and an agent who is predictably susceptible 
to normative pressures. The same reasoning can be applied to another 
paradigmatic case, viz. psychopaths. Even though they can understand the rules, 
their susceptibility to the moral pressures of the group is not enough to predict a 
behavior according to these pressures, with an acceptable guarantee for the 
group that can be harmed by the psychopath. They might be capable of 
deceitfulness or malice, but in an artificial way, since they cannot feel (and 
therefore fully understand) the burden of guilt that should accompany those who 
have developed a mature personhood. 
The case of Phineas Gage, made famous by Antonio Damásio (1994), is a 
clear illustration of this point. Gage’s behavior was affected by an accident that 
destroyed a large part of his left frontal lobe, and he was no longer responsible 
for his acts, not because he did not cause them, but because his susceptibility to 
the moral pressures of society was affected so that his behavior became 
unpredictable and could no longer be determined by the pressure exerted on him 
by the others. Because of this, even the act of holding him responsible was no 
longer effective as a behavioral constraint. Gage’s mind could no longer be 
influenced towards the group’s expectations, but was influenced by forces that 
led his behavior to disagree with those expectations and disagree in a way that 
was unpredictable or could not be corrected by ordinary moral pressures, 
including that of responsibility. Moreover, he lacked the capacity to feel guilt for 
not acting in accordance with the social influences he was exposed to. His 
personhood was impaired. 
IN CONCLUSION 
The objective of this text was to present the outline of a naturalized view of the 
notion of responsibility, such that the latter could be understood in terms of 
natural and immanent causality, that is, without the assumption of a causality by 
freedom. From the point of view of a critical naturalism, as I defined it, 
responsibility can be explained based on the disposition of the agent to be 
appropriately influenced, that is, influenced according to the mutual demands 
that can be made from them by members of society and that in turn are guided 
by reasonable moral principles. That reasonability, considering also the 
naturalist perspective, is aligned with the principles and preferences that favor 
cooperation and that constituted an evolutionary advantage for our species. It 
makes sense to hold individuals responsible if they are susceptible to the social 
influences, amongst which precisely is the act of holding a person responsible, 
whose anticipation should, by means of guilt and as expected by the other 
members of the social group, influence the decisions of an individual towards 
aligning them with the prevailing norms, whether contained in statutes or not. 
 2 
LIBERAL NATURALISM, ORDINARY THINGS AND THE 
IMPORTANCE OF SECOND-PERSONAL SPACE 
DAVID MACARTHUR 
Philosophers constantly see the method of science before 
their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer 
questions in the way science does. This tendency is the 
real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher 
into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can 
never be our job to reduce anything to anything… 
– Wittgenstein  
Liberal naturalism is a novel philosophical platform from which to think about 
the conceptual space occupied by the philosophically neglected realm of non-
scientific non-supernatural items: that is, natural things the understanding of 
which goes beyond the causal or causal-functional explanations made available 
by the sciences. Examples of such items include people (understood as rational 
agents), action (in the Anscombian sense of something done under a 
description), art (understood as having intentional content), reasons (understood 
as irreducible conceptually normative items), human history (understood as the 
history of human action), ordinary objects and much else. A liberal naturalist can 
readily admit the reality of such natural non-scientific things. These are among 
its “ontological commitments” in a deflationary sense of that expression not 
beholden to any metaphysical theory or Ontology. A key feature of the things 
within this category is that they admit of, or require, non-scientific forms of 
understanding. That they are not fully explicable in scientific terms is the reason 
I speak of them as “non-scientific” – which, of course, is not to deny that they 
are susceptible to various forms of scientific inquiry.  
A large part of the motivation for this new kind of naturalism is in order to 
overcome the placement problem that afflicts scientific naturalism; or, rather, 
those versions of scientific naturalism that cleave closely to the world of physics 
or, slightly less drastically, the image of the world posited by the natural 
sciences collectively (including physics, chemistry, and biology). Given the 
dominance of scientific naturalism in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy 
the shift to liberal naturalism would have a significant bearing on how 
philosophy in this tradition is conceived and practiced.  
On a standard version of the placement problem one starts with an 
exclusively scientific image of the world – more or less expansive versions of 
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which are possible – and a mismatch between this image and the manifest image 
of the world as it is recognized in ordinary thought, talk and experience. The 
standard naturalist supposes that only the scientific image (often thought of as 
“the physical facts”) issues in unproblematic ontological commitments. One then 
asks how various things in the manifest image that we are pre-theoretically 
committed to and which seem, prima facie, distinct from the scientific image are 
to be understood. Is our commitment to moral values, say, to be reduced to 
scientific items or regarded as a metaphysical ‘error’ (as Mackie put it); or are 
we to interpret our talk of moral values in non-representational terms, serving 
some other function in our lives than describing a region of reality (understood, 
recall, as the physical facts). This is what I am calling the placement problem. 
Liberal naturalism overcomes the placement problem, so understood, by 
acknowledging, as a starting point at least, all the things that figure in the manifest 
image. So, for example, it draws attention to things that the practice of doing 
scientific research itself takes for granted: that there are people called scientists 
working in laboratories, whose results – published in books, journals, and on-line 
– are assessed in terms of the value of objectivity, and who contribute to public 
institutions such as universities. A liberal naturalist perspective on the activity of 
science itself will have to admit people, laboratories, books, journals, computers, 
the internet, rational values and institutions, amongst other things that do not 
figure in scientific explanations themselves. 
But another placement problem might seem to be pressing at this point, one 
that threatens to undermine the impact of the liberal naturalist response to the 
traditional placement problem. Call this new placement problem the relation 
problem. We can put it this way: how do people, values and institutions and so 
on ‘fit with’ the scientific image of the world? The placement problem is one of 
fitting into but the relation problem is one of fitting with: it is not a matter of 
having to find a place for these things (say, moral values) within the scientific 
image of the world but of finding a place for them in relation to it.  
The relation problem depends on supposing that the legitimacy of any non-
scientific item (i.e. any item that does not figure in the scientific image) can only 
be earned by showing how it can be integrated into a synthetic account of things 
which includes the scientific image and the relevant non-scientific items. Thus 
many philosophers do not feel the liberal naturalism of John McDowell has 
progressed the debate very far when he argues in Mind and World that the 
intelligibility of reasons is sui generis with respect to scientific intelligibility. 
McDowell does not restrict his account of nature to the scientific image so he 
does not face the usual placement problems of a scientific naturalist with regard 
to the irreducibly normative reasons that are his primary concern. Reasons and 
their relations to one another are part of nature on his conception of it. 
McDowell explains that through a normal human upbringing (“Bildung”) we 
become aware of the reasons there are for judgments of various kinds and that 
that is all that needs to be said to assuage anxieties that might otherwise arise 
concerning what he calls “rampant Platonism”.  
But even sympathetic critics have felt this “naturalized Platonist” position is 
unsatisfactory. For let us suppose we accept his liberal naturalist expansion of 
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nature to include non-scientific items such as reasons this still leaves them 
looking mysterious, so the thought goes, unless and until we can provide an 
account of how they relate to the scientific image. This is what I am calling the 
relation problem.  
The present paper aims to argue that the relation problem is misconceived. A 
liberal naturalist has the resources to show that the problem is based on a false 
prioritizing of the scientific image, as if only scientific entities are real in some 
basic or underived way. The right thought is not that the natural world requires 
legitimation by being suitably related to the scientific image, as scientific 
naturalists would have it, but that the scientific image is an abstraction from a 
natural world which transcends it in so far as it also includes natural non-
scientific items. This is not to say that specific questions cannot be raised about 
the relation of any given item to the scientific image but it does mean that the 
legitimacy of recognizing natural non-scientific items in general does not 
depend upon showing how they are caused, or constituted by, or otherwise 
dependent upon, aspects of the scientific image. Science is an abstraction from 
the ordinary world of our experience that has deeper roots in our worldview than 
any particular version of the scientific image.  
I shall focus the discussion on ordinary artifacts which we observe and 
interact with every day. The choice of these items is strategic in that they are the 
least amenable to serious science. I shall consider the general question of the 
metaphysical legitimation of these objects in terms of the scientific image – a 
program which takes the relation problem seriously – in a recent paper of one of 
the more enlightened metaphysicians writing today, Lynne Baker, who is also a 
staunch critic of scientific naturalism. My aim will be to show that in demanding 
that ordinary objects be metaphysically legitimated in terms of the scientific 
image she makes a fatal concession to scientific naturalist orthodoxy. 
THE METAPHYSICAL THREAT TO ORDINARY OBJECTS 
Let us begin by considering chairs, such as my orange leather-bound Eames 
armchair, which will serve as a representative example of the ordinary things in 
the ordinary world of our experience. By ordinary things I primarily intend 
artifacts, items about which no one expects there to be any serious scientific 
findings (especially if we are thinking in terms of the discovery of causal laws). 
What I say could be extended to stones, trees, clouds, stars, animals and human 
beings in so far as there are intersubjective non-scientific criteria for the 
deployment of these concepts. Again, this is not to say these things are not 
amenable to scientific study; but it does imply that such science will not be 
conducted in terms of these concepts in their everyday connotation. But I shall 
leave these more complicated cases aside in the present context. 
We can investigate chairs from the point of view of many and various 
sciences. We can study their physical and chemical composition, their economic 
value, their ergonomic indices, their social or cultural functions and so on. But 
none of these studies are required for us to admit the obvious fact that there are 
chairs. That there are chairs is attested to by the fact that we, ordinary masters of 
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the English language, correctly apply the concept of a chair to, well, those things 
that we recognize as chairs. That is to say the reality of chairs is manifest in our 
mutual recognition of certain pieces of furniture as chairs. And, importantly, 
nothing more is required for our acceptance of the reality of chairs than that. 
Barring exceptional cases – Is Daniel Burset’s monumental artwork “Broken 
Chair” a chair? – we operate smoothly with the practice of using the term 
“chair” to pick out and make true statements about chairs, not to mention other 
kinds of utterance.  
Contemporary metaphysicians see things otherwise. Most have something 
called an “ontology” and tend to give priority to an exclusively scientific version 
of it, scientific naturalists being the most conspicuous example of this trend. 
Such philosophers draw an invidious contrast between reality and appearance: 
that is, between an ontologically privileged category of things exhaustive of 
reality (e.g. the items recognized by physics) and a class of things, including 
ordinary objects like chairs, whose reality is thus called into question – since 
they do not figure, under their ordinary concepts at least, within the privileged 
class. For present purposes it does not much matter whether the metaphysician is 
an eliminativist about chairs or one who vindicates the reality of chairs by 
showing how they are reducible to, or irreducibly constituted by, the 
metaphysically privileged items.  
The important point is that all metaphysical accounts share the basic 
methodological assumption that the reality of chairs requires some 
metaphysical legitimation, which may or may not be forthcoming. For 
example, Lynne Baker remarks, 
We need a metaphysics of ordinary things to explain the epistemological point 
[that “we engage in practices which involve the re-identifying of objects over 
time”] and to secure the rationality of practices requiring re-identification… The 
basic reason to pursue a metaphysics of ordinary things is that appeal to ordinary 
things is needed for a coherent and comprehensive metaphysics that secures the 
rationality of our practices and attitudes towards the things we encounter. 
[italics added] 
Let us acknowledge that unlike reductionists and eliminativists Baker laudibly 
accepts the irreducible reality of chairs and other common objects. But the 
present concern is one of metaphysical legitimation. According to Baker we 
need to accept the reality of ordinary things like chairs to give our metaphysics a 
coherence and comprehensiveness it would otherwise lack. At the same time, it 
is our metaphysics alone that can secure the rationality of our practices 
concerning the re-identification of ordinary things, including our thought and 
talk about chairs.  
We can, if we wish, accept the first of these conjuncts but certainly ought to 
reject the second. If we are in the business of constructing a metaphysics – and I 
do not say we should be – then there is undoubted value in recognizing the 
reality of ordinary things in so far as metaphysics aspires to being a 
comprehensive account of everything there is. But the reality of ordinary things 
and the rationality of our practices of thinking and talking of them in no way 
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depends upon the support of metaphysical theory. Indeed, the direction of support 
runs entirely the other way. As Baker herself says, whatever coherence a 
metaphysics has depends on recognizing ordinary things that are taken for granted 
by our everyday thought and talk. The truism that there are chairs, which is readily 
attested to by all (or at least those of sound mind untainted by philosophy), in no 
way stands in need of legitimation or vindication from metaphysics – one 
dependent on the relation of ordinary things to the scientific image. As we will 
see, to suppose it does so depend – and so, to take the relation problem at face 
value – lands the reality of ordinary things in a great deal of trouble. 
In any case naturalists, both scientific and liberal, ought to agree with 
Quine’s claim that there is no first philosophy. It is simply no longer credible 
that we have available to us the imagined a priori standpoint of traditional 
metaphysics and epistemology from which to assess, from some supposed 
superior plane, the knowability of our claims and the genuineness of the realities 
that they speak of. Naturalism is incompatible with the pretensions of traditional 
metaphysics. So a naturalist has no reason to accept without further argument 
the assumption of traditional metaphysical theorizing that the reality of things in 
general stands in need of metaphysical vindication. Consequently, a 
contemporary metaphysician must demonstrate the need for metaphysical 
vindication and not take it for granted.  
How do we recognize the reality of chairs then? As Wittgenstein says in a 
related context: “One answer would be: ‘I have learnt English’.” That may 
sound like a comically dismissive response. I shall now attempt to explain how it 
is not that.  
THE COMMUNICATIVE BACKGROUND OF SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE  
Let us begin with the supposed clash of the scientific and manifest images. For 
convenience I shall simply call this the clash. To think the clash exists and that it 
creates a pressing problem for us involves a number of questionable 
presuppositions. One is that the only successful sciences whose ontological 
commitments one is taking seriously are the natural sciences since otherwise, if 
one considers the ontological commitments of all the natural and social sciences 
then the gap between scientific and manifest images narrows considerably and 
threatens to disappear. While there may be no science of chairs, they would 
presumably be recognized in anthropology, sociology and economics, amongst 
other human sciences. Secondly, even if we do restrict our attention to the 
scientific image of the natural sciences, to suppose the clash is real is to suppose 
that the scientific image is constituted by only the explicit objects of scientific 
inquiry. This is to entirely overlook the objects (etc.) that are implicit or 
presupposed in the activity of doing science itself. And the aspect of this activity 
I would like to focus on is communication with other scientists since science is a 
collaborative activity on anyone’s reckoning. 
The scientist communicates with other scientists in what I shall call second-
personal space. This is the familiar communicative realm of I-thou relationships 
that we are inculcated into when we learn a language and in which we address 
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each other with various linguistic utterances, demanding mutual 
acknowledgement of the normative import of what we say in addressing others 
and in being addressed by others in turn. Both the utterances and the concepts 
they deploy are normative items whose recognition and deployment as such 
occurs in the ordinary realm of mutual recognition made available in second-
personal space. It is within this realm that all concepts must have a use, if they 
are to play any role in human knowledge and communication.  
When McDowell distinguishes “natural-scientific intelligibility” from “the 
intelligibility something acquires when we situate it in the logical space of 
reasons” one of his important points is that scientific intelligibility prescinds 
from conceptually normative relations which have their home in what he calls 
“the logical space of reasons” but which I prefer to call second-personal space. 
The embeddedness of scientific intelligibility in rational intelligibility is evident 
when we consider that a scientist is in the business of providing reasons to prefer 
one form of causal or causal-functional explanation of some phenomena to 
another (i.e. one form of scientific intelligibility over others).  
Several forms of conceptual normativity are involved in communicative 
activity. One is that speech acts are “performances constitutive of changes in 
normative status among various members of a discursive community”. For 
instance, to assert that P is to commit to the truth of P and, often, to give one’s 
word to others that P, making oneself responsible for the correctness of P and 
entitling others to criticize one if one is not. Another is that their use is 
assessable in terms of standards for correctness that we deploy in second-
personal space. For a concept to be correctly employed in a judgment is to be 
recognized as a reasonable employment of it under the circumstances by native 
speakers of the language. Like other concepts, being a chair admits of 
indefinitely many different occasion-sensitive understandings which we expect 
one another to normally be able to comprehend and track based on the most 
reasonable understanding of a speaker on a certain occasion of, say, making a 
judgment. Perhaps, under certain circumstances (e.g. for drinking a coffee on the 
balcony), an upside down milk crate counts as a chair. For different 
circumstances (e.g. people are coming over for dinner), not. As Wittgenstein 
reminds us, “agreement in judgment… is part of communication”.  
Broadly speaking, science is an objective study of the causal structures of the 
world, say, of its general causal laws and local causal patterns and of the data of 
the coincidence of various features of the world that is the raw material for 
causal hypotheses. Being an objective study means the scientist is committed to 
only accepting data and results that conform to certain impersonal standards of 
identifiability and verification. The 3rd-p point of view of science puts certain 
limits on the concepts he is entitled to employ in his inquiries. As we know from 
the history of modern science the abstract mathematical description of nature 
and its development yielded enormous leaps forward in providing fruitful causal 
explanations of physical phenomena. It also seems clear that everyday language 
is run through with intentional and normative idioms that do not meet scientific 
standards of (re-)identifiability. Consequently, the acknowledgement of, and 
responsiveness to, the normative dimension of concept instantiation and the 
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normative pragmatics of speech acts belong to second-personal space, not the 
realm of scientific intelligibility. 
Whether something is correctly described as a chair depends on the 
designer’s intentions and the way we – or at least grown up people in modern 
industrial societies – normally use it to sit on, as well as its suitability for such 
use. The involvement of particular intentions, interests and goals in the 
identification and re-identification of artifacts like chairs makes them unfit for 
natural scientific inquiry whilst putting severe constraints on social scientific 
inquiry. Since being a chair is largely a matter of an everyday function then 
there is no deeper structure in the causal orders of the sciences to investigate. As 
Chomsky says, referring exclusively to the program of natural science, 
It is hard to imagine how [“common-sense concepts”] could be fit concepts for 
theoretical study of things, events, and processes in the natural world.  
On Chomsky’s view chairs are not fit objects of naturalistic inquiry, on a 
restricted conception of that. But the natural scientist clearly accepts in his 
everyday life, and in conducting his scientific research, the reality of chairs and 
other common-sense objects even if they are not fit objects of his kind of 
inquiry. The identity conditions of everyday objects are looser and more interest 
relative than science would permit. Moreover, they differ from the identity 
conditions of the arrangements of the atoms of which they are composed since, 
e.g., the same chair will lose or gain atoms as it is knocked or painted or, in time, 
loses some of its parts e.g. rubber stops on the bottoms of its legs.  
Another important theme of McDowell’s distinction between natural-
scientific intelligibility and rational intelligibility is that scientific intelligibility 
is an abstraction from a form of intelligibility that includes our everyday 
perceptual encounter with ordinary things such as chairs. In order for there to be 
a language at all we must share a common intersubjectively available world. In 
order for that to be so we must be in a position to identify and re-identify 
ordinary objects such as chairs by way of recognitional abilities operating on 
what we are presented with in perceptual experience. As Wittgenstein remarks, 
“Every language game is based on words 'and objects' being recognized again.” 
The important conclusion we can draw from these considerations is that we 
should not say the natural scientist denies the reality of chairs and the ordinary 
criteria by which we identify them. How could he since he, too, is engaged in 
human communication? What we should say is that he abstracts away from this 
reality in order to do his work just as Descartes abstracted away from, without 
denying, beliefs that were, although not absolutely certain, more reasonable than 
not for the purposes of his special inquiry.  
We are entitled to suppose, therefore, that scientists are inevitably committed 
to the ordinary observable world that finds expression in our shared language. 
This is a world the includes middle-sized dry goods such as chairs. Furthermore, 
scientists constantly engage with chairs in carrying out the business of science. 
The scientist sits on them to write his reports for example. And in order to do 
that he must normally be able to visually recognize them. To think that there are 
chairs is, to borrow a phrase of Hilary Putnam, one of myriad “ways of thinking 
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that are indispensable in everyday life”. This does not mean they could not 
possibly be dispensed with in our worldview. What it means is that to dispense 
with them would alter our lives beyond recognition. We would have to try to 
make sense of their never having been chairs through some science fiction 
scenario involving global hallucination for an indefinitely long time. One such 
scenario is this: we might somehow discover that oxygen, apart from being life-
sustaining is also a powerful hallucinogen. But, of course, in that bizarre 
counterfactual case there would be a very great deal about the world we would 
then have been wrong about. We are inclined to say that that is just too far-
fetched to take seriously. 
This is not the kind of revision that metaphysicians, who would eliminate or 
ontologically reduce chairs, have in mind. They typically retain the concept of 
“chair” and do not suppose we need interfere with its everyday operation. The 
common strategy is to accept the truth of the sentence “There are chairs” whilst 
changing the accepted understanding of what it says. For example, they might 
say that the term “chair” really refers to a certain spatiotemporal worm or the 
sentence as a whole is reinterpreted as meaning that certain atoms are arranged 
chair-wise. Metaphysically motivated paraphrasings retain everyday truths 
involving the term “chair”, therefore, whilst being wildly at variance with our 
ordinary understanding of chairs. This shows up in qualifications that attach to 
the truth of their being chairs, for example, “Well, we rightly say there are chairs 
but really there are none over and above a certain arrangement of atoms”, (etc.). 
But it is important to see that in order that they correctly identify the 
metaphysically privileged items here they must employ the ordinary concept 
(hence the ordinary criteria) of a chair! The term “chairwise” would make no 
sense unless we understood what chairs are! 
Even Baker, who works hard to overcome the clash by defending everyday 
truths about chairs and what she calls their “face-value reading”, runs into 
problems with ordinary understanding. All metaphysicians consider everyday 
objects groundless without metaphysical support; but this is no part of our 
ordinary understanding. Why, then, should we take it seriously? The source of 
the trouble is that metaphysicians take seriously the relation problem. They 
suppose, with Baker, that the only way of vindicating ordinary thought and talk 
about chairs is in terms of a metaphysical theory that shows how chairs are 
reducible to, or constituted by, the physical facts (perhaps reinterpreted in terms 
of some favoured metaphysical apparatus e.g. mereology, time-slices).  
But once one supposes that ordinary thought and talk requires metaphysical 
guarantees then ordinary thought and talk is rendered groundless, even by those 
like Baker who mean to defend it. As Kant says in the preface to the Critique of 
Pure Reason, the history of metaphysics – and here one must surely include 
Kant’s own critical metaphysics – is “a battlefield of… endless controversies”. 
So we know from the history of philosophy that metaphysical theory is 
particularly ill-equipped to provide legitimation for anything given that it is, 
notoriously, a site of irresolvable disagreements. If we want to defend ordinary 
thought and talk the best strategy is to deny that it requires any (metaphysical) 
legitimation.  
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The best way to see this is to recognize the dependency of our philosophical 
and scientific inquiries on the realm of ordinary intelligibility. As we have seen, 
it is important to note that scientific study of something is an abstraction from 
what philosophers sometimes call “the life-world”, which in the terms we have 
already introduced is the ordinary world made available to us in second-personal 
space. For example, whilst he may not include his measuring equipment – the 
deflecting needles, LED displays, computer generated images, (etc.) – in his 
study it plays a key role in arriving at scientific results. Chairs are simply part of 
the presupposed world of scientific endeavour from which the scientific image is 
an intellectual abstraction. Wittgenstein writes, 
In giving explanations, I already have to use language full-blown (not some sort 
of preparatory, provisional one)… 
Yes, but then how can these observations satisfy us? – Well, your very questions 
were framed in this language; they had to be expressed in this language, if there 
was anything to ask! 
Scientists and metaphysicians both have no alternative but to rely on “full-
blown” ordinary language to raise their questions and communicate their results. 
But to use ordinary language “full-blown” means to accept the intersubjective 
world that it makes available to us. It is not abstracted “semantics” but the 
pragmatics of ordinary speech acts that makes explicit the features of the taken-
for-granted ordinary life-world.  
Philosophers of a metaphysical bent will sometimes cast aspersions on the 
reality of common-sense things such as chairs by analogy with witches or 
phlogiston. In medieval Europe it was common to suppose there were witches 
and yet modern science has shown this to be mistaken. There are none. Why 
couldn’t science similarly show that there are no chairs? But the cases are not at 
all analogous. Witches are women who are supposed to have supernatural 
powers (like flying unaided, causing magical transformations, consorting with 
supernatural beings etc.). Science has provided us the resources to reject 
supernatural entities and powers in favour of naturalistic explanations of natural 
phenomena. Chairs, of course, are not credited with supernatural powers so they 
are not subject to a similar debunking.  
The phlogiston analogy is no better. The phlogiston theory, which posited 
unobservable combustion molecules that were supposed to be used up in 
combustion, was discovered to conflict with experimental evidence e.g. metals 
such as magnesium tended to gain, not lose, mass when they burned. The 
observable phenomenon of fire and other forms of combustion is better 
explained in terms of oxidation. But chairs are not, pace Quine, theoretical 
posits hypothesized to explain various observable phenomena. They are part of 
the observable phenomena, not something we have to infer from evidence. We 
are immediately aware of chairs through sight and touch, not to mention the 
sound they make when pushed along a hard floor.  
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THE DISPENSABILITY OF METAPHYSICS 
Some argue that metaphysics itself is indispensable and so, since we are all 
metaphysicians whether we like it or not, the best we can do it to work out 
metaphysical principles that cohere as well as possible with our first-order 
claims, for instance, by appeal to the method of reflective equilibrium. Perhaps 
that is how Baker sees things. But while I accept the naturalness of metaphysical 
questioning and reflection I see no reason to think that the only, or the best, way 
of pursuing such reflections is to engage in constructive metaphysics. For 
philosophers to speak of ordinary people as having a “folk ontology”, as many 
are inclined to do, is an unargued prejudice, since it assumes without reason that 
ordinary folk are, just as such, already engaged in constructive metaphysics.  
To say that ordinary practice presupposes an engagement with ontology is 
ambiguous. Taken in one way it is false; in another trivial. The relevant 
distinction is between doing or having an Ontology (with a capital “O”) from 
some (a priori) metaphysical standpoint and having ontological commitments in 
the course of our daily engagement with the environment. To constructively 
engage in the program of Ontology with a capital “O”, to aim to develop a 
comprehensive theory of Being a priori, is not an inevitable consequence of 
reflecting on the ordinary world. There is no requirement that we attempt to 
answer the question “What are all the things that exist?” for example. Indeed 
without a specific context of inquiry this question makes no more sense than 
“What are all the things that are true?”. In neither case are we given any 
principle to use to count things nor are we provided any indication of how to 
understand the unbounded term “all”. It matters not that metaphysicians attempt 
to respond to these problems. What they must show is that we are all required to 
take them seriously.  
At one point Baker attempts to show that ordinary practice is committed to 
Ontological theorizing by claiming that we, in our ordinarily lives, are 
committed to the irrational view that “ordinary objects [such as tables] are really 
just sums of particles” (23, italics added); and that, without metaphysical 
support, this is an unstable position that threatens the rationality of our practices. 
But the woman in the street, let us say, need be credited with no such 
metaphysical position. And if someone is so incautious as to say that, for 
example, Rodin’s “The Thinker” is really just a lump of bronze they can be 
reminded that composition is not identity with the aid of some simple thought-
experiments (e.g. would losing a flake of metal from the base really destroy the 
sculpture?). Ontology is an otiose project from the point of view of the 
rationality of ordinary and scientific forms of intelligibility. 
Our everyday lives do not involve any implicit commitment to a “folk 
ontology” if that means, to borrow a phrase of Baker’s, “[a] complete inventory 
of what exists” (6). What our lives do commit us to is occasion-sensitive 
ontological commitments. Talk of occasion-sensitivity is appropriate for several 
reasons: 1) as we have seen, we need not engage with the problematic 
philosophical question of a complete inventory of things; also, 2), as Putnam has 
LIBERAL NATURALISM 
 29
taught us, there are different empirically equivalent ways of counting objects in 
certain theoretical contexts – a doctrine he called conceptual relativity; and 3) 
we may, or may not, decide to withhold ontological commitment in certain 
areas, not sure what to say, for example, if we are asked an ontological question 
like “Are there numbers?”  
But with regard to our primary topic of everyday artifacts, we show in our 
thought, talk and actions that we accept such things as making up at least a part 
of the world. As Wittgenstein says, 
My life shews that I know or am certain that there is a chair 
over there, or a door, and so on. – I tell a friend e.g. "Take that 
chair over there", "Shut the door", etc. etc. 
The reality of chairs is manifest in our lives. They are indispensable to our lives 
as we know them. This is not to say that it is impossible that we are wrong about 
there being chairs. It’s just that it would take an unforeseeable and massive 
alteration in our view of things to make it remotely credible. So much so, in fact, 
that it is hard to imagine a future in which it would not be more reasonable to 
accept the present and past reality of chairs no matter what happens.  
Liberal naturalism makes available the realm of second-personal space for 
unprejudiced philosophical study. It is in second-personal space that we address 
each other and draw each other’s attention to the same recognizable items in our 
environment thereby establishing, through mutual acknowledgement, an 
intersubjective world together – not that we create the world but, rather, that we 
identify worldly things in terms of ordinary criteria for concepts of everyday 
objects that native language speakers know how to deploy. Communication 
depends on our being able to rely on our normal capacity to be able to recognize 
speech acts and the speakers who produce them by way of perception. It also 
depends on our being able to identify and track individual objects and artifacts 
by appeal to ordinary criteria of identification and re-identification. The reality 
of ordinary things is thus a precondition of both scientific and metaphysical 
inquiry and does not await their discoveries. 
 3 
THE POVERTY OF ANALYSIS1 
DAVID PAPINEAU 
INTRODUCTION 
Many different ideas parade under the banner of philosophical naturalism. One 
is a thesis about philosophical method. Philosophy investigates reality in the 
same way as science. Its methods are akin to scientific methods, and the 
knowledge it yields is akin to scientific knowledge. This ‘methodological 
naturalism’ is to be distinguished from ‘ontological naturalism’ understood as a 
general view about the contents of reality. Ontological naturalism maintains that 
reality involves nothing more than the entities studied in the natural sciences and 
contains no supernatural or transcendent realm. While both ontological and 
methodological naturalism claim a species of affinity between philosophy and 
science, the two doctrines are largely independent.  
Part of the task in understanding these matters is to bring definition to this 
pair of naturalist doctrines. A surprisingly wide range of philosophers wish to style 
themselves as naturalists, and by no means all understand either the 
methodological or ontological commitments of naturalism in the same way. My 
focus in this paper will be on methodological naturalism. I shall aim to refine and 
defend methodological naturalism as a thesis about philosophical method. The 
ontological dimension of naturalism will not feature in what follows. 
Methodological naturalism asserts that philosophical investigation is like 
scientific investigation. Clearly more needs to be said before we can subject this 
claim to serious assessment. Nobody can doubt that the two enterprises are 
similar in some respects (both aim for precision and truth, say) and different in 
other respects (philosophers don’t use particle accelerators). If methodological 
naturalism is to have any significant content, it needs to be specified in what 
respects philosophical and scientific methods are supposed to be alike. 
I am going to argue that philosophy is like science in three interesting and 
non-obvious ways. First, the claims made by philosophy are synthetic not 
analytic: philosophical claims, just like scientific claims, are not guaranteed by 
the structure of the concepts they involve. Second, philosophical knowledge is a 
posteriori not a priori: the claims established by philosophers depend on the 
same kind of empirical support as scientific theories. And finally, to complete 
the traditional trio, the central questions of philosophy concern actuality rather 
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than necessity: philosophy is primarily aimed at understanding the actual world 
studied by science, not some further realm of metaphysical modality. 
I do not intend these claims in a revisionary spirit. I am not recommending 
that philosophers start doing something different. Here I diverge from other 
philosophers in the methodologically naturalist camp who take their position to 
require a shift in philosophical method—philosophers should get out of their 
armchairs and become more involved with active scientific research. This is not 
my view. When I say that philosophical investigation is akin to scientific 
investigation, I am not urging philosophers to change their ways. I think that 
most philosophy is just fine as it is, including philosophy that sticks to 
traditional methods of abstract theorizing, argument, and reflection on possible 
cases. My aim is to show that philosophy of this kind is already akin to science, 
not that it needs reforming in order to become so. 
In what follows I shall avoid offering any positive characterization of 
philosophy, and in particular of what makes it different from science. For what it 
is worth, I do have some views about this. If pressed, I would say that 
philosophy is characteristically concerned with theoretical tangles. It deals with 
issues where deep-seated assumptions pull us in opposite directions and it is 
difficult to see how to resolve the tension. Because of this, the gathering of new 
empirical data is often (though by no means always) of no help in resolving 
philosophical problems. The characteristic philosophical predicament is that we 
have all the data we could want, but still cannot see how to resolve our 
theoretical problems.  
Still, as I said, I am not going to commit myself to any positive 
characterization of philosophy. My argument does not need one. My intended 
subject matter is philosophy as it actually is, not a hypothetical philosophy that 
fits some set of prior specifications. Of course, this sociological dimension 
means that my claims are strictly speaking hostage to the activities of any 
philosophical eccentrics or extremists who deviate from my account of 
philosophical practice. But I hope that readers will understand my claims 
sympathetically in this respect. I don’t want to show that everybody who has 
ever called themselves a ‘philosopher’ vindicates my claims about the nature of 
philosophy. It will be quite enough if I can establish my theses for those kinds of 
philosophy that most of you regard as mainstream.  
Before proceeding, I need to qualify my claims in another respect. They do 
not apply equally straightforwardly to all philosophical subject matters. The 
areas that fit my claims best are the ‘theoretical’ branches of philosophy, 
including metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and 
epistemology. Things become more complicated when we are dealing with areas 
of philosophy that trade in normative claims, or mathematical claims, or logical 
or modal claims. Part of the difficulty here is that the contents of these claims 
are themselves matters of philosophical debate, and so any attempt to show that 
they fit my theses about the nature of philosophy will itself become embroiled in 
these debates. As it happens, I think that most of the spirit of my theses about the 
nature of philosophy applies to these claims too, give or take a bit. But to show 
this would require far more space than I have available here. For present 
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purposes it will be enough if I can show that my theses apply to the more easily 
interpretable claims of theoretical philosophy. 
In what follows, I shall devote most of my attention to my first thesis. The 
next four sections will be about the synthetic nature of philosophical claims. 
After that, I shall devote my final two sections to the issues of a posterioricity 
and modality.  
THEORIES AND CONCEPTS I 
It might seem that my account of philosophy falls at the first hurdle, at least 
in so far as it is intended as non-revisionary. What about the many philosophers 
who proclaim themselves to be concerned with the analysis or explication of 
concepts? A wide and varied range of contemporary philosophers describe their 
own philosophical practice as in large part concerned with the elaboration of 
conceptual truths. Does this not immediately belie my first thesis that philosophy 
as it is currently practised deals with synthetic rather than analytic claims? 
I say that that these philosophers misdescribe their own practice. They may claim 
that they are concerned with conceptual truths, but they are wrong. When we look 
more carefully at what they actually do, we can see that they are in fact concerned 
with synthetic and not analytic matters. Indeed their claims about their practice are 
not even supported by everything they say they do. I shall show that when these 
philosophers go on to fill out their account of philosophy, their own characterization 
of their practice is perfectly consistent with my first thesis.  
Anybody who thinks that there are conceptual truths to be uncovered must 
suppose that the relevant concepts have some kind of structure. They must be 
constitutively linked to other concepts in such a way as to place constraints on 
their proper application. The idea is then that this structure can be uncovered by 
reflection and analysis, perhaps including reflection on what we would say about 
a range of possible cases. 
An initial question to ask about this kind of putative conceptual structure is 
how it relates to theories involving the relevant concepts. By ‘theories’ I mean 
sets of claims with synthetic consequences. A simple theory of pain in this sense 
would be constituted by the two claims that (a) bodily damage typically causes 
pains and (b) pains typically cause attempts to avoid further damage. For note 
that together these two claims have the manifestly synthetic consequence that 
bodily damage typically causes attempts to avoid further damage. We can take it 
that everyday thought endorses theories like this about a wide range of 
philosophically interesting topics, including not only mental kinds like pain, but 
also such categories as persons, free will, knowledge, names, and so on—after 
all, this is simply to assume that everyday thought includes various synthetic 
assumptions about these kinds. 
It is widely supposed that there is a close connection between everyday 
concepts and everyday theories. But there are different views about the nature of 
this connection. In this section and the next I shall distinguish ‘verificationist’ 
from ‘descriptivist’ accounts of the connection between concepts and theories. 
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As we shall see, neither account lends any support to the thesis that philosophy 
is centrally concerned with analytic truths. 
Let me start with the verificationist account. This assumes that possessing a 
concept is a matter of being disposed to use that concept in a certain way. In 
particular, it is a matter of applying the concept in response to perceptual 
experiences and other judgements, and of drawing further inferences in turn 
from judgements involving the concept.  
Given this account of concepts, which concepts a thinker possesses will 
depend on what theories that thinker accepts. This is because accepting a theory 
affects your dispositions to apply the concepts it involves. For example, if you 
accept the phlogiston theory of chemistry, then you will hold that burning causes 
air to become saturated with phlogiston, that dephlogisticated air is easily 
breathable, and so on. Similarly, if you accept the baby theory of pain offered 
above, then you will be disposed to hold that those with bodily damage are in 
pain, and that those who are in pain will engage in avoidance behaviour. From 
the verificationist perspective, then, your commitment to these theories 
determines your concepts phlogiston and pain. Since the theories affect your 
dispositions to apply the concepts, they determine your concepts themselves. 
Now, one issue which arises at this point is how much of accepted theory is 
supposed to make such a constitutive contribution to concepts? Do all accepted 
assumptions make a difference, or only some distinguished subset—and if the 
latter, what distinguishes this subset? However, we can by-pass these familiar 
questions here. The points I now want to make are quite orthogonal to this issue. 
They will apply to any view that takes the acceptance of sets of synthetic claims to 
affect concepts, however those claims might be identified. 
A more basic issue is whether it makes sense to suppose that the mere 
possession of a concept can require a thinker to embrace synthetic commitments. 
Some of you may suspect that there must be something amiss with an account of 
concepts which implies this. However, not all philosophers share this worry. 
Robert Brandom, for instance, does not. He is insistent that concept possession 
incurs synthetic commitments. For example, after discussing Michael Dummett’s 
example of the concept Boche, Brandon says that this  
‘... shows how concepts can be criticized on the basis of substantive beliefs. If 
one does not believe that the inference from German nationality to cruelty is a 
good one, then one must eschew the concept Boche’ (Brandom 1994, p 126). 
Again, a page later, he explains 
‘The concept temperature was introduced with certain criteria or circumstances 
of appropriate application and with certain consequences of application.... The 
proper question to ask in evaluating the introduction and evolution of a concept 
is... whether the inference embodied... is one that ought to be endorsed’ 
(Brandom 1994, p 127). 
This account of concepts plays an important part in Brandom’s understanding of 
the philosophical enterprise. Brandon takes philosophy to be centrally concerned 
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with the explication of concepts. But for Brandom this is not a merely 
descriptive enterprise. Since concepts carry synthetic commitments, it is possible 
to criticize concepts on the grounds that these commitments are unwarranted. 
Brandom is quite explicit about this: 
‘I see the point of explicating concepts rather to be opening them up to 
rational criticism... Defective concepts distort our thought and constrain us by 
limiting the propositions and plans we can entertain... Philosophy, in developing 
and applying tools for the rational criticism 
of concepts, seeks to free us from these fetters, by bringing the distorting influences 
out into the light of conscious day, exposing the commitments implicit in our 
concepts as vulnerable to rational challenge and debate’ (Brandom 2001, p 77). 
The notion that concepts have synthetic implications and are therefore open to 
criticism is not peculiar to Brandom. It is a commonplace of much discussion of 
the role of concepts in philosophy. Thus in a recent discussion of philosophical 
intuitions Alvin Goldman asserts that  
‘A concept that embeds a bad theory is of dubious worth’ (Goldman 2007, p 22). 
Again, to take just one further example, in a recent paper on moral concepts we 
find Richard Joyce arguing that 
‘Sometimes discoveries lead us to decide that a concept (e.g., phlogiston or 
witch) is hopeless; sometimes we prefer to revise the concept, extirpate the 
problematic element, and carry on much as before’ (Joyce 2006, p 142). 
I alluded a moment ago to the oddity of a view of concepts on which the mere 
possession of a concept can incur synthetic commitments. In fact there are 
further aspects of the verificationist approach that should make us even more 
suspicious of its account of concepts. For a start, verificationism implies that 
theoretical change inevitably leads to conceptual change. If you alter your 
theoretical assumptions involving some concept, perhaps because empirical 
evidence has shown that these assumptions are mistaken, then you will change 
your dispositions to apply that concept—and so, according to verificationism, 
will end up with a new concept. ‘Meaning incommensurability’ then quickly 
follows: adherents of different theories must mean different things even when 
they use the same words, and so cannot communicate with each other in a 
common language. In the extreme case, this implies that those who reject the 
ontological commitments of some theory cannot use the language of that theory 
to convey this. Since I do not accept the phlogiston theory, I cannot mean the 
same by ‘phlogiston’ as the theory’s adherents, and so cannot communicate my 
disagreement to them by saying ‘There is no phlogiston’. 
For my money, these points are enough to discredit the verificationist 
account of the relation between concepts and theories. Still, I do not need to take 
a stand on the nature of concepts here. This is because I have no objection to 
what verificationists like Brandom say about philosophical practice itself, as 
opposed to their funny way of thinking about concepts. Brandom says that 
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philosophy is concerned with concepts, and then explains that for him this 
means that philosophy should identify the synthetic assumptions that guide our 
use of concepts, and criticize these assumptions when necessary. This vision of 
philosophical practice is entirely in accord with my first thesis that philosophy is 
concerned with synthetic claims.  
When philosophers like Brandom say that they are explicating concepts, an 
unwary audience might conclude that this means that that they are not concerned 
with synthetic matters. But by this conclusion is belied, not only by their 
philosophical practice, but also by their official explanation of this practice. If the 
possession of concepts requires commitment to synthetic claims, and explication 
of these concepts involves the assessment of these claims, then there is no 
difference between conceptual explication and ordinary synthetic theorizing. 
THEORIES AND CONCEPTS II 
Even if we reject verificationist thinking, there may still be a close connection 
between concepts and theories. Suppose that we dismiss the notion that concept 
possession hinges on dispositions to apply concepts. Then our concepts will not 
depend on which theories we accept. But they may still depend on which 
theories we understand.  
To see how this might work, suppose that T(F) is some synthetic theory 
involving the concept F. Then it is open to us to regard the concept F as having 
its reference is fixed via the description ‘the Φ such that T(Φ)’. That is, F can be 
understood as referring to the unique Φ that satisfies the assumptions in T, if 
there is such a thing, and to fail of reference otherwise. In this spirit, we might 
regard pain as referring to the mental state, if there is one such, that is typically 
caused by damage and gives rise to avoidance behaviour, and phlogiston as 
referring to the substance, if there is one such, that is emitted in combustion and 
absorbed during chemical reduction; and so on. 
On this descriptivist account, there is still a close connection between 
concepts and theories. But your concepts no longer depend on which theories 
you accept. Which theories you accept will of course affect your dispositions to 
apply concepts. But for non-verificationists this won’t make a difference to the 
concepts themselves. Even though I reject the phlogiston theory, and so apply 
the concept phlogiston quite differently from the eighteenth-century chemists 
who endorsed the theory, this doesn’t stop me having the same concept as they 
had. For we can all understand the concept phlogiston as equivalent to the 
relevant description—the putative substance that is emitted during combustion 
and absorbed during reduction—independently of our divergent views as to 
whether this description is satisfied. 
In line with this, note that on the descriptivist account of concepts no 
synthetic commitments are incurred by the mere possession of a concept. 
Somebody who possesses a concept F defied by some theory T will be 
committed to the ‘Carnap sentence’ of the theory—if (EΦ)(T(Φ)), then T(F))—
but this claim will be analytic not synthetic. For example, if you have the 
concept phlogiston you will be committed to the relevant analytic claim, that if 
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there is a substance emitted during combustion and absorbed during reduction, 
then it is phlogiston. But you needn’t thereby be committed to the synthetic 
commitments of the phlogiston theory itself. 
From the perspective of this approach to concepts, the original theory T(F) 
can be decomposed into the analytic Carnap sentence and the synthetic ‘Ramsey 
sentence’ of the theory—(EΦ)(T(Φ)). The Ramsey sentence expressed the 
substantial commitments of the theory—there is an entity which...—while the 
Carnap sentence expresses the definitional commitment to dubbing that entity F. 
The original theory framed using the concept F is thus equivalent to the 
conjunction of the Ramsey and Carnap sentences. 
This understanding of the relation between theories and concepts informs an 
influential contemporary vision of philosophical practice, inspired originally by 
the work of David Lewis and more recently codified by Frank Jackson (1998). 
As conceived by Jackson, philosophy proceeds in two stages. The first stage 
involves the identification and articulation of folk concepts. Here the aim is to 
figure out how everyday thought conceives of free will, mental states, persons, 
moral value, and other important philosophical categories. At this stage we will 
use traditional methods of conceptual analysis and reflection on possible cases. 
Then, once we have analysed such everyday concepts, we can turn to our most 
serious theories of the world to investigate what satisfies them. This second 
stage will involve synthetic claims about the underlying nature of reality—we 
will look to physics and any other basic sciences to inform us about possible 
candidates which might realize our everyday concepts. But while this second 
stage appeals to synthetic knowledge, it depends essentially on the first analytic 
stage, where the identification of everyday concepts plays an essential role in 
setting the agenda for further philosophical investigation. 
Thus Jackson: 
‘What then are the interesting philosophical questions that we are seeking to 
address when we debate the existence of free action and its compatibility with 
determinism, or about eliminativism concerning intentional psychology? What 
we are seeking to address is whether free action according to our ordinary 
conception, or something suitably close to our ordinary conception, exists and is 
compatible with determinism, and whether intentional states according to our 
ordinary conception, or something suitably close to it, will survive what 
cognitive science reveals about the operations of our brains’ (Jackson 1998, p 31, 
his italics).  
One worry about this programme is whether the relevant concepts really have the 
requisite descriptive structure. Strong externalists about content will doubt that 
there are any analytic assumptions involving free will say, or person, that you must 
be committed to if you have these concepts, let alone assumptions that will 
uniquely identify the referents of these concepts. (Cf Williamson 2007, ch 4.)  
Another worry, which arises even if we reject strong externalism, relates to 
the familiar question of which everyday assumptions play a definitional role. As 
before, are all assumptions to be included, or only some distinguished subset—
and if the latter, what marks the distinction? 
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I think that these are serious worries, but I shall not press them here. This is 
because I think I can show that, even if there are analytic truths of just the kind 
that that Jackson supposes, they are of no significance to philosophy. 
Jackson says that everyday concepts set the agenda for further metaphysical 
investigation. It is because everyday thought conceives of free action, and 
intentional states, and so on, in such-and-such ways that we philosophers are 
prompted to probe the nature of those things that fit these specifications. 
But why think of the matter in this way? Doesn’t it make far more sense to 
suppose that it is the synthetic theories implicit in everyday thought that raise the 
initial philosophical questions, not the mere analytic commitment to concepts. 
Even after we allow that everyday thought is indeed structured as Jackson 
supposes, the natural assumption is surely that it is the synthetic Ramsey 
sentences that matter to philosophy, not the analytic Carnap sentences. What 
makes philosophers interested in investigating further is the pre-theoretical 
supposition that there are entities fitting such-and-such specifications, not just 
the hypothetical specification that if there were such entities, then they would 
count as free actions, or intentional states, or whatever. 
The point is most easily brought out by considering cases where current 
everyday thought endorses the definitional Carnap sentence involving some 
concept, but not the substantial Ramsey sentence. I think, and so do all of you, 
that if there is a category of women who ride on broomsticks, cast spells, and 
enter into pacts with the devil, then these women are witches. But of course none 
of us think that there is a real kind of this sort, and so have no inclination at all to 
conduct metaphysical investigations into its nature. Again, to take a somewhat 
more serious example, we can all agree, I take it, that if there are entities that are 
conscious, separable from bodies, and can survive death, then those things are 
souls. But only those few among us who think that there actually are souls will 
have any motive to probe their metaphysical nature further. 
The point is that concepts themselves are ontologically non-committal. The 
mere possession of concepts carries no implications at all about the contents of 
reality, and so cannot point the way to further investigations, in the way that 
substantial synthetic claims can.  
I am very much in favour of the idea that much philosophy involves 
subjecting everyday ideas to serious scrutiny. All of us, philosophers included, 
acquire much of our understanding of the world from the everyday culture in 
which we grow up. Some of this everyday lore is sound, and some is not. If we 
are serious about our understanding of the world, we need to examine the 
assumptions that we acquire from everyday thinking, and see how many of them 
stand up to serious examination. But none of this is anything to do with 
concepts. Since concepts on their own are non-committal about reality, they 
cannot lead us astray. But the synthetic commitments of everyday thought can, 
and so do need to be properly examined. 
When Jackson and others who subscribe to his programme actually address 
serious metaphysical issues, they of course proceed in just the way I am 
advocating. That is, they take cases where everyday thinking commits us to 
substantial assumptions about the contents of reality, and ask whether these 
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assumptions are sustainable. To this extent, I would say that their official 
account of what they are doing is belied by their actual practice. Officially they 
say they start with concepts, but in fact they start with theories. 
Moreover, even the official account of what they are doing is not always 
strictly maintained. The difference between concepts and theories is not always 
respected. So in a number of passages. Jackson talks about the initial exploration 
of folk ideas as a matter of identifying theories rather than concepts. 
For example: 
‘... my intuitions reveal my theory of free action.. , your intuitions reveal your 
theory... to the extent that our intuitions coincide with those of the folk, they 
reveal the folk theory.’ (Jackson 1998, p 32)  
And later we find him saying that  
‘My intuitions about which possible cases to describe as cases of K-hood... 
reveal my theory of K-hood’ (op cit, p 37). 
As I have said, I am all in favour of beginning philosophical investigation with 
everyday theories. But this is not the same as beginning with mere concepts. 
Theories involve significantly more than concepts, as is shown by the cases of 
witches and souls, where we have the concepts but not the corresponding theories. 
THE METHOD OF POSSIBLE CASES 
My thesis that philosophy deals in synthetic claims might seem to be 
inconsistent with one salient feature of philosophical practice. Philosophers 
characteristically test philosophical claims by considering whether 
counterexamples are in some sense imaginable. At first pass, this certainly 
seems to support the view that philosophical claims are conceptual in nature. 
Imagination can plausibly show us whether or not certain situations are 
conceptually possible, but presumably not whether they are actual. 
Correspondingly, it looks as if imagination can usefully test claims about what is 
conceptually required, but not about what actually occurs. 
For example consider Gettier’s demonstration that knowledge is not true 
justified belief. Gettier showed us how to construct possible cases in which 
people have true justified beliefs, but are not knowers (because, roughly 
speaking, the truth of their belief is accidental relative to their method of 
justification). Surely this shows that the philosophical claim being tested is that 
true justified belief conceptually requires knowledge. Otherwise how could the 
mere conceivability of counter-examples disprove it? 
Again, consider Kripke’s demolition of the descriptive theory of ordinary proper 
names. Kripke invited us to consider possible cases in which someone (Schmidt, 
say) satisfies all the descriptions associated with some name (‘Gödel’) yet is not the 
bearer of that name (because he is not the causal origin of its use). Here too it looks 
as if the mere conceivability of a counterexample is enough to discredit the thesis of 
interest, and thus that this thesis must be conceptual in nature. 
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One possible naturalist response would be to reject the method of reasoning 
by possible cases. Since philosophy is concerned with synthetic claims, just like 
the sciences, it can’t possibly make progress just by reflecting on what is 
conceptually possible. Instead philosophers should get out of their armchairs and 
engage directly with experimental and observational findings.  
This is not my view. I take it to be uncontentious that Gettier’s and Kripke’s 
thought-experiments led to genuine advances in philosophical knowledge. More 
generally, I regard reflection on possible cases as a highly fruitful mode of 
philosophical investigation. As I said at the beginning, I am not proposing any 
revisionary account of philosophical practice. From my point of view, the 
methods that philosophers use are just fine, including the method of reflection 
on possible cases. So instead of rejecting armchair reflection, I am going to 
argue that armchair methods provide more than purely conceptual information 
and so can play a part in the assessment of synthetic claims. 
The obvious comparison here is with thought-experiments in sciences. Many 
important advances in science have been prompted by pure reflection on possible 
cases. Famous examples include Archimedes on buoyancy, Galileo on falling bodies 
and the relativity of motion, Newton’s bucket experiment, Maxwell’s demon, and 
Einstein on quantum non-locality. Cases like these certainly suggest that armchair 
reflection can be relevant to establishing synthetic claims. 
Scientific thought-experiments display a range of different structures. Let me 
focus on one of the simpler cases—Galileo’s analysis of falling bodies. 
According to the Aristotelian orthodoxy of Galileo’s time, heavier bodies fall 
faster than lighter ones. Galileo asks his readers to consider what will happen if 
a lighter body is tied to a heavier one by a piece of string (Galileo 1638). Since 
the Aristotelian theory says the lighter body will be inclined to fall more slowly 
than the heavier, it follows that the lighter should slow the heavier down when 
joined to it. But by the same coin the compound body consisting of the two tied 
together is heavier than the two individual bodies, and so should fall faster than 
both. The Aristotelian theory is thus shown to be inconsistent. Moreover, it 
looks as if the only consistent account will have the compound body falling at 
the same speed as the individual components, which implies that speed of fall is 
independent of weight. 
In this kind of case it is clear that the relationship between weight and speed 
of fall is a synthetic matter. Concepts cannot guarantee anything this 
relationship. How then can armchair reflection show us what to think? The 
answer must be that armchair reflection is showing us more than that certain 
scenarios are conceptually possible. Of course, it can’t show that there are any 
actual cases in which a compound body falls at the same speed as its 
components. Galileo didn’t create a real case of two bodies tied together just by 
thinking about it. Still, Galileo didn’t need an actual case to disprove the 
Aristotelian theory. If we construe that theory as saying that the faster fall of 
heavier bodies is required by the laws of nature, it will be enough for Galileo to 
show that a case of a heavier body falling at the same speed as a lighter one is 
consistent with the laws of nature. And that is just what Galileo does. He asks us 
to consider a manifestly naturally possible scenario in which two bodies are tied 
DAVID PAPINEAU 
 40
together, and then judges that in such a case the laws of nature will lead the 
compound body to fall at the same speed as its components. 
Obviously, the crucial step here is played by Galileo’s intuition that a 
compound body will fall at the same speed as its components. And this is clearly 
a synthetic intuition, by no means guaranteed by the concepts it involves. That is 
why it can overturn the synthetic Aristotelian theory. 
I want to suggest that philosophical thought experiments have the same 
structure. Explicit philosophical theories about the requirements for a thinker to 
know something, or for a thing to bear a name, (or for someone to have acted 
freely, or for one person to be the same as another,...) are synthetic claims about 
the relevant categories. Philosophers then test such synthetic proposals against 
their intuitions about possible scenarios. Thus Gettier appealed to the intuition 
that a belief whose truth is accidental relative to its method of justification is not 
knowledge; Kripke appealed to the intuition that something that is not the causal 
origin of a name is not its bearer; and so on. On my account, all these intuitions 
are synthetic claims about the relevant kind of scenario. This is why they have 
the power to discredit the initial philosophical theories.  
From this perspective, there is nothing in the method of reasoning about possible 
cases to undermine the idea that philosophy is concerned with synthetic claims. It is 
simply a technique that enables us to counter the synthetic theories proposed by 
philosophers by the synthetic intuitions elicited by thought experiments.  
There is one respect in which this account of thought experiments may be an 
oversimplification. I have suggested that thought experimental intuitions 
manifest certain general principles, such as that an accidentally true believer 
isn’t a knower, or that the causal origin of a name is its bearer, and so on. 
However Tim Williamson has pointed out that such general claims are arguably 
more than the thought experiments committed us to (2007, Ch 6). For example, 
in order to disprove the tripartite analysis of knowledge, Gettier only needed the 
particular counterfactual claim that, in the most obvious understanding of his 
scenario, the relevant thinker would not be a knower. There is no need to 
suppose that any thinker satisfying the explicit specifications of his scenario 
would fail to know, still less to suppose some still more general principle as that 
‘all accidentally true believer aren’t knowers’. For Williamson, philosophical 
thought experiments thus appeal only to our ability to reason counterfactually, 
and do not demand any grasp of general principles. 
I am happy to agree that counterfactual reasoning is enough for thought-
experimental purposes, and correspondingly that is in by no means mandatory to 
suppose that general principles lie behind the relevant intuitions. Even so, I 
would like to continue working on the assumption that thought experiments 
display general principles. This may be an oversimplification, but I don’t think it 
is too far from the truth. We may not fully understand counterfactual reasoning, 
but it is clear that it is strongly constrained by general claims about the working 
of the world. Williamson alludes to the role of imagination in counterfactual 
reasoning (2007, chs 5-6). But when I think about what would happen if I had 
dropped a vase, say, I do not imagine every outcome that is permitted by the 
concepts involved, such as that the vase floats gently onto the table. Rather I 
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consider just those outcomes that are consistent with some such synthetic 
general claim as that heavy bodies fall rapidly when unsupported. Perhaps this 
general claim as just formulated is more precise than anything that governs our 
counterfactual thinking. Still, it seems clear that our counterfactual thinking 
must be informed by some such principle. In line with this, I shall continue to 
assume that the intuitions in philosophical thought experiments are informed by 
general principles. Attempts to state these principles explicitly may inevitably 
lead to oversimplification, but I propose to overlook this in the interests of 
facilitating investigation into their nature. (In what follows I shall use ‘intuition’ 
to refer to both the general principles informing our counterfactual reasoning 
and the specific judgements about counterfactual situations that issue from them. 
When the distinction matters I shall draw it explicitly.)  
THE ENCAPSULATION OF ASSUMPTIONS 
There is an obvious objection to my proposed analogy between philosophical 
and scientific thought experiments. Consider Galileo’s thought experiment 
again. The crucial intuition was that tying two bodies together won’t make any 
difference to their speed of fall. Now, it is clear that this conjecture is hostage to 
further empirical investigation. It may strike us as obvious that Galileo is right, 
but even so empirical observation remains the ultimate test of his intuition. 
Galileo is in effect hazarding a guess—albeit a highly informed guess—as to the 
synthetic facts, and the final arbiter of this guess must be real observations. We 
need to find some actual bodies that are tied together see how they fall. Either 
they will conform to Galileo’s intuition, or they won’t. And both options are 
clearly left open by the terms in which the issue is posed. 
Things seem rather different in philosophy. In the Gettier thought experiment, for 
example, the analogous intuition was that a belief isn’t knowledge if its truth is an 
accident relative to its method of justification. But there seems no analogous room to 
check this intuition against real cases, by seeing whether or not actual thinkers with 
such accidentally true beliefs are knowers. For we already know what we will say 
about any such cases—namely, that these thinkers are certainly not knowers. The 
reflection involved in the philosophical thought experiment is itself enough to tell us 
what we will judge in any similar real situation, and thus to rule out any possibility of 
observing someone who is an accidentally true believer yet a knower. The same seems 
true of philosophical thought experiments in general. Take the Kripke case. We don’t 
need to find any real cases of names whose original bearers don’t fit the associated 
descriptions, in order to check whether or not the names really do name the original 
bearers. For again, we already know what we will say about any real such cases—
namely, that the names apply to the original bearers even if they don’t satisfy the 
descriptions. And this again rules out any possibility of observing a name which turns 
out to refer to the satisfier of associated descriptions rather than the original bearer.  
In short, the intuitions in play in the philosophical thought experiments don’t 
seem to be falsifiable in the way they ought to be if they were synthetic claims. 
On the contrary, their inviolability to any observational falsification seems to 
argue strongly that they are analytic. And this would then imply that the 
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philosophical thought experiments are serving to manifest the structure of our 
concepts, rather than to draw out our implicit empirical opinions. 
However, this is not the only way of seeing the matter. An alternative is to 
hold that the relevant philosophical intuitions are synthetic, but encapsulated in 
the cognitive systems that make judgements about such categories as 
knowledge, names, free will, persons and so on. By way of analogy, consider the 
way that the human visual system detects the edges of physical objects by 
registering sharp changes in intensity in the visual field. We can think of the 
visual system as embodying the implicit ‘assumption’ that intensity changes are 
due to the edges of physical objects. This assumption is then ‘encapsulated’ in 
the sense that the visual system will continue to embrace it even in cases where 
we are personally aware that the intensity changes are due to something else, as 
when we are viewing the surface of a photograph. 
Because of this, it is inevitable that we see intensity changes as edges. And 
this means that our visual system is never going to deliver intuitive particular 
‘judgements’ that falsify the intuitive general ‘assumption’ that all intensity 
changes are due to object edges. There is no possibility of a visual observation 
of sharp intensity changes that are not seen as edges. Still, it is clear enough that 
the assumption that all intensity changes are due to object edges is akin to a 
synthetic rather than an analytic claim. Its approximate truth is not due to the 
structure of its content, but to the fact that most intensity changes in the actual 
world are due to the edges of physical objects.  
I would like to say the same about the general intuitions which guide us in 
making particular judgements about knowledge, names, persons, free will and so 
on. The sub-personal cognitive mechanisms responsible for such judgements are 
not well understood, as is evidenced by the difficulty philosophers have in 
identifying the principles on which they operate. But it is clear enough how they 
must work: they take in information which do not presuppose the relevant 
categories, and use it to arrive at judgements about who knows what, and which 
words name which things, and when someone is the same person as someone 
else, and so on. I want to suggest that the particular intuitions displayed in 
philosophical thought experiments manifest the implicit general ‘assumptions’ 
on which such mechanisms hinge, in the way that the visual system hinges on 
the ‘assumption’ that intensity changes are due to object edges. 
This is why there is no question of any direct judgements about particular cases 
falsifying such ‘assumptions’. If my judgmental procedures decide who is a 
knower by assuming inter alia that accidentally true believers are not knowers, 
then clearly there isn’t any question of my meeting up with a case where I judge 
such an accidentally true believer to be a knower after all. Again, if my 
judgemental procedures decide what things bears some name by noting the causal 
origin of the use of the name, them I’m not going to come across cases where I 
judge that some name is borne by something other than its causal origin. But this 
impossibility of direct falsification does not mean that the relevant general 
assumptions are analytic. They may yet have a substantial synthetic content, like 
the visual system’s assumption that intensity changes are due to object edges. 
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Some readers may be feeling that I have not yet established a positive case 
for my first thesis that philosophy deals in synthetic matters. In this section and 
the last I may have succeeded in showing how the importance of thought-
experiments can be made consistent with that thesis. But isn’t it equally 
consistent with the contrary thesis that philosophy is centrally concerned with 
analytic matters? I may have been able to concoct a story which makes 
philosophical thought-experiments come out like scientific ones. But isn’t the 
more natural account still that the point of these thought-experiments is to 
articulate the structure of our concepts? Don’t I owe some positive arguments 
against this natural account and in favour of the one I have contrived? 
I have two responses to this line of thought. First, there are independent 
reasons for thinking that substantial synthetic assumptions are built into the 
automatic mechanisms that allow us to make particular judgements about 
philosophically salient categories like knowledge, names, persons, free will and 
so on. Judgements like these are important to us in our daily life, and it is 
therefore unsurprising that we should have unthinking mechanisms that allow us 
to form them quickly and efficiently. But it would be odd then to suppose that 
any inferential assumptions built into these mechanisms must be analyticities 
whose truth is guaranteed by the structure of their contents. The whole point of 
these mechanisms is to start with limited information and deliver further 
conclusions. It would run quite counter to this function if they were restricted to 
analytic inferences and precluded from engaging in ampliative ones.  
My second response is that, if philosophical thought-experiments were concerned 
only with the elaboration of analyticities, they would be much less interesting than they 
are. They would tell us about the structure of our concepts, but they wouldn’t help us 
to understand the rest of the world. (Cf Williamson 2007, 204-7.)  
Recall that analytic knowledge comes in the form of conditional Carnap 
sentences. These simply explain that, if things satisfying certain requirements exist, 
then they count as such-and-suches, but analytic knowledge never deliver any 
categorical information about the contents of actuality. Correspondingly, the 
philosophical analysis of concepts may tell us that, if there is a propositional attitude 
that requires truth, justification, and so on, then it is knowledge—or again that, if 
words and things bear certain causal relations, then the words name the things. 
But this seems far less than we actually get from the relevant thought-
experiments. Thus I take Gettier to have shown not just that our concept of 
knowledge imposes a requirement of non-accidentally, but far more interestingly 
that this requirement is satisfied by real knowledge—that is, the state that plays 
an important role in the world and is displayed in many paradigm cases. 
Similarly, I take Kripke to have shown that not just that we conceptualize names 
causally, but in addition that real name-bearer pairs—all those many instances 
we are familiar with—are causally related. 
If the assumptions manifested in philosophical thought experiments really are 
synthetic, then of course their contents leave it open that they may turn out to be 
false. They may not be directly falsifiable via a simple contrary observation, for 
the reasons outlined above. Still, we can imagine how more sophisticated 
investigations may show them to be flawed. Compare the way in which, even 
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though we never see sharp intensity changes as anything other than object edges, 
more elaborate investigation can show us that there are plenty of contrary cases. 
We can imagine reaching a similar conclusion about knowledge, say. We are 
notoriously unclear about the significance of knowledge. (Is it just that 
knowledge is an effective means to true belief, or because knowledge underpins 
a certain kind of robustness in action explanations, or because it is biologically 
more basic than true belief, or for some further reason?) Perhaps when we have 
a good answer to this question we will conclude that the principle that 
knowledge requires non-accidentality is a crude rule of thumb that works well 
enough in many cases, but on occasion leads us astray. (I doubt that it will 
actually turn out like this. My concern here is only to show how it is 
epistemologically possible.)  
PHILOSOPHY IS A POSTERIORI 
Let me now turn to my second thesis that philosophical knowledge is a 
posteriori not a priori. It might seem that this will now follow quickly, given my 
first thesis that philosophical claims are synthetic. How can a synthetic claim 
possibly be known to be true independently of experience, given that its content 
alone leaves it open that it might be false? But of course this is too quick. 
Traditional theists and transcendental idealists both take themselves to have 
good answers to this question. And even if we reject these particular answers, 
there is room for other non-experiential accounts of synthetic knowledge. 
On this topic, Timothy Williamson has argued that philosophical intuitions, 
though synthetic, should not be counted as a posteriori (2006, 165-9, 189-90). 
His reason is that experience does not play a normal evidential role in generating 
them. We can’t point to past observations of supporting instances to support 
such claims as that accidentally true believers are not knowers, or that names 
refer to their causal origins. Our route to these claims is thus clearly unlike the 
normal justification of synthetic generalizations by inductive or abductive 
evidence. (Williamson does not conclude that such philosophical judgements are 
a priori—he thinks the traditional contrast is not useful here. But we need not 
pursue this point, given that I am about to argue contra Williamson that 
philosophical intuitions should definitely be counted as a posteriori.) 
I am in broad agreement with Williamson’s view of the provenance of 
philosophical intuitions. They are not products of normal inductions or abductions. 
This accords well with my suggestion that the underlying assumptions are 
‘encapsulated’ in the cognitive mechanisms we use to decide on cases of knowledge, 
naming, and so on. Of course, there is plenty of room for debate about the means by 
which assumptions become encapsulated in this way. Strong nativists argue that all 
the relevant information is encoded in genes bequeathed to us by natural selection. 
Others hold that the relevant assumptions are laid down early in individual 
development, via the influence of surrounding culture and possibly also of 
acquaintance with particular paradigm cases. Still, whatever the precise truth on this 
matter, Williamson seems right to observe that the source of philosophical intuitions 
is not normal inductive or abductive evidence. 
THE POVERTY OF ANALYSIS 
 45
Still, the source of philosophical intuitions is one thing, their justification 
another. Even if philosophical intuitions do not derive from experience, it may 
still be that they can only be justified a posteriori. This is my view. Note that in 
general the epistemological status of encapsulated assumptions is not high. The 
function of cognitive mechanisms that embody encapsulated assumptions is to 
deliver judgements about particular cases quickly and efficiently. Because of 
this, the relevant assumptions are standardly rules of thumb that work well 
enough in most cases but are not strictly accurate, in the way illustrated by the 
familiar perceptual examples. If the cognitive mechanisms behind philosophical 
intuitions are at all similar, we should expect encapsulated philosophical 
assumptions to have a similar status. They may work well enough for practical 
purposes, but they may not be strictly accurate and may lead us astray in certain 
cases. If we are to be confident about these assumptions, we will need to make 
them explicit and subject them to proper a posteriori evaluation. 
I have already argued that it is at least epistemologically possible that there may 
be inaccuracies in the assumption that knowledge must be non-accidental. Nor is it 
hard to think of real cases of mistaken assumptions which were once encapsulated 
and therefore seemed immune to imaginable counter-examples. Descartes thought it 
unimaginable that a purely mechanical being could reason. Kant thought it 
unimaginable that parallel lines could meet. Many people still find it unimaginable 
that temporal succession could be relative, or that time could have a beginning.  
The recent findings of ‘experimental philosophy’ are relevant here. They 
indicate that many central philosophical intuitions, including those invoked by 
Gettier and Kripke, are by no means universal, but rather peculiar to certain 
cultures and social classes. (Knobe and Nichols eds 2008.) At one level, it is not 
always clear what to make of these findings. Presented as a challenge to 
‘conceptual analysis’, they invite the response that the variability of intuitions 
only establishes the philosophically insignificant point that different groups of 
people express different concepts by words like ‘knowledge’ and ‘name’. 
However, the variability of intuitions is clearly more significant if philosophical 
intuitions are substantial claims whose truth is not analytically guaranteed. In 
that case, the variability of the intuitions is in tension with their reliability. If 
different people have opposed philosophical intuitions, then it cannot be that 
intuitions of this kind are always true. This reinforces the point that an a priori 
provenance for philosophical assumptions does not amount to an a priori 
justification. As before, the justification of such assumptions requires that we 
subject them to proper a posteriori examination. 
It may seem as if I am here backtracking on my earlier enthusiasm for armchair 
philosophy. Among philosophers who agree with me that philosophical intuitions 
are synthetic, we can distinguish two broad positions. There are those who think that 
philosophical intuitions are little more than manifestations of naïve folklore, and 
should therefore carry little weight in serious philosophical discussion. According to 
this point of view, philosophers should turn away from intuitions and instead engage 
with serious empirical theories. (Cf. Kornblith 2002, Knobe and Nichols eds 2008.) 
On the other side are philosophers like Timothy Williamson, and perhaps Alvin 
Goldman, who think that philosophical intuitions are by and large reliable, and that 
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the findings of the experimental philosophers are not as worrying as they appear. 
(For example, Williamson suggests that the special training of philosophers may 
make them sensitive to niceties that escape the untrained—2007, 191.) My line of 
argument in this section so far may seem to place me on the former side and thus 
against armchair investigation. 
However, I think this conclusion is based on a false dichotomy. Just because I am 
doubtful about the authority of philosophical intuitions, it doesn’t mean that I have to 
reject the method of reasoning about merely possible cases. Armchair thinking can be 
useful, even if the intuitions involved are unreliable. Go back to the idea, briefly aired 
earlier, that philosophy is characteristically concerned with theoretical tangles. We find 
our thinking pulled in opposing directions and cannot see how to resolve the tension. 
Often part of our predicament is that we don't know what assumptions are directing 
our thinking. We end up with conflicting judgements, but are unclear about what led 
us there. In such cases thought experiments can bring the implicit principles behind our 
conflicting judgements to the surface. They make it clear what intuitive general 
assumptions are governing our thinking and so allow us to subject these assumptions 
to explicit examination. Nothing in this requires that thought-experimental thinking is 
generally reliable. When some explicit prior theory conflicts with an intuitive 
judgement elicited by a thought experiment, this needn't always result in the rejection 
of the theory. We can also end up rejecting the implicit assumptions behind the 
thought-experimental intuition. 
Just this pattern is displayed by some of the most famous and important 
thought experiments in science. Consider the 'tower argument' against 
Copernicanism, which appeals to the intuition that an object dropped from a 
moving source will be 'left behind' as it falls. Or take the Einsteinian argument 
against the completeness of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, 
which appeals to the intuition that spacelike separated events cannot be co-
ordinated without a common cause. In cases like these, the assumptions generating 
the thought experiments eventually came to be recognized as mistaken. But this 
certainly did not mean that the thought experiments were worthless. Both the 
tower and Einstein arguments were hugely important in the history of science. But 
showing us which of our implicit assumptions conflicted with new theoretical 
ideas, they led to crucial new advances. Galileo responded to the tower argument 
with his innovatory formulation of a principle of inertia, and J.S. Bell to the 
Einstein argument with his derivation of the eponymous inequality whose 
experimental confirmation ruled out local hidden variable theories.  
It is not hard to think of similar philosophical cases. The worth of 
philosophical thought experiments does not always require that the intuitions 
they elicit are sound. In some cases, of course, the intuitions will be correct. I 
don't think we should really harbour any serious doubts about the Gettier and 
Kripke intuitions. But in other cases thought experiments can clarify the issues 
even if the accompanying intuitions point us in the wrong direction.  
Consider the classic Lockean set-up where someone's memories are 
transferred to a new body. We all have an intuition that the person goes with the 
memories, not the old body, as evidenced by our reactions to the many fictions 
which trade on just this kind of scenario. But few philosophers of personal 
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identity would nowadays hold that this intuition is decisive in favour of 
Lockeanism. We need to follow through the implications of the Lockean views 
and assess the overall resulting theory against its competitors, and in this context 
the initial intuition is indecisive. But, for all that, it would be hard to deny that 
Locke's thought experiment has led to advances in our understanding of personal 
identity. Again, consider the intuition that conscious properties are ontologically 
distinct from physical ones, as displayed in our immediate reaction to zombie 
scenarios. Here too few would suppose that these intuitions are decisive in 
refuting physicalism. But at the same time even physicalists will allow that 
reflection on zombie cases has helped to clarify what is at issue in the mind-
brain debate. (I shall return to this particular example in the next section.)  
So my view is that philosophical intuitions do no qualify as knowledge until they 
have been subject to serious a posteriori assessment. Philosophers need to articulate 
their intuitions in order to understand the source of their theoretical difficulties. But 
since these intuitions are standardly nothing more the encapsulated rules of thumb 
we happen to have grown up with, we should not place any great epistemological 
weight on them until they have been properly evaluated against experience. In 
saying this, I do not mean to imply that all philosophical claims need to be assessed 
directly against specific empirical findings from empirical disciplines. A synthetic 
theory can be vindicated a posteriori even though it has no specific empirical 
evidence to call its own, on the grounds that it provides a more coherent and natural 
overall account than the alternatives. 
As it happens, I do think that specific empirical findings bear directly on a 
surprisingly wide range of philosophical issues. These include not just topics 
from philosophy of science, such as the logic of natural selection or the 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, but also such central and traditional topics 
as the nature of causation and the relation between mind and brain. Still, I am 
happy to allow that there are other central philosophical issues, such as the 
nature of persisting objects or realism about properties, where the philosophical 
claims float free of any specific matters investigated by the empirical sciences.2 
In such cases, we will then have no alternative but to evaluate alternative 
philosophical positions by comparing their overall coherence and naturalness. 
Still, this too is an a posteriori procedure, akin to the method by which we 
compare alternative scientific theories that are underdetermined by the evidence. 
When we prefer Copernicus to Ptolemy, or special relativity with the Lorentz-
Fitzgerald reworking of classical mechanics, it is not because of any specific 
empirical findings, but because they are more in accord with our general a 
posteriori understanding of the way the world works. I see no reason to doubt 
that the most abstract philosophical issues are to be decided in the same way.3  
                                                 
2 But see Maudlin, 2007, who brings scientific considerations to bear even on these two topics. 
3 Some readers might wish to query whether choices between underdetermined scientific 
theories should count as a posteriori. I think that they should (1993, Ch 5), but perhaps I can 
let the point pass here, and settle instead for the observation that empirically underdetermined 
philosophical theory-choices are made on the same grounds as scientific ones.  
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PHILOSOPHY AND NECESSITY 
Can the account of philosophy offered so far can accommodate the modal 
dimension of philosophical knowledge? It is sometimes said that the difference 
between philosophy and science is that philosophy seeks necessary truths where 
science trades in contingencies. (Thus Russell: ‘[a philosophical proposition] 
must not deal specially with things on the surface of the earth, or with the solar 
system, or with any other portion of space and time.... A philosophical 
proposition must be applicable to everything that exists or may exist’ 1914, p 
110.) This modal view of philosophy might seem to be in tension with my 
account of philosophy as synthetic and a posteriori. Don’t we need a priori 
analysis to uncover necessary truths? 
But of course this line of thought is far too quick. There no reason why 
necessities should not be synthetic and a posteriori. Empirical science provides 
plenty of familiar examples. Water is H20. Heat is molecular motion. Stars are 
made of hot gas. Halley’s comet is made of rock and ice. All these claims are 
necessary, but clearly they are not knowable a priori on some analytic basis. 
These claims are necessary because they use rigid terminology to report on 
facts of identity or constitution. All claims of these kinds are necessary, 
notwithstanding any synthetic a posteriori status they may have. It is a nice 
question, worthy of further discussion, why facts like these should count as 
necessary, while truths about spatiotemporal location, say, do not. But this is not 
the place to pursue this issue. For present purposes the important point is simply 
that the necessity of claims of these kinds is perfectly consistent with their 
synthetic a posteriori status. 
The central questions of philosophy are almost entirely concerned with issues 
of identity and constitution. When we ask about knowledge, names, persons, 
persisting objects, free will, causation, and so on, we are seeking to understand 
the nature of these categories. We want to know whether knowledge is the same 
as true justified belief, whether naming involves descriptive content, whether 
persisting objects are composed of temporal parts, and so on. Any truths we 
might establish about such matters will inevitably be necessary rather than 
contingent, even if they are also a posteriori and synthetic. 
The answers to the central questions of philosophy may be necessary, but 
that is no reason to suppose that philosophy is here concerned with necessity per 
se rather than actuality. Consider empirical science once more. As I have just 
observed, many of the claims established by science are necessary. But it would 
be odd to infer from this that empirical science is aiming to explore some wider 
modal realm rather than simply to understand the actual world. When science 
investigates the chemical make-up of water, or the composition of the stars, it is 
primarily concerned with how things are in this world (‘with things on the 
surface of the earth, or with the solar system, or with any other portion of space 
and time...’) That these discoveries have implications about the contents of other 
possible worlds, so to speak, is an inevitable side-effect of the content of these 
claims, but not something that we need regard science as actively seeking. 
I say the same about the central areas of philosophy. Our primary 
philosophical concern is to find out about things in this world. We want to know 
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about such actual categories as knowledge, free will, persons, and so on—kinds 
that exist and make a difference in this world. Of course, given that answers to 
our questions will normally take the form of claims about identity and 
constitution, philosophical knowledge will also place constraints on what is 
necessary and possible. But there is no reason to regard such modal corollaries 
as our main aim. We are first seeking to understand this world, and are only 
derivatively concerned with modal matters. We want to know whether p, not 
whether necessarily p. That the former implies the latter does not make the latter 
our focus of interest, any more that my interest in whether you are 47 years old 
makes me interested in whether your age is a prime number. 
Of course, some philosophers are specifically interested in modal questions 
as such. They are interested in whether necessary truths are necessarily 
necessary, or in whether modal claims commit us to an ontology of possible 
worlds, or in the connection between metaphysical and conceptual necessity, or 
indeed in why facts of identity and constitution but not spatio-temporal location 
should count as necessary, and so forth. There are certainly substantial 
philosophical issues worthy of serious discussion.4 But most central 
philosophical questions are not of this form. The study of modality is a specialist 
subject within philosophy, engendered by specific theoretical interests. There is 
no reason to suppose that an interest in modality infects all of philosophy, even 
if all philosophical claims have modal implications. 
Having said this, it is worth recognizing that it is often heuristically useful to 
focus on modal implications, even in cases where our real interest is in non-
modal matters. Given the immediate modal upshot of claims of identity and 
constitution, it is sometimes easier to articulate our thinking by starting with the 
modal consequences rather than their this-worldly counterparts. Take the 
relation between individual objects and their property instantiations. In the 
actual world there is a one-to-one correspondence between objects and sets of 
property instantiations. But is this a matter of identity, as in the ‘bundle theory’ 
of objects, or mere association? A good way to clarify our thinking on this issue 
is to consider the modal question of whether there could be a world in which this 
blue cup, say, acquired all the properties of that red one, and vice versa. To the 
extent this strikes us as possible, then we are thinking of objects as distinct from 
their property instantiations; while if it seems that this is not a real possibility, 
then we are identifying objects with their property instantiations. 
I am not of course here suggesting that such modal intuitions are somehow a 
privileged route to the truth. Whether we are right to think of objects as bundles 
of properties, say, would remain a substantial further issue, even after modal 
reflection has made it clear that this is our intuitive view. The role of the modal 
reflection is merely to clarify the content of our intuitive commitments in cases 
where thinking about actuality alone leaves them unclear, not to decide the 
                                                 
4 This branch of philosophy obviously demands a qualification to the third of my initial 
theses—philosophers of modality are certainly concerned to understand modality per se, 
even if other philosophers are not. But it may still satisfy my other two theses by being 
synthetic and a posteriori. As before, however, we cannot expect decide these issues in the 
absence of an agreed view about the nature of modal claims. 
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substantial issues. From this perspective, modal thinking is a special case of the 
kind of thought-experimental reflection described in previous sections. It is a 
useful way of identifying the implicit assumptions that drive our reasoning. 
Once these assumptions have been identified, we are then is a position to subject 
them to serious a posteriori evaluation. 
Let me conclude with one further example. Consider the relation between 
conscious mental properties and brain properties. Let us agree that pairs of these 
properties go hand-in-hand in the actual world. Still, is this association due to 
the identity of the relevant properties, or merely to a correlation between distinct 
properties? Well, ask yourself whether there could possibly be a being with all 
your brain properties but who lacks your conscious properties. If you think that 
such zombies are possible, then you must be of the view that conscious 
properties are distinct from brain properties in this world. Conversely, if you 
think that conscious properties are in actuality one and the same as brain 
properties, then you won’t think that zombies are so much as possible. 
Many recent writers look at this thought experiment differently. They think 
we can start with our concepts of conscious and brain states, proceed to the point 
that zombies are conceivable, somehow move from this to their possibility, and 
thence end up with the conclusion that conscious and brain properties are 
distinct in the actual world. (Chalmers 1996, Bealer 2002.) I don’t think that this 
works at all. (Papineau 2007.) The interesting thing about zombies isn’t that we 
can conceive them—after all, we can conceive lots of things that aren’t 
possible—but that they strike us as possible. This shows us something rather 
surprising, namely that at an intuitive level we are all dualists about the mind-
brain relation.  
Of course, it is one thing to identify this intuition, and another to justify it. As 
I have argued throughout, philosophical intuitions need a posteriori backing 
before we can place confidence in them. In this case it seems clear that the a 
posteriori evidence counts against the intuition. (Papineau 2002, Appendix.) 
Still, this is not the place to pursue this issue, which is in any case independent 
of my present point—which is that in most familiar cases the purpose of modal 
reflection is not to find out about other possible worlds per se, but simply to 
clarify our pre-theoretical assumptions about the actual world.5 
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DEMYSTIFYING THE NATURE OF MORAL JUDGMENTS BY 
REDUCTIONIST NATURALISM 
EVANDRO BARBOSA 
INTRODUCTION 
Currently, moral naturalism seems to be a powerful tool for solving the problem of 
justification. Among its supporters, David Copp offers his Society-Centered Moral 
Theory as a reductionist kind of naturalism, which connects realism and 
constructivism. Nevertheless, this seems to be a conflicting point in his work that 
needs to be clarified. According to Copp, the understanding of the moral landscape 
requires three basic interrelated points: identifying the nature of moral judgments, 
specifying the justification of those decisions and determining the role of moral 
society in this scheme. Hence, the philosopher discusses the necessity of a cognitivist 
theory of normative language (standard-based theory) as well as a theory of moral 
codes justification (society-centered theory). In 1995, Copp wrote Morality, 
Normativity and Society, in which he systematically defends his philosophical 
position as a naturalist, realist and constructivist. Later, in his book Morality in a 
Natural World (2007),1 he revises his position and discusses why it would be better to 
explain his naturalist theory as a non-constructivist one, although he provides no 
definitive position on this matter. In spite of further changes and detailing, the 
leitmotif of his theory remains intact: the defense of a reductionist and realist moral 
naturalism reluctant whether to sustain a constructivist position or not. This chapter 
analyzes the extent to which Copp’s moral theory is able to support a constructivist 
methodology on the basis of his realist moral naturalism without undermining his 
naturalist purpose of relating (and reducing) moral properties to natural ones. To 
determine this relationship, broad definitions – which I regard as lato sensu ones – of 
                                                 
1 There is a doubt in his theory that will follow our discussion: “One important distinction that 
I need to explain is between the ‘constructivist’ version of the theory that I presented in my 
first book [Morality, Normativity, and Society] and the ‘nonconstructivist’ version that is at 
work in the present book [Morality in a Natural World]. I believe that the nonconstructivist 
version is preferable.” (Introduction) Recently, Copp wrote a text titled “Is constructivism 
an alternative to moral realism?” (2013), which is relevant from the point of view of 
systematization of the relationship between realism and constructivism in his theory, 
insofar as he says that there is no contradiction in approximating both, provided the settings 
are clearly determined.  
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naturalism, realism and constructivism2 will be introduced with the purpose of 
showing their specificities in Copp’s theory and of identifying the reason why 
naturalism does not convincingly connect realism and constructivism. Further, the 
core elements of his theory will be presented – specially his cognitivist perspective of 
normative language (standard-based theory) and his theory of moral codes 
justification (society-centered theory) based on his Society-Centered Moral Theory.  
I – LATO SENSU NATURALISM AND MORAL NATURALISM 
It is somehow difficult to specify what the term “naturalism” means to different 
philosophers, since a wide variety of definitions follows the huge range of areas of 
application. Nevertheless, one element is generally agreed upon: all models of 
naturalism reject the possibility of supernatural entities.3 In this sense, the naturalist 
is based on a metaphysical position according to which all the facts, including moral 
ones, are natural facts.4 Harman defines naturalism in a broad sense as follows: 
Philosophical naturalism is a special instance of the wider conception of philosophy, 
taking the subject matter and methods of philosophy to be continuous with the 
subject matters and methods of other disciplines, especially including the natural 
sciences. From a naturalistic perspective, productive philosophers are those who 
(among other things) produce fruitful more or less speculative theoretical ideas, with 
no sharp distinction between such theorizing by members of philosophy departments 
and such theorizing by members of other departments.5 
In the normative and metanormative spheres, naturalism is a title frequently used to 
indicate a point of view that combines moral realism and moral naturalism. This 
relationship defines the standard position of naturalism. Such position assumes the 
naturalist methodological strategy and the realist ontological condition as a powerful 
combination not only to support objective moral facts, but also to explain the 
relationship between moral properties and natural properties. In this regard, while the 
non-naturalist can appeal to entities or properties considered non-natural to explain the 
moral phenomenon, the naturalist does not support a domain consisted of non-natural 
or supernatural facts. Therefore, in face of questions related to the moral value and its 
justification basis, the naturalist answer goes through the possibility of supporting 
values and moral duties on scientific and naturalist grounds. Sturgeon defines the 
standard position of moral naturalism as involving two properties: 
(a) that such ethical properties as the goodness of persons, character traits, and 
other things, and such as the rightness or wrongness of actions, are natural 
properties of the same general sort as properties investigated by the sciences, and 
                                                 
2 As Copp provides no lengthy discussion about constructivism, we will make use of Sharon 
Street’s (2010) definitions, which the author uses to determine the type of constructivism 
being defended.  
3 Cf. Papineau, 2015. 
4 We use Jamie Lenman’s (2006) definition of natural facts: “Natural facts are understood to 
be facts about the natural world, facts of the sort in which the natural sciences trade.” 
5 Harman, 2012, 10. 
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(b) that they are to be investigated in the same general way that we investigate 
those properties.6 
Nevertheless, this definition is too broad, for it depends on each theory to 
determine what is regarded as a natural property, what the investigation method 
is, and the definition of natural world. As previously mentioned, we must 
understand that this is just the standard definition of naturalism, for some of its 
further conceptions extend to constructivists, expressivists, relativists and even 
error theorists. Such is the range of naturalism over the families of meta-ethical 
views.7 However, it is ensured, as much as in lato sensu naturalism, the strong 
conviction in the rejection of dependence on any supernatural beliefs or 
commands. 
Moreover, moral naturalism intends to demonstrate that moral questions can 
be explained from the perspective of a natural world, resulting it the onus of 
explaining why, when reducing value and moral knowledge to a purely scientific 
matter, it does not undermine the very condition of the moral world.8 
Particularly in Copp’s theory, the presupposition that moral facts and 
propositions e x i s t  – being such facts and properties reducible to natural facts 
and properties – points to a difficulty in establishing an association between 
naturalism and constructivism. 
REDUCTIONIST AND NON-REDUCTIONIST NATURALISM 
Copp follows the standard definition of naturalism. In other words, he supports 
a kind moral realism when he affirms that: 
Moral naturalism holds that in thinking of things as morally right or wrong, good or 
bad, we ascribe moral properties to these things – properties such as moral rightness 
and wrongness, goodness and evil. It holds that there are such properties, and it adds 
that these properties are ordinary garden-variety natural properties – properties that 
have the same basic metaphysical and epistemological status as the properties a tree 
can have of being deciduous, and the property a piece of paper can have of being an 
Australian twenty-dollar bill.9 
                                                 
6 Sturgeon, 2006, 92. 
7 An example is the relativist position, which speaks of moral relativism as given by the different 
social conventions established. And, since the conventions are assumed as social facts that 
presuppose natural facts, relativism could be qualified as a form of naturalism. But this seems 
to go against the eternal convention-versus-nature debate. See Sturgeon, 2006, 93. This is 
what seems to weaken Copp’s realistic position or at least it does not make it a kind of moral 
dogmatism. This point will be developed in the text in order to overcome the apparent 
contradiction between realism and constructivism defined as a tenable position.  
8 Divine command theorists question precisely this point, since the resulting determinism would 
preclude the conditions for freedom, will and responsibility of the moral agent. On this matter, 
see the theological voluntarism of Philip L. Quinn in Copp, 2006, 63-90.  
9 Copp, 2007, 249. 
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In this regard, moral properties such as goodness, justice and virtue are natural 
properties. Therefore, ethical naturalism, even if being a kind of moral realism, has 
the particular condition of assuming natural properties and is, thus, distinguished 
from other kinds of realism. As we will see later, Copp’s naturalist proposal is 
different from other kinds of realism as it regards moral properties as natural 
properties. For now, the naturalist challenge is to present and support a positive 
answer to the question of the existence of moral properties that come from natural 
properties, because it is not clear how those properties relate to each other. 
Differently from science, wherein observation and explanation of natural 
properties are progressively more precise and complex, ethics seems to rest on 
obscure grounds when attempts are made to determine moral properties such as 
wrongness. Let us make a comparison. From a scientific point of view, we can 
precisely understand how a murder has occurred by precisely determining how the 
projectile of a fire gun passed through the victim’s body, how the organs were 
affected and the consequent death. However, while criminal science regards the 
causa mortis as sufficient to determine the causer of this event, it is up to ethics to 
determine, as Hume said, “where is fact that here we call crime; point it out; 
determine the time of its existence”10 In other words, we could not assign the moral 
property of wrongness to the murder and, without it, it would not be possible to 
assign guilt to the offender. However, this challenge of explaining how moral 
properties are extracted from natural properties has a clear answer to the naturalist: 
there are no doubts that moral properties exist in the same way as natural properties 
do and, strategically, he argues that moral judgments about right and wrong are also 
assertions about the world. Therefore, certain moral properties exist in the world and 
we are able to identify them as well as science does with other kinds of natural 
properties. 
The question of the relationship between moral properties and natural 
properties divides the naturalists. The lato sensu definition of naturalism does 
not require the existence of moral properties as a unique nature, neither as a sui 
generis one, but it only requires those properties to be connected with other 
properties. And it is this very requirement of connection between natural 
properties and moral properties that divides the theorists into non-reductionists 
and reductionists. The non-reductionist moral theorists, such as Brink, Sturgeon 
and Boyd,11 proponents of what became known as Cornell realism, claim that 
moral properties are irreducible to natural properties, although they recognize 
that moral judgments work in consonance with explanations about the 
world. On the other hand, moral reductionism claims that “(...) the moral 
properties are properties that can be identified as being other, non-moral 
properties, where such identification involves us picking out exactly which other 
properties the moral properties are.”12 Summarizing, reductionists assume that 
                                                 
10 Hume, Appendix I, 6; see too Putnam, 2002, Chapter 01. 
11 According to Jackson (1998), Cornell realism has three characteristics: “(a) ethical 
properties are identical to descriptive properties; (b) relevant statements of identity are 
required a posteriori and (c) any analysis of the predicates and ethical judgments in 
descriptive terms is possible.” (144) 
12 Kirchin, 2012, 49. 
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moral properties exist in the world, and this world is the natural one. Hence, it 
seems reasonable to assume that there is a link connecting the natural and the 
moral worlds. 
Now, if we move the focus of our discussion about moral justification to the 
nature of moral properties, we can clearly see a problem that precedes this 
relationship between natural and moral properties. If we are willing to define the 
reductionist relationship between moral and natural properties, we need to 
understand what a natural property is.13 Copp claims that a natural property 
must be understood as an empirical property; in other words, “(...) a property is 
natural if and only if any synthetic proposition about its instantiation that can be 
known could only be known empirically.”14 Therefore, naturalism is defined in 
terms of what we can and cannot conceive from experience. Kirchin calls 
synthetical reductionist naturalism15 models similar to Copp’s, considering that 
it would be possible to reduce moral properties to natural properties in a 
specific way (in this case, to empirical properties). According to this view, we 
would be able to map the natural world or to discover the mappings available in 
this world, which would allow us to identify the usage of moral properties in the 
world through empirical investigation. If this is the case, there seems to be a 
subset of natural properties inside the natural set, as much as science has a 
subset of assessable natural properties. 
II – COPP’S SOCIETY-CENTERED MORAL THEORY 
NORMATIVE CONSTRICTION AND THE PICTURE OF MORALITY 
To Copp, moral questions are Janus-faced, because every time we state a value 
judgment about certain questions, we tend to assume that our moral convictions 
are beliefs “similar” to beliefs about chairs, tables and books. In other words, we 
                                                 
13 Copp identifies four strategies to address this issue and solve the problem of Moore’s open 
question argument: (A) reductionist proposals, (B) ostensive definitions, (C) metaphysical 
definitions and (D) epistemic definitions. See Copp, 2007, 36-39. 
14 Copp, 2007, 36. 
15 Kirchin, 2012, 69. Kirchin still distinguishes the analytical materialistic reductionism, 
which affirms the reductionist possibility as the synthetic position, but he replaces mapping 
through non-empirical methods with a conceptual analysis. At this point, there would be a 
difficulty in establishing the link between moral and natural property, especially for the 
analytical reductionist. Him strategy is to perform a network analysis, that is, relate moral 
concepts to other equally moral concepts and explain how such concepts are individually 
identified with natural concepts. For example, the concept of goodness is explained in a set 
of propositions wherein its use is relevant, demonstrating the role that goodness plays in 
this conceptual scheme in moral terms. The next step is to demonstrate, as did Moore and 
Hare, for instance, the concept of good as our central moral concept. In turn, we can 
remove all other evaluative and normative terms, explaining the good from natural 
properties that describe goodness. Thus, we could reinterpret how such natural properties 
perform the correct function because they play the role of goodness. With this, there is an 
anchor in our system from which we have a natural property that plays the role of 
goodness. Consequently, we reduced moral properties to natural properties.  
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intuitively take them as being true. At the same time, we see the other side of the 
coin when we consider the existence of moral convictions as a doubtful truth, 
insofar as we ordinarily tend to observe our moral convictions as different from 
our beliefs about chairs, tables and books. Generally, this dichotomy follows all 
of our metaethical questions. 
Hence, the discussion about normativity involves the metaethical challenge 
of developing a theory about the nature of moral judgments, at the same time as 
we need to discuss the truth conditions of such judgments. Copp’s central 
concern is to demonstrate the relationship between natural properties and moral 
properties, explaining how natural properties might be normative properties.16 
The safest choice would be, then, to commit to realism through a naturalist 
model, since “(...) our moral beliefs ascribe moral characteristics to things, 
characteristics such as goodness and rightness, and that these characteristics are 
natural characteristics, relevantly similar to ordinary properties of things, such as 
meteorological or economic properties.”17 
At this point, Copp resorts to the so-called Society-Centered Moral Theory18 
as an example of moral naturalism. According to Copp, every society needs a 
social moral code that ensures a balanced coexistence among individuals. After 
all, it is the social moral code that guides our relationships and allows 
cooperation among members of society.19 If we want to understand the dynamics 
in this picture of morality, we need to understand three basic interrelated 
features to determine the social moral code: we need to (i) identify the 
nature of morality (of moral judgments), (ii) determine its justification and 
(iii) discuss the role of society in this scheme and in the determination of 
the two first elements. 
                                                 
16 Furthermore, Copp assumes what he calls normative internalism, according to which if moral 
properties exist, they are necessarily normative, that is, a property can only count as moral 
property if it is normative. Therefore, the failure to explain the normative implies the failure to 
explain moral properties. Copp follows with a critique of motivational internalism, drawing 
attention to the need to explain the link between moral belief and motivation. According to 
him, despite defending a normative internalism model for moral judgment issues, his theory 
endorses a kind of motivational externalism, although he reaffirms the distinction between his 
naturalism and Cornell realism that also employs a kind of motivational externalism. Cornell 
realism’s weak point, according to Copp, is not the problem of motivation, but the failure in 
the explanation of the normativity of moral properties.  
17 Copp, 2007, 02.  
18 Copp defines society as follows: “A society is a multi-generational temporally extended 
population of persons, embracing a relatively closed network of relationships of friendship, 
affection, kinship, and cooperation in reproduction, and limited by the widest boundary of a 
distinctive and salient system of instrumental interaction that facilitates pursuit of the 
necessities of life and the priorities of the group’s culture.” (Copp, 2007, 22)  
19 According to Copp, morality is a useful set of social rules if we think in terms of its 
function. In this regard, basic moral propositions about right and wrong – for instance, lying 
is wrong! – will be true if and only if they work in the best way for their purpose of social 
organization. If we take the basic moral proposition that lying is wrong, socially we could 
establish the prohibition of lying. In these terms, morality is the useful set of social rules. In 
other words, moral beliefs are simply useful fictions.  
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In this framework, any attempt to harmonize the elements of this picture into 
a consistent theory would require us to explain the normative. This is the so-
called normative constriction, which claims that “(...) an adequate metaethical 
theory must explain what the normativity of moral judgment consists in.”20 This 
means that, before we discuss the moral weight of certain propositions, the 
properties of these propositions must be normative ones. This moral 
framework’s formula has two nuclear components. We need a cognitivist theory 
of normative language, that is, a standard-based theory (SBT) that offers a 
general model of truth conditions to normative propositions. In other words, a 
moral proposition will be true if and only if the rule or pattern to which it refers 
is justified. 
Moreover, we lack a justification theory of moral codes and patterns, which 
Copp calls society-centered theory (SCT). Societies need moral social codes, and 
this means that we need certain patterns to be justified so that our moral 
assertions can be justified and regarded as true or false. This issue must now be 
investigated. 
A standard-based theory does not provide moral justification of a moral code 
by simply deriving basic norms from a certain moral view. On the contrary, a 
moral code is justified if and only if a certain society is rational when choosing 
this social moral code.21 This feature endorses that moral judgments need to be 
justified by a cognitivist theory of normative language (SBT), which provides a 
general model of justification conditions, for it is in this discussion that the 
constructivist bias of Copp’s theory will be established.22 He points t o  a 
distinction between moral propositions such as “ lying is wrong” and moral 
standards such as the standard that forbids lying and that may be expressed with 
the imperative “Do not lie!” In this regard, standards are the semantic content 
expressed by imperatives, although they (the standards) are not beliefs nor 
represent the world in any way. This is the cognitivist theory of normative 
language proposed by Copp: 
The schema is intended to be applicable to laying out the truth conditions for any 
kind of normative proposition. The schema says that a (pure and basic) 
normative proposition of type K is true if and only if a corresponding standard of 
type K has the K-relevant “truth-grounding” status.23 
Starting with that presupposition, the philosopher proposes SBT as a scheme capable 
of explaining truth conditions of moral propositions in terms of a status that is 
relevantly correspondent to moral patterns. Consider the example of etiquette and the 
need for standards that support its rules such as “Don’t speak with your mouth full” 
                                                 
20 Copp, 2007, 03.  
21 This view is presented in Morality, Normativity, and Society (1995), but he seems to 
abandon it in his 2007 work, when he realizes that his theory is troubled by the task of 
defining rationality. Afterwards, this discussion is resumed in order to distinguish the 
naturalist and constructivist aspects of his theory.  
22 Cf. Copp, 1995, Introduction. 
23 Copp, 2007, 14. 
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or “Do not interrupt other people’s conversations.” Such rules are only held if there 
is a correspondent (K-relevant) indicating that it is rude to speak with the mouth full 
or that it is not adequate to interrupt the conversation of others without being invited. 
The same would stand in the moral dimension, because if we apply the SBT 
procedure, we will discover that a moral proposition will be true if and only if there 
is a corresponding standard, which must have a morally relevant truth condition. And 
this condition of being morally relevant is central for us to understand what status a 
moral standard must have insofar as the moral proposition is true. 
Hence, there must be a truth-grounding status that ensures the truth of moral 
corresponding proposition. In this interplay between standards and moral 
propositions, t h e  SBT intends to ensure the truth of a proposition by testing 
its corresponding standard. Therefore, if the standard is justified, the 
corresponding moral proposition also is.24 
Social moral codes may be given by a society-centered theory, which, in 
spite of being necessary, may vary from society to society. With the notion of 
SBT, Copp has only pointed out to the need of justification of standards, but 
he has not indicated what such justification consists of. Now, SCT will provide 
the procedure by which we will be able to present a justification theory of 
moral codes and patterns.  
According to the latter, 
a basic moral proposition is true only if a corresponding moral standard is 
included in or implied by the moral code the currency of which in the relevant 
society would enable the society better to serve its basic needs than would the 
currency of other sets of rules and better than would be the case if no set of 
rules had currency in the society.25 
In this case, moral patterns need to have a certain truth-grounding status that 
is relevant. Such status is the capability of being morally authoritative, which 
means having strength to oblige us. We are interested in knowing if the SCT is 
able to explain the authoritative status of the morality of these codes, for it is its 
relevant condition for grounding moral truth. 
There is a concern with identifying what is a normative assertion, since it has 
many variants, such as normative assertions about legal, moral, epistemological and 
etiquette matters. Besides, they differ from non-normative assertions like “the snow 
is white” or “my cat is fat,” since those do not present a corresponding standard from 
the normative perspective. Resorting to SBT, Copp defines that normative assertions 
point to certain standards. In the moral sphere, such standards hold an appropriate 
status that is correspondent to this sphere, as well as there are corresponding status to 
the legal sphere, epistemological sphere, etc. (remember the example of etiquette), 
what makes us infer that the nature of these status depends on the sphere of their 
application. In the moral sphere, the status of the assertions in this context is itself 
normative; hence, moral propositions will be true if and only if the corresponding 
                                                 
24 See Copp, 2007, 15. 
25 Copp, 2007, 17. This society should ensure physical integrity, cooperative integrity (internal 
social harmony), and peaceful and cooperative relationships with neighboring societies.  
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moral standards are appropriately justified.26 Therefore, there is an intrinsic 
normativity to each moral proposition, that is, they naturally oblige us in Copp’s 
understanding. On the other hand, SCT is concerned with explaining the conditions 
under which moral patterns should be relevantly justified, which implies, in Copp’s 
case, stating that a certain moral code is only justified to a society if this society 
rationally chooses and endorses such moral rules. 
Thus, it is by the combination of SBT and SCI that Copp expects to justify 
his realist naturalism. As he himself says, such components could be combined 
distinctly when separated, that is, the social-centered theory could endorse a non-
cognitivist position, as well as the standard-based theory could work to justify 
other supernaturalist or non-naturalist non-cognitivist models.27 However, the 
society-centered moral theory is, in Copp’s understanding, a powerful 
combination between standard-based theory and society-centered theory for 
solving the problems of moral epistemology and justification, respectively. 
Resorting to it, we would be capable of explaining the normative content of 
moral propositions and determining the nature of these propositions. As we 
could see, Copp’s naturalism makes us relate moral and natural properties by an 
explanation of normativity. And, as we will see, SBT points to a cognitivist and 
realist condition of his theory, but it is especially in SCT that we find elements 
for a constructivist interpretation of his theory. 
III – MORAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND MORAL REALISM 
MORAL CONSTRUCTIVISM 
I will now identify the lato sensu versions of both constructivism and 
realism. The lato sensu moral constructivist claims that moral facts or truths 
are constructed, that is, moral norms are truths made from a set of beliefs, 
which are our evidences in ethics. A moral realist such as David Brink defines 
constructivism as follows: 
Moral constructivism: 
(1) There are moral facts or truths, and 
(2) these facts or truths are constituted by the evidence for them.28 
Obviously, this definition is infected by Brink’s realist grasp, but the core of 
the constructivist model, which states that values are constructed and not 
discovered, is preserved. However, when Copp discusses the problem of 
constructivism, he makes use of Sharon Street’s29 terminology to divide it into 
                                                 
26 Copp, 1995, 03. 
27 Copp, 1995, 06. 
28 Brink, 1989, 20. Moreover, Brink claims that there are two kinds of constructivism in these 
terms: (a) relativist constructivism and (b) non-relativist constructivism.  
29 See his paper What is constructivism in ethics and metaethics? (2010). 
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(a) restrictivist view, according to which constructivism is a matter of 
substantive normative ethics, and (b) metaethical view, according to which 
constructivism has to deal with central second order questions. Street defines 
restrictivist constructivism as follows: 
(a) Restricted constructivist views in ethics specify some restricted set of 
normative claims and say that the truth of a claim falling within that set consists 
in that claim’s being entailed from within the practical point of view, where the 
practical point is given some substantive characterization.30 
Since it is a first order question, the restrictive proposal has the objective of 
accounting for the truth of a limited subset of normative claims. In this regard, a 
specific set of substantive normative claims chosen by the proponent of the 
theory, that is, the moral theorists, is talked about. Generally, this kind of 
constructivism claims that the truth of moral assertions comes from the fact 
that such assertions are forged from a predetermined practical standpoint,31 such 
as Copp’s society-centered procedure or even John Rawls’s original position. 
This view is endorsed by Darwall, Gibbard & Railton when they claim that this 
kind of constructivism deals only with first order problems and that, hence, it 
must explain, when facing different normative models, why it should be 
established instead of any of those other models.32 Summarizing, the 
constructivist view differs from other ethical views by prioritizing the 
relationship to be established between certain procedure and the correct/true 
result of its use. 
Given its restrictivist character, metaethical questions still remain open in this 
constructivist view; hence, Street suggests the abandonment of procedural 
characterization and the acceptance of the practical standpoint as a determining 
one. In other words, she claims that metaethical constructivism is better, since 
the strength of the argumentation is not exactly due to the procedure, but to the 
point of view of the agent who endorses certain values, that is, to the practical 
standpoint about what to do and what not to do within this procedure. 
Street proposes, then, the replacement of the procedural title of 
constructivism – represented by the slogan no normative truth independent from 
the procedure – by the notion of constructivism from a certain practical 
standpoint, here represented by the idea of no normative truth independent 
from the practical standpoint. Doing so, we are able to claim that there are no 
                                                 
30 Street, 2010, 08. Similarly, Darwall, Railton and Gibbard (1992) corroborate this view: 
“(…) the constructivist is a hypothetical proceduralist. He endorses some hypothetical 
procedure as determining which principles constitute valid standards of morality. The 
procedure might be one of coming to agreement on a social contract, or it might be, say, one 
of deciding which moral code to support for one’s society. A proceduralist, then, maintains 
there are no moral facts independent of the finding that a certain hypothetical procedure 
would have such and such an upshot.” (140)  
31 To Street, “(...) according to the proceduralist characterization, constructivist views 
understand normative truth as not merely uncovered by or coinciding with the outcome of a 
certain procedure, but as constituted by emergence from that procedure.” (Street, 2010, 03) 
32 See Toward Fin de siècle Ethics: Some Trends (1992), especially 137-144. 
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correction patterns within the normative realm, except from some place, that is, 
“(...) from the point of view of someone who already accepts some normative 
judgments or other – the point of view of a valuing creature.”33 In other words, 
given that metaethical constructivism is based on the practical standpoint, 
these norms are not defined by the procedure, but by the agents who 
create the moral judgments. 
Based on this distinction, Copp claims that his SCT – which he calls 
original theory since it was developed firstly (1995) – is a constructivist theory. 
However, later in the development of his theory he abandons this position, 
claiming that SCT – which he now calls a basic theory (2007) – can do well 
without these constructivist outlines. According to his understanding, the 
original theory is constructivist insofar as 
(…) it is committed to the thesis that moral propositions are “made true” by a 
relevant kind of “endorsement” from a preferred “standpoint.” We can say that a 
constructivist theory defines an “endorsement function” that takes a specified 
kind of input and yields moral propositions (or moral propositions of a certain 
kind) as output; a constructivist theory holds that there is an endorsement 
function F such that a moral proposition (of kind K) is true just in case (and 
because) F yields the proposition as “output” given a relevant “input.” If we take 
this to be the central doctrine of constructivism, the original theory is 
constructivist.34 
On the other hand, SCT’s basic theory is not constructivist, because the truth 
of a moral proposition depends only on “(...) which system of norms 
could better meet the needs of the society in question, and this is an 
endorsement-independent matter.”35 As it does not require endorsement, the 
basic theory would not need to presuppose a theory of practical rationality for 
the problem of justification. Thus, since it does not need rational endorsement, 
Copp’s naturalist theory would be in the following situation: on t h e  one 
hand, there would be original SCT as a kind of restrictivist constructivism 
insofar as it requires a procedure in which rational agents endorse and, 
consequently, construct the social moral code; on the other hand, basic SCT 
would not make use of a theory of rationality and would not reduce the problem 
of morality’s normativity to a simple matter of rational choice theory.36 
Despite the abandonment of original theory, Copp does not explain exactly why 
his theory is no longer constructivist, for SCT seems to be a restrictivist kind of 
constructivism and, although it might not settle the core of justification on the 
rationality of the involved agents, it still has to explain the transition of natural 
properties (input) to moral properties (output). Perhaps this explanation might be 
given by the realist definition of his theory. Let us see. 
                                                 
33 Street, 2010, 05. 
34 Copp, 2007, 19. 
35 Copp, 2007, 20. 
36 See Copp, 2007, 21. 
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MORAL REALISM 
In his work Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (1989), David 
Brink provides a broad definition of moral realism. 
Moral realism: 
(1) There are moral facts or truths, and 
(2) these facts or truths are independent from the evidence for them.37 
Together, (1) and (2) constitute the hard core of lato sensu realist theories. In 
terms of moral ontology, this definition is really broad, to a point that 
antirealists38 could agree with (1) and the realists themselves would diverge – 
as they currently do – about where to find (2). In order to clarify this point, 
Copp takes premises (1) and (2) as a starting point, but points out to five 
characteristics of realism, distinguishing it into basic realism and stance-
independent realism: 
Basic realism 
1. There are moral properties (and relations). There is, for example, such a thing 
as wrongness. 
2. Some moral properties are instantiated. For example, some actions are wrong. 
3. Moral predicates are used to ascribe moral properties. When we call an 
action “wrong,” we are ascribing to it the property wrongness. 
4. Moral assertions express moral beliefs. When we call an action “wrong,” we 
are expressing the belief that the action is wrong. 
                                                 
37 Brink, 1989, 16 
38 The classic example of this dissolution of the realist core is John Mackie’s antirealism 
(1977), although his critique seems to deal with only certain kinds of realism. His position is 
clearly antirealist insofar as it endorses three basic theses of moral ontology: a. There are no 
objective moral values (moral facts) that are independent from the subject’s mind; b. Moral 
judgments are independent from objective moral values (if they exist); c. Objective moral 
values are derived from moral judgments. See Mackie, 1977, Chapter 01. As a result, his 
proposal takes the form of an error theory to inform the mistake of assuming that setting out 
moral judgments would necessarily imply presupposing objective moral properties. This 
assumption is a mistake. Therefore, Mackie calls for the famous arguments from relativity 
and from queerness. The former provides indirect support to second-order skepticism to 
confirm the existence of discordant and antithetical moral judgments, which are derived 
from their respective contexts and time. The latter is divided into two parts: the 
metaphysical element, which states that “(...) if there were objective values, then they would 
be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else 
in the universe” (38). In the same measure, the epistemological element states that “(…) if 
we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or 
intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else.” (38)  
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5. Moral properties, in being properties, have the metaphysical status that any 
other property has, whatever that status is.39 
Stance-independent realism adds a sixth (6)40 thesis, claiming that certain moral 
facts exist in a mind-independent way. Such problem of moral ontology interests 
us in the discussion about naturalism, for the possible constructivist aspect of 
Copp’s theory would be supported on the basis of moral realism and 
constructivism. We have established, thus, the broad and the strict definitions of 
constructivism and realism, remaining, now, the discussion about how the 
relationship between them is established in a naturalist manner. 
In a nutshell, the philosopher argues that the metaethical constructivist might 
accept the five-theses package of basic realism, but would fall into contradiction 
if he accepted thesis 6 (stance-independent). Concerning thesis (1), about the 
existence of moral properties, we can say that the lato sensu constructivist 
would endorse the existence of such properties, although he would not reduce 
them to natural properties, nor search for a value-independent order for them. In 
this regard, the constructivist’s adherence to this thesis does not make him a 
reductionist naturalist. As to thesis (2), the constructivist can also accept that 
there is a relationship between moral and natural properties, just like in the 
naturalist case, but with the clarification that non-moral properties, since the 
moment they take part in the constructivist procedure, are interpreted as 
moral properties, which does not seem to be a problem for the naturalist.41 
About thesis (3), the constructivist has no problem in assuming the existence 
of instantiated properties, inasmuch as they are the result of a construction 
process, that is, created by its evidence. Regarding thesis (4), the constructivist 
– specially the one with a restrictivist bias – claims that the predicates are 
ordinary only until they take part in the procedure. From this point on, they 
would become moral predicates, non-reducible to simple scientific verification. 
The example presented by Copp is claiming that the predicate wrongness is 
used to assign the moral property is wrong to action x, whereas such 
predicate would not hold any sui generis condition for its existence. This 
discussion is directly connected to thesis (5), since constructivism would not 
have to deny that the agent’s mental state reduces normative assertions to 
ordinary beliefs, insofar as the agent’s mental state is of valuation and 
distinguishes moral assertions from simple ordinary beliefs. In this regard, 
beliefs would not be reduced only to its truth conditions, for the constructivist 
                                                 
39 Copp, 2014, 121-122. According to Copp, non-cognitivist antirealists could agree with 
thesis (1), (2), (3) and (4), but point (5) would be paramount to distinguish his position. 
Thesis (5), that moral properties share the same metaphysical status of any other property – 
regardless of the status – would distinguish Copp’s position from deflated versions of 
antirealism and non-cognitivism.  
40 In his text Morality in a Natural World (2007), Copp provides another definition of the sixth 
thesis: “(6) Moral properties are natural properties.” (10)  
41 Examples of this defense are the reductionist naturalism sustained by Copp and Peter 
Railton and some trends of neo-Aristotelianism and post-positivism. Cf. Darwall, Gibbard 
& Railton, 1992, 11.  
EVANDRO BARBOSA 
 64
would regard them as evidences only in the first moment, that is, before they 
join the procedural game.42 Regarding the example above, constructivism 
would agree with the use of the predicate wrong in propositions such as 
“Torturing is wrong!’ By doing so, we would assign the moral property 
wrongness to torture, although this property preserves its condition of being a 
belief that holds epistemic value. 
THESIS (6) – THE PROBLEM OF MIND-INDEPENDENT MORAL REALISM 
As we have seen, the realist theses from (1) to (5) of the so-called basic realism 
might be endorsed by the constructivist, but what is there to say about thesis (6), 
which defends a value-independent order and a kind of independent moral 
realism? Undoubtedly, the big restriction to a relationship between realism and 
constructivism in Copp’s naturalist theory concerns this sixth thesis. In a broad 
spectrum, independent moral realism (Thesis IMR)43 is a kind of ontological 
defense over the existence of an independent moral fact or truth, that is, 
regardless of the mental states of the moral agents. This strong type of moral 
realism, in which a certain moral fact or truth seems to be resistant to possible 
distortions given by the agent’s interpretation, would undermine the possibility 
of a moral constructivism that admits that moral facts or truths exist and are 
constructed in spite of any individual or social group. Hence, the mind-
(in)dependence problem would distinguish realism supporters from lato sensu 
constructivism supporters: 
Realism: 
(1) There are facts or truths of kind x, or 
(2) These facts or truths are independent of the evidence for them. 
Constructivism affirms R(l) and denies R(2). 
Constructivism: 
(1) There are facts or truths of kind x, and 
(2) These facts or truths are constituted by the evidence for them. 
Constructivism asserts and realism denies that the facts or truths in question 
are constituted by our evidence for them.44 
Briefly, we could say that facts are evidence-independent and moral truths are 
evidence-independent to supporters of thesis (6). But, what exactly is this 
                                                 
42 Hare draws attention to ethical descriptivism, which has incurred in what Austin called 
“descriptive fallacy”. See Hare, 2003, 71-94.  
43 Kirchin defines this position as follows: “Thesis IMR: The existence of moral properties and 
moral reasons is a mind-independent matter. That is, the existence of such properties and 
reasons is not dependent on what human beings, either individually or collectively, think, 
desire, are committed to, wish for, etc. Similarly, the 'type' or 'character' of value or reason 
that they are - e.g. goodness, kindness- is a mind-independent matter.” (2012, 22)  
44 Brink, 1989, 16.  
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independence? Brink suggests three kinds of independence: causal independence, 
metaphysical independence and conceptual independence.45 Causal independence 
would be supported by scientific realism models when claiming that objects like 
doors and walls exist as causally independent of their creator’s mental state. As to the 
moral realist, his concern is with a kind of conceptual independence (such as Moore 
trying to isolate the Good from our definitions and frameworks), or even with 
metaphysical independence as held by Platonist moral intuitionism. In this regard, 
conceptual or metaphysical independence works on grounds of a fact-value 
dichotomy. Summarizing, these theories claim that properties of moral terms and 
their truth conditions are not provided by the moral agent, which means they 
constitute this value-independent order. 
On the other hand, constructivist theories support that facts are evidence-
dependent. Hence, moral truths are evidence-dependent, as well as moral 
judgments are mind-dependent. Mind-dependent models are models in which 
truth conditions of moral judgments evoke counterfactual assertions about the 
agent’s choices in hypothetical circumstances of some kind. As said before, 
constructivism is a kind of mind-dependent defense when claiming that the truth 
of moral judgments depend on knowing if they (the judgments) are coherently 
related to the moral principles endorsed by valuing creatures engaged in an 
idealized reasoning process.46 If this is the case, thesis (6) cannot be claimed by 
the constructivist, because it would result in a contradiction. As mentioned, if 
Copp assumes the strong type of realism (endorsing thesis 6), according to 
which moral reality is fixed regardless of any of the agent’s beliefs related to it, 
the application of constructivism would be redundant. 
A remaining question is: how does Copp face this dilemma in his theory? 
As seen before, he identifies in the moral landscape the need for normative 
judgments to have strong truth conditions, as well as the need for the 
determination of those conditions. Moreover, it seems that we must determine, at 
some point, a kind of normative leap from natural properties to moral properties, 
which inclines us to think of constructivism as an adequate methodology. We 
can assume restrictivist constructivism and its procedural use, which defines the 
conditions that will produce moral facts or truths as a result (output). Hence, 
such facts or truths, and only those, will be moral facts or truths, due to being 
generated by the procedure. In other words, the procedure provides the 
conditions of justification of moral propositions, although it does not explain 
the resulting kind of fact or truth in terms of moral objectivity. What we know is 
that constructivism claims that moral facts are determined as the result of a 
procedure made on the basis of a value-dependent order; thus, it would accept 
basic realism without contradiction, that is, it would endorse theses (1) to (5) 
pointed out by Copp. That would be a procedural interpretation of the original 
theory of SCT, to which some judgments would be justified as social moral 
codes. 
                                                 
45 See Brink, 1989, 15. 
46 See Copp, 2013, 115. 
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Also, if we assume Copp’s model with a kind of metaethical constructivism – 
considering the mind-dependence question to the normative question and the 
consequent view to which there is no value-independent order to the practical 
standpoint –, his theory would still endorse a counterfactual dependence of value 
on the attitudes of agents. To both types of constructivism (procedural and 
metaethical), the essential consideration is that there are no moral facts beyond the 
standpoints of the agents who value from the society-centered perspective. 
Therefore, every social moral rule would be created and justified from this point; 
before that, natural properties would not hold the sufficient normative weight to be 
a justified moral property. Per se, SBT only provides the truth conditions of 
normative propositions as a cognitivist theory of normative language, which 
requires the condition of SBT to provide a kind of justification to social moral 
rules. Now it seems to point to a moral construction. 
CONCLUSION 
With these explanations, I believe we have enough elements to consider the 
relationship between constructivism and naturalism in David Copp from a 
common basis: moral realism. As mentioned before, Copp’s moral naturalism 
adds a sixth thesis to basic realism: (6) moral propositions are natural 
propositions. If Copp assumes his realist naturalism to be consonant with 
constructivism, the thesis above will lead him into contradiction. If he assumes 
similarities between naturalism and constructivism, then his realism cannot 
resort to the present mind-independence thesis (6). By doing so, he would 
render constructivism irrelevant to the justification perspective of his theory. 
However, Copp’s naturalist proposal points out that moral properties might be 
understood as natural properties. In this case, it seems that the constructivist is 
able to endorse the naturalist position of a basic realism, as far as the 
construction determines what moral facts or truths are. 
The fact is that resorting to Society-Centered Theory seems to point to some 
kind of constructivist naturalism in Copp’s proposal, for if we assume a 
rationally required justification for moral rules, ‘ correct’ and ‘ incorrect’ are 
not determined beforehand. In other words, the ideal moral code would be the 
moral code rationally chosen by a society to be used as a social moral code, 
regarding the needs and values of this society, as well as its circumstances. If all 
the members of a community subscribe to it, then the ideal moral code 
determines what actions might be considered wrong or right in relation to this 
society, which seems to reveal a relativist character in his theory. 
Now, if the constructivist option presented above is not sufficient, Copp can 
still assume metaethical constructivism as being compatible with his theory’s 
realism, accepting even his five theses on realism. However, the shadow of the 
sixth thesis still hovers over his theory. In this case, metaethical constructivism 
claims that normative facts are constructed by facts derived from rules of 
practical reason, which are combined to non-normative facts. The trick would be 
to provide a plausible model of practical reason, which implies explaining what 
involves playing the game of valuing. 
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The aim of this short draft was not to support Copp’s constructivist claims, but to 
clarify some obscure points about this theme throughout his naturalist theory, since 
the relationship between naturalism and realism is not a cause of disagreement. If 
Copp is successful in his normative desideratum of integrating natural basis to a 
constructivist model, it remains to be seen to what extent the commitment to the 
natural world negatively affects the mind-dependence condition of constructivism, 
since the naturalization of morals implies that normative explanations are derived 
from scientific explanations. Extrapolating this relationship, from the perspective of 
having normative reasons for actions, the fact of knowing scientific data about what 
we regard as a good life does not seem to be a relevant one. Reductions on the 
answer about the social moral code make the facts about what is valuable dependent 
on the result of causal process, which might be irrelevant to moral justification. It is 
due to the fact that, as in the previous example of murder, the moral condition of an 
action does not include the scientific explanation of the rule based on the victim’s 
causa mortis. In this regard, we notice that the reduction of moral properties to 
natural properties is derived from the answer of agents under idealized 
circumstances, such as SCT. In this case, the question is about normativity and not 
about moral itself. When the focus of the discussion is moved and the central 
question is obscured, we take the risk of reducing not only moral properties to 
natural properties, but also the moral realm to the normative realm. In this case, we 
would no longer be asking ourselves whether moral rules, such as chess or baseball 
rules, are good rules but, instead, we would be asking why we should observe them 
as we play. Even though antirealist criticism has been refuted in a minimum level, 
assuming a naturalized kind of morals does not avoid old embarrassments, insofar as 
presenting a set of factual data to explain the value of a certain moral judgment does 
not seem to be enough to demystify the nature of moral judgments. Such is the 
problem of not assuming the constructivist condition of Copp’s theory. Without it, 
the mystery remains to be seen… 
 
 
 5 
IS A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY STILL VIABLE?  
FABRÍCIO PONTIN 
What I want to offer in this article is a reading of political philosophy, particularly 
modern and liberal accounts of political philosophy, within a phenomenological 
perspective. My hypothesis is that a re-articulation of the main issues of 
phenomenology as it relates to social philosophy, first in the context of a natural-
world, non-transcendental, description (as developed by Schutz), but also in the 
context of a transcendental, in-depth, approach (as developed by Waldenfels), 
provides us with a methodological ground that can respond to some of the issues 
raised in the Habermas-Rawls debate, adding some important insights for many of 
the paradoxes identified in the praxis of Democracy. It will also provide us with 
clues as to how to think issues of social choice and decision making outside the 
framework of a methodological individualism. 
Weber had divided his narrative of social action into three levels to illustrate how 
we pass from a level of individual conceptualization of judgments and creation of 
identity (I), into an attempt to communicate these concepts and “mean to say” 
something to some other person (II), until finally one is also hit with a somewhat 
different conceptualization that motivate social interaction (III). Habermas, on his 
turn, will stress the first aspect of this process of conceptualization, claiming that 
sentences can and will be understood if the parties operate rationally. Moreover, not 
only will conceptualizations be understood, they will be agreed upon. So the 
universal of discursivity, which is understood aprioristically, is articulated with a 
universal will for communication.  
Schutz, however, tries to point at the static narrative behind these levels of 
understanding and action, providing a different account for the Weberian 
analysis of meaning and its articulation with action. Schutz identifies that 
Weber’s preoccupations, at the end of the 19th century, are not very different to 
those of his contemporary in philosophy, Edmund Husserl. To a great extent, the 
analysis of meaning constitution in Weber is almost identical to what we find in 
the Logical Investigations. In the idea of the solitary life of the soul, for 
example, Husserl also provides us with a first analysis of identity formation as 
“solitary” and isolated, and then moves such formation in terms of expression 
and indication, which are modes in which pre-conceptions about the world will 
enter interaction. Schutz points at these similarities in a brilliant way, but he also 
holds that Weber’s static understanding of action fails to describe social action 
and interaction in terms that are fair to experience. The problem of meaning 
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constitution, identity, and expression, in Schutz, is a time-problem.1 This means 
that all processes that lead to the formation of an identity and how an individual 
acts in society will be understood in terms of time-consciousness.  
This genetic level of analysis is understood by Habermas in terms of a 
philosophy of consciousness which is operative on the “lifeworld paradigm”. 
This motivates Habermas to see system-theory, as developed in the social 
sciences, as an heir to the reflections in Schutz and Husserl.2 Habermas, 
however, insists on the possibility of consensus as a guiding principle for 
sociological reflection: social interaction presupposes that individuals are in 
consensus about the meaning-like structures of the world and the value-like 
expressions of language. This element in Habermas is in tension with the 
account given by Rawls and with a phenomenological account of social action. 
Such tension reproduces the before-mentioned epistemological aspect of 
political liberalism: the question of language and discourse as a leading clue to 
the constitution of society and politics.  
Schutz points at a less formal understanding of the process of social-
constitution, and stresses the importance of historicizing the elements of action 
that characterize the behavior of individuals in society. In this sense, Schutz 
already anticipates a critical element in the Habermasian development of 
Communicative Action, that is: stressing the element of consensus in social 
interaction is to introduce an ought-like element in sociological analysis. Now, if 
we wish to understand the paradoxes in social action, especially as they relate do 
advanced democracies and their peculiar character, we need to move away from 
a description of how language and communicative practices should operate in 
society, and investigate how they are given in social interactions. To be sure, 
Habermas provides us with a sophisticated description of the processes of social 
interaction that lead to consensus in deliberative practices. The problem is that 
such description is artificial. 
This is not to say that Schutz himself does not have limitations. His genetic 
analysis of the processes of social constitution still trusts a somewhat formalistic 
account of the lifeworld. Schutz is successful in showing how the process of 
action and world-constitution can be accounted for phenomenologically, but his 
form of description of the “rational choice of values” in society is limited by his 
understanding of the lifeworld in terms of time-consciousness. This means that 
Schutz is not so open to the ways in which our constitution of values is 
determined by the environment in which these constitutions appear. Schutz still 
                                                 
1 Alfred Schutz. The Phenomenology of the Social World, (Evanston:Northwestern University 
Press,1967), 12 
2 “There is no doubt that the familiar psychological and sociological models of an 
isolated actor in a situation, affected by stimuli or acting according to plans, gain a 
certain depth of focus through being connected with phenomenological analysis of 
lifeworlds and action situation. And this is in turn the jumping-off point for a 
phenomenologically informed systems theory. This shows, incidentally, how easy it is 
for systems theory to become the heir to the philosophy of consciousness.” Jurgen 
Habermas. The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. II. (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1987), 128. 
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understands the emergence of ideal types in a Weberian way, that is, types are 
ultimately related to the history of an individual that articulate his optimum 
notions of values. But Husserl developed his idea of types in a generative level 
later in his philosophy, and this brings consequences to the form in which we 
understand society. 
Such comprehension of the processes of value-constitution, which also 
constitutes the political sphere, will allow us to understand some of the main 
issues in contemporary politics in a different light. Particularly, it motivates us to 
look into the evolution of the argument for a relationship of meaning and action, 
particularly in Kant, Weber and Husserl. The questions of voting, participation 
and what it means to have a preference, for example, will have to be 
reconsidered under these lights, and it is my thesis that a phenomenological 
analysis of these issues will allow us to comprehend the crossroads in political 
liberalism in terms of a permanent crisis in the processes of signification and 
comprehension of world-views, one that can be undesrstood as both destructive 
(in terms of political totalitarianism) and emancipatory (in terms of development 
of personal identity and plans of life). 
Ultimately, it is my take that generative phenomenology is a phenomenology 
of human freedom and that the legacy of a phenomenological interpretation of 
political philosophy points at a defense of freedom of speech. Husserl's 
generative phenomenology, in fact, points at the absurd of the totalitarian 
descriptions of human nature and vocation, and the static, stratified, notion of 
society that we find in contemporary philosophers like Heidegger and Scheler. It 
is particularly important to focus on this aspect, given the dark political 
implications of Heidegger's philosophy. Phenomenologists, especially social 
phenomenologists, must admit that Heidegger's political options, in the late 
1920's and early 1930's are a direct consequence of his epistemic choices and 
options, particularly his understanding of territory, ground, identity and 
vocation. There is an important collaboration in taking a Husserlian point of 
view here; as it shows that not all phenomenological contributions to political 
and social philosophy will lead to an anti-humanistic, anti-modern, interpretation 
of personality and rights. Husserl places himself as an heir to the philosophy of 
Kant, Hegel and Descartes while Heidegger points at the Jüdische Sprachen that 
threatens the motherland, the German territory, and identity. As I approach 
Tugendhat’s critique of Heidegger’s epistemological options, this contrast will 
become central to my option of dropping a non-liberal interpretation of political 
philosophy within the phenomenological spectrum. 
I hope to be able to show, at the end of this article, that a phenomenological 
approach to political philosophy will enrich our understanding of the history of 
human rights. Moreover, it will allow us to pin-point at some of the apparent 
paradoxes of political philosophy as a hermeneutic problem: we identify as 
paradoxes, as irrational choices, choices that we are not able to situate 
historically. Understanding these historical circumstances wherein different 
perspectives are given to social constitution will help us think through some of 
the political issues we struggle with nowadays, particularly the questions of 
social identity, and the current tension between different cultures and 
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implementation of rights and culture claims– which has been the main difficulty 
liberal societies have been struggling against. 
NORMAL AND OPTIMAL / HOME AND ALIEN: ELEMENTS FOR A SOCIAL 
COMPREHENSION OF THE LIFEWORLD 
The question of the constitution of the normal and the optimal, in Husserl, plays 
a similar role to the one we attributed to the notion of type in Weber. The normal 
refers to a process of habituation: in time, individuals incorporate elements of 
their surroundings, and the set of experiences they have in these surroundings, to 
their consciousness. Such processes create familiar appearances and relations of 
expectancies and disappointments. Allow me to give a banal example here in the 
form etiquette norms: if one grows up in a scenario where if one sneezes, one 
immediately apologizes for it, this creates a norm. This norm, then, orients 
comportment in every point in which one sneezes. In that case, if one fails to 
apologize after one sneezes, other actors who share the same heritage will react 
with disappointment.  
Now, though this example is banal, it points at certain characteristics of the 
constitution of normality. First of all, this stresses that we will only be able to 
understand something as a norm as it is inserted in time. I already anticipated 
this while bringing to modalities of time-consciousness (expectancy and 
disappointment) in my description of normality. It is because of this timely 
constitution of the normal that I am able to establish a concordance in the 
continuity of appearances, leading to my qualification of a certain experience as 
“normal”3.  
As these normal experiences are repeated in time, they acquire a certain 
density, and we might them qualify our normal experiences as “optimal”. An 
“optimal” here does not imply a rupture in the former experiences of the 
“normal”, at least not yet. It seems to me that an optimal level of constitution is 
at first possible in terms of an experiential peak for a certain normal, say, in 
terms of etiquette, participating in a tea-ceremony in Japan might institute an 
optimum in terms of table manners, this optimum does not necessarily introduce 
a rupture, or a discordance, with my previous set of experiences regarding table 
manners, but it does introduce a standard against which all other experiences of 
the same type will be compared.  
But a rupture in this experience, a discordance with the way the object 
normally appears, that is an abnormality, can re-constitute the object. The 
abnormal here will have its own continuity, its own presence in the experience of 
the object. A discordance will then constitute, an optimum, a new norm. This 
emerges out of the experience of the everyday world, of the lived-world. Of 
course, this is fundamental to our understanding of home and alien worlds; the 
normal and the abnormal only apply in a system of specific species, in a 
determined ecosystem, if you wish.  
The interesting point here is that a discordance is a break within a former 
                                                 
3 Ibid, 132 
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order of normally instituted constitution. If in the example of the tea-ceremony 
we have a confirmation of previous established norms of table-manners, but on a 
higher level of technical and aesthetical proficiency, in this case we would have 
a completely different dimension of what table-manners mean to begin with - in 
this case, the abnormal institutes a new level of signification, and points at a 
different mode of constituting social reality. 
In fact, abnormal forms of constitution reflect a multiplicity in the way in 
which we constitute social reality. This multiplicity, in Husserl, is expressed in 
the distinction between a familiar homeworld and a strange alienworld.  
Now, the familiar and the strange are generated, in Husserl, according to 
habituation and experience. In this, I am dangerously close to simply repeating 
the distinction between primary and secondary socialization in Weber. 
A homeworld would operate in a very similar form to the primary 
socialization in Weber, as it is the immediate, familiar, surroundings in which 
individuals appropriate and institute norms in accordance to a shared heritage, a 
shared socialization, a shared set of meaning-complexes. Husserl, however, 
stresses the importance of presentational and passively synthetized information 
in the constitution of this “home”. In that sense, the formation of a homeworld is 
dependent both on conscious activity of a self towards the constitution of 
meaning-like relations to objects that surround oneself, as well as non-conscious 
affection of that self by previously intersubjectively constructed and instituted 
relations, and contingent and territorial circumstances. In that sense, the order of 
an oikonomia is established historically within a space of similitude, and within 
this space individuals will also develop more and less dense experiences that 
will be further qualified as “normal” or “optimal”. 
Now, an alienworld takes the place of secondary socialization: an alien form 
of worldliness is one that disrupts the pacified set of experiences that we had 
previously constituted at home. At this stage, we have a reconsideration of the 
fundamentals of a familiarly constituted norm, now in relation to the emergence 
of a discordance, of a realization that something can be constituted in a different 
form. These processes of cultural shock insert an element of disorder into a 
previously well-ordered constitution of an object. Such disorder is, above all, 
temporal: we cannot grasp where the disordered element “fits” within our former 
experiences regarding a type – and this brings the realization that the temporal 
constitution of norms is not shared universally. 
Now, is this to say that the transcendental aspect of the lifeworld is in 
jeopardy? After all, how can we attest to the structure of the lifeworld if the 
historical conceptualizations of objects differ so radically? 
It seems to me that Husserl would indicate that to ask this question would 
miss the point of the transcendental analysis of the lifeworld. But I also believe 
that Schutz identified at this point a contradiction in the analysis of the lifeworld. 
I will get back at this in detail further in this article, but for now it suffices to say 
that Schutz, perhaps for lack of access, or for a general misunderstanding of the 
scope of the analysis of the lifeworld, does not comprehend how the 
transcendental character of the lifeworld refers to the co-generativity of home 
and alien. This is to say that the generation of normal and abnormal types is 
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always being constituted within an universally shared lifeworld which shapes the 
possibilities for the constitution of society. Hence the distinction between an 
analysis of the constitution of social reality, as in Weber, and an analysis of the 
possibility of social reality, which is what we have in Husserl. 
 Further, I will deal with how Schutz uses Husserl to approach and criticize 
Weber, but I also want to stress the limitations of the approach taken by Schutz, 
and how his decision to focus on a formal analysis of the lifeworld might have 
opened the way for Habermas’ critique of interpretative sociology, and his 
adoption of Tugendhat’s critique of Husserl’s phenomenology of consciousness. 
At this point in the dissertation I have enough elements to move to a 
phenomenological contribution to the issues of political and social philosophy. 
Schutz was able to identify in Weber a great affinity with the main problems in 
Husserl’s phenomenology. Weber and Husserl share a general assumption that 
the objective world, without individuals to experience it, is meaningless, and that 
the structure of “empirical reality” or “objective reality” is constituted in history. 
Now, we will see that Husserl was able to move further than Weber in this issue, 
particularly in the question of historicity and the division of formal and 
transcendental approaches to knowledge. This division is important to the 
understanding of the field and scope of social investigation, as well as to the 
epistemic consequences of taking a transcendental perspective to political and 
social issues.  
Next, I will attempt to formulate how Schutz relies on Husserl to develop a 
non-transcendental perspective to an analysis of everyday life4, in doing so, I 
hope to clarify the main differences in the historical and contextual account of 
meaning, as provided by Weber, and the phenomenological account given first 
by Husserl, and then by Schutz.  
Schutz appropriates the entire lexicon of Weberian sociology, infiltrating 
some elements of phenomenology for two effects. First, Schutz wants to broaden 
the scope of Weber’s sociology, by reframing the question of the “terms” in 
which we argue the structure of social reality. Schutz, in this sense, anticipates a 
problem in Habermas’ normative view of society: the structure of social reality 
cannot be just a matter of intersubjective agreement to what the terms used to 
describe external objects should be5, rather, the question of sense and meaning is 
left unsolved in classical sociology precisely because it is taken for granted as a 
matter of raw epistemic collection of “world views”. Second, Schutz informs the 
Weberian analysis of types with a structural phenomenology, which in turn 
allows him to disclose the structure of the social world as a structure of 
intelligible intentional meaning. Intentionality, of course, is the key turning 
point here: Weber speaks of “intended meaning” in an empirical sense, as in 
“what was meant” in a sentence uttered by a social actor; in Schutz intentional 
meaning refers to the structure of intentionality, trying to point that the social 
                                                 
4 Dan Zahavi, Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity. (1996 repr. Athens:Ohio 
University Press, 2001), 22-24 
5 Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World. Translated by George Walsh and 
Frederick Lehnert. (1932, repr. Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1967), 9 
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behavior of an actor is already given in a context, and that the “individual” actor 
is also inserted in a social space. In that sense, Schutz dislocates the solipsistic 
development of solitary constitution of meaning in Weber, introducing a field 
wherein a social phenomenology could operate. 
This dislocation operates on Schutz’s understanding of temporality and how 
it shapes behavior and reason – that is, how time-consciousness allows us to 
speak of the constitution of personality differently. Identity formation, in Weber, 
presupposes the existence of a primary form of socialization that informs and 
binds individual conceptions. Socialization, then, takes place within a certain 
social structure, and the process of formation of identity is immediately 
informed by social reality – by the surroundings of a social actor. This first 
movement is further made more complex in secondary form of socialization, but 
in this context the individual already has something like a “formed” personal 
identity. Thus, personal identity in Weber is dependent on the immediate aspect 
of socialization, on the form of early socialization of an individual; still, this 
dependency does not provide social actors with a static form of identity, further 
socialization might render aspects of primary socialization undesirable, or put 
them under a different light. 
 But the dynamic nature of identity constitution also re-constitutes the 
environment, or the social-organism, where actors are situated, so the social 
surroundings that once affected a social actor is now affected by one’s acts. This 
temporal dialectic of being-affected by social reality and constructing new 
conceptions onto social reality characterizes the social construction of the 
lifeworld. Such process is underdeveloped by Weber. 
A social phenomenology will therefore presuppose Weber’s notion of 
meaning and social action, but also indicate that what Weber has offered is only 
at the level of a regional analysis of meaning and a historical understanding of 
temporality. This might appear of little consequence for a sociological analysis 
of everyday life, but it brings consequences to the way in which we understand 
decisions and judgments, and particularly how we attribute validity to beliefs 
about conduct in an increasingly diverse homeworld.  
So we can follow the consequences of the formal approach taken by Schutz, I 
will break down his critique of Weberian sociology into three different topics: 
first, I will introduce the distinction between intended and observed meaning in 
Schutz as a re-articulation and critique of the distinction between absolute and 
instrumental understanding in Weber. Second, I will point to the way in which 
Schutz takes on the prevalence of perception of reality over the representation of 
reality, which allows him to read the notion of ideal types as at loss with 
experience rather than enriching it. Finally, I will point that social relationships, 
and social action, in Schutz are not meaning-oriented, but rather other-oriented.  
THE CONSTITUTION OF MEANING IN SOCIAL PHENOMENOLOGY 
Schutz defines meaning as a way in which we approach former experiences; this 
approach will circumscribe certain aspects of external reality as possessing a 
determined density, a materiality. Materiality is the building of a mastery of the 
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I, the realization that it is possible to have a perspective on an experience, and 
that this perspective, though it presupposes socialization, is a solitary endeavor. 
Only the individual that perceives something as meaningful is fully aware as to 
why and how that particular experience becomes charged with meaning. Later, 
one might wish to share his view, but as we will see communicating the entire 
density, the entire meaning, of a personal experience is always at loss with the 
actual experience. In this sense, having a self presupposes constituting what 
Schutz calls a “world of experiences”, that is, a scheme of references and 
presentations to which a social actor refers to in the moment something is 
constituted as meaningful. Further a self acquires a density, “a certain way of 
directing one’s gaze at an item of one’s own experience.”6 In this we create a 
peculiar stock of meaningful-like relations to objects and experiences, based on 
the repetition of these objects in experience.  
One could be tempted to ask how this description is any different than the 
Weberian description of identity constitution. The main distinction is that Weber 
presupposes that meaning is always rationally constituted, that is, that it can be 
described in a detailed analysis of a conscious individual that is in full control of which 
elements of her primordial world of experiences are affecting her experiences. Her 
judgment of something as meaningful is perfectly coherent within a system of 
references, and behavioral factors do not enter play as “meaningful”.  
In Schutz, references that are not represented rationally or consciously by an 
individual are relevant and participate in the constitution of meaning. Individuals 
never really cease to be affected by previous perceptions that inform and 
constrain the circle of what is meaningful. In that sense meaning is both 
intentional, as it refers to the form of conscious apprehension and signification 
of presentations, and observational, since all data which is presented to a social 
actor becomes relevant to the process of signification.  
At this point, meaning is constituted topologically: it is attached to the place 
of speech and to the circumstances of a given place of speech. It also reflects the 
multiplicity of presentations as always already integrated within a context of 
meaning. All lived experiences, in Schutz, are meaningful insofar they constitute 
the field of possibilities in which something is perceived as meaningful7.  
I want to focus on the question of disorder in the constitution of meaning 
within Schutz. I do not think it is controversial at all to claim that social action in 
Weber is a matter of ordering a previous stock of shared and individual 
knowledge and expressing this knowledge as a preference, as something that one 
values. In that sense, when I say that I choose x rather than y, I am expressing a 
historically constituted scheme of representations which is consciously chosen 
by me. I am expressing an ordered and rational interest. In some scenarios, if we 
are dealing with goods or values that are of importance to what I consider to be 
the core of my self, then I will attribute a static value to that good or value, that 
appears to me as absolute. In both cases, my preference is ordered, rational and 
fully under my control.  
                                                 
6 Ibid, 42 
7 Ibid ,27 
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Such is not the case in Schutz. First of all, the elements that constitute 
something for me as meaningful are not fully well-ordered in my consciousness. 
There are affective elements in the process of object and value constitution that I 
simply cannot grasp, and yet, they participate in my attribution of “meaning” to 
that same object. Object constitution in Schutz is, in that sense, disordered.  
Things get further complicated, then, when we think of terms of a social act 
and a social action. If these modes of social interaction, in Weber, reproduced 
the modes of rationally constituted meaning (as either instrumental or absolute, 
according to the orientation of a self towards that object or value), in Schutz an 
act includes all active and passive elements of the lived-experience of a social 
actor: instinctive behavior, for example, can and will play a part in the 
constitution of a social act. Action is not confined to the realm of the rational8.  
In that sense, the notion of rational choice is taken under a very suspicious 
light in Schutz’ phenomenology. For Schutz, reducing the process of choice to a 
ranking of preferences that can be described in a transitive and connected form 
loses sight that any constitute preference is always in interaction with an 
individual who never ceases the constituting process. In that sense, the 
typification of social choice and social preference into a system of hierarchically 
ordered types can be useful for the understanding of the economic aspects of the 
process of choice and valuation. But the danger in adopting such model is losing 
sight that individual preferences are not reflected upon, in experience, in the way 
which formal models in political economy express such preferences. The 
adoption of “neutral” points for the distribution of ideal preferences in social 
plans (and Schutz is particularly critical of Pareto at this point) is further 
evidence of what we lose when we adopt such methodology9. 
Schutz provides a different methodology in which we can deal with the 
constitution of economic and social preferences. I will try to use a game 
developed by António Damázio and Antoine Bechara10, the Iowa Gambling 
Task, as an example of a decision experiment that can be interpreted under the 
methodology suggested by Schutz: 
The Iowa Gambling Task was developed as a tool to present the hypothesis 
of the somatic marker. This hypothesis, which is the central point in Damázio’s 
classical study on the brain Descartes’ error11 is that what we call a “decision” is 
such a complex and detailed process within the brain that it is impossible for an 
individual to consciously grasp all that is going on when she thinks she is 
deciding upon a preference or upon a strategy.  
Damázio defends that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) centralizes 
the input received from the “perceptive areas” of the brain, including the amygdala, 
the olfactory system and the temporal lobes, and then sends signals, or somatic 
                                                 
8 Alfred Schutz, On phenomenology and Social Relations. (The University of Chicago Press: 
Chicago, 1970), 144-5.  
9 Ibid, 133  
10 Bechara A, Damasio H, Tranel D, Damasio AR (1997). "Deciding advantageously before 
knowing the advantageous strategy". Science 275 (5304): 1293–5. 
11 António Damásio. Descartes' error. Emotion, reason, and the human brain. (New York: 
Putnam, 1996). 
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markers, to the “cognitive areas” of the brain which will further interpret these 
outputs as “emotions” or use these outputs to conceive of “strategies”. However, 
since the vmPFC centralizes the entire input of perceptions given to an individual, it 
also works as a “filter” of information for consciousness. What we later recall as the 
core of relevant perceptions for a determined experience, or for a decision, is already 
somewhat filtered within the vmPFC.  
The Iowa Gambling Task aims at testing this hypothesis. The test asks an actor to 
choose among 4 different decks of cards A, B, C and D. Each card within the deck is 
labeled with an economic value. Each deck contains a different harmonic 
distribution of advantageous or disadvantageous cards, so the harmonic distribution 
in deck A will be for eventual marginal gain, short term significant loss and long 
term significant loss (in game theory, this will be a mini-mini situation), B will have 
a harmonic distribution of eventual significant gain, short term marginal loss and 
long term marginal loss (a mini-max, in terms of game theory), C will have a 
harmonic distribution of eventual marginal loss, short term marginal gain and long 
term marginal gain (a max-mini, in terms of game theory), D will have a distribution 
of rare marginal loss, short term significant gain and long term significant gain (a 
max-max, in terms of game theory).  
Individuals enter the game in a blind situation: they do not know that the decks 
have this composition. All they know is that they have to choose a card within each 
of the decks, and that they have 50 choices to maximize their gain. However, for 
every choice of a card within a deck they are informed by the simulation that they 
have lost “x” and won “y”. If the result is positive, the simulation provides the actor 
with positive feedback (a smiley face on the computer screen and a pleasant sound, 
if the test is conducted by software, positive reinforcement, if the test is conducted in 
person). As individuals play the game it is expected that they will learn and 
understand the patterns of each deck, choosing the more advantageous deck in order 
to maximize gain and avert risk. 
And, in fact, this is the most typical result for the test. Individuals indeed learn 
which deck is more economically advantageous and then establish that it is a 
dominant strategy to always choose the deck “D”. However, this is the typical result, 
not the necessary one. And some variation is perceived according to social standing, 
education level, compulsive behavior and brain damage. Some variation has also 
been observed according to the place wherein the test is conducted.  
Of course, I cannot problematize the implications of this test in terms of brain 
physiology. It should suffice to say that the results seem to confirm the existence 
of the somatic markers, particularly when the results of individuals with 
extensive damage to the vmPFC are so dramatically different from individuals 
that do not show any kind of brain damage. It should also be said that 
individuals that express compulsive behavior often show understanding of the 
task and of its implications, they often know that the deck “D” offered more 
gain, but they actually preferred to take risks in decks with less harmonic 
compensation. It is also interesting to perceive that the results tend not to change 
if the compensation is virtual or actual. In the original game, individuals actually 
gained and actually lost the amount given in the cards. In other scenarios, where 
compensation to participants in medical experiments is not allowed, the 
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compensation and loss was only virtual. In both scenarios, the results tend to 
remain homogeneous: typically, individuals will a) perceive that there is a more 
advantageous deck, and b) choose from that deck.  
This test is often taken as a confirmation of most rational choice theories: 
individuals indeed organize choices in terms of gain, individuals indeed prefer to 
take a dominant strategy which is advantageous rather than a strategy that is not, 
and individuals often behave oriented towards goals.  
I think, however, that we can try to read the results in a different manner.  
First of all, we need to understand how the mind is operating while it plays 
the game. Surely, for the economist the moment of decision is isolated in the 
moment in which we “play”, or in which one actually takes a card from a deck 
in one’s hand and sees the result. Of course, this could be isolated as a 
“moment” of decision, but I think that Schutz can provide us with a more 
complex reading of this phenomena. 
I do not want to argue (and I do not think I could, in good faith) against the 
hypothesis of the somatic marker. Actually, I believe we can use it to strengthen 
the point of a phenomenological reading: I have been stressing throughout this 
section that the main element of a phenomenological reading is the perception of 
external information which is affecting our processes of constitution of 
something as a “concept” or the way in which we value one thing rather than 
another. I also stressed that much is lost when we remember, or when we recall a 
presentation forth as a memory. We are not fully in control of all the elements 
that constitute a choice. We cannot rank all these elements; we cannot really 
understand how they affect our thought process. And yet, they are affective. 
Somatic markers seem to be doing precisely this: they seem to be providing 
consciousness with some elements that will be apparent to us in the moment of a 
decision, while at the same time a number of other affections continue to inform 
the constitution of something as a choice. In that sense, the “ranking” of 
preference or the establishment of a dominant strategy is but an aspect of the 
entire process leading to the choice. It is a standstill image within a movie. 
Schutz, then, is not very far from current hypothesis in decision theory, 
particularly to what Damásio has been stressing, when he writes that the 
problem of social action should be understood as a question of perception and 
temporal constitution of perceived data. Social phenomenology, in that sense, 
provides us with leading clues that we can use in order to interpret economic 
action. In the examples of the Iowa Gambling Task: should we not consider the 
constitution of a “gain” for the player?  
If we subscribe to a purely economic theory of choice and decision we will 
have a very direct answer to this question: individuals that do not aim at 
economical gain are not acting rationally. There is something fundamentally 
wrong with their conduct if it is a conscious conduct towards consistent 
economic loss.  
Surely, we would all be surprised if we witnessed an individual burning 
money on the street. But we make uneconomical choices all the time, we choose 
against our economic interest often and consciously (anyone who has opted for 
an academic career has probably made this kind of choice consistently and 
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repeatedly). This goes to show that the notion of “gain” is not only connected to 
the apparent economic advantage of a choice (even though they are analogic to 
burning money on the street). Rather, a choice is connected to a system of 
previous affections and references, to a stock of presentations which is 
represented as a choice consciously – but the elements that are represented rely 
deeply on a number of other elements that affect the decision passively, 
elements that are not ranked and that cannot be expressed as a “reflected upon” 
decision. 
In that sense, I dare say that the max-max in the Iowa Gambling Task is 
dependent on socialization more than economic gain. Individuals might very 
well perceive more gain in choosing the deck “B” because they like the color red 
so much, and the deck B keeps on providing them with cards in the color red. 
They might have been socialized in a context where getting a red card is good 
luck (even though they are suffering staggering economic losses by keeping on 
choosing the deck “B”). Perhaps the negative reinforcement given by the 
computer in the software simulation (a sad face and a strong beep noise) is 
pleasurable for that individual, and she hence insists on that sensation (though 
that sensation might be costing her real money). Our stock of presentations 
might inform our conception of gain and utility differently, and this should 
motivate us to look at expression of sets of preferences that ignore the existence 
of the stock of presentations or that insist that we should abandon such stock 
with suspicion. These models will necessarily be artificial and super-imposed. 
They will also rely on a particular stock of presentations that allows for the 
consideration of a view of nowhere. This is not to say that such exercises are not 
useful, or that they are not efficient as a pattern to analyze economic utility. As I 
have stressed in my first chapter, the methodological soundness of these models 
is hard to be argued against. But they cannot be framed as an irresistible model 
of analysis for social choice. Social phenomenology allows us to think the 
principle of utility differently and in context, thus informing economic theory 
with elements of disorder and unpredictability – and providing a more complete 
picture of the decision process.  
THE RICHNESS OF EXPERIENCE AND THE POORNESS OF THE CONCEPT 
Now, if Schutz has a big point of departure from both Weber and Husserl, it 
would be in his interpretation of social experience and the conceptual reduction 
of such experience. It seems that the interlocution with American pragmatism, 
particularly William James and John Dewey, motivates Schutz to become 
increasingly suspicious of attempts to establish a transcendental theory of 
intersubjectivity, or even a transcendental account of knowledge12. 
Schutz ultimately accuses transcendental methodologies of a solipsist 
attitude, where even other individuals are taken as data available for 
consciousness. The transcendental ego, in Husserl, takes the existence of other 
                                                 
12 Alfred Schutz, On phenomenology and Social Relations. (The University of Chicago Press: 
Chicago, 1970), 252-3 
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egos as mere datum that are interpreted within consciousness, it is not in 
interaction with others in a social context13. Moreover, the phenomenological 
reduction, taken radically as a transcendental approach, might lead to the 
bracketing of the existence of others, and the integrality of a self would be hence 
reduced to its solitary life.  
However, this is a brute simplification of the transcendental ego in genetic 
and generative phenomenology. As Husserl advances his argument we perceive 
that, first, the lifeworld is primordial, it constitutes a condition for the 
integration of sense, and the ontological structure of these world will therefore 
manifest itself for everyone, it will constitute the primordial stock of 
presentations which will further inform a pre-predicative level in which all 
individuals within the lifeworld will disclose sense. Thus, the pre-predicative 
level of a lifeworld which is retained by consciousness indicates that external 
reality is persistent, and that it exists not only for me but for others within that 
world14. Moreover, it indicates that I am not only in monadic relation to other 
monads in a static reality: it points that the solitary life of the self is only a 
methodological clue into the understanding of materiality, instead of a matter of 
fact about our selfhood. Actually, the transcendental aspect of our selfs, what 
Husserl calls the transcendental Ego, refers to the privileged status of external 
reality, and the transcendental pull that objects in that reality operate into our 
consciousness – in that, Husserl suggests that individuals share a determined 
structure which allows for the signification of these “pulls”.  
So, Schutz misunderstands the problem of origin and primordiality in 
Husserl, reading as a sort of solipsism. But it is interesting to note that as he 
attempts to provide a phenomenology of the social world which focuses on the 
natural attitude (in order to avoid the solipsism of the transcendental attitude) he 
ends up surprisingly closer to a generative phenomenology, and this is clear in 
his critique of the notion of ideal types in Weber. 
Schutz criticizes the notion of ideal types in Weber, but not out of a 
disagreement with the hypothesis that individuals tend to overemphasize certain 
aspects of experience and turn them into ideals. His main contention is with the 
notion that ideal types would somehow enrich or purify experience, working as a 
filter of sensible pollution. For Schutz, any sort of typification is necessarily at 
loss against the experience of what is conceptualized. As we turn experiences 
into concepts we lose a great deal of what was experienced – we cannot 
communicate the whole of a feeling or of a value into a typification15. Moreover, 
types will often go against social experience and deny the density of feelings and 
behavior. The Weberian attitude towards concepts and types, and the sort of 
social reality these types produce will therefore produce a stratification of reality 
which turns the process of resignification and historical reevaluation of 
                                                 
13 Dan Zahavi, Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity. (1996 repr. Athens:Ohio 
University Press, 2001) 24 
14 Anthony Steinbock. Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1995), 193 
15 Michael D. Barber. Equality and Diversity Phenomenological Investigations of Prejudice 
and Discrimination. (New York: Humanity Books, 2001), 107 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 
 81
experience into a history of grammatical reconsideration of types. Thus, the 
hermeneutics provided by Weber are located on the level of the normative 
comprehension of society alone, they do not deal with the actual uses and 
appropriations of experiences in everyday life.  
When Schutz describes this process he is in fact dealing with the problem of 
the origin of sense, and the generation of new meaning within different social 
worlds. This is precisely the point of a generative analysis of the lifeworld, 
where sense is not only generated within solipsist acquisition of external data, 
but out of a familiar world which includes heritage, tradition and so on. From the 
standpoint of a generative phenomenology, then, Husserl and Schutz seem to be 
in the same position regarding types: the normative level of typification loses the 
richness of presentational experience16, it also points at the constant level of 
transformation and re-consideration of what is a tradition, how it is constituted 
and re-constituted within different societies. 
Typifications then are useful only insofar they operate as a scheme of 
orientation for members of a determined society. They create a common 
grammar that allows for a normative organization of society17. However, these 
processes of organization take the social organization of a social group itself for 
granted, as well as the formal structures that constitute such social group.  
THE REFERENCE OF SOCIAL ACTION 
Weber had to stress the prevalence of meaning in his study of social relations. 
This is particularly clear once we understand his methodology: social actors 
operate in society in a diverse fashion, but sociology can only be occupied with 
the aspects of this operation that can be circumscribed to rational expression of 
values and preferences by this individual. Weber trusts that society is ultimately 
formed by rationally oriented individuals that pursue their goals in a conscious 
and ordered fashion. In that sense, when we act in society we act with the 
meaning of our act fully constituted, at least from our point of view, and we 
expect our interlocutor to be able to also understand the meaning of our action. 
Accidents in this process, as far as Weber is concerned, are either a result of 
primary aspects of socialization that were not shared, or of instrumental 
interpretation of social acts for aggressive motivations. Still, the orientation of 
the action is towards meaning. We “mean to say” something when we act in 
society, we want to communicate an interest and be understood in this interest. 
If Weber focuses on the meaningful constitution of types, Schutz wants to 
privilege the experiential aspects of these types. For Schutz, we are always 
inserted within a circle of expectations within social reality, and this circle of 
expectations already informs the reception of our social actions before we 
actually express any preference. More tragically, our points of view will never 
meet the expectations and subjective view point of the other person that we refer 
                                                 
16 Ibid, 195 
17 Alfred Schutz, On phenomenology and Social Relations. (The University of Chicago Press: 
Chicago, 1970), 121 
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to. Expressive movements, intonations and erotic interactions in general enter 
interaction along with what we actually mean to say, and further complicate the 
picture of an action as oriented towards meaning. Rather, social action 
presupposes a sort of mutual attraction and a will to leave the solipsism of a first 
person perspective and to enter social interaction.  
The core of Schutz interpretation of social interaction, then, is based on an 
interpretative effort to disclose the peculiar motivations of individuals (or 
groups) as they enter social relations. Not only does he focus on elements of 
meaning (or appropriation of meaning) within these groups, but also on how 
their common lifeworld has been constituted. In that sense, even under a radical 
phenomenological reduction, there is no way one can leave the position of a 
point of view when considering social action.  
Interpretative sociology, as coined by Schutz, will then focus on analyzing 
social interaction and the uses of terms in social interaction as contingent. It also 
recognizes a certain disorder in the processes of signification and appropriation 
of tradition and experiences.  
RE-CLAIMING A TRANSCENDENTAL APPROACH TO SOCIAL REALITY: 
THREE SHORT PROPOSALS 
Perhaps a phenomenological analysis of meaning constitution could help us 
understand why certain societies recognize that women have the right to drive, 
and certain societies do not allow women to drive, but it does not allow us to say 
that allowing women to drive is fundamentally more rational and legitimate than 
not allowing them to drive.  
Habermas18 stresses that phenomenology remains on the level of mere 
description of social reality, if it chooses to follow the terms of Schutz’ 
interpretative sociology, never really analyzing how the social reality that is 
constituted has a fair or unfair systemic organization. Even worse, if we are to 
take a more transcendental approach, and choose to focus on the structure of the 
self and the presence of a field of affections that restrict and constrain meaning, 
then we de-rationalize the process of meaning constitution, leaving the 
possibility of a rational constitution of a systemic order aside, and, with it, 
abandoning the project of modernity.  
If Habermas is right, then, phenomenology is not compatible with any 
modern or liberal account of political dynamics within society, and it hence 
denies the necessity of the regimen of rights. Consequently, a phenomenological 
position will deny the language of human rights as anything but a historical 
construction, one that has the same degree of validity and normativity as 
dogmatic and totalitarian conceptualizations of social preferences. 
I want to further present three general theses that I take to be compatible with 
both a phenomenological perspective and a modern account of political 
                                                 
18 PONTIN, Fabrício. “The invention of a paradigm: the normative conception of the 
lifeworld in Habermas”. In TRAVEJTELOVÁ, Jana. The yearbook on the history and 
interpretation of phenomenology 2015. pp. 27-65 
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philosophy. Since I have been stressing the problem of social choice and 
decision throughout this dissertation, I will attempt to delimitate the implication 
of my theses to this issues. 
A. CULTURE IS A STOCK OF PRESENTATIONS 
Interpretative anthropology indicated that culture should be understood in terms 
of a web of significations that inform and constitute social relations. This 
interpretative standpoint for culture owns a great deal to Weber, and sticks to a 
regional understanding of these webs of significations. Geertz defends that we 
should understand and interpret signs in the network of significations where they 
are active, in a way, making ourselves more familiar with determined uses of 
terms and signs that will vary from place to place. 
Geertz uses the distinction between an eye twitch and a wink to illustrate his 
point19. From the standpoint of mere observation, it is quite difficult to 
distinguish which is which, and anyone who has been in a situation of 
attempting to court someone else might have asked the question ‘was that a 
wink? Or a twitch?’, and faced the disastrous consequences of a 
misinterpretation of the sign. Part of the difficulty in interpreting a body sign is 
not only in distinguishing between involuntary movement and voluntary 
movement, but also in distinguishing on what is meant by a determined 
movement. When I wink, do I communicate an intention to flirt? Do I 
communicate that I am lying about what I just said? Do I communicate to a peer 
that I wish to conspire against someone? Do I wish to threat an opponent in a 
card game? The codified meaning of the act of winking is hence dependent on a 
number of aspects of socialization that integrate that act into a web of references 
to a cultural stock of knowledge, actually, it is also dependent that the act is 
rendered as meaningful. After all, certain gestures that are charged with meaning 
in one cultural scenario might be completely meaningless in different contexts. 
Geertz brilliant analysis of culture, however, remains on the level of a stock 
of knowledge to which an interpreter refers to when attempting to clarify the 
meaning behind certain acts. Surely, interpretative anthropology goes above the 
limits of structural anthropology, and shakes some of the most static 
presuppositions behind Levy-Strauss’ analysis of practices. This, however, is not 
the place to dwell in these distinctions. What I am most interested in is that even 
from the stand point of interpretative sociology, culture refer to a process of 
signification which says that we have some control over what the terms we are 
referring to mean (at least what they mean to us) and how we want to control 
them. This places culture on the level of representation: it already presupposes 
that we associate things with their meaning, conducts with determined values, 
and so on.  
But I want to question if we are indeed in control of the process of 
signification and association which is going on in culture: are we actually 
referring to a stock of knowledge when we build and interpret social reality? If 
                                                 
19 Clifford Geertz. The Interpretation of Cultures. (New York: Basic Books, 1973) p. 6-7. 
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we assume so, we also must admit that the creation of a social reality and the 
consequential choice of values and preferences leading to the institution of a 
systemic order are fully under our control: we actually know how and what we 
are choosing and preferring. 
And yet, we are clearly in a conundrum: what does a stock of knowledge refer 
to? A stock of knowledge may not appear by fiat in a subject, it is somehow 
acquired in social life and in personal experience. Here, Rawls and Habermas will 
provide us with different solutions to this problem, which I see as a problem of 
control. For Rawls, such stock of knowledge should be understood in terms of 
plans of life and comprehensive doctrines that are mitigated within the terms of 
political liberalism in decent societies. For Habermas, this stock of knowledge 
hints at the necessity of communicative reason: individuals are prone to organize 
their social preferences according to meaning-oriented practices of speech which 
are universally shared by any individual. If societies are not organizing themselves 
according to the necessity of such procedure, it is because an instrumental 
approach to reason has taken over the public sphere. For Habermas, 
communicative reason frames the limits of rational cultural claims, and for Rawls, 
the only aspect of culture, as something that informs a comprehensive doctrine, 
which is meaningful for a political perspective is the aspect that will impact the 
sustainability of a political doctrine aiming at developing fairness, which is to say, 
cultural claims are only problematic in the moment they impact the possibility of 
other culture claims to occur at the same time. 
Is Weber in a better position here? The historicist approach has a certain 
malleability that both Rawls and Habermas lack. Rawls lacks such malleability, 
it seems to me, on purpose: he wants to decrease the scope of analysis of 
political philosophy to a minimal account of social choice and preferences. 
Habermas, however, takes the Weberian analysis to its limit, by choosing to turn 
a regional analysis of meaning and signification into a universal pragmatic that 
rules all sorts of rational constitution of meaning.  
Still, even Weber insisted that we could only comprehend social action in 
terms of meaning orientation. This is to say that the aspects of culture that matter 
for our analysis of action and preference should be restricted to meaning-
oriented performances by social actors. 
But, again, it seems to me that we need to ask how the constitution of such 
stock of knowledge, which is the reference for meaning-oriented performance, 
becomes the case to begin with. I want to suggest that the cultural stratum is not 
only connected to a web of meaning-complexes that are signified and re-
signified in everyday practices. Rather, it seems that culture is precisely that 
which affects our meaning-like assertions about the world, while at the same 
time not being perceived as affective. 
Technology provides us with a good clue to this hypothesis: the use of virtual 
environments has become “naturalized” among young individuals in most 
developed countries to the point in which virtual experiences are rendered with a 
sort of density that defies the arm-chaired distinction between ‘virtual’ and ‘real’ 
environments. In that sense, virtual environments enter the realm of ‘culture’, as 
they participate and compose part of the complex to which we refer when we 
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act. But the key question here is if they are apprehended in terms of knowledge: 
that is, are we in control of the ways in which technology shapes and orients our 
conducts? It seems that these elements are affective much before we actually 
appropriate them as “meaningful”, our interaction with devices, with tools, has 
always shaped and changed the ways in which we comprehend reality, but I do 
not think we can claim that we are in full control of the “meaning” these 
interactions have – and yet, they are part of culture. 
Culture, then, refer to the sets of references to which we are exposed, and 
that constitute our everyday experiences on a passive level. This level is relevant 
to what we will later represent and apprehend as meaningful. What I want to 
stress here is that the level of primary socialization, as developed by Weber, 
indicates that we do not originally refer to a stock of knowledge, that is, an 
organized web of meaning complexes. We only do so much later, on the level of 
the representation of retended experiences.  
The constitution of something as meaningful, then, already presupposes a 
cultural stock of presentations, which include all elements that impact upon our 
choices and preferences, and that we do not control. In time, we will be able to 
re-constitute some of these elements, and then indeed re-appropriate them in 
meaningful terms. We can look back at former choices and identify elements in 
those choices that we were not aware of by the time we established a preference.  
This allows us to understand the malleability of the process of choice in more 
radical terms: our processes of signification and re-signification always points 
back at a dynamic cultural set that affects us and pushes us towards these 
processes. The difficulty of a static view of culture, particularly one that views it 
as related to a stock of knowledge, is that it will ignore that the dynamic 
incorporation of new elements into the cultural stratum does not allow us to 
immediately conceive of these elements as meaningful, even though they affect 
our social interactions decisively. 
Consequently, the process of acquisition of knowledge is in a time-lag 
between “the realization of something (object), of someone (subject), and of 
meaning (order)”20, and in tension with the reverberation of elements in 
objectivity, intersubjectivity and order that are not at all under our control, in the 
shaping of the cultural strata that affects our attempts of constitution. Meaning 
constitution, whatever the sort of meaning constitution, from the standpoint of a 
phenomenological account, is hence anachronic in any case21. We have a 
temporal disorder between the moment in which we perceive and are affected by 
something, and the moment in which we attach meaning to that same something. 
Surely, we are also able to identify something in a stable form, and then realize 
the repetition of a certain input. But in this we are repeating our first 
representation of a given experience, and remain in time-lag.  
In that sense, claims of particular privilege of preferences regarding 
originality or tradition should be regarded with a great deal of suspicion. We do 
                                                 
20 Bernhard Waldenfels, The Question of the Other. (Hong Kong: The Chinese University 
Press, 2007), 55. 
21 I own this point to Anthony Steinbock. 
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not have any access to “the way things were” or to the original and primordial 
stance of meaning constitution, particularly because on a primordial level 
meaning might not even be possible.  
I realize this might get us dangerously close to an overly relativistic account 
of social preferences, but this is not my intention here. Rather, I want to point at 
claims of cultural, traditional and moral superiority as fundamentally absurd and 
indefensible from an epistemological point of view. Surely, we can understand 
these sorts of preferences as an of appropriation of the time-lag between culture 
and meaning, one that tries to compensate the disordered nature of the process of 
meaning constitution by emphasizing some narratives that attempt to provide us 
with an ordered description of the act of origin. It should be no surprise, then, 
that the more literal the interpretation of a founding myth, the more dogmatic the 
values that arise from this interpretation will be.  
I would then approach the problem of meaning constitution and the 
attribution of values in terms of freedom, rather than in terms of culture. Our 
cultural stock of presentations refers to the basis in which the constitution of 
meaning is possible; it operates as a dynamic field in which we institute normal 
and abnormal practices, and this process of constitution and institution of 
normality and abnormality is further constricted by more or less dogmatic views 
of culture, which brings me to my second thesis. 
B. FREEDOM AS THE POSSIBILITY OF RE-SIGNIFICATION 
Consider how your priorities and meaning-complexes would be like had they 
remained the same ones you had in the moment you were seven years old. On a 
personal level, I would have to say that most of my priorities would involve 
having chocolate, going to swimming lessons, and avoiding Sunday school. 
Interestingly, I now can no longer have chocolate, dislike swimming, and still 
avoid Sunday school. I suppose I could provide some other examples, to illustrate 
a certain maturity, but my point is quite simple: we change the way in which we 
constitute our preferences and how we think about certain objects in time. 
Take, for example, the case of a cup of coffee. Now, one can grow up having 
Robusta coffee of a terrible brand bought in cans at the nearest supermarket 
chain, and be convinced that one, in fact, hates coffee. In time, however, one 
might have the opportunity to have a fine, single-origin, Arabica coffee bought 
directly from the producer, and then realize that, in fact, one loves coffee quite a 
lot. Of course, the change in perspective does not have to rely on the quality of 
the bean (though most, if not all, coffee enthusiasts will insist quite verbally on 
the superiority of Arabica over Robusta); it might rely on the experience of 
having coffee, as a whole. Allow me to elaborate: it is quite conceivable that one 
prefers the lower quality coffee because it recalls other sorts of experiences 
which one associates with that particular coffee. So, one prefers the Robusta 
coffee, which one is fully aware is of lower quality than the Arabica sort, 
because that was the sort of coffee one was having during an important event. In 
that sense, the coffee is not only the quality of the bean, but an entire context, an 
entire experience which is recalled and presentified in that moment. In both 
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cases, we have the constitution and re-constitution of optimal appearances of 
something to consciousness, though in the second example the earlier experience 
remains optimal even though the individual experiences another “norm”.  
But my point here is not about coffee, it is about freedom. How so? I want to 
hold that the central point for a phenomenological contribution for political 
philosophy will have to retain a privileged space for a notion of freedom as 
freedom of re-signification. Of course, as long as we are talking about coffee, we 
are relatively free of dogmatic views about changing one’s mind. But what about 
Sunday school? 
Chocolate, swimming and coffee do not offer us much controversy in terms 
of practices. Few people actually mind that one does not like coffee, swimming 
or chocolate, and even fewer people seem to be willing to kill you if you change 
your mind regarding a preference for Arabica to Robusta. Now, if we look at 
more controversial values, the situation changes immensely.  
Reconstitution of preferences and values regarding organized religion, 
ethnicity, sexuality, and other aspects that are perceived as absolutes within 
different cultures seem to be problematic. And yet, they are a central part in the 
development of societies that tend to be less brutal than others.  
In that sense, the impossibility of re-signification of values, grounded on the 
supposed originality or superiority of a certain claim of culture, institutes a very 
peculiar kind of bondage that inflicts a direct impediment of speech. 
Freedom of speech as freedom to re-signify and re-appropriate becomes 
central to my phenomenological interpretation of the political: the process of 
meaning constitution is always on the open, and opens a venue in which we can 
articulate and re-appropriate culture positively or negatively, we can access 
former experiences, or current cultural norms, and deem them racist, 
inappropriate, undesirable, and so on. 
Now, it would be naïve to suggest that such process will always be successful. 
It will not. It is quite possible that in time conducts will be re-signified and an 
individual might become more racist or more totalitarian. This is, in fact, quite a 
common response when we look at totalitarian social groups that feel threatened 
by the appearance of “anomic” competing individuals or groups. 
This also points at a comprehension of cosmopolitan history outside the 
limits of a teleological and evolutionary base. From a phenomenological 
standpoint, peaks of mutual recognition and understanding might be followed by 
disastrous new norms of conduct. We are not inexorably moving towards a more 
cosmopolitan political order.  
Interestingly, this takes me back to some of the conclusions of the analysis of 
democracy in Arrow: if we look at how democracies fail, part of the problem is 
with whom feels motivated to organize and speak about values. As a democratic 
order becomes more organized and stable, individuals tend to take the 
institutional framework for granted. In that sense, a stable and relatively 
apathetic relationship with the process of voting and active political participation 
might be (and should be) interpreted as a good sign. General commotion towards 
elections usually indicates incipient or failing regimens (think of the 2011 
protests at the Middle East, or the commotion of the 1989 presidential elections 
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in Brazil – the first direct election since 1960, and the first fully inclusive 
election in the history of the country). But the paradox in this situation is that the 
individuals that will feel motivated to speak in these elections, that will actually 
vote, are individuals that do not represent the majority of society. These 
individuals benefit from an order that allows them to claim for particular 
policies, for particular re-considerations of systemic norms, and then might use 
these norms to decrease the reach of freedom of speech and re-signification.  
This puts us in an awkward position: attesting the freedom to re-signify 
values and preferences might cause us to, in time, decrease the possibilities of 
signification: it might move us to a totalitarian position of speech where a 
determined norm, a determined view point about society, dominates all forms of 
assertions.  
We are then again faced with the problem of control: how do we control 
assertions about preferences in order to, first, recognize that we cannot simply 
establish an ought-like structure for social relations, and, second, that an 
uncontrolled system of assertions about preferences tends to anarchy and 
totalitarianism (often at the same time).  
My final thesis about this matter is quite liberal: I want to defend that we 
need to think politics through as a system of organization for our processes of 
signification.  
C. POLITICAL ORDER AS LIMITING THE SCOPE OF SIGNIFICATIONS 
Rawls’ insight about the toleration of the intolerant is one of the most 
compelling examples of how to defend freedom of speech while retaining some 
sort of coercion against violent behavior. For Rawls, the key point is the right to 
complain: the right of complain is a fundamental principle of justice, which 
follows from equal liberty. Until an intolerant sect gives us reason to perceive it 
as threatening our basic civil institutions, or our physical integrality, we have no 
justification to “curb” the intolerant22. Unreasonable claims of any sort are 
acceptable insofar they are understood as a manifestation of a shared equal 
liberty among all individuals: the liberty to speak one’s mind.  
“Threat”, is, nevertheless, a complicated concept. I am sure that Rawls 
understands it in terms of direct and expressed intent to destroy civil liberties, 
and direct and expressed actions towards violence against individuals. But what 
about symbolic violence and symbolic threat? Are those levels irrelevant?  
I do not think that Rawls disputes that language plays a role in constituting 
social reality and the fairness of institutions, but, and this was an important 
claim in my first chapter, it seems that his focus on political economy as 
providing a neutral point of view for the development of the original position 
suggests that interpretations about the symbolic violence of a determined social 
actor are only relevant as they are in conflict with normative guidelines.  
                                                 
22 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. (1971; repr., Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1999) , 
190-4. 
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Granted the scope of Rawls’ analysis, I do not have any reservations against 
it. Indeed, from the standpoint of a normatively constituted order, we have much 
more to lose than to gain by regulating speech excessively. But the problem here 
is precisely with the scope of the analysis: how do we get to the point where we 
have a normatively constituted order? 
If we follow the three thesis I am presenting progressively, we have (1) a 
cultural stock of presentations which is (2) consistently appropriated and re-
appropriated meaningfully in individual and social practices and experiences 
that (3) will need to be regulated, in time, in order to avoid a complete collapse 
in social relations. In that sense, I hope that a systemic level will serve as a 
control for the processes of signification and re-signification of culture, thus 
dramatically increasing the scope of the analysis provided by Rawls. 
The problem with increasing the scope of analysis here is avoiding falling 
prey to the same issue that plagued Habermas: the insertion of an ought-like 
structure for social relations. First of all, I think I already dodge this issue by 
introducing a non-teleological account of the process of constitution: I admit that 
the process of constitution and re-constitution of preferences is in the open as it 
does not follow the necessity of communicative reason, it only follows clues 
given by a cultural stock of presentations. 
But even if you grant me that I have avoided the problem of an ought-like 
description of social action, I still need to clarify how norms are possible within 
this perspective. I think that I have already anticipated much of these movements 
in the introduction of this article, when I brought up the question of optimality 
and normality in Husserl. But I did not offer any description of these processes 
on an institutional level in Husserl.  
This is because Husserl offers nothing of that sort. We will not find in 
Husserl any direct reference to the constitution of norms on an institutional 
level, and how these norms influence and change social behavior. However, I do 
not think it is impossible to incorporate these elements onto the “stock of 
preferences” that influence the way in which we make decisions.  
Allow me to suggest that we can interpret a movement within Weber 
phenomenologically in order to have a clue into this issue: grant that we have a 
disordered set of references which is informing the constitution of normal and 
abnormal conducts. Now, once this disordered set is interpreted within a familiar 
context, we start to conceive of what Husserl calls a “homeworld”, and the 
formerly disordered set of references is organized within a system. At this point, 
the cultural stock of presentations becomes a stock of knowledge. In time, our 
social interactions will move us away from our initial topological position, 
disturbing what was previously organized as “normal” and “abnormal”, this 
generates new possibilities for conceiving of preferences (as in my example with 
coffee, or, in a more radical example, religious conversion), and also increases 
the scope of the stock of presentations to which any future meaning-like 
conceptualization will ultimately refer to. Now, this is the point in which conflict 
between different sorts of conception of “normal” conduct will become more 
radical, as they are going to refer to fundamentally differently constituted stocks 
of knowledge, that is, each “home” will constitute the conflicting form of normal 
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constitution as “alien”. Once again, the social interaction here seems to point at 
the necessity of implementing a grammar for social relations which will increase 
the scope of familiarity, but the formation of such grammar is going to be 
effective within a context where the reference point of discussion has been 
affected by this irreversible encounter with an alien perspective. In that sense, 
the formation of a more or less totalitarian State which will regulate future 
mutual encounters is directly related to the history of previous interactions with 
different perspectives. A cosmopolitan position, in this context, is only possible 
within a perspective that will give the historical conditions to such possibility. 
Then, if we want to claim that the historical movement leading us to the 
current discourse on human rights is indeed irresistible, we will have to find 
ways to inform and communicate the necessity of such approach within 
communities that may have reason to be suspicious of our suggestions. This is 
not to say that we should drop our historically constituted preferences about the 
good, but to put them in perspective, including how the pathway leading to the 
prevalence of a discourse on human rights in developed democracies has often 
and consistently been implemented on the basis of the exploration of 
underdeveloped countries. The history of the formation of the Westphalian 
consensus, in this context, is particularly informative, as the development of the 
way of life in the European Empires, leading to the implementation of a 
discourse on rights, was only possible while the same European potencies that 
claimed the values of human dignity were, and still are, exploiting western 
Africa to the point of destruction.  
In this sense, the process leading to the legitimacy of modern democracies 
and the universal claim of Human Rights, which I also believe is a claim that 
finds full support within the context of the Husserlian later philosophy and its 
obsession with the relevance of European humanism, can only be implemented 
on a broader level in terms of an exchange of historicities, of a mutual awareness 
of the processes leading to current mainstream conceptions of goods in different 
States and communities.  
 6 
VALUE AND MORAL PLURALISM 
FLÁVIA C. CHAGAS 
“Some people cross the forest and see only firewood.”  
(Leo Tolstoy) 
The idea that value judgments are subjective, lacking objective theoretical 
warranties, or impossible to be understood in a rational justification is not new, 
not only in philosophy, but also in common sense. Actually, not touching upon 
sociological, anthropological or psychological—in other words, empirical—
discussions concerning whether and how it is possible to morally justify our 
choices having in mind possible factors that condition (but not determine) our 
actions, philosophical skepticism generally supports that it is not possible to 
dispute valuation questions so that questions about “what is good?” or “how 
should we live?” concern only the subjective dimension of moral evaluation and 
decision. 
As is well-known, the Kantian perspective goes against the kind of 
argumentation outlined above, in which we may include both skeptical 
perspectives, as that of the amoralist, for instance, and emotivist perspectives, 
which reject the possibility and even the necessity of justifying moral values and 
norms. 
However, the thesis that practical reason should act as a mainstay for the 
justification of moral values is not restricted to the body of Kantian universalist 
ethics, but is actually defined among wider theoretical perspectives, so to speak, 
as the case of Hilary Putnam’s pragmatism or of the social liberalism endorsed 
by the philosopher and economist Amartya Sen. Indeed, in the beginning of his 
book The Collapse of the Fact/ Value Dichotomy and Other Essays, Putnam 
posits that 
The idea that “value judgments are subjective” is a piece of philosophy that 
has gradually come to be accepted by many people as if it were common sense. 
In the hands of sophisticated thinkers this idea can be and has been developed in 
different ways. The ones I shall be concerned with hold that “statements of fact” 
are capable of being “objectively true” and capable, as well, of being 
“objectively warranted,” while value judgments, according to these thinkers, are 
incapable of object truth and objective warrant. Value judgments, according to 
the most extreme proponents of a sharp “fact/value” dichotomy, are completely 
outside the sphere of reason. This book tries to show that from the beginning 
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these views rested on untenable arguments and on over-inflated dichotomies. 
And these untenable arguments had, as we shall see, important “real world” 
consequences in the twentieth century (Putnam, 2008, p.13). 
Indeed, according to Putnam, the idea that value judgments are strictly 
subjective and, therefore, cannot be rationally disputed results from certain 
philosophical stories and constructions that began with modern empiricism, but 
were reaffirmed and consolidated with their 20th century “offspring,” namely 
logical positivism. Thus, one of the objectives of Putnam’s analysis in this book 
is to show that the reason why value judgments lack objectivity is found in the 
advocates for the dichotomy between fact and value, which is, on its turn, 
attributed to the well-known Humean argument that from judgments about how 
the world is (descriptive enunciates about facts) it is not possible to infer how 
the world should be (prescriptive enunciates about values). But this distinction 
echoes another, namely the distinction between judgments about relations 
between ideas, known as analytic judgments, and judgments about questions 
concerning fact and existence, known as synthetic (a posteriori) judgments, so 
that such judgments synthesize the set of enunciates capable of carrying some 
kind of objectivity, since the truth value of these enunciates depends upon either 
the simple logical relations among the concepts involved or the possibilities of 
assessing the correspondence between representation and object.1 
                                                 
1 Putnam does not reject the necessity and the utility of the distinction between fact and 
value. What many theoreticians, among them Putnam, Sen, Nagel, Hare, Habermas and 
Korsgaard, reject is the thesis that, to be objective or to have some kind of pretention of 
objective validity, judgments should be descriptive. Indeed, Cristine Korsgaard points in 
that direction when she posits, in her article “Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth 
Century Moral Philosophy,” that “what is important for my purposes is this: even when 
what we might call the verificationist element in verificationism was dropped—that is, even 
when philosophers reclaimed the intelligibility of propositions that cannot be verified 
through the empirical sciences—one element in the verificationist picture was retained. 
That element is the idea that it is the function of all of our concepts, or anyway all of our 
authentically cognitive concepts, to describe reality. We must go carefully here. In calling 
this into question, I don’t mean to deny that there is a sense in which all of our concepts—
that is, all of the concepts we have any business using—can be used in propositions that do 
in fact describe reality, in the sense that they are capable of being true or false. Rather, I 
mean to call into question the idea that this is what all of our concepts are for—that their 
cognitive job, so to speak, is to describe reality. So long as we retain that idea, it will 
continue to appear that moral realism is the only possible alternative to relativism, 
skepticism, subjectivism, and all of the various ways that ethics might seem hopeless. And 
so long as moral realism appears to be the only alternative to these skeptical options, the 
need to show that moral truth is as solid, as real, as objective, as scientific truth—and also 
that it is objective in the same way as scientific truth—will seem pressing. This was our 
situation in the early and middle years of the twentieth century. I am aware that what I have 
said about the function of our concepts will seem vague until I articulate an alternative 
function. I intend to do that presently, but first I want to notice that from the start there was 
already a problem with the distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism in ethics. 
The distinction suggests that a moral judgment either articulates a description of some fact 
or is as a disguised version of some alternative use of language—either expressive or 
prescriptive. But where does this leave theories like Aristotle’s or Kant’s, according to 
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Without entering into the details of the difficulties among the truths by 
convention and Quine’s critique of the analytic/synthetic dichotomy or in the 
problems of the defined descriptions and the question of the notion of truth 
understood as correspondence, it is important to define the limits of our 
reconstruction of the problem of the justification of ethics so as to draw attention 
solely, at this moment of the argumentation, to the fact that not only tautologies 
or factual/empirically verifiable truths may reclaim objective validity for its 
enunciates, but also certain enunciates about moral value without the need to 
address the problematic notion of moral facts or truths, which would have to be, 
so to speak, discovered. 
Does saying that philosophical ethics does not have the function of 
describing moral facts or truths that could, in this case, be the object of a 
description, imply the impossibility of disputing value questions? Or yet, is the 
renunciation of objectivity in ethics and in questions of value based on the fact 
that ethics does not have a descriptive function? And, moreover, is the solution 
inevitably skepticism in terms of values? 
If we understand the task of ethics as moral philosophy not only, or better, 
substantially, as that of describing the world, but as that of intending to offer a 
possible guide for human conduct, that is, an answer to the question about the 
good life, it seems impossible to deny the possibility, and even the necessity, 
according to Kant and Putnam, of disputing not only the means, but also the 
ends when we treat valuation questions. However, this dispute, according to 
these philosophers, depends on and goes through finding a notion of rationality 
applicable to normative questions.2 
This notion of rationality should be capable of guaranteeing the moral 
pluralism of several conceptions of good without, on the one hand, falling into 
                                                 
which moral judgments are the conclusions of practical reasoning? A conclusion of 
practical reasoning is not obviously a description of a fact about the world, but it hardly 
seems like some sort of emotional expletive, either. Where do these theories fit? I believe 
that the answer is that they don’t fit, but unfortunately this may not be obvious, because the 
issue raises a further question about the principles of practical reason themselves. We may 
say that it is true that an action is right just in case it accords with the categorical imperative, 
for instance, but what then are we to say about the categorical imperative itself? When we 
ask about the status of the principles of practical reason, the question of cognitivism and 
non-cognitivism seems to come up once more. For instance one may suppose that the 
principles of practical reason must be self-evident truths known by intuition, and then Kant 
will come out looking like a traditional rationalistic realist. This is not just a fantasy—this is 
how Kant was actually read by many late nineteenth-century philosophers, especially in 
Britain. Sidgwick and Mill, who read Kant this way, will serve as sufficiently distinguished 
examples. Alternatively, someone who takes seriously Kant’s thesis that moral laws are the 
laws of autonomy, legislated by the agent’s own will, may read him, as Hare sometimes 
seems to do, as a prescriptivist and so a non-cognitivist. So although practical reason 
theories might at first seem to fall between the cracks, there are ways of making them fit the 
mold.” In: A Filosofia Prática de Kant: ensaios. Pelotas: Nepfil Online, 2014, p.25-26) 
2 This suggests, beforehand, the skepticism in relation to the set of theories that deny that 
practical reason plays a fundamental role in moral justification, such as current expressivist 
and non-cognitive theories 
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moral relativism and, on the other hand, searching for an ultimate groundwork 
for what is morally good as understood in terms of a “strong” moral realism, 
such as is the case, for instance, in Boyd and Railton, who advocate the general 
idea that objectivity in ethics supposes the notion of objectivity analogous to that 
of the natural sciences (that is, that there are moral facts that are objectively 
valid or independent from the mind). 
Thus, the aim of this paper is to show that, and how, the Kantian perspective 
is capable of offering, if not the best, at least a good option for solving the 
problem in question, namely finding and justifying the notion of practical 
rationality capable of warranting moral pluralism without falling into relativism. 
 
* * * 
 
Although the objections to the Kantian paradigm are well-known, I would like to 
draw attention to some that can be productive to the dialog in this text: 1) that it 
is a timeless, de-contextualized and ahistorical notion of rationality3; 2) Kantian 
ethics is an ethics of the “duty for duty’s sake,”which means a rigorist ethics that 
demands too much from the subject4; 3) it is an ethics that does not include the 
pluralism of conceptions of good,5 since the only ethics capable of having moral 
value is that founded on the CI. 
I will try to show that these three objections are unjustified due to the reasons 
that will be developed throughout my argumentation: 1) the claim that it is a de-
contextualized and ahistorical notion of rationality depends on assuming a 
theory of the two worlds, or yet, the support of a double ontology to justify this 
conception of practical reason; 2) as Kant, Sen and Putnam posit, it would be a 
very shallow presupposition about human beings to identify rational choice with 
the search for realization only of self-interest, having in mind that the subject 
values and has reasons to value “things” such as commitments, ideas, values, 
that are not exhausted in the pursuit of pleasure and the tendency to avoid pain. 
This point may also call to mind the important link in Kant between the notions 
of morality and virtue; 3) finally, the third objection is that it is an incomplete 
ethics concerning the justification of good in ways that can integrate different 
conceptions of good. The Kantian proposition is exactly the contrary: that only 
through a formal criterion of evaluation it is possible to ensure moral pluralism 
without falling into moral relativism. 
In order to avoid misunderstandings, it should be emphasized that this paper 
aims not so much to defend Kant by attempting to refute these objections than to 
provide a somewhat detailed investigation of an implication, seemingly fairly 
                                                 
3 Cf. for instance, SCHOPENHAUER, A. Sobre o fundamento da Moral. São Paulo: Martins 
Fontes, 1995; WILLIAMS, B. Moral: Uma introdução à ética. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 
2005; SEN, A. A ideia de Justiça. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2011; TUGENDHAT, 
E. Lições sobre Ética. Petrópolis: Vozes, 2010; KERSTING, W. Liberdade e Liberalismo. 
Porto Alegre: Edipucrs, 2005. 
4 Idem. 
5 KEKES, John. The morality of pluralism. Princeton University Press, 1993. See also the 
analysis by AUDI, R. Moral Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 40-41. 
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obvious, of the notion of practical reason as found in the Kantian paradigm that 
apparently has not been discussed in depth by the commentators, namely that 
exactly against such objections, Kant advocates the pluralism of conceptions of 
good so that this thesis can only be ensured from a conception of practical 
rationality as the groundwork for the moral value of actions. In this perspective 
we read in the Anthropology: 
Finally, the moral egoist is a man who limits all ends to himself, sees no use in 
anything except what is useful to him and, as a eudaemonist, locates the supreme 
determining ground of his will merely in utility and his own happiness, not in 
thought of duty. For, since every other man also forms his own different concept 
of what he considers happiness, it is precisely egoism that results in [the 
eudaemonist’s] having no touchstone of the genuine concept of duty, which 
absolutely must be a universally valid principle.—So all eudaemonists are 
practical egoists. The opposite of egoism can be only pluralism, that is, the attitude 
of not being occupied with oneself as the whole world, but regarding and 
conducting oneself as a citizen of the world (Kant, Anthropologie, VI, BA 8). 
In order to understand how this connection between the notion of practical 
rationality as the nucleus of moral value is possible and how this conception 
allows Kant to say that the criterion of the categorical imperative is what allows 
moral pluralism, we will firstly investigate the demands and presuppositions of 
the Kantian understanding of practical agency to see whether and how it is 
possible to say that it allows moral pluralism. 
1. PRACTICAL RATIONALITY AND MORAL VALUE 
To understand the Kantian thesis that the moral value of an action depends 
on its being based on the normative demand of practical rationality, two 
considerations are indispensable: 
 
1) practical rationality, in its formal aspect, is the source of moral value; 
2) to conceive this demand, which unites aspects of normative or substantive 
ethics, we do not need to suppose super-inflated ontologies, or, in Putnam’s 
words, metaphysical stories, even from the Kantian text. 
 
In relation to the first point, Kant stresses what he understands as the form of 
the law as groundwork for the determination of the will in the first two section 
of the GMS and the first six chapters of KpV from the distinction between acting 
according to maxims that may be considered valid only subjectively or 
objectively. This mode of judgment, according to him, is possible only by the 
disposition of the subject to act based on the representation of rules. 
In the two texts mentioned above, namely GMS6 and KpV, we read that the 
categorical imperative consists, then, not in a concrete norm or in a set of 
                                                 
6 KANT, I. Werke in Sechs Bänden. Herausgegeben von Wilhelm Weischedel. Wiesbaden: 
Insel Verlag, 2011. From now on, I will use the usual abbreviations to cite Kant’s works: 
Critique of Practical Reason (KpV), Critique of Pure Reason (KrV), Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals (GMS), Metaphysics of Morals (MS).  
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concrete norms, but in a formal criterion for evaluating maxims. Then, it is not 
decided a priori which maxims are moral or not so that the subject has to 
evaluate, from his or her own moral consciousness, which maxims could be 
thought of as valid from a universal perspective. 
Even though Kant evidences that the categorical imperative is not a set of 
empirical norms or even a moral truth, it is important to stress the fact that this is 
a very controversial point in the exegesis of the Kantian text, since, whereas 
Kant is often accused of advocating a cosmopolitan universalism or a realistic 
metaphysics in the sense of advocating the existence of moral facts that could be 
grasped by intellectual intuition, we should remind the unwary reader about two 
central theses of the critical-transcendental project, which are: 1) the limit of 
every possible knowledge—we can only know that which can be the object of a 
spatial-temporal intuition; and 2) the categorical imperative consists in a formal 
principle of evaluation of maxims or subjective principles. 
For short, we can say that, if the rules are represented as only subjectively 
good, that is, considered valid only for “my” will, then the groundwork for 
determining freewill consists in the expectation of the sensations of pleasure 
resulting from the realization of some desired object. Therefore, such maxims 
may not aim at universal validity, that is, be considered morally good. However, 
having in mind that good is not to be confused neither with useful nor with 
agreeable, maxims have the pretension of being considered moral if they can be 
considered valid for all rational beings in general based on the criterion of the 
universalizability of the subjective principles of the will. Thence, two questions 
arise: 1) how can I know if the maxim that “I” consider good can be evaluated as 
valid for “us” or for “all”?; 2) how is it possible that a being like man may want 
to act according to these moral maxims giving up the pretension of satisfying 
their inclinations and particular interests? This discussion reminds us of the 
theme of moral pluralism. Before that, I would like to provide a brief remark 
about the second issue above. 
The question about who is the moral subject in Kant, or better, if there is an 
implicit double ontology in the justification of his conception of practical reason 
is one of the most controversial and difficult questions “within” and without 
Kantian philosophy so that a promising path is assuming the thesis of the KrV 
that all that “exists” may be the object of possible knowledge. Then, Kant does 
not need to support the reality of a noumenic, supersensible I to ground the 
validity of the moral principle, but actually to suppose as starting point for this 
task the pre-philosophical “moral” (practical) consciousness of the empirical 
subject insofar as he is capable of acting from the representation of rules.7 That 
                                                 
7 Cf. the following passages that corroborate this interpretation: GMS, 412, KpV, A 14 (n.), 
KpV, A 19, etc. In addition to these passages, KpV(A 53) §6 may provide an interesting 
clue for interpretation, in which Kant affirms, in an analogy with theoretical philosophy, 
how we can understand the necessity with which moral consciousness is imposed in the 
moment in which the subject evaluates his or her maxims. Indeed, the fundamental premise 
of Kantian ethics is that moral consciousness is a priori or necessarily imposed and 
constitutes a way of self-understanding that is not to be confused with any intellectual 
intuition, on the one hand, and also, on the other hand, cannot be reduced to the mere 
VALUE AND MORAL PLURALISM 
 97
is, Kant does not assume a double ontology with the distinction between the two 
perspectives in which man can represent himself as rational and sensible; it is, as 
Kant himself posits, an epistemological distinction between different points of 
view in which the same subject can consider himself. 
Supposing that it is a “real” distinction means doing what Ryle calls category 
mistake. Indeed, in “The concept of mind,”8 Ryle posits that the myth of the two 
worlds was actually more harmful than beneficial to the understanding of the 
distinction between mental and physical. 
Thus, if the supposition that the starting point of Kant’s argument consists in 
assuming that the justification of the validity of the consciousness of moral law 
as a categorical imperative is based on the empirical consciousness that an agent 
has in the moment in which he judges the content of his maxims, of an a priori 
demand or constraint of practical reason, then we do not need to commit 
ourselves with supporting inflated metaphysical theses. 
Finally, it should be remembered that for Kant it is not possible to formulate 
moral maxims independently of the human mind. That is, moral consciousness, or 
the consciousness of what I should do is only present when the subject evaluates 
his maxims; in other words, it arises only from reflection in the act of judging 
one’s maxims. That is why a child who is not yet capable of judging based on 
concepts would also be incapable of having the consciousness of what to do. To 
conclude the Kantian answer, realism and idealism are intertwined in the critical-
transcendental system. Then, reality depends on human perception (the way reality 
is and should be depends on the human perspective—cognitive apparatus). 
In his book on the “dichotomy between fact/value,” Putnam follows the 
Kantian argumentation that both our descriptions and our valuations depend on 
the way we “build” our values and beliefs from the cognitive structure of the 
human mind, that is, such ways of “seeing” (describing/valuating) already 
suppose a priori a perspective, a point of view—in a word, some place. 
Returning to the first point, if a moral action is that which satisfies the 
demand of the criterion of universalizability of the maxims of the will, which 
actions can be considered good? Or yet, how can I know what maxims are 
universalizable? 
                                                 
empirical consciousness of moral duties. Thus, the consciousness that the subject has of 
what he must do in a certain situation presupposes not only the practical self-consciousness 
of his own freedom (Willkür), but also the a priori knowledge of his self-reflexive practical 
ability (Autonomie). For short, the agent that recognizes that he should do X or that 
something in a certain situation is morally necessary immediately and originally approves 
of the validity of morality; then the question “How can I know that this consciousness is 
real or not?” seems senseless at this moment; or yet the perception that beyond the 
consciousness of the need of doing X I still need some kind of intuition or theoretical 
warranty that this representation is not a figment. This means, then, that, before thematizing 
the content of the moral principle, understood as the categorical imperative, we have to 
presuppose that every rational human being originally, or a priori, recognizes moral duties, 
which are not to be confused with juridical norms, rules and social patterns of a certain 
society or culture. 
8 RYLE, G. The Concept of Mind. Hertford College, University of Oxford, 2009. 
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It should be reminded that there is no a priori way of defining what can be 
said as a moral maxim. Kant does not intend to determine, from the criterion of 
the universalizablity of the maxims of the will, a set of moral “truths” or 
“norms,” which could be consensually conceived as good to guide actions. 
Indeed, Kantian ethics defines what exactly should be considered as morally 
good. Thus, insofar as the categorical imperative does not establish a set of rules, 
but a criterion for evaluating rules, the agent should evaluate based on the formal 
criterion of practical rationality what he or she should do; therefore, “the right 
thing to be done” implies the reciprocal recognition of the other as worthy of 
respect in his or her autonomy and freedom. 
Thus, if there is no predetermination in relation to what maxims are moral or 
what rules should be followed, if each subject should judge from his own 
consciousness what should be done, would we not fall into a relativistic position, 
something that Kant would definitely not be inclined to accept in his project of 
ethical justification? 
2. SOCIAL PLURALISM AND MORAL PLURALISM 
To avoid misunderstandings, I would like to tell what Barbara Herman calls 
social pluralism in the second chapter of her book Moral Literacy9 as “the 
presence of a society of distinct traditions and ways of life,”10 from the moral or 
normative pluralism that seems to be connected to a conceptual (or 
metaconceptual) demand that aims to justify a concept of what is morally good 
without supposing the existence of moral facts or truths. 
Barbara Herman points out to the fact that in many moral perspectives 
pluralism is seen as a potential factor not to solve problems of moral 
disagreement, which would then require the possibility of justification of an 
objectively valid value or norm. Maybe this is exactly one of the reasons why 
Kant is seen as opposing pluralism, namely due to grounding morality on one 
“only” principle. However, what I try to advocate, as Herman does, is that “one 
of the reasons for employing a Kantian model of moral judgment is that it can 
acknowledge the distinct claim of local values without regarding them as fixed” 
(Herman, 2007, p.33). 
What seems problematic, however, in Herman’s interpretation is that such 
discussion about pluralism seems not to be solved with what she understands as 
social pluralism. My conjecture is that, in this systematic point of his argumentation, 
Kant seems to reclaim something “stronger,” so to speak, namely moral or 
normative pluralism, which implies a question of second-order justification. 
Although Barbara Herman treats the “practical principles that structure the 
deliberative field” (Herman, 2007, p. 42), the discussion at this moment of her 
argumentation seems to be focused more on how such principles can be experienced 
in our moral sensibility as well as in the demand of articulation with the socialization 
                                                 
9 HERMAN, B. Moral Literacy. Harvard University Press, 2007. 
10 HERMAN, B; op. cit, p. 29, my translation. This conception of social pluralism in Herman 
does not seem to be distant from what Rainer Forst determines as the ethical context of 
normative justification in his book “Contexts of Justice.”  
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and education of individuals than on an investigation of the justification of the scope 
of the practical reason. 
However, Herman intends to show, from the investigation of rational agency in 
Kant, how the Kantian model, contrarily to the objection of skeptical authors, may 
be the basis for a pluralist conception of different ways of life in one same moral 
community. Thus, if social pluralism concerns the different ethos in one same 
community (or different ethos in different communities) which we can approach 
with a merely descriptive point of view, moral or normative pluralism is linked to 
the attempt to justify a conception of moral value able to refute moral relativism. 
In other words, it seems to us that the problem in “remaining” strictly on the 
level of discussion of social pluralism is that we do not have a way to justify the 
reason why some conceptions of good in some moral communities are problematic, 
which then demands a normative principle that is able to show that and why certain 
conceptions of good cannot be justifiable. 
If we go back to the original sense of the principle of universalization, we see 
that it should not be understood as a moral truth or the true content of ethics, but 
actually as an indicator of a negative criterion, or yet a limit-concept that serves to 
“assess” the possibility of coexistence of different conceptions of good in a 
democratic society of rights. In this perspective, it is not given beforehand which 
should be the ends to be sought or which are the conceptions of good and values that 
have a moral content, thus warranting social pluralism. On the other hand, any 
possible conception of good should be compatible with other worldviews from the 
standpoint of its possibility of rational justification. 
From this interpretation of the Kantian moral criterion, it is possible to justify 
why certain values of a community, as the practice of corrective rape or female 
mutilation or also, as Herman points out, sadistic desires such as sexually abusing a 
person, could not be justified as “good” from a moral point of view, exactly because 
either they harm certain rights or they do not respect the person in his or her 
autonomy or are founded on an absurd egoism. In other words, they could not be 
rationally justified in face of the community of human beings to use Rainer Forst’s 
words in the context of normative justification of morality in his book “Contexts of 
Justice.”11 
But here we find another problem, which constitutes one of the objections 
cited in the beginning of the text, namely the Kantian justification of the thesis 
that moral value is based on practical reason. Why should I act according to a 
normative demand of practical rationality understood from the criterion of 
universalization? And, in addition, is this demand not beyond the interests and 
the motivational set of what human beings are able to have? Although this 
problem seems to be the source of debates and different interpretations, it seems 
to us that this is not merely a problem of motivation and moral psychology, but 
of justification and moral philosophy. 
                                                 
11 FORST, R. Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit, Politishe Philosophie jenseits von Liberalismus 
und Kommunitarismus. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1994. Contextos da justiça. 
Filosofia política para além de liberalismo e comunitarismo. Tradução de Denilson Luis 
Werle. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2010.  
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To conclude, I would like to draw attention not to the practical self-
contradiction of the subject who does not want to engage in a kind of action that 
involves certain capacities such as the disposition to act based on reasons and 
justify them also from reasons, but to some insights found in the Kantian corpus 
and also in different philosophical traditions: 
 
1) a subject who does not ask himself “how should he spend the time of his 
existence” (Habermas, Sartre) is a subject that seems in some sense alienated; 
2) just as Sen, Nagel and Putnam point out, human beings do not define their 
lives by the ongoing search for pleasure and by doing only what interests them; 
but they actually value different things that they have reasons to value, such as 
character, values, commitments, causes and ideals, affective relationships and 
bonds etc. 
3) we can always ask, as Forst, Korsgaard and Putnam suggest, whether that 
which is seen as something valuable is actually valuable. For such, we do not 
need metaphysical stories, but the critical ability we all understand from our 
practices as subjects inscribed in certain traditions, situated in different 
normative contexts. 
 
Finally, however, we can say that finding out the extent to which such 
questions about whether so called normative demand are able to serve as a 
mainstay for our lives is no longer a typically philosophical task, but something 
that concerns each person’s own intimacy, and here we see the limits of all 
moral investigation. 
 
 
 7 
IMPLICATIONS AND POSSIBILITIES OF NATURALISM IN 
NIETZSCHE’S PHILOSOPHY 
FELIPE SZYSZKA KARASEK 
The relationship between Nietzsche’s thought and philosophical naturalism is 
currently one of the most debated themes within the studies of Nietzschean 
philosophy, focusing on the implications, the contributions and the limitations 
that this relationship may bring for the interpretation of themes developed by the 
German philosopher.1 In these studies, the main problem is not the association of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy with philosophical naturalism, but the attempt to 
contemplate in a naturalistic approach Nietzsche’s analyses related to nature, 
culture, morals and other themes, which seem, most of the times, distant from 
naturalistic approaches. Thus, the different meanings of philosophical naturalism 
should be investigated and whether this association is a hermeneutic necessity 
that contributes to the understanding of Nietzsche’s philosophy or it reveals a 
necessity of contemporary philosophy.2 Therefore, this paper analyzes 
                                                 
1  SCHACHT, Richard. Nietzsche. London; Boston: Routledge, 1983; LEITER, Brian. Nietzsche 
on Morality. London: Routledge, 2002; JANAWAY, Christopher. Beyond Selflessness. 
Reading Nietzsche’s Genealogy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007; CLARK, 
Maudemarie; DUDRICK, David. The soul of Nietzsches ‘Beyond Good and Evil’. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012; SCHACHT, Richard. “Nietzsche’s 
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visible especially in English language academic circles, could be indicated as the most 
immediate cause of the marked interest of Nietzsche’s interpreters for this theme, as we can 
see in articles published in this issue of Cadernos Nietzsche. Indicating this immediate 
cause could, on its turn, strengthen the suspicion that these attempts to associate Nietzsche 
and naturalization programs that are very strong in contemporary debate could have been 
motivated less by the questions that were indeed crucial to the German philosopher than by 
an imposed agenda. This agenda, on its turn, could have sprung from an ever growing 
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suggesting its subordination to the methods and results of the sciences." If a naturalist 
position means a necessary relationship between philosophy and the natural sciences, we 
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Nietzsche’s philosophy according to some perspectives that show the 
contributions and limits of the association between philosophical naturalism and 
the question of morals. 
In addition to the reasons cited, the motivation for this study arose from the 
works of Brian Leiter, Christopher Janaway and Richard Schacht, which 
advocate that Nietzsche’s philosophy is in consonance with philosophical 
naturalism. In face of the classical interpretations of Nietzsche’s philosophy and 
the novelty that this striking affirmation represented, the central question of this 
paper is whether Nietzsche is a naturalist philosopher or not. A second question, 
originated from the first, is, if Nietzsche is indeed a naturalist philosopher, what 
is the contribution of naturalism to the problem of morals in his philosophy? 
The most radical affirmation concerning philosophical naturalism in 
Nietzsche comes from Brian Leiter.3 For him, Nietzsche is a scientistic 
naturalistic philosopher, and his naturalism is manifested in two ways: 
methodologically (which means affirming that Nietzsche is convinced that 
philosophy should be continuous with the results and methods of natural 
sciences) and substantively (which means affirming that Nietzsche believes that 
all existing things are natural). Brian Leiter believes that Nietzsche is actually 
committed to a scientific view about how things function. Brian Leiter is 
criticized by Christopher Janaway and Richard Schacht for relating the 
orientation of Nietzsche’s thought with an exaggerated empirical scientism. 
Christopher Janaway4 advocates a wide version of naturalism in Nietzsche, 
supported by the negation of any kind of transcendental metaphysics and by the 
emphasis in the human body, in the instincts and the affections, in psychology 
and history (the disagreement seems to be mainly between a reductionist 
physicalist proposition and a non-reductionist physicalist proposition). Richard 
Schacht5 is even more distant from Brian Leiter’s proposition and advocates an 
extended naturalism in Nietzsche. He affirms that Nietzsche’s philosophy cannot 
be related to any type of methodological or metaphysical naturalism since the 
investigative methods employed by the philosopher are not in continuity with 
                                                 
should question whether this association is something required in some circles in 
contemporary philosophy—which desire to produce philosophical knowledge from this 
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3 LEITER, Brian. Nietzsche: on morality. London: Routledge, 2002; LEITER, Brian. 
“Nietzsche’s naturalism Reconsidered”. University of Chicago, In: Oxford Handbook of 
Nietzsche, 2009, n. 35. 
4 JANAWAY, Christopher. Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007; GEMES, Ken & JANAWAY, Christopher. "Naturalism 
and Value in Nietzsche." In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71, 729-740, 
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5 SCHACHT, Richard. "Nietzsche’s Anti-Scientistic Naturalism" In: Helmut Heit, Günter 
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scientific methods. In addition, the observations concerning human morals, even 
if related to physiology and psychology, are constantly molded by culture. 
Therefore, if there is naturalism in Nietzsche, it is constituted from a new sense 
that includes in the notion of natural a diversity of physiological, psychological, 
scientific, social, cultural, and artistic perspectives that are equally associated in 
the interpretation of the main philosophical problems. 
From these arguments, it is necessary to assess whether or not a naturalistic 
statute (the necessary relationship between philosophy and the natural sciences) is 
demanded only by contemporary philosophy, that is, a contemporary reclamation 
of philosophy far from the time when Nietzsche wrote his texts and established his 
main philosophical problems. In face of the difficulty of supporting any type of 
closed philosophical naturalism in relation to Nietzsche’s thought, it is necessary 
to discuss whether or not the association of Nietzsche’s philosophy with 
naturalism is more plausible to his interpreters (focused on a debate that aims to 
make Nietzsche’s philosophy “fit” into some type of naturalism, making the 
necessary conceptual stretches in order for that to be possible) than to Nietzsche’s 
own philosophical propositions.6 In addition, Richard Schacht’s analyses and 
Helmut Heit’s reference indicate that the meaning of nature to Nietzsche seems to 
be distant from the meaning of nature used in a rigid naturalistic debate, in which 
nature means exclusively the material, the physical, that which can be explained 
by the laws of physics.7 Thus, to understand Nietzsche’s intention of “re-
translating human being back into nature,”8 it is necessary to investigate the 
meaning of nature to Nietzsche in association with his proposition of re-
translation, marked by the potentialities of interpretation and the project of 
substitution of the vocabulary inherited from the traditional Western metaphysics 
in the presentation of the problems of morals and philosophy. 
In addition, the main naturalistic projects of modernity should be analyzed as 
well as the perspectives and works that were known and read by Nietzsche and 
how they have influenced his views. In this approach, an informative pathway of 
reconstruction of Nietzsche’s historical context is proposed by the studies by 
Thomas Brobjer9 and Rogério Lopes,10 which are interested in presenting 
Nietzsche’s main interlocutors in modernity. Therefrom we know that Nietzsche 
was interested in learning the rigor that can be offered by the discipline and 
method of the natural sciences to the philosopher in the pursuit of philosophical 
conclusions, which is different from the exclusive fondness of natural sciences’ 
methods and results advocated by Brian Leiter. 
                                                 
6 LOPES, Rogério. “A ambicionada assimilação do materialismo: Nietzsche e o debate 
naturalista na filosofia alemã da segunda metade do século XIX”. In: Cadernos Nietzsche 
29, p. 309-352, 2011. 
7 HEIT, Helmut. "Perspectivas naturalizantes de Nietzsche em Além do bem e do mal". 
Transl. Leonardo Camacho. Accepted for publication in October 2014, forthcoming in: 
Estudos Nietzsche, v.6, n.1, jan./jun. 2015. 
8 JGB/BM §230. 
9 BROBJER, Thomas. Nietzsche’s philosophical context: an intellectual biography. Illinois: 
University of Illinois Press, 2008. 
10 Idem. 
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In face of Nietzsche’s rejection of any type of evolutional determinism and the 
criticisms to the notion of struggle for existence, self-conservation and vital 
competition, it is still necessary to investigate the possibilities of any naturalistic 
influence on the notion of will to power, which could have been inherited from the 
works of Darwin and the biologists Wilhelm Roux and William Henry Rolph, as 
identified by Wilson Frezzatti Júnior.11 In this case, if there is any influence, it is not 
explicit, and the notion of will to power can only be considered the groundwork of a 
project of naturalization of morals if this does not mean a reduction of culture to 
biology or a type of biologism that affirms the biological origins of culture.12 
Resuming the possibilities of naturalism in Nietzsche’s philosophy, it could only be 
configured as a new type of naturalism (still undefined in contemporary philosophy) 
that would not accept any type of reductionism and could encompass all the 
definitions of what is understood as culture. 
Thus, the will to power can be interpreted in many different ways, but it 
seems accurate to say that this notion plays a fundamental role in the 
Nietzschean project of overcoming the metaphysical foundations of the soul and 
of opening the possibilities for new interpretations of the meaning of soul.13 
From this argumentation, it is necessary to resume classic interpretations and 
readings of Nietzsche’s works, which are responsible for giving his thought the 
relevance and importance that it currently has. This is an imperious need since 
the hermeneutics of the fundamental problems in Nietzsche’s thinking has 
already been undertaken with competence and precision by his first interpreters 
and somehow the exaggerated preoccupation in finding the proper type of 
naturalism to his thought may have neglected these interpretations, which had 
already focused on and perceived its naturalistic nuances (and may contribute 
the groundwork for refuting some exaggerations). This far-fetched interpretation 
toward naturalism seems to occur with the notion of will to power as in the 
relationship hastily established between the will to power and a monist 
materialistic reading. Thus, against an excessively reductionist reading of the 
will to power, the interpretation of Wolfgang Müller-Lauter,14 as well as his 
arguments distancing Nietzsche’s philosophy from Heidegger’s readings15 
should be revisited. Müller-Lauter’s interpretation dissociates the will to power 
from a causal confinement within the physical world, avoiding a reductionist 
physicalist naturalism, and also from a metaphysical and cosmological 
                                                 
11 FREZZATTI JÚNIOR, Wilson Antônio. “Tradução dos póstumos de Nietzsche sobre 
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Oswaldo Giacoia Júnior. São Paulo: Annablume, 1997. 
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aprioristic confinement, demonstrating the need of supporting some connection 
with empirical experience. 
Taking Müller-Lauter as a starting point, we emphasize Nietzsche’s 
commitment to knowing the method and results of natural sciences, but we also 
perceive that any form of causal, and even monocausal, explicative model is not 
admitted in his philosophy. Rogério Lopes stresses this argument in affirming 
that, if there is any naturalism in Nietzsche, it is a liberal type of naturalism that 
endorses the submission to an empirical discipline and a temporary scientific 
practice as a way of learning excellent conditions and the epistemic virtues 
necessary for philosophical reflection, with the aim of defeating the epistemic 
vices inherited from a metaphysical tradition. In this sense, a liberal naturalism 
advocates this experience by acknowledging the descriptive competence of 
natural sciences resulting from the sobriety and economy of the hypotheses 
demanded by the scientific method. The learning of this economy should be 
reflected in the genealogical, normative and terminological propositions, which 
could be perceived in the notion of will to power engendered in a wide sense of 
interpretation.16 In addition, in a liberal naturalism, suspicion should be the main 
characteristic of the philosopher in order to produce new ways of interpretation 
as a form of reaction to any form of dogmatism that intends to establish itself in 
thought to acknowledge the importance of values other than the cognitive and 
epistemic ones for philosophical reflection. 
The study of Nietzsche’s relationship with the natural sciences shows the 
philosopher’s refusal of any form of determinism and causality as well as the 
interest in overcoming Western traditional metaphysics. Nietzsche provides 
many criticisms to the foundational solutions of morals. Thus, if Nietzsche, from 
his project of transvaluation of all values, is interested in destroying metaphysics 
and overcoming foundational theories of morals, how could the relationship of 
naturalism with moral normativity be conceived of? Jesse Prinz17 affirms that 
Nietzsche’s interest in descriptive questions concerning morals is relevant since 
he is searching, with this question, for the origin of our moral values. This aim is 
evidenced by a genealogical intention of interpreting moral normativity, hoping 
that the exposition of the origin of values from our social history is able to 
destabilize established beliefs and function as a motivation to overcome these 
beliefs (in perceiving that the values prized by us have an origin, and this origin 
may not be that interesting). 
Jesse Prinz seems to be right in relating Nietzsche’s genealogy to the 
possibility of moral revisionism; nevertheless, he seems to disregard the 
importance that the notions of sense, value and history have within a 
genealogical reflection. Thus, it is important to show that, for the genealogical 
method to be effective as a strategy of moral revisionism, it is crucial to resume 
the interpretations provided by Gilles Deleuze18 and Michel Foucault19 
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17 PRINZ, Jesse. The emotional construction of morals. New York: Oxford University Press, 
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concerning genealogy. To Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche’s critique of truths and 
metaphysics is necessary to withdraw from substantialism in philosophy and re-
introduce the importance of interpretation. To Michel Foucault, the connection 
between genealogy and historical sense is necessary in order not to be involved 
by any supra-historical sense and, thus, aided by an effective history, re-
introduce in becoming and corporeity everything that had been understood as 
immortal in the human being. 
This does not mean that it is not possible to relate Nietzsche’s project to 
some type of moral normativity. On the contrary, his previous arguments intend 
to show the pathways through which his thought can be connected to the notion 
of moral normativity without falsifying his philosophical intentions. Richard 
Schacht20 affirms that internalization and identification are the pathways from 
which moral norms acquire normative effectiveness. However, in order to 
understand how morals develop and mainly how morals acquire a normative 
statute, it is necessary to investigate how internalization takes place in human 
beings. In this sense, it is relevant to resume Helmut Heit’s affirmation about 
nature in Nietzsche, which sustains that the meaning of nature for the 
philosopher is in front of the meaning of nature used in the strict naturalistic 
debate. Thus, the Nietzschean task of “re-translating human being back into 
nature” is not related only to the task of destroying Western metaphysics to erect 
new notions of interpretation of the human phenomenon. Nietzsche intends to 
show that the effectiveness of the task of re-translation depends upon the 
reconstruction of the meaning of nature in Western philosophy to, therefrom, 
suggest how morals and culture arise within this reconstructed notion of nature. 
The notion of nature cannot be harmonized with morals. For instance, for 
Nietzsche, the Stoic maxim that urges us to "live according to nature" points to an 
ideological conduct and a strategy to grant universal validity to a valuation. In 
Nietzsche’s perspective, a well-grounded philosophy always imposes its 
configurations to nature. If avoiding it is not possible, Nietzsche recommends 
moderation in relation to believing in philosophy itself, which means believing 
that it is possible to use strong philosophical perspectives at the same time that its 
limited validity is acknowledged.21 According to Pierre Hadot,22 Nietzsche 
suggests that any knowledge about nature that does not result from 
anthropomorphism is inhuman knowledge. Thus, the solution would be to 
integrate into the interpretation of nature mistakes, illusions and the perception that 
values and representations are engendered by nature itself on behalf of life; they 
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are not disposable and cannot stay out of any theory about nature. Just as the veils 
and the illusions are engendered by nature itself on behalf of life, nature’s pure 
truth is the negation of life—the exaggerated will to truth becomes a will to death. 
The depth of things is horrifying, but appearance is engendered from this horror; 
nature creates representations and appearances to affirm existence. 
If nature creates representations, nature is the quintessential artist. Therefore, 
Nietzsche posits that art has not a direct relationship with the beaux arts; the 
meaning of art encompasses all the activities of production and creation linking 
life to nature. Art is a force of nature that engenders the possibility of living. 
“Whoever has seen deeply into the world has doubtless divined what wisdom 
there is in the fact that men are superficial,”23 says Nietzsche. This citation from 
Beyond Good and Evil has some similarity with the theses of his early texts 
about Greek mythology and arts. In an interpretation that overflows the 
objectivity of Heraclitus’s fragment, Nietzsche could affirm that “Nature (Truth) 
loves to hide, loves to lie, loves illusion, loves to create works of art,” as 
emphasized by Pierre Hadot with the aim of showing that Nietzsche does not 
endorse a strictly scientific interpretation of nature, demonstrating the value of a 
psychological and aesthetical approach in its interpretation. 
Moreover, in analyzing Nietzsche’s philosophy, it is important to perceive 
nature as a process in which the states and phenomena are engendered from the 
inter-relationship between consciousness and language. Thus, if in Nietzsche’s 
thinking nature is a process, it should be thought of beyond dualistic and 
monistic propositions. Nietzsche admits some continuity between inorganic, 
organic, mental states, consciousness, becoming conscious, cognitive activities 
and the projects of action and its engenderments. As affirmed by Günter Abel,24 
to Nietzsche, human being is an embodiment of all the oldest estimations of 
value interpreted by all intelligent activities that have been found in the organic, 
became organic and from this moment on have participated in the organization 
of experience. To resume the issue of internatilization, we can say that Nietzsche 
affirms that “the will to power interprets”; therefore, appropriation and 
incorporation mean a will to configure and reconfigure until the subdued force 
has passed entirely to the power of the attacker and has potentialized it; if this 
incorporation is not successful, the formation will probably disintegrate.25 
Nietzsche considers that it is possible to think, feel and want without all these 
operations entering into consciousness since the preconscious and organic forms 
of life represent dynamic processes with the ability to interpret. The impulses are 
not blind—they are constantly occupied in observing, perceiving, ordering, 
delimiting, intensifying, preferring, despising.26 
Thus, according to Günter Abel, Nietzsche’s critique to consciousness, to 
becoming conscious and to self-consciousness means a critique to the Cartesian 
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model of consciousness, which affirms the possibility of a pure internal 
experience of the conscious being. To Nietzsche, we have consciousness and 
thinking due to language, signs and the need of interpretation, not through them, 
that is, it is not possible to think outside linguistic signs and, when attempting to 
do so, thinking is disrupted. Consciousness and language are engendered 
together. Human beings are capable of inventing signs of communication—these 
processes are linked to sociability and, the more they create signs of 
communication, the more they become conscious.27 To understand the notion of 
nature in Nietzsche, it is necessary to know his interpretation of Heraclitus’s 
fragment “nature loves to hide,” his interpretation of ancient Greek art and 
culture and how he develops a philosophy of the process that connects nature, 
consciousness, language and sociability. 
Similarly, to understand the project of transvaluating values, it is necessary to 
perceive the importance that psychology has in Nietzsche’s thought, the motives 
that led him to affirm that psychology is the “queen of the sciences, for whose 
service and equipment the other sciences exist,” that “psychology is once more 
the path to the fundamental problems”28 and why in Ecce Homo he deems 
himself “a psychologist who has not his peers.”29 In his early writings, during 
the time when he taught in Basel, Nietzsche already posited that “philosophy 
develops its science of nature around false psychological data and involves the 
whole with a metaphysical necessity.”30 For him, the inside (psychological) has 
a correlation with the outside (physiological); therefore, he wants to free 
psychology from metaphysical prejudices to, from psychology, analyze moral 
prejudices. As affirmed by Giacoia,31 in order for that to be possible, it is 
necessary to perceive the objective of his critical philosophical project, which 
intends to destroy the metaphysical pillars of rational psychology and the 
theoretical bases of psychology in general to found a science of subjectivity 
devoid of metaphysical and moral prejudices that have founded Western 
thought, affirming the psychic connected with consciousness and 
unconsciousness. In order to destroy psychology’s moralistic background, it is 
necessary to dissolve the superiority of consciousness and the idea of 
subjectivity identified with it. In addition, freeing psychology from moral 
prejudices may enable the liberation from nihilism as psychological state, 
overcoming the search for meaning, a moral canon, a universal order, a totality 
and an objective that is not in the events. The cause of nihilism is the dogmatic 
belief in the categories of reason because we learn to measure the world 
according to these categories that result from a fictive world. The new 
psychology intended by Nietzsche should demonstrate that the origin of moral 
values in modernity is the “thou shalt,” that is, submission. The mark of modern 
morals is a combination of Platonism with Christianity; the systems of moral 
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evaluation and judgment are derived from this combination, and psychology 
may be the science that will offer a way to overcome this morals. 
The interpretation of nature in Nietzsche, differentiating itself both from 
Western metaphysics and a scientistic view of nature, aims to build a perspective 
that connects the organic, the inorganic, consciousness and language. In this 
purpose, psychology may mean a science of depth, showing how nature 
engenders itself in organisms, moral values, societies and States. In Nietzsche’s 
philosophy, psychology is not only a science of consciousness, but a science 
capable of revealing the depth that is veiled in human consciousness, the 
processes and the artifices of engenderment in nature. In this sense, the world is 
a self-generating and self-conserving organism, natural life a constant flow, and 
there is no such thing as an essential constitution. The forms of development of 
life can be investigated by perceiving that from the interplay between many wills 
to power, different engenderments may come about. This means that will itself is 
an illusion since this is one of the ways through which nature engenders itself—
“creating” illusions. Thus, Nietzsche affirms that illusions are always more 
elaborated than nature. However, as affirmed by Araldi,32 Nietzsche understands 
human beings as units of force of relative duration and demonstration of 
stability, which are able to produce arts of transfiguration of unbridled violence 
and cruelty operating between the will to elude and the will to be eluded. Yet, 
the will to illusion does not arise from a human freedom to mold oneself, but the 
permanent impetus and pressure of a creative force. 
These creative forces are related to dispute (agon) and with a disquieting 
double character of nature. Nature is disquieting because it contains an awesome 
aspect that it struggles to hide. Thus, a tragic wisdom should be engendered that 
acknowledges the impossibility of rationalizing and knowing nature as a whole, 
which is backed by the knowledge of the limited character of its institutions, 
standards and norms. In this notion of nature, the understanding of the limits of 
knowledge, the impossibility of the will to truth and the perception that nature is 
awesome are demanded, but we cannot live without this knowledge exactly 
because it shows the limits of the possibility of knowing. Nature is engendered 
from the possibility of dispute and conflict. The continuity of a society and a State 
lies in its capacity to be in favor of dispute and to distance itself from conflict. To 
Nietzsche, the prolonged maintenance of the absence of war represents one of the 
most interesting aspects produced by dispute, but this is in relation to the capacity 
of this society or State to grasp the tragic element in its culture.33 
Is Nietzsche a naturalistic philosopher? He could only be considered so if the 
type of naturalism related to his thinking is also related to the notion of nature. 
In this case, this naturalism is a new naturalistic approach, different from the 
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naturalistic categories that exist in contemporary philosophy and, at the same 
time, the notion of nature that grounds this new type of naturalism is distanced 
from the notion of nature understood in contemporary naturalism. However, 
naturalistic perspectives can be found in his philosophy, which was perceived by 
his main commentators, and his naturalistic perspectives are connected to his 
project of transvaluation of values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
THE NATURALIZATION OF MORALS AND THE FAREWELL 
TO NATURALISM IN NIETZSCHE’S PHILOSOPHY 
CLADEMIR LUÍS ARALDI 
Despite the many naturalistic approaches to Nietzsche’s philosophy that 
emerged in the last decades,1 defining Nietzsche’s naturalistic position in 
relation to morals is still a difficult task. For such, it is necessary to rebuild the 
strong connection between naturalism and genealogy concerning moral values. 
The naturalistic explanation to the origin of moral values, as I intend to show, is 
in consonance with the genealogical method in its three main axes: psychology, 
history and physiology. Thus, this study will investigate naturalism in the sense 
formulated by Nietzsche firstly in The Gay Science. At this point, it is important 
to resume Brian Leiter’s questioning2 about whether Nietzsche’s naturalism is an 
instrument for the “revaluation of all values.” 
The difficulty consists exactly in articulating the two very different tasks of 
this project of Naturalization (Vernatürlichung): 1) the development of the 
critique of morals (including the dehumanization of nature), and 2) the 
naturalization of morals and man, since Nietzsche himself seems to tell the 
critique of morals from the invention of new values, as pointed out in the critical 
evaluation of all moral values of On the Genealogy of Morals: 
we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values should itself, for 
once, be examined – and so we need to know about the conditions and 
circumstances under which the values grew up, developed and changed 
[…],since we have neither had this knowledge up till now nor even desired it.3 
However, Nietzsche does not separate the critical from the affirmative aspects in 
developing the genealogy of moral values. Therefore, in the building of his 
“affirmative ethics,” Nietzsche easily transposes the limits of the critical 
genealogy to accomplish his creative “task” of naturalizing moral values as if 
there was a necessary link between these domains. I intend to show that there is 
not a necessary connection between the critique and the invention of moral 
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2  See LEITER, Nietzsche on Morality. New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 26: “Nietzsche 
develops a naturalistic account of morality in the service of a very particular normative 
goal, namely, to force us to reconsider the value of morality: naturalism is enlisted in the 
service of what Nietzsche calls his “revaluation of all values”.” 
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values in the works The Gay Science (GS), Beyond Good and Evil (BGE) and 
On the Genealogy of Morals (GM), but an urgency to overcome moral nihilism. 
In this sense, this study is articulated into three points: 1) The dehumanization of 
nature (Die Entmenschlichung der Natur) through the moral critique in The Gay 
Science; 2) the naturalization of man (die Vernatürlichung des Menschen) and 
their values in GS, BGE and GM and 3) the central role played by art in the 
creation of naturalistic values. 
I. THE DEHUMANIZATION OF NATURE (THE CRITICAL TASK) 
The main point of Nietzsche’s naturalism is establishing the relationship 
between philosophy and the sciences from the (pre-)genealogical method. In the 
core of these naturalistic investigations lie moral values. Here, the scope is 
limited to the relationship that can be made in Nietzsche’s philosophy with the 
“best” sciences of his time: physiology, psychology and history. The works in 
which the philosophy of the free spirit is developed – Human, all too Human, 
Daybreak and The Gay Science – are pre-genealogical insofar as they do not yet 
methodologically define the criterion for evaluating all moral values. However, 
they actually point out to the objective of Nietzsche’s naturalism, namely that of 
uniting the ethical-philosophical research and the sciences. 
After the publication of Daybreak, as he prepared The Gay Science, Nietzsche 
studied scientific works, mainly those by Robert Mayer, Wilhelm Roux, “Der 
Kampf der Theile Im Organismus. Ein Beitrag Zur Vervollständigung der 
Mechanischen Zweckmässigkeitslehre,” as shown by W. Müller-Lauter, Günter 
Abel and Gregory Moore4. 
Naturalism is formulated more clearly in the Book III of The Gay Science, after 
the first mention to the death of God (GS, § 108). Only after the utter de-divinization 
of nature the question of the naturalization of man would be put forth: 
When will all these shadows of god no longer darken us? When will we have 
completely de-deified nature? When may we begin to naturalize humanity with a 
pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature!5 
The connection between the critical aspects and the affirmative project also 
appear in a preparatory writing to the GS: “My task: the dehumanization of 
nature and, then, the naturalization of man after he has obtained the pure concept 
of ‘nature’.”6 The first task consists in describing nature without 
anthropomorphisms and without moral, aesthetic, and religious interpretations 
with which man has falsified and covered it throughout history. This would 
enable achieving, secondly, the naturalization of man. This is not a task for 
natural science strictly speaking, but for the gaya scienza. 
In the Book IV of The Gay Science, however, Nietzsche seems to 
fundamentally modify the project of achieving “pure” nature, with no moral 
                                                 
4  Cf. G. ABEL, 1998, W. MÜLLER-LAUTER, 1971 and G. MOORE, 2002. 
5  GS, § 109. 
6  PF 11 [211] – beginning of 1881 – summer of 1882. 
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interpretation. In GS 335, with the title of “Long Life Physics,” he no longer 
develops the general character analysis of the world as chaos. The exhortation to 
physics takes place within the ambit of psychological observation and the 
emergence of moral judgments. To be creators of new values, “... we must 
become the best students and discoverers of everything lawful and necessary in 
the world: we must become physicists in order to be creators in this sense – 
while hitherto all valuations and ideals have been built on ignorance of physics 
or in contradiction to it.” 
This is the necessary condition not only for new naturalistic values, but also 
to configure and create oneself. The emphasis lies in the ethical-aesthetical 
aspect, which, strictly speaking, surpasses the limits of the natural sciences. 
According to Nietzsche, however, man always projects valuation perspectives in 
natural sciences, including physiology. 
By that time, Nietzsche intends to effect “the reduction of morals to 
aesthetics.” The task involves creating “a profusion of aesthetic valuations, 
equally justified […], each of them being the ultimate fact and the measure of 
things for the individual.”7 Nietzsche’s “Naturalism” is above all an “experiment 
of the knower,” from which he wants to configure a gai saber. It is the rare art of 
“giving style to its character” (GS 290), so that man may be the “poet of his own 
life” (GS 299). This means that both scientific praxis and the creation of new 
values would have an aesthetic character. 
We question, however, whether by the time GS was written Nietzsche was 
already a speculative methodological naturalist, as claimed by Brian Leiten in 
his 2002 book Nietzsche on Morality. Every phenomenon has deterministic 
causes so that they can be naturalistically understood. The deterministic 
explanation of how men act, feel and think the way they do would have been 
employed by Nietzsche within ethics.8 According to Leiter, however, in his late 
work (especially BGE and GM), Nietzsche provides deterministic causal 
explanations for the human phenomena, mainly within ethics. The positive point 
is the continuity of methods with the empirical sciences. But would that be the 
decisive naturalistic turn in Beyond Good and Evil? For B. Leiter, naturalism is 
no more than a part of Nietzsche’s philosophical project, the only, however, that 
would be of relevance for ethics and moral philosophy. 
Nietzsche would be reductionist if he affirmed that values were only direct 
expressions of physiological impulses and needs. This occurs in Leiter’s 
naturalistic explanation of moral values and beliefs from the individual 
psychophysical constitution (the Typ-facts). To avoid this reductionism, 
Christopher Janaway questions the coherence of methodological naturalism in 
Nietzsche’s thinking. Janaway advocates that there are no scientific proofs (both 
in relation to the methods and in relation to the results of the science) for many 
of Nietzsche’s explicative hypothesis, such as, for instance, the introduction of  
 
                                                 
7PF, 11[79]. 
8 Cf. LEITER, B. Nietzsche on Morality, Routledge, New York 2002. 
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the will to power as the “best model” for biology and the organic world.9 In 
addition, Nietzsche, as a naturalist, would not completely employ the scientific 
methods for understanding things. If Nietzsche is a naturalist since The Gay 
Science, in what sense can we speak of naturalism? 
Nietzsche did not simply find in the sciences of his own time the naturalistic 
criterion to evaluate moral values. His insights and his “deep thoughts” surpass 
the empirical domain of science, just as the conceptual-argumentative ambit of 
philosophy. However, he searched for and found in the sciences some methods 
and results to prove them, since he believed they could provide a scientific 
character to his thinking. 
II. THE NATURALIZATION OF MEN AND THEIR MORALS 
The project of naturalization of man has a significant elaboration in Beyond 
Good and Evil and in The Gay Science, Book V, when Nietzsche develops the 
natural history of morals. We can affirm that, in a certain sense, from this time 
on Nietzsche becomes an ethical naturalist. With this definition, emerge also the 
difficulties of understanding the singular character of his enterprise. The 
challenge consists in maintaining a naturalized conception of Nietzsche’s 
genealogy without abandoning the positive and critical tasks of his late 
philosophy in relation to ethics. My thesis is that in his naturalistic 
interpretations, Nietzsche goes beyond the genealogical critique of morals 
without determining his ethical position. 
The genealogist of morals assumes a modest empirical task: formulating and 
conceptually classifying the different moral experiences of value, the long and 
difficult task of understanding “the hieroglyphic writing of human moral past” 
(GM, Preface, § 7). In this context he operates with physiology as a starting 
point to his genealogical-naturalistic researches.10 It is also physiology that 
allows articulating naturalism and genealogy. We cannot forget that Nietzsche 
necessarily links physiology with psychology and history. According to my 
interpretative hypothesis, the genealogical method will be effective (among the 
three methods mentioned above) only if the philosopher shows that the will to 
power is the explicative model or a valid criterion for the naturalization of 
morals, that is, to assess moral values in a non-moral way. In this sense, the trial 
of naturalization of morals depends on this impulse to power in its pshysio-
psychological aspects and in its manifestations throughout history. 
Thus, one attempts to understand Nietzsche’s particular naturalism as a 
physio-psychological hypothesis that aims at explaining the human ways of 
feeling, thinking and evaluating, above all in relation to the emergence and 
                                                 
9 “On a straightforward reading, Nietzsche goes out of his way to reject Results Continuity 
with scientific biology – unless he believes that a perfected scientific inquiry would find 
that relations of over-powering and interpretation were indeed the best models for 
biological process. But in that case more recent science does not display Results Continuity 
with Nietzsche.” (Christopher Janaway, Naturalism and Genealogy, In Keith Ansell-
Pearson, A companion to Nietzsche, Blackwell 2006, p. 340). 
10Cf. PF 40[21], outono 1884 – outono de 1885. 
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transformation of human values. I question here whether Nietzsche develops 
naturalism strictly speaking, as he announces in the end of his first dissertation 
in GM, namely that genealogists should prepare the future task for philosophers: 
that of creating values. If the task of genealogy articulated to naturalism is thus 
exhausted, the Philosopher Nietzsche tries to abandon naturalism even before 
having developed the potentialities of this method. 
Philosophers had up to now only an insufficient knowledge of physiology, 
says Nietzsche in the beginning of BGE. Therefore, it would be necessary to free 
the physiology of his time of moral prejudices and superfluous teleological 
principles, such as the principle of self-conservation.11 On the other hand, the 
critic of metaphysics wants “to practice physiology in good conscience,”12 duly 
treating physiological demands and physiological constitution.13 Thus, it would 
be possible to advance in the constitution of an “authentic physio-psychology,” 
that is, the combination of physiology and psychology. This physio-psychology 
(Physio-Psychologie), as a “morphology and theory of the development of the 
will to power,”14 would be the most promising path to the naturalization of 
morals. The physiopsychologist would have the prerogative to duly interpret 
nature, which is the evaluator and dominator of human impulses, beyond moral 
prejudices. Nobody had gone this way until then, and Nietzsche does not 
advance much in it. 
Moral is the greatest impediment to resuming the homo natura. So the insane 
task is 
To translate humanity back into nature; to gain control of the many vain and 
fanciful interpretations and incidental meanings that have been scribbled and 
drawn over that eternal basic text of homo natura so far; to make sure that, from 
now on, the human being will stand before the human being, just as he already 
stands before the rest of nature today, hardened by the discipline of science 
[…].15 
Moral prejudices would have prevented the investigation of physiological 
processes and facts that are the groundwork for all the judgments and values of 
good and evil. The repeated mentions to the physiology of power (Physiologie 
der Macht), the physiology of passions (Physiologie der Leidenschaften), the 
physiology of morals (Physiologie der Moral) or to the relationship between 
morals and physiology occur in the sense of reinforcing this investigation.16 
Physiology undoubtedly has a decisive role in the first dissertation of the GM in 
criticizing the failures (die Missrathenen) and for the position of values of the 
noble type of man. Nietzsche describes “physiological facts” (physiologische 
                                                 
11 Cf. BGE, § 13. 
12 Cf. BGE, § 15. 
13 Cf. BGE, § 3. 
14 Cf. BGE, § 23. 
15 BGE, § 230. 
16 Cf. PF 27[14] and 27[37], summer – fall of 1884; PF, 29[67]; PF 37[4], June – July of 
1885; PF 1[186], e PF2 [76], fall of 1885 – fall of 1886. 
CLADEMIR LUÍS ARALDI 
 116
Tatsachen) concerning human nature, attempting to explain how Christian 
values came out of the resentment of failures. 
In concluding his first dissertation with the narration of the terrible millenary 
struggle for power between the values of slave morality and master morality, 
Nietzsche places himself in a perspective that goes beyond good and evil as 
conceived in the old morals. But this does not mean that he is free from 
valuating positions, since the aristocratic way of valuing is the perspective he 
adopts in his critical and re-evaluating work. 
It is meaningful that Nietzsche was aware of the immensity of the task of 
naturalizing genealogy. In admitting the limits of his philosophical enterprise, 
the solitary philosopher expresses a wish in the note that closes the first 
dissertation of GM: “it is just as essential to win the support of physiologists and 
doctors for these problems (on the value of all previous valuations).”17 The 
professional philosophers would be no more than mediators to render the 
relationship between physiology, medicine and philosophy fruitful. In this 
“scientific interchange,” physiology seems to have a greater significance among 
the sciences, since it helps the philosopher to solve the problem of value; it is 
not, however, developed in physio-psychology as announced in BGE I, 23. 
Up to this point (at the end of GM I), Nietzsche is neither a naturalized 
genealogist nor yet the Philosopher who would be in condition of solving this 
great problem. But the new relationship between sciences and philosophy 
presented there is promising: “All sciences must, from now on, prepare the way 
for the future work of the philosopher.”18 This “future Philosopher” would 
actually be a legislator and a creator of new values. However, he does not exist 
yet, although Nietzsche yearns for him: 
– Towards new philosophers, there is no alternative; towards spirits who are 
strong and original enough to give impetus to opposed valuations and initiate a 
revaluation and reversal of “eternal values”; towards those sent out ahead; 
towards the men of the future who in the present tie the knots and gather the 
force that compels the will of millennia into new channels. To teach humanity its 
future as its will, as dependent on a human will, to prepare for the great risk and 
wholesale attempt at breeding and cultivation and so to put an end to the 
gruesome rule of chance and nonsense that has passed for “history” so far […] a 
new type of philosopher and commander will be needed for this some day.19 
Is man still unexhausted for great possibilities? In case the answer is yes, then 
would we all, herd animals, be infected by the “complete degeneration of man” 
(Gesammt-Entartungdes Menschen), that is, by the process of nihilistic 
dissolution? Were we irreversibly dominated by the will to nothing? Or are the 
inexhaustible energies of the homo natura still found in us? This is Nietzsche’s 
question mark, which seems to us exaggerated preoccupations, typical of the end 
                                                 
17 GM I, § 17. 
18 GM I, § 17. 
19 BGE, 203. 
THE NATURALIZATION OF MORALS 
 117
of the 19th century. However, they bring to light the disquieting problem of the 
value of human values. 
 
* * * 
For our problem—the naturalization of morals—we arrive at a provisional 
conclusion: without the sciences of nature, the Philosopher cannot act. I 
understand that Nietzsche the genealogist assumes very partially the task of 
articulating philosophy with physiology, medicine, psychology, ethnology, 
philology, and history in his own time. Therein lies his surprising modesty: 
genealogists and future philosophers have the task of developing and 
consummating the naturalization of morals. Nietzsche himself does not go 
further with the project of naturalism in this strong sense. His artistic 
inclinations and the not clarified belief that art is the only antidote to nihilism 
lead him into following another path, saying farewell the naturalism associated 
to the natural sciences. 
III. NATURALISM AND ART: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATURALISM 
AND THE ART OF LIVING OF THE FREE SPIRIT 
After the naturalistic investigation of the three psychological mechanisms 
(resentment, bad conscience and the pursuit of power in ascetic priesthood), 
Nietzsche affirms, in the end of GM, III (§ 25) that science, including modern 
science, is not yet the antagonist of moral denaturalization of the ascetic ideal. 
Science shares with the ascetic ideal “the same faith that truth cannot be 
assessed or criticized), and this makes them both necessarily allies.” Art, in 
which the will to mischief has good conscience, would be “more fundamentally 
opposed” to the ascetic ideal. In valuing art in this way, it seems to me that 
Nietzsche abandons the “heroism of veracity” and the epistemic virtues of the 
free spirit. There is no criterion yet of naturalistic evaluation, since the artistic 
inclination to simplification and falsification would be stronger than the artistic 
inclination to knowledge: 
What the spirit enjoys here is its multiplicity of masks and its artfulness, and it 
also enjoys the feeling of security these provide, – after all, its Protean arts are 
the very things that protect and conceal it the best!20 
The good will to appearance through art is not the definitive solution in On the 
Genealogy of Morals. In searching for a more adequate solution, Nietzsche 
planned, in the fall of 1887, to write three more dissertations for the second part 
of the Genealogy of Morals. One would be dedicated to the study of “the history 
of denaturalization of morals.”21 By that time, he intended to replace “moral 
values with naturalistic values.”22 It is the continuation of the project of 
                                                 
20 BGE, 230. 
21 PF, 9 [83] – fall of 1887. 
22PF, 9 [8]. 
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retroverting man to nature, which now is called “moralist naturalism,” namely 
“the retroversion of moral value apparently emancipated and supernatural to its 
‘nature’, namely to its natural morality.”23 Here we have a progress in 
Nietzsche’s naturalistic project insofar as it presents a new conception of art 
against the denaturalization of values: “I also want to naturalize Aesthetics.”24 
The development of the physiology of art shows that “ethics” is the objective of 
Nietzsche’s naturalism. Only through art, or better, only through the physiology 
of art it would be possible to create new values and ways of life to reach “a 
creative attitude towards the world and ourselves.”25 
Through the “naturalism of morals” (Naturalismus der Moral), Nietzsche 
aimed to describe the physiological realities “beyond morals.”26 He employs the 
“will to ascending life” (der Wille des aufsteigenden Leben)27 to criticize the 
symptoms of decline in the Christian morals of compassion and in Wagner’s 
music. In this sense, the real primary causes of moral and aesthetic values are 
physiological. In 1888, Nietzsche reinforces his position of 1887 (GM III) in 
affirming that art is more valuable than truth, since “art is the only force contrary 
and superior to the will of denying life.”28 Here Nietzsche is not talking about 
modern art, which ends up in nihilism, in the exhaustion of value and meaning. 
The reduction of morals to aesthetics is a farewell to moral philosophy—and the 
entrance into a world devoid of values. 
In face of the threat of nihilism, the solitary Philosopher ached to create 
naturalistic values: they are not “moral” values, since they have an aesthetic 
character and physiological presuppositions. Naturalizing aesthetics means that 
values are human inventions that arise from the will to mischief, illusion and 
appearance, but they can also lead to superior forms of life. 
The supposed ethical-aesthetical Naturalist still searches for the 
physiological causes that result in the increase of power. The physiology of art 
could be a necessary means to naturalize values. We could then understand the 
reasons why Nietzsche resumes the themes of the Dionysian and inebriation in 
1888. In inebriation an increase in force, a feeling of wholeness effectively 
occurs.29 The investigation of the physiological causes of inebriation shows that 
this state may express two radically different types: i) a sick type, that masks its 
ill states (art would be an example for that) and ii) a healthy type, in which art 
expresses the affirmative instincts of life. 
Unfortunately in the last months of his philosophical art of living, Nietzsche 
was more concerned with the ill aspects of inebriation, mainly the diagnosis of 
unnatural traits in morals. Maybe he had overestimated the danger of nihilism. 
Nevertheless, he opened a very promising pathway for the naturalization of 
                                                 
23PF, 9 [86]. 
24PF, 9 [93]. 
25JANAWAY, C. Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche’s Genealogy. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007, p. 234. 
26 See PF, 16 [73] beginning – summer of 1888. 
27PF 16 [86]. 
28PF, 17[3], May – June 1888 
29Cf. PF 1888, 17 [9]. 
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morals, in which psychology, history and physiology could contribute for the 
future creator of the human being. For such, we should return to the philosophy 
of the free spirit. 
In this direction, Giuliano Camponi’s position about the “French Nietzsche” 
should be addressed. It is very valuable to fixate the sui generis character of 
Nietzsche’s naturalism, which I call here naturalisme à la provançale. By the 
same time that he was searching for a new “physiological-psychic center,” in 
which he was focused on the genealogical construction of the subject, Nietzsche 
believed he had found in Paris “the laboratory of values and forms of life,” 
mainly in the budding empirical psychology. In addition to the readings of P. 
Bourge, Ch. Féré and Th. Ribot, he was focused on studying the new French 
romanciers.30 He turns to the south, to the joyful and serene genius of the 
Provençal. The “France of taste” is not the “imbecile and rude France” of the 
bourgeois-democratic era in which he lives. The few who belonged there are 
hidden, obscure, sick. What mattered, however, is exactly the “inheritance” of 
the France of the spirit. In addition to the capacity for having artistic passions 
and the culture of the moralists, the superiority of the French of the good times 
was thus expressed: 
At the core of the French there is a half-successful synthesis of north and south 
which lets them conceive many things and do many others that will never occur 
to an Englishman. Using a temperament that is turned periodically towards and 
away from the south, and whose Provençal and Ligurian blood bubbles over 
from time to time, the French fortify themselves against the awful northern gray 
on gray, the sunless concept-ghostliness and anemia, – our German disease of 
the taste, against whose excess people at the moment are strongly resolved to 
prescribe blood and iron: I mean “great politics”(following a dangerous medical 
practice that teaches me to wait and wait but not, so far, to hope –)31. 
As a new free spirit (freier Geist), with new tasks, Nietzsche projected himself 
in his time as one of the rarest, who felt welcomed in France. As a “native 
Mediterranean,” who learned to love the south in the north and the north in the 
south, he proposes the Philosopher’s task: self-affirmation from an ethical-
aesthetical perspective. As those who “determine the hierarchy of values,”32 the 
future philosophers would be legislators strictly speaking. They would be, above 
all, artists and legislators. Only in a small measure Nietzsche assumes a 
commitment with the epistemic virtues and with the methods of science. After 
all, it is only through art and artistic illusions that existence could be affirmed in 
face of the threats of nihilism. In this sense, the focus would become rather the 
naturalization of art (die Vernatürlichung der Kunst), with the support of a 
naturalized approach to asceticism. 
                                                 
30Cf. Giuliano Campioni, Der französische Nietzsche. Berlim, de Gruyter, 2009, pp. 313 - 
314.  
31BGE, § 254. 
32 GM I, § 17. 
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Asceticism of the spirit (Der Asketismusdes Geistes)33 is a condition for man 
to regain nature: 
“I want to renaturalize Ascetics, too; instead of the tendencies to negation, the 
tendencies to strengthening; a gymnastics of the will; a deprivation and periods 
of voluntary fasting in all ways, also in the spiritual senses auch im 
Geistigsten.”34  
To reach self-domination, many men in different times had to obey during long 
periods, as well as practice many exercises of bodily and psychic deprivation, 
such as the ascetics of the Philosophy of Vedanta, the “practical ascetics” of the 
Greek philosophers or even the “more popular” ascetics of the old Germans.35 
The Free Spirit would also willingly engage in ascetic exercises. With discipline 
and rigor it would dedicate itself to the “gymnastics of the will,” that is, the 
asceticism of the spirit and of virtue, enjoying the overflowing feeling of power 
and plenitude in the solitary desert of its liberation. In the years of philosophical 
errands, the free spirit philosopher assumes the task, with patience and 
determination, to build the “asceticism of the strong” (der Asketismus der 
Starken).36 The ascesis typical of these moral and bodily exercises would be a 
means to the intensification of power in order to reach the “innocence of the 
child in becoming”37; finally, it is a means to give “style” to the character and 
existence of each and every one as it was proposed since The Gay Science.
                                                 
33 Nietzsche employed many expressions to mean “ascesis”: Asketismus, Asceticismus, 
Asceticism, Asketism, Ascetik, Asketik, Asketenthum, Askese, Askesis, ascese. 
34 PF 9[93] fall 1887 
35Vgl. GM III, 12, M 195. 
36 Cf. PF 15[117] – spring de 1888. 
37 PF 25 [351]-Frühjahr 1884 
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IS ONTIC STRUCTURAL REALISM A VIABLE FORM OF 
NATURALIZED METAPHYSICS? NATURALISED  
METAPHYSICS AND TROUBLES CAUSED  
BY THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE 
JACK RITCHIE 
Sometimes naturalism is presented as a general world view. Most often when so 
presented naturalism is identified with physicalism: the view that everything is 
physical or in some sense dependent upon the physical. But physicalism faces a 
well known and very serious problem, Hempel’s dilemma. The problem can be 
put like this: when we say everything is physical what do we mean by the 
physical in physicalism. Do we mean to define the physical interms of current 
physics? Well, then the view is almost certainly false. We expect current physics 
to be revised as science develops in unknown ways and so some of the claims 
currently accepted by physicists to be rejected as false in the future. Well, then 
do we mean some idealised future physics? Since we have no idea what that 
idealised future physics is, we have no real idea of what the content of 
physicalism is supposed to be on such definition. If we are told that physics here 
just means the discipline which captures all the facts which all other facts are 
dependent upon, then the claims of physicalism are tautological.  
There is a vast literature on this problem but it is not my purpose to engage 
with that here. All we need to note is that Hempel’s dilemma highlights a 
general problem, which a naturalist ought to be very sensitive, about combining 
naturalism with any very general world view. The history of science and physics 
teaches us that science is prone to revolutionary episodes. Basic ideas about how 
the world works are overthrown as physics develops. Once scientists thought, 
for example, there was absolute space, caloric and phlogisten but now we reject 
such ideas. So even modest reflection on science and its history ought to make 
us at the very least a little wary about drawing any confident conclusions about 
the fundamental furniture of the universe; and we would expect anyone calling 
themselves a naturalist to be at least that reflective on science and its history 
since for a naturalist it is from science she hopes to build her philosophy. 
Does this mean that that naturalized metaphysics is impossible. Not 
necessarily. Perhaps metaphysicians can learn something from scientific realists. 
Presented with the a history of science of past failure realists typically claim that 
a more nuanced reading of the history can show that where there appears to be 
discontinuity and error, there is in fact gradual accretion and progress. One 
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metaphysical position which takes this approach is so called Ontic Strucutral 
Realism (OSR). In line with others that call themselves structuralist they believe 
that as science progresses we see structures retained from one theory to the next 
and so we have good reason to believe in those. To this epistemic thesis they add 
a radical metaphysical twist – all there is structure and, very importantly for this 
volume, a loud and confident proclamation that this is a radical form of 
naturalized metaphysics since its claims and arguments are drawn directly from 
science. 
In the rest of the paper I explore this idea and it naturalist credentials. First I 
look at the argument which makes use of some odd aspects of contemporary 
physics to motivate the very radical thesis that there are no things. Then I 
consider structuralist responses to the problem of scientific revolutions before 
finally turning to consider whether the idea that structure is all there is makes 
any sense. My conclusions will be uniformly negative. The arguments for 
structuralism are poor and it is doubtful OSR makes sense.  
OSR AS MOTIVATED BY PHYSICS 
The argument for OSR from physics starts with some observations about the 
strangeness of quantum systems. Consider a system of two particles, illustrated below: 
 
Box A  Box B 
 
 
Classical physics says there are 4 possibilities here. Both particles can be in Box A, both in B, 
particle 1 in box A and particle2 in B and vice versa . 
 
 
In quantum theory different statistics apply depending on what kind of particle is 
under consideration. In particle physics we divide particles into two kinds - - 
bosons and fermions. Bosons are particles like photons, and larger complex of 
particles like the hydrogen atom. They obey Bose-Einstein statistics. According 
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to these statistics there are only three possible states these particles could be in. 
There is only one state corresponding to the bottom line. 1 
Fermions are particles like quarks and electrons. They obey Fermi-Dirac 
statistics. There is only one possible state the fermions could be in according 
these statistics, the one represented by the bottom line. What is especially odd 
about all of this, whether the particles we are interested in are fermions or bosons 
is that what we might think of as natural permutations of particles do not 
correspond to different physical states. 
The fathers of quantum theory thought that this should lead to profound revision 
of our basic ontology. Here is how Hermann Weyl elegantly sums up the 
situation. 
[T]he possibility that one of the identical twins Mike and Ike is in the quantum 
state E1 and the other in the quantum state E2 does not include two differentiable 
cases which are permuted on permuting Mike and Ike; it is impossible for either 
of these individuals to retain his identity so that one of them will always be able 
to say ‘I'm Mike’ and the other ‘I'm Ike.’ Even in principle one cannot demand 
an alibi of an electron! (Weyl 1931,) 
Quantum particles they are argued could not be treated as individuals.  
In the 1980s some philosophers of physics developed a different interpretation 
of the funny quantum statistics. They argued that quantum particles were 
individuals but whatever facts individuated the particles (some basic thisness or 
other metaphysical property)2 were not represented in the theory. The particles 
obeyed these funny stats not then because of their lack of individuality but 
simply because of nomological constraints. Not all the states that one would 
expect classically to be available to a particle where in fact possible states. Here 
is how Steven French sums up this view: 
[T]he implication of the different ‘counting’ in quantum statistics is not that the 
particles are non-individuals in some sense, but that there are different sets of 
states available to them, compared to the classical case. On this view, the 
particles can still be regarded as individuals — however their individuality is to 
be understood metaphysically (French 1989) 
This leads to what advocates of OSR call a version of metaphysical 
underdetermination. One theory, quantum mechanics, can have multiple 
interpretations. So even if one believed that the empirical success of that theory 
were good grounds to believe it, metaphysical underdetermination would imply 
that you would have no way of working out what the content of theory is that 
                                                 
1 So if appropriate symmetries are in place so all states are equally probable, then classically 
we would expect the probability that the particles are in different boxes to be ½ but in Bose-
Einstein stats the probability would be 1/3. 
2 The Bohm theory would be an example of this. Here the hidden variable is the definite 
particle position. 
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you ought to believe. The success of the theory is compatible with multiple, 
contradictory metaphysical interpretations. 
This sounds like very bad news for realism of any kind but James Ladyman 
and others have argued that in fact cases of metaphysical underdetermination 
like this should motivate OSR. 
In the case of individuality, it has been shown [...] that electrons may be 
interpreted either as individuals or as non-individuals. We need to recognize the 
failure of our best theories to determine even the most fundamental ontological 
characteristic of the purported entities they feature. It is an ersatz form of realism 
that recommends belief in the existence of entities that have such an ambiguous 
metaphysical status. What is required is a shift to a different ontological basis 
altogether, one for which questions of individuality simply do not arise. 
(Ladyman 1998) 
The argument is not elaborated much more than this in the publications of 
advocates of OSR but it seems to go as follows: 
1. If we assume quantum objects, then our ontology is metaphysically 
underdetermined. 
2. If our theories are metaphysically underdetermined, then we can’t be realists 
about those theories since we do not know what we are being realists about. 
3. If we adopt OSR, there is no metaphysical underdetermination. 
Hence(?) if we want to be realists, our best bet is to be ontic structural realists. 
Let’s just assume 1 is right for the reasons given by advocates of OSR. The 
argument even so seems very odd for it arrives at a metaphysical conclusion by 
apparently appeal to an epistemic problem. We don’t know which interpretation 
of quantum theory is right so we should move to a third interpretation – OSR. 
But on the face of it OSR makes the problem of metpshucal underdetermination 
worse. Instead of just having two underdetermined rivals, it looks like we now 
have three. Particles as individuals, particles as non-individuals or no particles 
just structures. Why should we favour any one of these options over the others?3 
Steven French (2014) has recently argued that OSR is not just another 
competitor interpretation but picks out the “common core” between the 
underdetermined rivals and that is why we should favour OSR over the two rival 
interpreations. But if OSR were the common core between these rival 
interpretations, then it would not deny anything asserted by the other theories. 
But it does. That there are objects. So this claim is implausible. It could be 
argued that what is the common core is the mathematical structure which is 
common to both interpretations but even if we grant that is so no metaphysical 
conclusion follows. Surely the most sensible attitude to adopt would be one of 
epistemic modesty. We should draw back from assenting to any claims that go 
                                                 
3 This point is made in Saatsi (2009) and Brading and Skiles (2012). 
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beyond the structural. Such an attitude would be that of epistemic structural 
realism (ESR). ESR recommends that we believe in the structure of the theory but 
remain agnostic about all other claims. Hence in this case we ought to believe the 
fact about quantum systems contained in the group theoretic structures but be 
agnostic about whether there are particles and those particles are individuals. In 
short it seems to me that the favoured argument of metaphysical 
underdetermination offers no reasons to believe ontic structural realism but 
possibly some reason to accept ESR. With that I mind I know turn to the 
arguments form the history of science which are meant to motivate both positions. 
OSR AS MOTIVATED BY THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE 
As we noted above a fundamental difficulty for any metaphysical view with 
naturalistic pretensions is to offer some response to the problem of scientific 
revolutions. How can we get reliable information about how the world is from 
science given we expect our best scientific theories to be overthrown in the 
future? The general structure of any response to this problem will be to adopt a 
so called divide and conquer strategy. Scientific realists will typically argue that 
we have reasons to believe some parts of our theories but ought to be anti-
realists about others. Structural realism is one such answer and it is best 
understood and motivated by looking at case study.4 
FRESNEL AND THE ETHER 
The dominant view of the nature of light in the 19th century was corpuscularian. 
Light consisted of rays formed of tiny particles. This theory could account for a 
wide range of optical phenomena including, reflection and refraction but it had 
difficulty in accounting for diffraction effects. Augustin Fresnel, showed that 
many of these diffraction phenomena (and indeed other features of light like 
polarization)could be accounted for if we adopted a new theory of light in which 
it was described as a transverse wave propagating through a luminiferous ether. 
Henri Poisson an advocate of the rival corpuscularian view, thought this led to a 
ridiculous result. If Fresnel’s theory were right there should be a bright white 
spot in the centre of the shadow cast by an opaque disc. Poisson took this result 
to be a reductio of Fresnel’s theory. However, an experiment was performed to 
test Poisson’s prediction and surprisingly the white spot was observed. Surely 
such an incredible result shows that light must be as Fresnel described it. 
Unfortunately, later physics does not support this view. Subsequent work by 
Maxwell and Einstein consigned the ether to history. If there’s no ether, there’s 
no vibrating in the ether and so there is nothing in the world like Fresnel’s 
description of light. 
Structural realists claim we can have the best of both worlds here. If we look 
more closely at Fresnel’s theory we see that certain aspects of it are retained in 
later physical theories like Maxwell’s. Specifically, the mathematical equations 
                                                 
4 This is Worrall’s(1989) example. 
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with which Fresnel described the relative intensities of reflected and refracted 
light reappear in Maxwell’s theory unaltered. (See below.) Of course the 
referents of the key terms are different. For Fresnel the equations described a 
mechanical oscillation in a jelly-like stuff; for Maxwell and his successors they 
describe a displacement current in an electric field. But says the strucutural 
realist that shows us that what Fresnel got right was the structure of light as 
encoded in the mathematical equations; what he got wrong was its underlying 
nature. So we should be realist with respect to the structural claims of science 
and anti-realist about the claims that go beyond structure.  
Fresnel’s equations for the relative intensities of reflected and refracted light. 
R/I=tan(i-r)/tan(i+r) 
R’/I’=sin(i – r)/sin(i+r) 
X/I=(2sinr.cosi)/sin(i+r)cos(i-r) 
X’/I’=2sinr.cosi/sin(i+r) 
 
I2, R2 and X2 represent the intensities of the incident, reflected and refracted 
beams respectively for the component of light polarised in the plane of 
incidence. I’2, R’2, X’2 the same for the component of polarised light orthogonal 
to the plane of incidence. The angle of incidence of the beam is represented by i 
and the angle of refraction by r. 
GENERALISING FROM THE CASE 
What are we to make of this suggestion about how to respond to 
revolutionary episodes. One kind of problem which I will discuss in a bit 
more detail in the next section is something called the Newman problem 
which threatens the very coherence of structuralism. But before I look at 
that I want first to consider the general form of the structural realist 
response to see if even on its own terms it is plausible. 
The structural realist recommends belief in the structure of scientific 
theories because it is claimed these structures are essential in explaining the 
success of scientific theories and because when we look at the history of science 
the mathematical structure is preserved (approximately) across theory change. I 
say approximately, of course, because the Fresnel case is somewhat atypical. It 
is not generally the case that exactly the same mathematical equations are 
retained from one theory to the next. But often enough the equations of a new 
theory can be recovered by some idealization5. For example, by setting the 
speed of light to infinity we can recover the Galilean transformations of 
Newtonian physics from the Lorentz transformations of special relativity.  
So what we should expect when look through the history of science, if the 
                                                 
5   One might worry about what counts as an appropriate idealization. Not evry way of deriving a 
sset of equations from another could count for that would trivialize the claims of structural 
realism. But advocates strucutrual realisms have said very little about what should count as an 
appropriate idealization. 
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structuralist is right, is that structure is in fact retained from one theory to the 
next and that retained structure is essential to the success of the past scientific 
theory. I think this claim is not true and a simple example can show this. 
Consider the shift that I alluded to above the move from Newtonian 
Mechanics to the special theory of relativity. Both of those theories are 
theories of space and time and as I explained some of the structuralist 
intuitions do indeed seem to apply to these theories. Consider another 
important structural continuity between these theories. Both theories 
describe space (or space-time) as flat. In other words, there is an important 
structural continuity at the level of global space-time structure. Moreover, it 
seems essential to both theories success that they represent space-time in 
this way. It is difficult to make sense, for example, of special relativity’s 
success without reference to Minkowski space-time. Nevertheless( and I 
hope the lesson is obvious) even though structure here is retained form one 
theory to the next and even though that structure seems to play an essential 
role in explaining the success of the theory, we have for familiar reasons 
good reason to reject realism about the structure. The familiar reasons are 
of course further reflection on the future development of physics. General 
relativity supersedes both Newtonian mechanics and special relativity but, 
of course, it does not represent the structure of space-time as flat.  
I suggest a simple example like this should be enough to undermine our 
confidence in the structuralist strategy. It just does not seem to be true in 
general that if a structure e is retained from one theory to the next and that 
structure is part of what explains he success of the theory then that structure 
picks out something real. The history of science should make us as chary of 
structural realist claims as any other. 
OSR DOES IT EVEN MAKE SENSE? 
So far I have argued that the arguments which are meant to motivate structural 
realism that appeal to metaphysical underdetermination in physics and theory 
change in science are no good. The first at best motivates an epistemological 
position rather than a metaphysical position and the second does not accurately 
reflect certain key developments in the history of physics. I want now to turn to a 
much more profound problem from structural realism. I will argue that not only are 
the arguments for structuralism no good but in fact its key claims make no sense. 
First let me begin by considering the position discussed above, epistemic 
structural realism. What exactly does it mean to believe only in the structure of 
the theory? Well, the clearest way to make sense of the idea of a mathematical 
structure is in set theoretic terms. A set theoretic structure asserts that there 
exists a certain relation or relations defined extensionally which satisfy a domain 
of objects. But this claim cannot be what a scientific realist wants as a 
description of what is held true in a scientific theory for it is too easy to satisfy 
such a structure. Any set of objects provided it has the right cardinality can  
 
satisfy such a structure. This point was first made by W.H. Newman against a 
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similar proposal from Bertrand Russell6. Newman puts it like this: 
No important information about the aggregate A, except its cardinal number, is 
contained in the statement that there exists a system of relations, with A as a field, 
whose structure is an assigned one. For given any aggregate A, a system of relations 
between its members can be found having any assigned structure compatible with the 
cardinal number A. (Newman 1928, p.140. Italics in the original) 
To know then the structure is to know no more the cardinality of your domain. A 
scientific realism based on this claim is empty. 
Many people (including me) think this objection fatally undermines 
epistemic structural realism but advocates of the position we are interested in 
discussing here, OSR, have a very neat solution to this problem. Since according 
to OSR there are no objects, it makes no sense to talk of the same structure 
satisfying different domains of objects; all there is is the structure itself. This 
neat solution though quickly gives rise to an equally serious problem for 
advocates of OSR.  
Advocates of OSR like Ladyman and Ross(2007) think the fundamental 
structures which exist in the world are mathematical in nature That’s why they 
say things like this: 
 if one were asked to present the ontology of the world according to … [general 
relativity] one would present the apparatus of differential geometry and the field 
equations and then go on to explain the topology and other characteristic of the 
particular model… of these equations… There is nothing more to be said” (159)  
But now we have to answer the obvious question how is this physical structure 
different from the mathematical structure which we would normally think of as 
representation of it. What in short makes something a physical structure as opposed 
to a mathematical structure? The problem for a structuralist metaphysics is that 
whatever they appeal to differentiate physical from mathematical structure they will 
face the following dilemma: Let us call the fact which differentiates physical from 
non-physical structure, X. Is X a structural fact? If not then there is at least one non-
structural fact and so OSR is false. If it structural, then we have just pushed our 
question back. How now are we meant to distinguish this enriched structure from an 
enriched mathematical structure which could represent it?7 
Both Ladyman and Ross (Ladyman, Ross and Kincaid 2013, ch.6) in recent 
talks and papers have tried to address this issue. Ross has claimed the world is 
the totality of non-redundant statistics and that this avoids the above dilemma 
since there is “no such thing as purely formal statistics”. But this is just rhetoric. 
Statistics can indeed be worked out purely formally (that is what they study in 
                                                 
6 Russell (1927) is taken by advocates of SR as an early version the structuralist project 
although its motivations are quite different from those of Worrall’s paper. See Stathis 
Psillos (2001) for what he calls the upward and downward paths to SR.  
7 Disappointingly, despite being aware of the question, Ladyman and Ross (2006) in their 
book “refuse to answer it” (158). But the question is compulsory. Without an answer to it, it 
is impossible to make sense of the claims of OSR. 
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departments of pure statistics) what is needed is some reason to say a particular 
model is an adequate representation of some facts; and that requires a way of 
differentiating the statistical model from the represented facts. No appeal to non-
redundant statistics does that. This is essentially a repacking of the original 
problem. 
Ladyman (2011) in a discussion with van Fraassen offers an alternative 
route. He has suggested that we might adopt “intensionalism about the relevant 
relational structure’’ or ‘‘that there is in the world some causal or nomological 
structure that is represented by logical and mathematical relationships in our 
theoretical thought’’(421). The suggestions here are very vague and 
programmatic to say the least but I will content myself with two observations. 
First, this appears to admit the need for non-structural elements in order for there 
to be a viable position but secondly and this takes us back to where we began, it 
seems very likely that in order to make sense of and develop these ideas further 
Ladyman will have to appeal to a priori metaphysical theorising. Accounts of 
intensional properties or causal structure will not be found to be read off from 
our science and so OSRists claims to be doing an entirely novel naturalised form 
of metaphysical theorising will be undermined. They, like more orthodox 
metaphysicians, will be left to appeal to intuitions and non-empirical data to 
support their programme. 
CONCLUSION 
OSR is a bold and ambitious metaphysical programme which promises to offer a 
new and interesting way to do metaphysics by engaging both with physical 
theory and its historical development. Anyone who thinks of themselves as a 
naturalist will find much to celebrate in the work of Ladyman, French, Ross and 
other advocates of OSR. Unfortunately, the arguments offered in favour of OSR 
are disappointing. Naturalised metaphysicians have yet to offer us a world view 
which can be said to be truly naturalistic while acknowledging our epistemic 
frailty in the face of scientific revolutions. The search must go on.  
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THALES OF MILETUS AND THE GREEK NATURALISM 
JOÃO HOBUSS 
1. This essay is not aimed at dealing with any theoretical aspect or vertical 
discussion concerning naturalism, regardless of the precise meaning this 
conception has, since, as recognized by Papineau, the term has no precise meaning 
in contemporary philosophical debates (2009, p. 1). Therefore, considerations 
about the separation between an ontological and a methodological component in 
naturalism will be left aside. Why? 
There is a simple reason for that: Naturalism interests us here only in its 
more generic sense, which may bind it to what we could understand as its 
inception, that is, the philosophical movement occurred in Miletus in the 6th 
Century BC that had as its most prominent proposer Thales of Miletus, the 
forerunner of the natural sciences who apparently, anachronism aside, was 
generally imbued with some conditions inherent to contemporary naturalism.1 
These general conditions are clear enough: 
“These philosophers [naturalists] aimed to ally philosophy more closely with 
science. They urged that reality is exhausted by nature, containing nothing 
‘supernatural’, and that the scientific method should be used to investigate all 
areas of reality, including the ‘human spirit’” (PAPINEAU, 2009, p. 1) 
Thus, our focus is the physical universe, and nothing within nature may evade 
the processes that inhere in science—understood as the principle of and 
condition to knowledge—, be it from the standpoint of chemistry, biology, 
physics, sociology or psychology etc. Also, in the Milesians’s point of view, 
particularly in Thales’s, who is the focus of our interest here, there is an absolute 
rejection, as shown by the citation above, of any recurrence to supernatural 
realities, immaterial beings or religious-like revelations whatsoever since it is 
centered in the physical reality and the objective laws commanding it, that is, 
nothing that goes beyond observable causations and events. 
 
                                                 
1 The main interest of this chapter is not to provide a detailed discussion of Thales’s theses, 
but actually to go through the texts found within his doxography, aiming at structuring, 
from the reports that have survived to our days, a perspective about the philosophical and 
physical preoccupations of our first philosopher, highlighting what distinguishes him from 
his successors and, eventually, showing that his seemingly awkward conceptions may have 
a certain sense from the point of view of explaining nature. 
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2. In his book Consilience. The unity of knowledge, Edward Wilson describes his 
dream and path regarding the unity of knowledge (WILSON, 1979, p. 1), and 
the search for a synthesis of natural science, exploring thinkers that aimed to 
establish a structure of natural history and focusing mainly on the implications 
that the idea of evolution has to biology, “and for philosophy. And for just about 
everything” (1979, p. 4), not as an idle idea (1979, p. 5), but as something that 
has been vindicated and tested by “experience and logics” (id.). According to 
Wilson, his thoughts, as a biologist, “traveled along a chain of causal events, 
from mutations that alter genes to evolution that multiplies species,” and so on, 
experiencing what he has termed “Ionian Enchantment” (1979, p. 4). What does 
this mean? 
“It means a belief in the unity of science – a conviction, far deeper than a mere 
working proposition, that the world is orderly and can be explained by a small 
number of natural laws. Its roots go back to Thales of Miletus, in Ionia, in the 
sixth century B.C. The legendary philosopher was considered by Aristotle two 
centuries later to be the founder of the physical sciences” (1979, p. 5) 
Such “Ionian Enchantment,” that dates back to Thales, but also to Anaximander 
and Anaximenes, is part of a well-defined philosophical context, namely the 
School of Miletus, which, as much as contemporary naturalists, sought to 
explain reality and everything that exists from natural phenomena, not taking 
into consideration any supernatural basis for their hypotheses and arguments, as 
questionable and naïve as these hypotheses and arguments may be. In other 
words, they preferred “a search for objective reality over revelations in another 
way of satisfying religious hunger” (1979, p. 7). 
 
3. The Milesian School represents a break with the mythical cosmogonies and 
cosmologies, especially due to its naturalistic approach that takes into account the 
various aspects of the constitution of the world such as, for instance, the 
generation of living beings and the phenomena of the world, as can be seen in 
Anaximander (ALGRA, 1999, p. 48), ignoring the anthropomorphic gods as 
“explanatory factors” (id.), satisfied with a free theoretical activity, elaborating 
hypotheses that completely diverge from those of his predecessors (ALGRA, 
1999, p. 49). 
Then, what should be highlighted—and this is the heart of what Wilson calls 
the “Ionian Enchantment”—is the existence of a systematic, harmonic 
preoccupation with nature, aiming to understand the “general formation and 
structure of the world” (DONINI; FERRARI, 2012, p.17), especially regarding 
the “physical and biological processes” that take place in the world, in an 
attempt to account for the true nature of things. For such, it was absolutely 
necessary to suppress, as mentioned above, the mythology of cosmologies and 
cosmogonies (DONINI; FERRARI, 2012, p.17).2 
                                                 
2  These first two paragraphs of item III may be found with further development in HOBUSS, 
J. Introdução à História da Filosofia Antiga. Pelotas: NEPFIL/UFPel, 2014, p. 25-28. 
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Not taking into consideration the compared quality of the thought of the three 
Milesian philosophers, or physics, and their heritage, the figure that excels them 
in originality is that of Thales of Miletus, the first philosopher, who inaugurated 
a new way of approaching reality, not only beyond the mythical narrative, but 
clearly breaking with it: 
“Some think that the ancients who lived long before the present generation, and 
first framed accounts of the gods, had a similar view of nature; for they made 
Ocean and Tethys the parents of creation, and described the oath of the gods as 
being by water, which they themselves call Styx; for what is oldest is most 
honourable, and the most honourable thing is that by which one swears. It may 
perhaps be uncertain whether this opinion about nature is primitive and ancient, 
but Thales at any rate is said to have declared himself thus about the first cause” 
(Met. 983b27-984a3). 
Aristotle emphasizes, in his Metaphysics, the feature that Thales shares with his 
Milesian colleagues, that is, that the principles from which all things originate 
are properly material principles, responsible for generating all there is in reality, 
all that is: 
“Of the first philosophers, most thought the principles which were of the nature 
of matter were the only principles of all things; that of which all things that are 
consist, and from which they first come to be, and into which they are finally 
resolved (the substance remaining, but changing in its modifications), this they 
say is the element and the principle of things, and therefore they think nothing is 
either generated or destroyed, since this sort of entity is always conserved, as we 
say Socrates neither comes to be absolutely when he comes to be beautiful or 
musical, nor ceases to be when he loses these characteristics, because the 
substratum, Socrates himself, remains. So they say nothing else comes to be or 
ceases to be; for there must be some entity—either one or more than one—from 
which all other things come to be, it being conserved” (983b6-983b18). 
Among the forerunners of philosophy, Thales was the first to ask about the 
principle (archê) that originates all things, the nature (phusis) that underlies all 
things. The answer is known by all: the archê of the whole of reality is water 
(hudôr). Aristotle attributes to Thales the genesis of this kind of perspective. 
Thales, “the founder of this school of philosophy [or natural science], says the 
principle is water (for which reason he declared that the earth rests on water).”3 
According yet to Aristotle, the idea that water is the principle of all things is due 
to the fact that the nourishing fountainhead of things is the moist: “the nutriment 
of all things is moist, and that heat itself is generated from the moist and kept 
alive by it (and that from which they come to be is a principle of all things).” 
Evidently, Thales provided reasons for sustaining that the principle of all things 
was water, reasons that do not seem to us as sufficient, or well-grounded, but 
that support, from a rational argument, his core point: “He got his notion from 
                                                 
3 Cf., also, Diógenes Laércio (DK A I).  
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this fact, and from the fact that the seeds of all things have a moist nature, and 
that water is the origin of the nature of moist things” (983b19-983b28). 
Aristotle’s testimony is confirmed by Simplicius (DK4 A XIII) when he affirms 
that “among those who declare the principle as one (cf. also Aëtius in DK A XIIIb) 
and moving, whom Aristotle names physicists proper, some he claims to be limited, 
as [does] Thales.” And this principle is the water due to the fact that empirical 
observation shows that “heat takes its life from moist, the corpses necrose, dry, the 
seeds of all beings are moist and all feeding is juicy” (…), since water is the 
principle of moisten nature that comprises in itself all things.” 
This new way of considering nature from an eminently rational view that we 
find firstly in Thales, as mentioned by Jonathan Barnes, is what should be 
celebrated (1982, p. 4) insofar as “they sought out and drank from the springs of 
reason” (idem). What would it mean? Not only an antagonism between mythical 
and philosophical narrative,5 since it would be a too restraining conception, but 
above all a background change, wherein “unargued fables were placed by argued 
theory, that dogma gave way to reason” (idem), that is, despite a doctrinal 
inconsistency, what should be preserved is the idea that his doctrines, mainly the 
one concerning Thales, presupposed a rational argumentation, an explanation; 
and his conclusions, even if ‘simplistic’ or ‘nonsensical’,6 followed from it.7 
Aristotle himself (HUSSEY, 2009, p. 8) was suspicious about the kind of theory 
developed by Thales and his colleagues, considering it somewhat strange. 
Nevertheless, he saw in it “at least in intention, a genuinely ‘scientific’ 
explanation,” which attempted to rationally account for the whole of the 
universe, understand its functioning and the laws that command it. 
                                                 
4  Diels and Kranz (see Bibliography ). 
5  According to Hussey, “It is clear that this sort of general and abstract claim is not the kind of 
thing that one meets with, either expressed or latent, in Homer or Hesiod. It is characteristic 
of a theoretical enterprise. Aristotle elsewhere (e.g. Met. B.4, 1009a9-19; Meteor. II.1, 
353a34-b5) contrasts with scientific explanations the explanations of those he calls “writers 
about gods” (theologoi), those who speaks “in myths” (muthikôs), implying that they are 
incomplete, unsatisfactory and not wasting time on.” (HUSSEY, 2009, p. 8) 
6  Thus Seneca considers the thesis that the earth rests or floats on water: “Thales’s thesis is 
absurd; indeed, he affirms that the earth rests on water and floats as a ship and that, when 
one says that the earth shakes, this is due to the mobility of water. No wonder the liquid 
element is abundant and gives birth to rivers, since the world in its entirety is found within 
water” (DK A XV). On the idea that the earth flows on water, see Aristotle and Simplicius 
(DK A XIV).  
7  Within this view, there is no room for attributing it to “the will - or the caprice - of the gods” 
(BARNES, 1987, p. 16). There is no room for external interventions insofar as all the 
natural phenomena or events should be systematically and methodically explained (idem, p. 
17): the “thunder was explained scientifically, in naturalistic terms - it was no longer a noise 
made by a minatory Zeus” (idem, p. 16).  
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This is precisely what Thales sought to understand, that is, how “that which 
exists” works, as well as the laws inherent to this process,8 as acknowledged in 
this testimony by Apuleius (DK A XIX): 
“Thales of Miletus, undoubtedly the most eminent of the famous seven sages, was 
the first among the Greek to discover geometry, to show with regard to nature a firm 
scientific curiosity and to observe the asters with great competence, he did important 
discoveries9 thanks to small segments (parvis lineis): the marching of the seasons, the 
courses of the winds, the movement of the stars, the roaring sound of thunder, the 
oblique orbit of the stars and also the growth of the Moon when it rises, its decline 
when it hides and the obstacles responsible for its eclipses.” 
This kind of experimental attitude may be perceived in the anecdote told about 
Thales—when he was ridiculed due to his poverty—and the supposed 
uselessness of philosophy. Utilizing his knowledge of astronomy, he foresaw a 
successful harvest of olives, which led him to rent all the presses in Miletus and 
Chios. His prevision ultimately brought him wealth. The lesson that he wanted 
to teach is that a philosopher—if he had this purpose—could easily become a 
wealthy man, but this should not be the aim of “his virtuous efforts” (DK A X). 
His astronomical knowledge, and the great interest aimed at investigating nature, 
contributed a supplementary anecdote strictly consonant with his scientific 
curiosity. Having fallen into a hole for being occupied with “the heavenly 
things,” he was the object of laughter by a Thracian servant because he was so 
concerned with knowing what happened in the heavens and did not pay attention 
to what was right in front of him or at his feet (Plato, Teeteto 174a). 
The reading of Thales’s doxography may seem strange concerning his 
affirmations that (i) inanimate beings have souls, using as examples magnet and 
amber or that (ii) all is filled with gods (or daimones10). Both views bring about 
the suspicion that Thales would not share the contemporary naturalists’ conception 
that we should focus only on explanations that do not appeal to the existence of 
supernatural entities or to immaterial minds, thus evading the study of nature and 
the laws therein originated, a necessary condition for the naturalistic 
argumentation. But could we treat both views in this sense or should they be 
explained without the need of an immaterial mind or a supernatural being? 
                                                 
8 “The world [for the pre-Socratics] is orderly without being divinely run. Its order is intrinsic: 
the internal principles of nature are sufficient to explain its structure and its history” 
(BARNES, 1987, p. 17).Therefore, the universe is an orderly whole that can be understood 
(idem). 
9
   According to Diogenes Laërtius (DK A I), Thales was regarded as the first philosopher, 
or physicist, to deal with astronomy. He predicted sun eclipses and solstices. It is 
actually well-known in his doxography that the prevision of an eclipse in the time of 
Alyattes II was attributed to Thales—not to Darius, as seen in DK A II. On the eclipse, 
see also DK A V. 
10 “In Homer and others early authors, gods, even Olympians, coud be referred to as daimones 
(in: The Oxford Classical Dictionary. 3.ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 426. 
Another possible translation would be ‘spirits’. 
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There are two specific passages about (i); one by Diogenes Laërtius, the 
other by Aristotle: 
“Aristotle and Hippias say that [Thales] gave inanimate things too a share in soul 
(psuchê), taking his evidence from the magnetic stone and from amber” (DK A I). 
“It seems, from what they report, that Thales too supposed the psuchê to be a sort 
of motor, given that he said that the magnet has a psuchê because it moves iron” 
(DK A XXII). 
Johnathan Barnes always reminds us that, though simple, the arguments are 
always rational (1982, p. 5) and, in this particular case, they reveal “a keen 
philosophical eye,” whose internal consistency lends some plausibility to the 
propositions, exposing an internal consistency (p. 7). The argument could be 
synthesized in three parts: 
 
(1) If anything has a motor, it has a psuchê. According to Barnes, these are 
self-starting motors, which Aristotle names “animators or psuchai” (p. 6 - 7); 
(2) Magnets and pieces of amber have motors. This premise would be, still 
according to Barnes, a common-sense observation: “magnets or pieces of 
amber are seen to possess the power to cause locomotion in other things and 
to move themselves” (p. 6 – 7); 
(3) Magnets and pieces of amber have a psuchê. This conclusion follows from 
(1) and (2): “magnets and pieces of amber are animate things (...) they are 
alive” (idem). 
From this perspective, the building of the argument is not bizarre, or an 
unpardonable theoretical insult, but it follows a reasoning that presents an 
internal plausibility that should not be simply discarded as nonsense. 
 
In relation to (ii), which says that everything is filled with gods (cf. DK A I [27], 
A III, A XXII, A XXIII), there is also a possible, if extravagant, rational and 
credible explanation that answers well to the reductionist perspective that sees 
these fragments as an appeal to a supernatural, divine entity. What would this 
explanation be? 
This proposition could be associated to what was just talked about, that is, 
that, in affirming that all the things in the universe are filled with gods, panta 
plêrê theôn einai (DK A XXII), or daimones (DK A I 27 [kai tôn kosmon 
empsuchon kai daimonôn plêrê], A III [ton de kosmon empsuchon ephê kai 
daimonôn plêrê] and A XXIII, which comprehends both terms—gods and 
daimones, when God is mentioned as the world’s mind [noun tou kosmou ton 
theon, to de pan empsuchon hama kai daimonôn pléres]: the two forms appear in 
the fragments found within DK. Thales simply affirms that all things have a soul 
(a self-starting motor), that is, a life principle or, as mentioned by Barnes, an 
animator, which indicates that all things are endowed with soul in an entirely 
different way as posited by the mythic tradition. Such an idea can be found in 
Aristotle’s De Anima 405a19-21 (DK A XII):  
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“From what people say about him, it seems that Thales supposed that soul is 
some kind of moving principle – if, that is, he said that the magnet has a soul 
because it moves iron.” 
As said by Algra (1999. P. 53), Thales is positing that the physical universe in its 
entirety has “a principle of movement, even in inanimate objects,” and that this 
principle of movement may be named psuchê (or even God or gods). Algra 
concludes that there would be some conception of divinity left in his cosmology, 
but with a very important remark: 
“Even if this shows that the world picture of the early Milesians was not fully 
‘secularized’, it should be stressed that instead of the more or less 
anthropomorphically conceived cosmic deities of Hesiod we now have a more 
despersonalized or “physicalized’ conception of divinity that does not readily 
allow for a description in wholly theistic terns” (ALGRA, 1999, p. 53). 
It is my belief that Algra does not take the definitive step in acknowledging the 
background distinction between the mythical and the philosophical views, since 
he does not break with the existence of a certain notion of the divine, even if it 
was not fully secularized’ or ‘a more despersonalized or “physicalized’ 
conception of divinity’ and ‘not a description in wholly theistic terms’. The use 
of god or spirits seems to have a merely allegorical meaning that does not 
authorize even a distant relationship with the mythical narrative. In reality, the 
breakage with mythical narrative is clear and even with the instrumental use of 
terms belonging to this narrative, the perspective is absolutely different. 
Does this allow treating Thales as the earliest naturalist philosopher? Maybe 
it is a bit of an audacity and an anachronism, but not a crime, regarding him, at 
least, as a proto-naturalist in his purposes, since his investigations aimed simply 
at explaining nature focusing only on rationally-grounded explanations, 
attempting to understand the way the natural laws and events functioned. Due to 
this, the various reports consider him the founder of the studies on nature, which 
is the special niche occupied by him in the History of Philosophy: 
“Thales is reported to be the first to reveal natural history to the Greeks, even 
though many before him were focused on it, as it seems to be the case also of 
Theophrastus; but he is in such a manner above them that he has eclipsed all 
those who preceded him” (Simplicius in DK BI). 
 
 11 
THE NATURAL KIND STATUS OF DELUSION  
JOSÉ EDUARDO PORCHER 
INTRODUCTION  
Delusion is defined by the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) as a ‘false belief based on incorrect 
inference about external reality that is firmly held despite what almost everyone 
else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or 
evidence to the contrary’ (American Psychiatric Association 2013, p. 819). 
Predictably, a great variety of phenomena are apt to be grouped under such a 
definition. Indeed, people who are deemed to be clinically delusional affirm 
many different things in many different contexts. Here are some of them (Davies 
and Coltheart 2000, p. 1):  
‘My closest relatives have been replaced by impostors.’  
‘I am dead.’  
‘I am being followed around by people who are known to me but who are 
unrecognizable because they are in disguise.’  
‘The person in the mirror is not really me.’  
‘A person I knew who died is nevertheless in the hospital ward today.’  
‘This arm [the speaker’s left arm] is not mine, it is yours; you have three arms.’  
‘Someone else is able to control my thoughts.’  
 ‘Someone else’s thoughts are being inserted into my mind.’1 
What follows is an investigation about our warrant for grouping such disparate 
phenomena together. My primary aim is to assess the prospects for a scientific 
theory of delusion through the examination of the scientific respectability of this 
psychiatric category—a status which is arguably put in jeopardy by the fact that 
the detection and attribution of delusion seem to stem not from causal 
classification but from the application of what we may call ‘folk psychiatry’. I 
will do so by first introducing the philosophical notion of natural kind and 
examining the question of whether psychiatric kinds as a whole meet the 
demands required for a kind to be an objective, mind-independent distinction in 
nature. I will then introduce a liberal sense in which biological taxa as well as 
                                                 
1  These examples pertain to eight different subtypes of clinical delusion, respectively: Capgras 
delusion, Cotard delusion, Frégoli delusion, mirrored-self misidentification, reduplicative 
paramnesia, somatoparaphrenia, thought control, and thought insertion. See Radden (2011) 
and Porcher (2016) for a more in-depth introduction to delusion.  
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psychiatric categories might be viewed as natural kinds—namely, the 
homeostatic property cluster model. Subsequently, I will introduce and assess 
how models of the detection and attribution of mental disorder may impact even 
a liberal understanding of delusion as a natural kind. Finally, I will conclude by 
making a case for a folk-psychological understanding of ‘delusion’ in general 
while also recommending a natural-kind methodology for the investigation of 
subtypes of delusion.  
1. KINDS OF KINDS  
Are mental disorders real? One of the main theoretical challenges for psychiatry 
is to determine whether the kinds it investigates are natural. Psychiatry’s 
scientific credentials came under heavy criticism in the 1960’s and 1970’s—the 
most radical embodiment of which was represented by the so-called anti-
psychiatry movement, which questioned whether mental disorder represents the 
pathologizing of normal problems of living. Thomas Szasz, the father of anti-
psychiatry, argued not only that mental disorder as a kind fails to pick a real 
distinction in nature, but that it is just a ‘convenient myth’ (1961, p. 113). This 
intuition is reinforced by controversies such as that over the recent removal of 
the “bereavement exclusion”in the diagnosis of depression in the DSM-5. 
Likewise the proposed addition of ‘persistent complex bereavement disorder’ in 
an attempt to classify those who are significantly impaired by prolonged grief 
symptoms for at least one month after six months of bereavement.2 Against the 
backdrop of challenges to the validity of psychiatric classifications as a whole, 
the task is to make clear the basis on which conditions are included or excluded 
from the manuals and why this basis is scientific and objective and not just a 
matter of social rules of normal behavior (Bolton 2008, p. 164). If entities 
classified as mental disorders could be shown to be natural kinds, then many of 
the controversies surrounding the status of psychiatry as a serious scientific 
endeavor could be resolved. However, this will depend on what exactly one 
takes natural kinds to be.  
1.1 ESSENTIALISM ABOUT NATURAL KINDS 
What are natural kinds? What characteristics must a kind have in order for it to 
be considered a natural kind? The traditional account of natural kinds is 
represented by various forms of essentialism which date back to the Aristotelian 
tradition, in which essences had both causal and classificatory (sortal) roles. The 
causal role referred to the underlying properties that determined and sustained an 
instance’s visible properties. Because these underlying properties were supposed 
to be fixed, they were identified with the nature of a kind—that which makes it 
be what it is. After the rise of natural philosophy in the seventeenth century, the 
essential hidden properties which Locke called ‘real essences’ came to be 
                                                 
2   Persistent complex bereavement disorder was placed in the chapter ‘Conditions for Further 
Study’ in the DSM-5 after its proposed addition generated a great deal of controversy.  
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identified with underlying structural properties which, he argued, are not 
observable.3 In the twentieth century, essentialism was mostly related with the 
revival of the notion of natural kinds in the work of Saul Kripke (1972) and 
Hilary Putnam (1975),4 which followed the skepticism about the stability of 
scientific knowledge brought about by the work of Thomas Kuhn (1962).  
As Marc Ereshefsky (2009) observes, essentialism usually involves three 
main tenets: first, all and only the members of a kind share a common essence; 
second, that essence is a property, or a set of properties, that all the members of 
a kind must have; and third, a kind’s essence causes the other properties 
associated with that kind. So, for example, the essence of gold is gold’s atomic 
structure, and that atomic structure occurs in all and only pieces of gold. That 
structure is a property that all gold must have as opposed to such accidental 
properties as being valuable to humans. And the atomic structure of gold causes 
pieces of gold to have the properties associated with that kind, such as readily 
dissolving in mercury at room temperature, conducting heat and electricity, and 
being unaffected by air and moisture. 
The reason why it matters for the development of a science that its kinds be 
natural in the sense of picking up essential distinctions has to do with the fact 
that such kinds will be ideally suited to figure in key scientific practices such as 
induction, explanation, classification, and discovery. Natural kinds pick out 
classes about which non-accidental, scientifically relevant, inductive 
generalizations can be formulated, since its members share many non-
accidentally related properties. The reliably co-varying clustering of properties 
that instances of natural kinds possess is, however, contingent (as opposed to 
logically or conceptually necessary) and its existence calls out for explanation, 
usually undertaken through the identification and specification of the structures, 
processes, and mechanisms that causally explain the property clusters associated 
with the kind under consideration.  
In other words, one’s ability to make inferences about members of a natural 
kind is explained with reference to their shared underlying properties. Being 
some such natural kind explains why an instance of that kind has the features 
that it does, and that explanation is to be found in studying the intrinsic 
underlying properties an instance shares with other instances of that kind. 
Furthermore, with respect to the classificatory role, if one can identify the 
essence of a thing, one may be able to determine its place in the natural order. 
According to essentialism, if you want to know whether something is a true 
member of a natural kind, you should check whether the causally essential 
underlying properties are present, as such properties will invariably be necessary 
and sufficient conditions for membership in a natural kind. Thus, essentialism 
implies that there is a correct classification of naturally occurring kinds out there 
                                                 
3 It is fair to say that Locke underestimated the kinds of observation that technology would 
eventually allow us to make of properties which are potentially essential, such as the number 
of protons in the nucleus of an atom, or the genetic code in specific DNA sequences.  
4 But see Hacking (2007) for criticism of the lumping together of Putnam’s and Kripke’s 
theories of natural kinds on the basis that Putnam was not an austere essentialist. 
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waiting to be discovered. As the philosophical adage goes, nature is such that it 
can be “carved at its joints.”  
Besides figuring in the practices of generalization, explanation, classification, 
and discovery, Richard Samuels (2009) points out three further characteristics 
that flow from natural-kindhood as necessary conditions for the scientific 
respectability of any given kind. Given that natural kinds possess a sortal 
essence,5 they will be discrete classes of entities that can be clearly demarcated 
from other phenomena and they will be highly homogeneous classes as well. 
Moreover, natural kinds will be mind-independent in an important sense,6 which 
Sam Page (2006) calls individuative independence, namely, that of being 
circumscribed by boundaries that are totally independent of how we categorize 
things. Page illustrates his concept by alluding to the individuation of the night 
sky into constellations: ‘Though it is prima facie plausible that reality is 
individuated intrinsically into stars, reality is not individuated intrinsically into 
constellations, since it is people who divide the night sky into constellations’ 
(2006, p. 328).  
Essentialism about psychiatric kinds—the view that psychiatric disorders are 
(or at any rate should be) akin to stars, not to constellations—is associated with 
the biomedical model of psychiatry, which proposes that psychiatric kinds can 
and should be isolated by studying underlying biopathological processes. Jerome 
Wakefield’s (1992) harmful dysfunction model, arguably the most important 
philosophical theory about the nature of mental disorder, recognizes the claims 
of Szasz and others concerning the evaluative nature of psychiatric diagnosis 
without thereby abandoning realism about psychiatric disorders. Wakefield 
argues that the presence or absence of a dysfunction is a factual matter, just as 
the presence or absence of a natural function is. Since natural functions were 
selected for during evolution because of their contribution to the survival of the 
organism, evaluative statements about functions (and, hence, dysfunctions) can 
be translated into objective, factual statements about evolutionary history. To 
qualify as a “disorder,” however, Wakefield acknowledges that there must also 
                                                 
5 As Samuels (2009, p. 57) uses the term, sortal essences consist of intrinsic properties and, as 
a matter of metaphysical necessity, they are possessed by all and only the members of the 
kind. Causal essences, on the other hand, do not imply these commitments, and are simply 
the set of properties that figure in causal explanations of a given kind. So all sortal essences 
are causal essences but not vice versa.  
6 Following Page (2006), Samuels (2009, pp. 53–4) identifies three possible senses of mind-
independence that do not flow from natural-kindhood and are, therefore, irrelevant to the 
characterization of natural kinds. The first is that attached to theoretical entities (e.g. quarks, 
electrical fields, and chemical compounds), which should not be considered trivially mind-
dependent, non-natural kinds. The second is that attached to entities whose existence 
metaphysically necessitates the existence of minds, such as psychological kinds as beliefs, 
desires, delusions, etc. and, again, should not be considered trivially non-natural. Finally, 
and perhaps more controversially, Samuels rejects the relevance of causal dependence on 
mental activity, which is true of such kinds as toy poodles and the radioactive chemical 
element californium, as he argues that this feature should not trivially imply that such kinds 
are not “natural” in the scientifically relevant sense (i.e. though not naturally-occurring, they 
may nevertheless turn out to figure in all relevant scientific practices).  
THE NATURAL KIND STATUS OF DELUSION 
 141
be evidence that the condition in question is harmful to its bearer—and this will 
be an inherently evaluative, normatively assessable aspect of all judgments of 
pathology.  
Given the present stage of development of biological psychiatry, however, 
the essences of the dysfunctions that constitute psychiatric disorders—alongside 
the evaluative aspect of suffering or impairment—are yet to be discovered, just 
as the essence of electrons and gold once were. Until the necessary scientific 
discoveries are made, their essences are, so to speak, in a black box. As Peter 
Zachar explains, Wakefield’s (2004) black-box essentialism follows the scenario 
proposed by Putnam and Kripke wherein, at some point in history, there occurs a 
“baptismal” event in which, in the example at hand, a disorder is clinically 
observed and named: “This is psychopathy,’ said Hervey Cleckley (1941). ‘This 
is autism,’ said Leo Kanner (1935). If the original disorder concept can be 
developed into a proper scientific construct (one based on an objective 
dysfunction), the clinician’s original concept can be said to have indirectly 
referred to the objective dysfunction all along’ (2014b, pp. 83–4).  
Note, however, with respect to the aforementioned conditions for the 
scientific respectability of a kind, that biological taxa such as species appear to 
meet all of them and, still, they are widely regarded as failing to constitute 
essentialistic natural kinds7 as do chemical kinds such as ascorbic acid and H2O, 
and physical kinds such as quark and lenticular galaxy. This is the case because, 
as the first tenet of essentialism requires, for a biological trait to be the essence 
of a species that trait must occur in all and only the members of that species. 
However, as Ereshefsky (2001, p. 98) points out, a number of biological forces 
work against the uniqueness and universality of a trait in any given species. For 
example, suppose a genetically-based trait were found in all the members of a 
species, such as the unique genetic code of lemons that Putnam (1975) 
speculates is the essence of lemons. The forces of non-adaptive causes of 
evolution such as mutation and genetic drift can cause the disappearance of that 
trait in a future member of the species. Furthermore, as Ereshefsky observes, 
even if a trait occurred in all the members of a species, that trait would be the 
essence of a species only if it were unique to that species. But organisms of 
different species often have common traits because they inherit similar genes 
and developmental resources from common ancestors. Therefore, given the 
requirements of essentialism and the forces of evolution, essentialism about 
biological kinds has been widely rejected.8 
                                                 
7  From now on, I drop ‘essentialistic’ as always refer to natural kinds in the essentialistic 
sense unless otherwise noted. As we will see below, the term ‘natural kind’ has been re-
appropriated by authors who believe that essentialism is too stringent, while believing that 
less stringent criteria can properly characterize kinds as ‘natural’ (Boyd 1991).  
8  Three main views have been advanced in response to this: denying that species are natural 
kinds and looking elsewhere in biology for kinds with essences (Hull 1978); arguing that 
species are indeed kinds with essences, but that their essences are of a non-traditional 
variety (Okasha 2002); and, as we will see below, arguing that natural kinds do not require 
the sort of essences implied by essentialism (Boyd 1999).  
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If biological kinds are not amenable to conceptualization as natural kinds, 
then what chance do psychiatric kinds stand of successfully being characterized 
as such? Zachar (2000) argues that conceptualizing psychiatric disorders as 
bounded entities in nature is inconsistent with evolutionary biology’s 
understanding of species. Indeed, as Nick Haslam (2014, p. 11) notes, 
psychiatric classification would be a great deal easier if its diagnostic entities 
were like biological species, since, while the process of demarcating biological 
taxa rests on the scientifically impeccable confidence that naturally occurring 
biological kinds exist, the taxonomic situation in psychiatry is very different, as 
mental disorders do not pick out distinct, reproductively isolated, spatially 
concentrated populations. Moreover, while biological species are “indifferent 
kinds”, at least some mental disorders seem to be “interactive kinds” (Hacking 
1999), since those who are classified are often aware of being labeled and may 
come to change their behavior and even their self-experience in consequence of 
such awareness, thus producing a “looping effect” whereby the labels may 
change in virtue of their subjects changing (Hacking 2007b).  
Furthermore, in stark contrast to their biological counterparts, psychiatric 
kinds (and kinds of people more generally) tend to be at least partly shaped by 
social processes and normative concerns. These considerations are the 
motivating force behind the anti-essentialist argument in philosophy of 
psychiatry. As we will see, the cogency of this argument will depend on how 
exactly one should understand ‘essence’, as essentialism about natural kinds has 
been challenged in recent years (Boyd 1991). Also, it will depend on the 
plausibility of the repudiation of pluralism—the view that different psychiatric 
kinds differ in how much they fail to meet the criteria for natural-kindhood 
(Haslam 2002)—the acceptance of which would in principle keep open the 
possibility that at least some mental disorders might have essences. For now, 
however, I will assume that the general argument is cogent in order to consider 
what may be proposed instead to properly capture the features of psychiatric 
kinds, noting that by assuming that they are not natural kinds one is not 
immediately committed to the view that they are non-kinds (pace Szasz). 
Following a nuanced classification of kinds of kinds, such as that offered by 
Haslam (2014), will go a long way toward disabusing one of the notion that 
distinctions proper must be essential or fail to be real distinctions at all. His 
schematic account is based on five kinds of kinds that satisfy increasingly 
stringent criteria, each successive kind of kind having to meet one more 
requirement, with natural kinds being on the top of the ladder.  
In the remainder of this section, I will go over the different kinds of kinds 
that fall short of being distinguishable by a category essence: dimensions, 
practical kinds, fuzzy kinds, and discrete kinds. I will connect these notions to 
the discussion of natural-kindhood in the philosophy of psychiatry, as well as to 
the more general discussion of the proper way to characterize natural kinds, 
within which the most widely adopted view states that natural kinds should not 
be conceptualized essentialistically, but in terms of property clusters sustained 
by complex, mutually reinforcing networks of causal mechanisms.  
THE NATURAL KIND STATUS OF DELUSION 
 143
 
1.2 DIMENSIONS AND PRACTICAL KINDS  
The first kind of kind and the least demanding structure in Haslam’s model is what 
he refers to as dimensions (strictly speaking a non-kind, since they do not define 
delimited categories). The label comes from the standard categorical/dimensional 
distinction in psychopathology research and theory, motivated by the categories of 
personality disorder which, perhaps more than any other current DSM category, do 
not seem to be distinct species (Clark, Watson, and Reynolds 1995; Livesley 2003; 
Widiger and Sanderson 1995). Zachar (2014, p. 93) alludes to a model introduced by 
Livesley (2003), in which once the pathological dimensions have been identified—
which may include narcissism, impulsivity, anxiousness, social detachment, and 
hostility (Widiger, Livesley, and Clark 2009)—patients meeting criteria for a broad 
category called ‘personality disorder’ are distinguished from one another by their 
respective position on the dimensions. To qualify as a dimension, all that is required 
for a kind, such as any given mental disorder, is that there be a set of correlated 
properties, such as symptoms. As Haslam puts it, ‘Individuals may differ by degree 
along a dimension by possessing greater or lesser numbers or degrees of these 
properties. Variation along a dimension is continuous and seamless, so there is no 
naturally occurring break separating individuals who are affected with a condition 
from those who are not’ (2014, p. 14). In other words, if psychiatric kinds were 
dimensions, this would amount to there not being delimited conditions at all. A 
cutpoint would be defined on the dimension so that the quantitative variation would 
be simplified into a dichotomous diagnosis, but its placement would be arbitrary.  
Thus, proponents of dimensional models of psychopathology hold that the 
distribution of variation on psychopathology-related dimensions is continuous in the 
same sense as what philosophers refer to as ‘vague predicates’. These models are 
devised in response to the limitations of the purely categorical approach, such as the 
failure to capture individual differences in disorder severity, and clinically 
significant features subsumed by other disorders or falling below conventional DSM 
thresholds (Brown and Barlow 2005). Nevertheless, while rejecting the view that 
psychiatric kinds are natural kinds, Zachar (2000) argues that mental disorders pick 
out reasonably stable, nonarbitrary patterns that can be identified with varying levels 
of reliability and validity, and that the application of many of the distinctions of 
psychopathology is justified by its usefulness for clinical purposes, being 
demarcated on the basis of external considerations rather than on the basis of internal 
discontinuities. In keeping with these observations, Zachar proposes that mental 
disorders be conceptualized as practical kinds, the next rung in Haslam’s ladder, 
which refers to the least demanding sort of non-arbitrary cutpoint—that of 
pragmatically grounded distinctions.9 
As an example from outside the field of psychiatry, Zachar (2014b, pp. 154–
5) alludes to the distinction between an adult and a child. Although the kinds 
                                                 
9  Though, as we will see below, Zachar’s most recent proposal acknowledges the middle way 
between practical kinds and essentialism about natural kinds embodied in Richard Boyd’s 
property-cluster approach, going so far as to state that Boyd’s model is probably the most 
appropriate for conceptualizing most psychiatric disorders (Zachar 2014, p. 94). 
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‘adult’ and ‘child’ are not in themselves sharply demarcated, the uses for which 
we deploy them will determine where their boundaries should be drawn. 
Consequently, many distinctions between adults and children are context-
dependent. For example, if our aim is to decide who is able to vote, engage in 
consensual sex, get married, be sent to prison, drink alcohol, or enter into a legal 
contract, each of those considerations will result in different ways of 
demarcating adulthood (Horwitz and Wakefield 2012, p. 53). 
As medical examples of non-arbitrary cutpoints on continuous dimensions, 
Haslam (2014, p. 14) points out blood pressure values for diagnosing 
hypertension and Body Mass Index values for diagnosing obesity—values that 
roughly correspond to levels at which health risks become more likely. When at 
some point along a dimension the severity of the relevant symptoms becomes 
clinically significant or a source of functional impairment, the existence of a 
non-arbitrary, pragmatic distinction is justified.  
So practical kinds, while fuzzier than natural kinds, are not open to the charge 
of arbitrariness as dimensions are (at least as conceptualized in Haslam’s model). 
The classification of practical kinds requires balancing criteria that do change their 
values in different contexts depending on treatment goals, research priorities, and 
disciplinary standards of validity. As a consequence, practical kinds fall short of 
possessing the perfect reliability one may be justified to expect from natural kinds. 
Relating the practical-kinds model to his claim that psychiatric nosology is 
inherently goal-oriented, Zachar has recently elaborated on the dynamics of 
classification within his model, observing that it emphasizes that discovery of fact 
contributes greatly to progress in classification, but that discovery alone cannot tell 
us how to classify: ‘For example, discovering that a mild form of cognitive 
disorganization (schizotypy) is common in families of people with schizophrenia 
was an important finding that highlighted an objective feature of the world. Should 
schizotypy, therefore, be classified as mild manifestation of a unitary 
schizophrenic spectrum (a genetic grouping)? Another possibility is that should it 
be classified as a premorbid personality style that represents a vulnerability to the 
mental illness of schizophrenia. In which box should it be placed?’ (2014, p. 90). 
Zachar’s point is that, apart from goals relating to classification and theory-
building, neither demarcation is privileged in and of itself.  
The presence of goal-oriented cutpoints raises the question of whether 
practical kinds are apt to count as scientifically relevant kinds, and this, in turn, 
raises the question of the minimal criteria of scientifically-relevant kindhood. 
Zachar defers to Nelson Goodman, who did not advocate for natural kinds or 
scientific realism, but instead offered a theory of relevant kinds. With respect to 
the criteria for relevance, according to Goodman, good scientific kinds support 
induction (to a greater or lesser degree) or, as he would later put it, they have 
properties that are “projectible,” meaning that if we observe certain properties in 
a subset of a kind, we can infer that these properties will occur in other instances 
of the same kind, allowing us to confirm generalizations about that kind 
(Goodman 1978, 1983). Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that 
projectibility is a good enough criterion of relevance. Do psychiatric kinds 
support induction? Even though present classifications of mental disorders are 
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highly variable with respect to validity, and in spite of diagnosis being presently 
based on polythetic categories,10 research on mental disorder has been able to 
produce many useful generalizations.11 The question is whether these 
generalizations are based on (at least some) psychiatric kinds being held together 
by shared causal mechanisms or if they are based solely on these kinds’s shared 
surface features, meaning that they are merely practical kinds.  
The practical-kinds model is implicit in the symptom-based nosologies of 
current diagnostic manuals which aim at grouping patients into useful classes 
that serve practical goals (such as predicting behavior, assessing genetic risk, or 
selecting a course of treatment). This grouping, effective as it may be, does not 
require that diagnoses be grounded in shared causal processes. On the other 
hand, the assumed causal heterogeneity of psychiatric kinds does not 
immediately imply that they cannot be causally classified. Note, however, that as 
the existence of shared causal mechanisms underlying mental disorders is 
currently an open question, assuming that a causal classification of psychiatric 
kinds is tenable is something of a “black box” approach (as is Wakefield’s 
harmful dysfunction model). Nevertheless, as Kenneth Kendler, Peter Zachar, 
and Carl Craver (2011) argue, by focusing solely on the adjustments and 
compromises that actually occur in classification, the practical-kinds model fails 
to suggest a way toward progress. In other words, the model is purely 
descriptive of the current state of psychiatric classifications. If progress is to be 
made, however, linking disorders to their etiology and underlying mechanisms is 
indubitably psychiatry’s best bet. For this reason, psychiatry may profit from 
conceptualizing its kinds in a way that goes beyond the merely pragmatic and 
                                                 
10 Polythetic (as opposed to monothetic) categories were introduced in the DSM-III (1987) 
and are still used in the present edition, DSM-5 (2013). Polythetic classification is carried 
out by assigning a certain number of criteria, of which some, but not all, need to be met in 
order for an individual to be a member. So, for example, the diagnosis of schizophrenia is 
partially dependent on the patient showing two or more of the following symptoms (for 
much of the time during a one-month period): delusions, hallucinations, disorganized 
speech, grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior, and negative symptoms such as blunted 
affect, alogia, and avolition.  
11 For example, with respect to depression, preventive efforts result in a decrease in rates of 
the condition of between 22 and 38% (Cuijpers et al. 2008), and stepped-care intervention 
(watchful waiting, cognitive behavioral therapy, and medication in some cases) has 
achieved a 50% lower incidence rate in a patient group aged 75 or older (van’t Veer-
Tazelaar et al. 2009). With respect to schizophrenia, a combination of new medications and 
community-case management—a multidisciplinary team of mental health professionals 
who engage with the patient and their carers inside and outside the hospital, and ensure a 
combination of health and social care—has resulted in remission of about 80% of patients, 
especially if treatment is initiated early during the first episode of the illness (van Os and 
Kapur 2009). With respect to bipolar disorders, prodromal symptoms (i.e. those preceding a 
relapse) can be reliably identified by at least 80% of individuals with bipolar disorder 
(Jackson, Cavanagh, and Scott 2003), and teaching patients coping strategies to employ 
when noticing the symptoms, such as stimulation reduction and seeking professional help, 
has been correlated significantly with better social functioning (Lam and Wong 2005).  
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assumes internal (but not necessarily external) discontinuities. To this end, we 
may climb one more rung in Haslam’s ladder, toward a more ambitious model.  
1.3 FUZZY KINDS AND DISCRETE KINDS 
Dimensions and practical kinds both represent forms of continuous variation. 
According to Haslam, such variation becomes categorical in a deeper sense 
when there exists some sort of internal discontinuity within a kind which cannot 
be accounted for by pragmatic considerations alone: ‘Such a discontinuity 
involves a break on the underlying continuum, which produces a qualitative 
distinction between people who fall above the discontinuity and those who fall 
below it. An example is a threshold effect, in which a qualitative change of state 
occurs at a certain point on an underlying continuum (e.g., a liquid turning to a 
gas at a certain temperature, or a spring losing its tension beyond its elastic 
limit)’ (2014, p. 15). When internal discontinuities within a kind are present but 
are not sharp, we have what Haslam calls fuzzy kinds. Within these, then, kind 
membership will not always be definite: there will be a penumbra of 
intermediate cases between those that are definitely members of the kind and 
those that are definitely not.  
On the other hand, when internal discontinuities are sharp but no set of 
essential properties exists, we step up Haslam’s ladder once again to find what 
he calls discrete kinds. In this kind of kind we have what may properly be called 
a category boundary. However, Haslam points out that discrete kinds may have a 
variety of possible causal underpinnings, as many types of causal explanation 
can yield category boundaries: ‘These causal explanation types include sharp 
threshold effects (where the qualitative change of state is abrupt), dynamic 
interactions of multiple causal factors, and explanations that invoke centripetal 
tendencies within categories (e.g., conscious identification with a group or label) 
and/or differentiating tendencies’ (2014, p. 15). This immediately makes discrete 
kinds excellent candidates for scientific respectability in the eyes of those who 
argue that scientific practice does not require an essence in the traditional sense 
of a microstructural property that explains all the other properties of a kind while 
also being unique to that kind.  
Indeed, both fuzzy and discrete kinds are candidates for natural kindhood if 
one refuses to accept that what makes a kind a natural kind is its possession of 
an essence, rather than its utility in induction and other scientific practices. 
Within the non-essentialist kinds-in-science tradition (Cooper 2013), fuzzy, 
discrete, and essentialistic natural kinds are all proper subsets of inductively 
useful kinds.12 Within this tradition, several accounts of kinds have been 
developed with the aim of explaining how it is that kinds like biological 
species—in which there simply are no essential properties to be found—can 
                                                 
12 Though the history of natural kind thought is usually traced back to Locke’s real essences 
(Boyd 1991), Murphy (2006, p. 335, fn. 6) notes that, as a historical precedent for the 
kinds-in-science tradition, Hacking (1991) argues that the notion of natural kinds 
indubitably surfaces in Mill and Venn in the mid-nineteenth century in connection with 
induction—something which did not preoccupy philosophers before Hume.  
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successfully ground explanations and inductive inferences. Insofar as the most 
ambitious sense in which psychiatric kinds might turn out to be natural is the 
same in which biological kinds are taken to be natural, such accounts of 
kindhood are of particular interest for the conceptualization of mental disorders 
as something belonging between practical kinds and kinds with essences.  
John Dupré (1981, 1993) argues for promiscuous realism—the view that 
there are countless, yet legitimate ways of dividing up the world into kinds. He 
asks us to consider the entities of some domain mapped into a multidimensional 
space wherein the different dimensions map onto different properties, as in 
cluster analysis—a statistical method for grouping sets of objects based on their 
similarities, in such a way that objects in the same cluster are more similar to 
each other than to those in other clusters. According to Dupré, biological 
species—as well as higher taxa such as families and kingdoms, and lower ranks 
such as subspecies and varieties—would be identified with some such clusters. 
His realism has to do with the fact that he accepts that the world possesses 
individuals which are objectively similar to each other, sharing properties and, 
thus, being identifiable as being of the same kind. The promiscuity of Dupré’s 
realism, on the other hand, has to do with the fact that he denies that these 
properties are intrinsic properties of kinds and, in line with Haslam’s concept of 
fuzzy kinds, he argues that natural kinds are not necessarily categorically distinct 
(i.e., they are not necessarily discrete kinds). Moreover, such taxonomic 
promiscuity is reflected on our classificatory practices both in the context of 
common sense and within science.  
In the context of common sense, a (presumed) natural kind such as lilies is 
classified as a flower, although, in biology, species which are commonly 
referred to as lilies occur in numerous genera of the lily family (Liliaceae), 
including bulbs such as garlic and onions. However, as Dupré observes, to 
include the onions and garlics in the reference of the English word ‘lily’ would 
surely amount to a debasement of the term (1981, p. 74). The moral is that 
common sense and biology provide us with pluralistic ways of classifying lilies 
and each is equally legitimate depending on our interests. This is not to say that 
Dupré’s kinds are merely practical—it means that his conception of natural 
kinds takes seriously the different classifications that arise from a variety of 
interests. Indeed, cross-classification sometimes occurs within the context of a 
single science, to which the countless ways of classifying species bear witness 
(Dupré 1993, p. 38).  
By denying that there is one unique way of demarcating the set of natural 
kinds, Richard Boyd (1991, 1999) endorses promiscuous realism. Furthermore, 
by emphasizing that members of a kind share properties for a reason, his 
homeostatic property cluster (HPC) account elaborates on Dupré’s idea. In a 
near-consensus in recent philosophy of science, the HPC account has been 
widely seen not only as the most successful approach to make sense of the 
intuitive natural-kindhood of biological species, but as quite simply the best 
account of natural-kindhood (Samuels and Ferreira 2010). The HPC model 
defers to the kinds-in-science tradition by stating that natural kinds are 
scientifically relevant kinds and that these are, at a minimum, fuzzy sets defined 
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by homeostatic13 mechanisms at multiple levels that act and interact to produce 
the key properties associated with the kind. These mechanisms are the reason 
why members of a kind are, and continue to be, alike. Importantly, they are also 
the reason why the clusters of phenomena identifiable as being of the same kind 
are similar enough to be subject to explanation in terms of the same underlying 
causal properties. Thus, Dominic Murphy (2006, p. 338) refers to Boyd’s 
account as a refined form of essentialism, since homeostatic properties substitute 
and play the same role of what in “simple” essentialism constituted the essence 
of a kind (namely, microstructural properties). By not insisting on necessary 
properties or a single, essential cause, and by not specifying that such a cause 
must be biological, the HPC account is clearly broader than simple essentialism 
and advances a much more liberal sense of natural-kindhood.  
So Boyd’s natural kinds are, minimally, fuzzy kinds. In cluster-analytic 
terms, if the members of different fuzzy kinds whose members share a certain 
number of properties are plotted in a multidimensional space, there will not 
always be a clear gap between them. As Haslam (2014, p. 18) notes, since 
homeostatic mechanisms merely produce correlations among properties and 
resemblance among entities that possess those properties, there is no reason to 
assume that similarity-generating mechanisms will always yield sharp 
discontinuities between entities that possess sufficient levels or numbers of those 
properties and entities that do not. This leads Carl Craver (2009) to conclude that 
HPC kinds have a prototype or family-resemblance structure. Note, however, 
that both discrete and essentialistic kinds are also proper subsets of the set of 
HPC kinds, so that Boyd’s account accommodates the intuitively plausible 
possibility that there are different levels of natural-kindhood—in Haslam’s five-
tier classification, these levels comprise all kinds for which there are internal 
discontinuities independent of our interests. In this way, some scientifically 
relevant kinds may turn out to be fuzzy, others discrete, and still others may turn 
out to have essences. For example, membership in the kinds encompassed by 
chemical elements may be essentially defined by the number of protons found in 
the nucleus of an atom. This is part of the appeal of Boyd’s account, since there 
is no reason to think that psychiatric disorders, biological species, and chemical 
elements must pertain to the same kind of kind, and, according to the kinds-in-
science tradition, there is also no reason to deny natural-kind status to non-
essentialistic kinds as a matter of principle.  
The inductive potential of HPC kinds is underwritten by the fact that if 
properties are held together homeostatically, then we will be able to conclude on 
the basis of one property that others will typically occur with it. Boyd’s focus on 
the underlying causal mechanisms that make homeostasis possible is important 
for the present investigation because it ties the HPC model to causal explanation 
and classification which, as we have seen, is absent from the practical-kinds 
model—the main competing model of psychiatric kinds. As Samuels notes, for 
any homeostatic property cluster ‘there is some set of empirically discoverable 
                                                 
13 Homeostasis being the property of a system or mechanism by which variables are regulated 
so that internal conditions remain stable and relatively constant.  
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causal mechanisms, processes, structures, and constraints—a causal essence, if 
you will—that causally explains the co-variation of these various symptoms’ 
(2009, p. 55). Therefore, kind-membership will be defined not by sets of co-
occurring properties or symptoms, as mental disorders are presently demarcated 
in diagnostic manuals such as DSM-5, but by the set of causal mechanisms that 
make these properties occur together. On the other hand, psychiatric conditions 
could satisfy the requirements of an HPC kind even if the boundary separating 
the affected individuals from the unaffected was fundamentally ambiguous and 
the affected individuals fell on a gradient of prototypicality (Haslam 2014, p. 
18). Partly for this reason, philosophers of psychiatry increasingly endorse 
Boyd’s as the appropriate concept of kindhood for psychiatric categories 
(Beebee and Sabbarton-Leary 2010; Kendler et al. 2011).  
Along these lines, Samuels (2009) provides the first in-depth discussion of the 
natural kind status of delusion in particular. He argues for the view that delusion is 
a natural kind in the liberal HPC sense by skillfully answering various objections 
to this view and drawing positive morals from them. These objections focus on 
three characteristics of delusion that may be viewed as flying in the face of its 
natural kind status: the alleged continuity of delusion with normal experience (van 
Os et al. 2009); the causal, neural, and cognitive heterogeneity of delusion 
(Freeman and Garety 2006); and the mind-dependence of delusion as a kind 
(Murphy 2006). As I am confident that Samuels successfully deals with the first 
two groups of objections, I will not go over these here, but will confine myself to 
the mind-dependence objections which, I think, merit further discussion. In the 
next section, I will set the stage for the discussion of the mind-dependence 
objections by presenting a model of our intuitive detection and attribution of 
mental disorder, and an extension of this model that aims at accounting for the 
detection and attribution of delusion in particular.  
2. FOLK PSYCHIATRY AND FOLK EPISTEMOLOGY  
2.1 THE DETECTION AND ATTRIBUTION OF MENTAL DISORDER  
How do people detect and attribute mental disorder? How do culture-specific 
models of dysfunction influence these processes? And how do pan-specific 
features of human minds influence cultural models of detection and attribution? 
As Pascal Boyer (2011) notes, the actual cognitive processes engaged in when 
people think about mental disorder have eluded empirical research. He attributes 
this to the fact that such processes fall between the domains of two well-
established disciplines, namely, cross-cultural psychiatry (which focuses on the 
cultural variation of disorders themselves) and anthropological ethnopsychiatry 
(which focuses on cultural models of sanity and madness). Recently, however, 
Haslam and colleagues have, in a series of theoretical and empirical papers, 
developed a social–cognitive model of laypeople’s thinking about mental 
disorder—what they dub folk psychiatry—which shows promise as an 
organizing framework for a field that has lacked a clear theoretical basis.  
Haslam’s folk psychiatry model specifies four dimensions along which 
laypeople conceptualize mental disorders: pathologizing, that is, the extent to 
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which the observed behavior is construed as abnormal or deviant, mainly on the 
basis of rarity, and as a result of the failure to explain the behavior; moralizing, 
the extent to which the observed behavior is under the subject’s control and to 
which individuals are morally accountable for their abnormality; medicalizing, 
the extent to which the observed behavior has a somatic basis and is the direct 
result of an underlying organic condition; and psychologizing, the extent to 
which the observed behavior has a mental, non-intentional basis, and is the 
direct result of a psychological dysfunction which shifts the explanatory focus 
toward causes, not reasons, undermining moral judgment (Haslam, 2003, 2005; 
Haslam, Ban, and Kaufmann 2007).  
Empirical support for the folk psychiatry model comes from a series of 
studies in which participants rate descriptions of mental disorders and other 
conditions on a number of items that assess features of the model. In the first 
study of this sort, Nick Haslam and Cezar Giosan (2002) interviewed American 
undergraduates who had no formal education in abnormal psychology. They 
were given the task of reading paragraph-length descriptions of 68 conditions, 
47 of which corresponded to DSM-IV mental disorders. They were then asked to 
judge if the conditions were mental disorders and to rate them on 15 items 
addressing components of the concept of mental disorder proposed by several 
theorists. The authors found that American lay understandings understandings of 
‘mental disorder’ showed moderate convergence with the DSM-IV concept of 
mental disorder. Then, in a follow-up study, Cesar Giosan, Viviane Glovsky, 
and Nick Haslam (2001) replicated the pilot study in student samples from 
Brazil and Romania using an identical research design and carefully translated 
versions of the original questionnaire. The most interesting departure from the 
American understanding of mental disorder was found among Brazilian 
participants, who did not represent moralizing and medicalizing as polar 
opposites, placing them on separate factors and thereby justifying the 
distinctness and irreducibility of these dimensions.  
Besides mapping stable understandings of abnormality within and across 
cultures, the folk psychiatry model also illuminates shifts in these understandings. 
Since they found earlier that North American understandings of mental disorders 
tend to be more psychologized or“internalistic”than those of Brazilians, Glovsky 
and Haslam (2003) predicted that the longer the period of acculturation of 
Brazilian citizens living in the United States, the more psychologized their 
understandings of disorders would be compared to their less acculturated 
compatriots. Consistent with this prediction, more acculturated participants judged 
a larger proportion of the conditions to be mental disorders. Importantly, they also 
understood these conditions more as manifestations of emotional distress and 
intrapsychic dysfunction and showed a stronger tendency both to understand 
disorder as a violation of social expectations and to pathologize behavior in excess 
(‘acting out’). Therefore, the concept of ‘distu ́rbio mental’ they once shared with 
their Brazilian peers broadened and took on a more psychologizing cast among 
more “Americanized” Brazilian participants.  
Note, however, that while these studies and the theoretical framework that 
emerges from them provide an elegant illustration of the cognitive processes of 
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intuitive detection at work, they do not address the equally important why and 
how questions about our intuitive detection of mental disorder—namely, why 
and how intuitive folk psychiatries emerge. Toward that end, Boyer forges a 
cognitive model that builds on the evidence provided by Haslam and colleagues, 
as well as on observations about the causal connections between pathology, 
cultural context, typical manifestations, popular categorization, and scholarly 
description. In the first stage of Boyer’s account, dysfunction triggers behaviors, 
only some of which are detectable as violations of folk psychology—that is, the 
shared set of assumptions that are the basis of our ability to describe, interpret, 
and predict each other’s behavior by attributing beliefs, desires, hopes, feelings, 
and other familiar mental states. (The ones that are not bounce off intuitive 
detection.) Importantly, sometimes causes other than dysfunction will trigger 
behaviors that will be interpreted as violations caused by dysfunction, and in 
these instances detection will have gone wrong. Detection of unexpected 
behavior will trigger explanatory causal models for the behavior, not all of 
which make it through cycles of acquisition and communication (unsuccessful 
models bounce off transmission). Finally, frequently activated models may have 
feedback effects. These affect the models themselves through the work of 
transmission biases whereby people are more likely to adopt and transmit 
representations that are already widespread (Boyd and Richerson 1985). 
Moreover, they affect people’s behaviors when subjects of classification become 
aware of being so classified. Such changes, in turn, may lead to revisions in the 
initial descriptions of mental disorders (Hacking 1995).  
For our purposes, what is especially important are the first stages in Boyer’s 
account, which, in short, boil down to the claim that our intuitive detection of 
mental disorder involves judging that certain kinds of behavior are so different 
from our expectations that they are taken as evidence that the mental systems 
that produce them are dysfunctional. These are mental dispositions that form 
part of our shared cognitive architecture (Sperber 1996). But just as ‘narratives, 
scholarship, etiquette, politics, cuisine, musical traditions or religious rituals’ 
(Boyer 2011, p. 112) are culture-specific, the manifestations of these 
dispositions to attribute dysfunction will—by deriving from the sets of mental 
representations that constitute the models of what is wrong with people’s 
behavior within specific contexts—also be culture-specific. While Boyer’s 
theory is not a theory of mental illness, but a theory of its attribution, his idea of 
mental disorder as a defeater of folk psychology may have an important impact 
on the project of uncovering natural psychiatric kinds, including the project of 
vindicating the natural kind status of delusion.  
2.2 THE FOLK EPISTEMOLOGY OF DELUSION  
In the context of a discussion about what he calls the ‘counterintuitive biology’ 
inherent in some religious and magical concepts, Boyer (2001) considers Wendy 
James’s account of ‘ebony divination,’ a practice of the Uduk-speaking peoples 
that she encountered while carrying out fieldwork in the borderlands of Sudan’s 
frontier with Ethiopia in the 1960s. The Uduk report that ebony trees can 
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eavesdrop on conversations and that they ‘know of the actions of the arum [souls, 
spirits, including people who were not given a proper burial] and of dhatu 
(witches) and other sources of psychic activity’ (James 1988, p. 303). According 
to James, diviners perform oracular consultation by burning ebony wood as a form 
of seeking personal healing and keeping foreign gods at bay. During the 
consultation, the ebony stick will produce specific smudges in the water which 
indicate not only the nature of the problem at hand but also a solution.  
In contrast, consider the following case described by Murphy:  
Ed was sleeping rough, and heard (or, had the experience of) a tree in a park tell 
him that the park was a good place to stay. So Ed settled down for the night in 
the park. But a little later, the sprinklers in the park erupted and Ed was 
drenched. Thereupon Ed heard the tree tell him that he (the tree) was very sorry: 
trees like to be watered, and the tree had not understood that Ed would not 
appreciate a good soaking. Ed accepted the tree’s apology and went on his way. 
(2013, p. 118)  
Why is it intuitive to attribute dysfunction in Ed’s case, but not in the Uduk’s 
case? In addition to characterizing delusion as a false belief based on incorrect 
inference that is firmly held despite what almost everyone else believes and 
despite being confronted by evidence to the contrary, the DSM’s definition 
continues in the following way: ‘The belief is not ordinarily accepted by other 
members of the person’s culture or subculture (i.e., it is not an article of 
religious faith)’ (American Psychiatric Association 2013, p. 819). At first 
glance, this cultural exemption clause may appear to be a highly arbitrary, 
relativistic, and even unscientific addition. As epistemology does not generally 
regard widespread cultural endorsement as a form of justification, this sort of 
exceptionalism has often been dismissed as unwarranted and question-begging 
(Radden 2011, p. 101).  
But the cultural exemption clause in the definition of delusion encodes the 
fact that other causes would be assumed rather than dysfunction in the latter 
case. Uduk people who believe that trees can hear conversations are members of 
a culture wherein trees are believed to have counterintuitive biological 
characteristics, whereas Ed is not. According to Samuels’s interpretation of 
cultural exemption, in the case of the Uduk the causes of what might seem 
aberrant behavior for outsiders will, on close inspection, have to do with 
testimony: when we acknowledge that the belief that trees have counterintuitive 
biological characteristics is part of the Uduk culture and is acquired through 
testimony, the need to attribute dysfunction vanishes. In short, testimony 
explains the acquisition of strange beliefs. But what about Ed’s case? Should we 
conversely interpret the intuitive pull to attribute dysfunction to him as being a 
result of Ed’s not having the epistemic warrant that the Uduk have through 
testimony? As much as Samuels’s observations about testimony make sense of 
cultural exemption in the detection and attribution of mental disorder, the 
converse interpretation in Ed’s case makes the treatment of delusions 
implausible, as lack of testimonial warrant is too narrow a rationale to account 
for our intuitive attribution of delusion. For this reason, Murphy (2014, p. 114–
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5) argues that to explain the attribution of delusion we should think more 
broadly about reasoning, going beyond testimony.  
In consonance with Boyer’s cognitive account of detection and attribution, 
Ed’s traffic with trees is readily taken as evidence of mental dysfunction in the 
absence of cultural exemption. Notwithstanding the fact that the description of 
Ed’s experience is one of hallucination, the fact that he accepts this experience 
as true, inferring that trees can talk and letting his behavior be guided by this 
conviction, supports the attribution of an accompanying delusion. Murphy 
(2012, 2013, 2014) applies Boyer’s framework to the case of delusion by 
hypothesizing that the psychiatric concept of delusion grows out of a widespread 
human tendency, which Boyer accounts for via cognitive science, to attribute 
mental disorder in cases where someone’s behavior fails to accord with folk-
psychological assumptions about how the mind works. More specifically, 
Murphy proposes that our practices of attribution suggest that a delusion is a 
belief that is acquired through a process that does not fit our folk theories of 
belief acquisition—which he dubs folk epistemology. Unlike the DSM 
definition, then, Murphy suggests that what is crucial to demarcating delusion 
from other kinds of aberrant beliefs is not the end product of reasoning but the 
process by which these beliefs are formed.  
What is conceptually basic about delusion is the perversion of normal 
mechanisms of belief acquisition and revision, not just the weird beliefs that one 
ends up with through that perverted changing of one’s mind. “Normal” here does 
not mean “according to our best scientific theory.”It means that folk psychology, 
broadly construed, endorses some avenues of belief formation and rejects others. 
Delusional people are people who are hooked up to the world in ways that ... folk 
epistemology says are weird, in the sense of falling outside normal human 
expectations about other people’s psychology. The weirdness of the ensuing 
belief is (defeasible) evidence for the abnormality of their reasoning 
mechanisms, but the weirdness itself is not the conceptually crucial element. 
(2014, p. 115)  
Thus, what makes delusions distinctive is not that they violate epistemic norms, 
per se. Instead, our folk-epistemological expectations are violated. All manner of 
beliefs that violate epistemic norms are part of our folk-epistemological 
expectations and can be accounted for by our folk-epistemological resources 
which, Murphy (2012, p. 22) elucidates, do not just include folk psychology in 
the narrow sense of theory of mind, but also beliefs and expectations about the 
role of “hot” cognition and personal interests in the formation and maintenance 
of belief, as well as the role of culture in shaping people’s assumptions about 
what counts as legitimate evidence. In the case of self-deception, for example, 
though the belief is formed and maintained in the face of contradictory evidence, 
we as interpreters do not run out of explanatory resources and can readily come 
up with an explanation of how and why the belief came about. In other words, 
what is distinctive about delusion is the “explanatory gap” created by its 
observation, and closed by its attribution.  
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3. ASSESSING THE MIND-DEPENDENCE OF DELUSION 
How does Murphy’s Boyer-inspired account of delusion attribution impact the 
status of delusion as a natural kind? Unlike biological taxa which, as we have 
seen, are prime examples of property clusters held together by homeostatic 
causal mechanisms, delusion (as well as other psychiatric categories) appear to 
be mind-dependent (or response-dependent) in ways that put pressure on even 
the most liberal sense of natural-kindhood.  
3.1 DELUSION AS A FOLK-PSYCHOLOGICAL KIND  
The first mind-dependence objection one may extract from the discussion of the 
attribution of delusion simply states that delusion is not a natural kind because it 
is an artifact of our folk psychology. As Murphy claims, ‘whether or not 
something is a delusion is a matter of how it strikes us, and that depends on how 
well it comports with our understanding of what people are like, both in general 
terms and within our culture’ (2006, p. 180). Note, however, that even if we 
follow Samuels and derive such an objection from Murphy’s claim that delusion 
is a matter of how it strikes us, this objection could not be derived from the mere 
fact that delusions are a part of our folk conception of the world, since there is 
no immediate incompatibility between the naturalness of a kind and the fact that 
it maps onto our folk conceptions.  
As Samuels notes, water is plausibly a natural kind, though ‘water’ and the 
concept it expresses are also part of our folk conceptions. Though one may have 
affinities for eliminativism concerning some of our folk concepts, there is, on the 
other hand, no principled reason to deny that at least some of our folk concepts 
do pick out natural kinds. What the present objection hinges on is the premise, 
attributed by Samuels to Murphy, that what it is to be a delusion is determined 
by how it strikes us. That is, the premise that all there is to being a delusion is to 
be a certain kind of response-dependent property. As we have seen, Samuels 
alludes to Page (2006)’s notion of individuative independence—the sense in 
which a class of things is circumscribed by boundaries that are totally 
independent of our taxonomic practices—as the relevant sense in which natural 
kinds must be response-independent. So the objection at hand can be seen as 
likening the individuation of abnormal psychological conditions into delusions 
to the individuation of the night sky into constellations: just as the existence of 
constellations is parasitic on the way we choose to categorize things, so does the 
existence of delusions. In other words, the task for those who wish to argue that 
delusion is a natural kind consists in showing that delusion as a kind is more 
akin to stars than to constellations.  
Samuels’s answer to the response-dependence objection consists in arguing 
that it conflates the metaphysics of delusion with its epistemology: ‘The relevant 
metaphysical issue concerns the nature of delusions: roughly, what is it to be a 
delusion. The relevant epistemic question concerns the evidential basis for our 
judgements about delusion: roughly, the sorts of evidence we invoke in judging 
that someone is deluded’ (2009, p. 68–69). Samuels concedes that Murphy gets 
the epistemology of delusion right, and that not only everyday judgments about 
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which mental states are delusions are made on the basis of commonsense 
psychological considerations, but the judgements of clinicians who diagnose 
delusions are also largely dependent on the same folk conceptions. Samuels’s 
point, then, is that the fact that the detection and attribution of delusion is a 
matter of how it strikes us does not show that what it is to be a delusion is 
exhausted by how things strike us and, consequently, there is still a possibility 
that, in this case, our folk conception will be vindicated by, and map onto, a 
scientific understanding of delusion—what Murphy (2014, p. 119) aptly calls the 
vindication project.  
3.2 THE CULTURAL RELATIVITY OF DELUSION  
The second mind-dependence objection to which Samuels refers is that which 
states that delusion is not a natural kind because delusion is context-sensitive. In 
fact, there are two senses in which delusion may be said to be culturally relative. 
The first sense expands on what has been just discussed, namely, the fact that the 
attribution of delusion derives from our folk conception of what is and isn’t a 
healthy or normal state of mind. Whereas the previous objection concerns an 
allegedly universal feature of human folk psychology, a new objection may 
hinge on the claim that the attribution of delusion will also depend on what is 
considered a healthy or normal state of mind within one’s cultural context, 
encoded in the cultural exemption clause in the definition of delusion given in 
the DSM-5. The clause makes sense of the intuition that the delusional 
individual stands alone in some sense (Leeser and O’Donohue 1999, p. 692). 
The intuitive character of the cultural exceptionalism clause can be seen by 
contemplating what we would judge as strange and even irrational beliefs which 
are nevertheless commonplace in cultures other than our own. For example, 
consider the following entry in Dan Sperber’s field diary, from the period he 
conducted ethnographic fieldwork among the Dorze people of Southern Ethiopia 
between 1968 and 1974:  
Saturday morning old Filate came to see me in a state of great excitement:  
“Three times I came to see you, and you weren’t there!” 
“I was away in Konso.” 
“I know. I was angry. I was glad. Do you want to do something?” “What?” 
“Keep quiet! If you do it, God will be pleased, the Government will be pleased. So?” 
“Well, if it is a good thing and if I can do it, I shall do it.” 
“I have talked to no one about it: will you kill it?” 
“Kill? Kill what?” 
“Its heart is made of gold, it has one horn on the nape of its neck.  
It is golden all over. It does not live far, two days’ walk at most. If you kill it, you will 
become a great man!” 
And so on . . . It turns out Filate wants me to kill a dragon. He is to come back 
this afternoon with someone who has seen it, and they will tell me more . . . 
(1982, p. 35)  
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Commenting on this entry, Sperber goes on to express respect and affection for 
his Ethiopian friend. He is confident that the man was not senile at the time of 
the unusual request and, moreover, that he was too poor to drink. Consequently, 
Sperber is faced with a variation of a question that, undoubtedly, all of us ask 
ourselves of someone else at some point: how could a sound person believe 
that? ‘That’ being, in this case, that dragons exist, not “once upon a time,” but 
there and then, within walking distance. What if Sperber had expressed doubts 
that such an animal even exists? What if he had pressed his friend on the issue of 
the dragon’s heart being made of gold and the apparent impossibility of a gold 
heart beating? Sperber concludes that his friend was ‘merely quoting what 
people who had killed these animals were reported to have said, and they knew 
better than any of us’ (1982, p. 61). In line with Sperber’s explanation, Samuels 
(2009, pp. 69–70) argues that the cultural relativity of delusions tracks precisely 
the insensitivity of delusions to testimony—an important source of epistemic 
warrant and epistemic defeat. Because it is normal for one to form and maintain 
beliefs based on the testimony of peers and authorities from one’s culture or 
subculture, resistance to testimony is viewed as a sign that something is wrong. 
And because one’s source of testimony varies with one’s culture and subculture, 
the cultural exemption clause is a necessary measure to avoid the hasty judgment 
that culture-bound beliefs are necessarily irrational and possibly even the 
product of pre-rational mental processes (Sperber 1980). However, so long as 
the resistance to testimony that characterizes delusion is culturally invariant, the 
fact that delusions are resistant to testimony does not suffice to show that 
delusion is a response-dependent property and, thus, cannot be used to 
successfully object to the natural kind status of delusion.  
The second sense in which delusion may be said to be culturally relative 
derives from the fact that the content of delusions is highly sensitive to social 
and cultural context. So, for example, Masato Tateyama and colleagues (1998) 
compared the schizophrenic delusions of 324 inpatients in Japan, 101 in Austria, 
and 150 in Germany, and found that themes of persecutory delusion (i.e., 
delusions of poisoning) and religious themes of guilt/sin were conspicuous in 
Europe, while amorphous delusions of reference (i.e. ‘being slandered’) were 
predominant in Japan. Another study conducted by Thomas Stompe and 
colleagues (1999) compared the schizophrenic delusions of 126 Austrian and 
108 Pakistani patients, finding significantly higher frequencies of grandiose and 
religious delusions in Austrian patients, and persecutory delusions with political 
themes among male Pakistani patients. To these observations may be added the 
existence of culture-bound syndromes whose expression includes culture-
specific symptoms, as in koro, most prevalent among Chinese ethnic groups, in 
which an individual claims that his or her genitals are retracting and will 
disappear (Chowdhury 1996).  
Time is also a factor. Changes within one and the same culture have an 
impact on the diachronic variability of delusional content, as Borut Škodlar and 
colleagues (2008) have found in a study of admission records of patients with 
schizophrenia in Slovenia from 1881 to 2000. The recent emergence of the so-
called Truman Show delusion attests to the same fact—patients with ‘Truman 
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signs’ claim that their lives are staged plays or reality television shows, as with the 
protagonist of the 1998 film The Truman Show (Fusar-Poli et al. 2008; Gold and 
Gold 2012). However, though the kinds of variability discussed above may 
suggest that delusion is response-dependent to the extent that what is a delusion 
depends on what beliefs are socially prevalent at a certain point in time, Samuels 
(2009, p. 69) notes that what the sensitivity of delusions to social context shows is 
only that the nature of delusion, as Karl Jaspers (1913) long before observed, 
cannot be characterized, but can at best only be classified, in terms of its contents. 
3.3 THE VINDICATION PROJECT  
If Boyer and Murphy are correct, then the science of delusion is inextricably 
tied with its intuitive detection. Psychiatric elaborations of folk psychology give 
rise to the clinical concept of delusion, the extension of which is then subdivided 
according to surface features, most prominent among these its content (i.e., what 
it is about). But can delusion, being rooted in folk psychology, play the role of 
regimenting scientific inquiry?  
By defending that delusion is a natural kind in the HPC sense, Samuels 
answers positively and wagers that scientific psychiatry will vindicate the folk 
concept of delusion—that is, if Samuels is correct, the folk concept of delusion 
picks out a causal signature that, once uncovered, will vindicate the reliability of 
this concept and show that delusion is, in fact, a homeostatic property cluster. 
Once the causal mechanisms that make the properties of delusion co-occur are 
discovered, causal classification may result in many current subtypes of delusion 
being excluded from its extension. But because the HPC conception of natural 
kindhood does not mandate that natural kinds have category essences or 
category boundaries, it is likely that a mature science of delusion informed by its 
causal mechanisms will not be able to give a simple yes or no answer to every 
question of the form ‘Is X a delusion?’. Of more practical importance, however, 
is the fact that a causal understanding of the underlying mechanisms would 
suffice to yield powerful inductive generalizations regarding diagnosis, 
prevention, and management.  
But how does the vindication project fare in view of the mind-dependence of 
the folk concept of delusion? As Samuels notes, this only hurts the chances of 
delusion being an HPC kind if we conflate the metaphysics and epistemology of 
delusion. As we have seen, Samuels argues that attention to the fact that our 
concept of delusion is a part of our folk psychology that has been incorporated 
into scientific psychology and psychiatry is not enough to show that it is not a 
natural kind: the folk-psychological kind may well track an underlying natural 
kind. Samuels (2009, p. 69) notes that, to support the mind-dependence 
objection, it would be necessary to show that in the case of delusion the 
metaphysical issues about the nature of the kind and the epistemic issues about 
how we know about instances of the kind should be collapsed. Showing that the 
clinical concept is built on folk conceptions of normality is not enough. 
Importantly, however, Samuels does not establish that delusion is a natural kind. 
In fact, he could not have established this on the basis of a priori speculation 
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alone, as establishing natural kindhood is ultimately a matter of investigating the 
causal basis of the homeostasis of property clusters (assuming the HPC model). 
Samuels does skillfully argue against various objections to the status of delusion 
as a homeostatic property cluster, some of which I have discussed above. In doing 
so, Samuels establishes something very important, namely, that these objections 
are not sufficient to exclude the possibility that delusion is a natural kind. So what 
we are left with after Samuels’s arguments is that the natural kind status of 
delusion is still an open question, i.e. that delusion is possibly a natural kind.  
Although the argument from mind-dependence that derives from accepting 
the application of Boyer’s theory to delusion is not enough to rule out the 
possibility that delusion is a natural kind, it does make Samuels’s thesis 
implausible and gives him the burden of proof. This implausibility can be better 
seen if we compare generic folk kinds and generic scientific kinds. If Samuels is 
right, delusion would be a generic natural kind. Just like the kind metal 
subsumes many different subordinate kinds such as gold, copper, and 
magnesium, delusion will subsume subtypes which would themselves also be 
natural kinds. But Samuels’s optimism regarding the vindication project is 
hardly justified by the observation of other generic folk concepts and how they 
relate to their scientific counterparts. For instance, what the folk concept of 
metal seemingly picks out is not a causal signature, but, as Murphy (2014, p. 
121) notes, a variety of properties that directly relate to our interests, properties 
like being shiny, being malleable, etc., rather than a chemical element whose 
atoms readily lose electrons to form positive ions, etc. Likewise, the folk 
concept of lily, as Dupré (1981, p. 74) points out, does not accurately map onto 
the biological concept of lily, which includes garlics and onions, but is used to 
refer exclusively to a type of flower. If delusion picks out properties that relate 
to our interests, like being weird to varying degrees, then the burden of proof 
falls squarely on Samuels with respect to the likelihood of vindication.  
Furthermore, as investigation into the causes of delusion is still in early 
stages, accepting the view that delusion constitutes an HPC kind is as much a 
“black-box” approach as Wakefield’s, only more modest in its ambition. I have 
argued that as an ontological commitment, this approach is weak. As a 
methodological commitment, on the other hand—and this is the sense in which 
Kendler and colleagues (2011) seem to accept that psychiatric categories in 
general are HPC kinds—there is still a case for viewing delusion as a generic 
natural kind with an eye toward progress in scientific psychiatry. Bearing in 
mind that what we are authorized to commit to (ontologically) at this moment is 
that delusion is a practical kind—as this coheres both with our knowledge of 
delusion in the clinic as well as with our best theory of detection and attribution 
of mental disorder (and delusion in particular)—if the possibility of natural 
kindhood is still open, assuming natural kindhood is a sound methodology 
inasmuch as it offers a way toward progress in causal classification. However, I 
maintain that this is neither the only, nor the best way toward progress.  
Even if the folk concept of metal is not appropriate to play the role of 
regimenting scientific inquiry, chemistry did eventually arrive at the natural kind 
metal and many subspecies of our folk concept of metal, such as gold, silver, 
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copper, etc. also turned out to be natural kinds. In this manner, despite delusion 
being a folk concept not so far mapped onto a rigorous scientific concept, many 
subtypes of delusion already recognized, such as clear-cut cases of 
monothematic delusions following brain damage (e.g. Capgras, mirrored-self 
misidentification, somatoparaphrenia, etc.), might still turn out to be natural 
kinds which are thrown in with similar conditions that strike us as weird into the 
set of phenomena described folk-psychologically (and clinically) as delusions. 
Our focus should be on uncovering the causal mechanisms underlying specific 
kinds of delusion rather than trying to impose a general causal explanation on a 
ragbag of different abnormalities that may or may not actually be of the same 
kind. Thus, I suggest a compromise between Zachar’s (2000) earlier work and 
Samuels’s (2009) defense of delusion as an HPC kind, drawing on Murphy’s 
(2014) observations: delusion, as a kind rooted in folk psychology, is probably a 
practical kind, and it probably does not pick out a universal causal signature that 
makes the whole category be a natural kind, but it probably does pick out many 
subspecies which are themselves natural kinds. Hence:  
Hypothesis: Delusion is a not a natural kind, but some delusions are.  
So if the question were ‘Is Capgras delusion a natural kind?,’ or ‘Is 
somatoparaphrenia a natural kind?,’ being that these are stable clusters of 
properties with recognizably homogeneous neurological causes and which are 
not the product of generic folk intuitions but of rigorous clinical observation and 
investigation, the case for their natural kindhood would be much stronger and 
plausible. Thus, I suggest that the way to progress in the science of delusion lies 
in trying to vindicate the natural kind status of subspecies of delusions through 
the study of the causal mechanisms that make the relevant properties occur 
homeostatically, and not in trying to find a shared causal basis for every 
phenomena that we call delusion assuming beforehand that such a share causal 
basis is present. After the investigation into the causal mechanisms is done with 
multiple subtypes of delusion, a causal account of delusion in general will no 
doubt progressively suggest itself. But the set of delusion subtypes that will be 
found to share causal mechanisms in the sense that would authorize us to 
abstract from them a generic natural kind will be a subset of the set of all 
delusions—a set the intension of which depends on context-dependent folk-
psychological intuitions and, hence, membership in such a set is tied to surface 
features (symptoms, not causes) detected with the tools of folk psychology.  
CONCLUSION  
In the preceding sections, I have attempted to elucidate some of the difficulties 
inherent in trying to claim that delusion is a natural kind. After delineating five 
different senses of kindhood and introducing a non-essentialist approach to 
natural kindhood—the HPC model—I have drawn on a cognitive model of the 
intuitive detection and attribution of mental disorder and its application to the 
case of delusion to flesh out the fact that the clinical category of delusion is 
rooted in folk-psychological expectations. Finally, being that the folk-
JOSÉ EDUARDO PORCHER 
 160
psychological status of delusion does not immediately remove the possibility of 
this kind being vindicated as natural by scientific investigation, I have 
questioned the vindication project and formulated a working hypothesis that I 
claim is both ontologically and methodologically more sound. My hypothesis is 
that along with the general category of delusion, some delusions will be 
confined to practical kindhood, perhaps along with the bulk of mental symptoms 
and disorders, while some will turn out to be objective distinctions in nature. 
Importantly, this hypothesis and methodological suggestion bypasses what 
Samuels calls the unity problem: if many different subtypes of mechanism are 
responsible for delusions, why treat delusions as such as a natural kind? 
According to him, it must be because these mechanisms are themselves of the 
same kind. What I have tried to show in this chapter is that this is an improbable 
scenario. Assuming that a variety of mechanisms make subtypes of delusion 
subtypes of some general mechanism as opposed to a heterogeneous collection 
of different mechanisms the products of which share surface features is not only 
unwarranted, but methodologically flawed.  
 
 12 
THE ROLE OF OSTENSIVE TRAINING 
 IN NATURAL LANGUAGE ACQUISITION 
JULIANO DO CARMO 
1. DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE PROCESS OF LANGUAGE ACQUISITION 
The process of natural language acquisition is a widely discussed theme among 
linguists, philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists, mainly due to the 
controversy regarding the explanations offered for the processes of acquisition of the 
abilities needed for learning and developing language. The fact that learners in a 
“verbal environment,” even if they lack formal training, generally learn to speak and 
understand the expressions of language with no great difficulties has been leading 
many theoreticians to think that there must necessarily be some previous syntactic or 
semantic structure that allows them to understand and use natural language. As we 
will see, there is no need to presuppose “innate categories” or even a “private 
language of thought” to explain the process of natural language acquisition1.  
Noam Chomsky’s innatist (or nativist) argument exposed in Aspects of the 
Theory of Syntax in 1965 aims to show that language learning cannot be dependent 
on a simple linguistic input, since this input would not be capable of developing the 
tools needed for the potentially infinite processing of sentences of a natural language 
in the learner. Chomsky’s strategy is to posit that there are some innate and universal 
biological grammatical categories (once they would be supposedly present in all the 
known natural languages), such as nouns and verbs, that enable the complete 
development of language in the learners. Moreover, the learners have a kind of 
natural (instinctive) disposition to associate nouns and verbs and, thus, to form 
complete and significant sentences. As is well-known, the success of Chomsky’s 
strategy depends on the presupposition of a Universal Grammar (innate biological 
categories). However, the idea of a Universal Grammar has been strongly refused by 
the theoreticians of cognitive psychology, mainly with regard to the supposed basic 
categories (nouns and verbs), since, from a biological and evolutionary point of 
view, the motives for these same categories being selected are not clear. Innatism 
should be able to explain how the “language faculty,” containing innate 
representations of the Universal Grammar, has arisen in the human mind.2 Until 
now, however, there is no consensus about how the knowledge of the Universal 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank those with whom I had the opportunity to discuss (in many events) 
some of the ideas developed in this article, in particular my dear colleagues Carlos Miraglia 
and Flávia Carvalho Chagas for the excellent remarks, critiques and suggestions. 
2   See: COWIE, F. Innateness and Language. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2008. 
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Grammar (or of its categories) may have evolved out of any adaptive element in our 
ancestors, since linguistic ability does not seem to offer any reproductive advantage.3 
Instead of presupposing specific innate mechanisms for language processing (from 
an intellectualist point of view), maybe it could be the case of presupposing that the 
learners of a natural language use cognitive principles of general learning. In 
addition, Chomsky’s innatism presupposes a mechanism of language processing that 
is excessively precocious for learners, since it assumes that learners have abilities 
that are fully developed in the competent users of the language. 
On the other hand, Jerry Fodor’s apriorist thesis, exposed in The Language of 
Thought (1975), is based on the idea that it is not possible to explain the process of 
learning a natural language without presupposing a “private language of thought.” 
Fodor advocates that, for learning a natural language, human beings need to have 
access to the representations of certain conceptual propositions, that is, they should 
be able to manipulate certain concepts.4 Natural languages are public and controlled 
by equally public criteria. However, in the moment of acquiring a natural language, 
human beings have no access to a natural language. Therefore, Fodor posits that the 
concepts needed for learning to occur cannot be controlled by public criteria and, 
thus, the previous manipulation of certain concepts should be controlled by 
regularities that are not public. Fodor’s strategy (concerning the explanatory need of 
the supposed private language of thought) seems to work only insofar as the 
computational model of language is true, and this seems to be an excessively high 
price to pay for an explanation of the process of language acquisition. In addition, 
Fodor’s intellectualism seems to presuppose that speaking a language (as an 
intelligent action) is an action necessarily preceded or directed by a previous 
theoretical operation, such as the intellectual action of considering a regulative 
proposition. If each and every intelligent action presupposes a previous theoretical 
operation, then it seems really difficult to prevent the infinite regress of theoretical 
operations.5 
Skinner’s behaviorism, whose bases are found in The Verbal Behavior (1957), 
has been the most important rival perspective to innatism and apriorism, once it 
seeks to explain the process of language acquisition through empirical, actual and 
publically observable events. The basic idea is that the acquisition and the 
development of a natural language occur through the learner’s exposition to 
influences of the verbal behavior of the competent users of the language. Insofar as 
there are no innate abilities, it is the verbal environment that enables the association 
of words and meanings.6 A verbal environment is the product of the constant 
                                                 
3  See: LEWONTIN, R. The Evolution of Cognition: Questions we will Never Answer, In R. 
Sternberg and D. Scarborough (eds.). An Invitation to Cognitive Science. Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1998. 
4  See: FODOR, J. The Language of Thought. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 
1975. 
5   RYLE, G. The Concept of Mind. New York: Routledge, 1949. p. 31. 
6
  Skinner’s behaviorism aims to explain language acquisition in terms of the subject’s 
previous history, current circumstances and nothing more. According to Stephen Winokur, 
the idea is to show, from an analysis of the speech behavior, that language acquisition is 
linked to many variables whereof verbal behavior is a function. Skinner’s psychology, 
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interchange among competent users of the language.7 The behaviorist strategy 
consists in advocating that the correct utterances of a learner are positively 
reinforced when he or she understands the communicative value of words and 
sentences. Language is fully acquired through an operative conditioning where the 
learners perceive certain regularities within the verbal environment through 
positively reinforced behaviors. 
The variables whereof behavior is a function are sought in empirical, actual and 
publically observable behaviors. The organism’s present and past states are 
observed (deprivation), its genetic constitution (a human being or a chimpanzee 
may acquire verbal behavior, but a pigeon may not), and the present and past 
states of the environment (stimuli); and all of them are actual, physical and 
intersubjectively observable things. The covariations of changes in these 
empirical variables and the changes in behavior may be described. The 
description of functional relationships among empirical variables constitutes the 
type of causal consideration that interests us.8 
What renders the classic versions of behaviorism not very attractive, however, to 
counter innatism and apriorism is the supposed difficulty in explaining the way the 
subjects become autonomous in relation to conditioning. Skinner also recognizes 
that the problem of determining how verbal environment may have arisen from a 
non-verbal source is the target of many speculations and that the answers offered to 
this problem are no more than inferences to the best explanation.9 Moreover, the 
explanations presented to make this passage most of the times seem excessively 
artificial. Yet, these difficulties do not fully disable an anti-intellectualist position on 
the process of natural language acquisition, but demand that the theoretician provide 
a reasonable explanation for the process as a whole, as will be seen. 
Studies on encephalic processes in language acquisition have been leading to 
considerable advancements in relation to the description of areas involved or 
                                                 
based on the notion of stimulus-response, understands behavior as the central point of 
investigation. The movements produced by the muscles of animals should be explained 
instead of ideas, meanings, desires, intentions, expectations or any type of hypothetical 
psychological mechanism. The idea, in other words, is to highlight that verbal behavior is 
also a kind of behavior (not too different from non-verbal behavior). According to 
Winokur, to make a noise with the mouth (to speak, for instance) is a behavior as much as 
riding a bicycle. Cf.: WINOKUR, S. A primer of verbal behavior: an operant view. 
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1976. 1-3. Fodor harshly criticizes this model of thinking, 
mainly concerning the notion of “proximal stimulus” as a proximal representation of the 
“distal stimulus.” Insofar as there is no internal representation without an internal language, 
Fodor believes that behaviorism is not a reasonable way of explaining the process of natural 
language acquisition. Cf. FODOR, J. The Language of Thought. New York: Thomas Y. 
Crowell Company, 1975, pp. 55-65. 
7  SKINNER, B. F. Verbal Behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957. p. 461. 
8  WINOKUR, S. A primer of verbal behavior: an operant view. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
Hall, 1976. 1-3. 
9  SKINNER, B. F. Verbal Behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957. p. 461-5. 
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activated when we acquire, understand and use language.10 Neuroscientists in 
general agree with the thesis that the brain has an innate ability to acquire language. 
Neural plasticity,11 as an anti-intellectualist element, has been required as an 
indispensable element for acquiring a language and also for molding most of our 
acquired behaviors, but empirical studies that show that neural plasticity is a 
necessary and sufficient element to explain semantic normativity are still lacking, for 
instance. That is, despite the fact that science aims to offer a detailed description of 
brain processes involved in the acquisition of the rules of a language, it supposedly 
cannot adequately explain what obliges or constrains us to use or apply these rules in 
the same way as we acquire them in the most varied situations or language games12 
(including in situations to which we have not been previously exposed13). 
The argument that will be developed here presupposes the idea that a natural 
language demands different abilities from its users and that these abilities14 are not 
innate or a priori, but actually totally acquired. In my opinion, there is no doubt that 
the hypothesis of the neurosciences is correct (that there must exist an innate cerebral 
“capacity” for language acquisition), but I will argue that although this is a necessary 
condition, it is definitely not a sufficient condition, since many “abilities” need to be 
acquired for learning to occur. 
                                                 
10 Neurosciences aim to explain the supposed universality of language due to the development 
of specific areas of the brain for language processing (mainly Broca’s and Wernicke’s 
areas). However, even if most studies and findings of the neurosciences result from studies 
about partial or complete loss of linguistic abilities (aphasia) due to encephalic lesions, 
research about the process of first natural language acquisition is scarce. Recently, Patrícia 
Kuhl has argued in favor of the universality of language in humans, showing, through 
magnetoencephalography, that children learn a natural language by exposition to speech 
differently than other animals, but has also highlighted the importance of social interaction 
to language learning. The results of neuroimaging and encephalic stimulation in general 
seem consistent with the areas mapped for language processing (inferred from aphasias). 
However, everything seems to indicate that language acquisition and processing involves 
much more than a simple relationship between Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas. See: KUHL, 
P.K. Learning and Representation in Speech and Language. Current Opinion in 
Neurobiology, 4: 812-822, 1994. 
11 See: BEAR, M.; CONNORS, B.; PARADISO, M. Neurociências: Desvendando o Sistema 
Nervoso. 3º Edição. Porto Alegre: Artmed, 2010. 
12 The general idea is that the investigation of the process of language learning is partly 
empirical and partly philosophical. See: HORWICH, P. Naturalism, Deflationism and the 
Relative Priority of Language and Metaphysics. In: Price, H. Expressivism, Pragmatism 
and Representationalism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013; and 
ENGELLAND, C. Ostension: Word Learning and the Embodied Mind. Massachusetts: 
MIT, 2015.  
13 I refer here to Kripke’s skeptical argument exposed in “Wittgenstein on Rules and Private 
Language”. 
14  It is important to observe that “capacities” are not identified here with “abilities.” The main 
difference between them is the fact that, in general, abilities are seen as something learned 
throughout life whereas capacities are considered something we are born with and may 
develop. Thus, understanding, for instance, will be seen as an ability (such as running and 
jumping) while neural plasticity is a capacity (such as motor flexibility and agility).  
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2. NATURALISM AND NORMATIVITY IN THE PROCESS OF NATURAL 
LANGUAGE ACQUISITION 
The usual way of explaining the process of natural language acquisition is taking the 
“ostensive teaching” of phrases in the language as starting point. “Ostension” is 
traditionally considered to be a bodily movement that supposedly manifests our 
intentionality in relation to the things or events in the world. If gestures and facial 
expressions are able to reveal intentional states, then ostension really seems to be 
extremely important for language acquisition, since it can provide the learner with a 
“pre-linguistic” way of understanding the words and sentences of a natural 
language.15 Clearly although ostension is one of the important elements of language 
acquisition, it is certainly not the only one. The learners should have a sensorial 
perception of the world and also of the types of things that should be found through 
it. Engelland16 posits that a natural language does not demand from its users only 
semantics, but also syntax, and syntax seems to demand much more than ostensive 
gestures. In addition, the learners need various abilities and capacities, such as the 
articulation of words in a meaningful discourse, memory and motivations. Then, 
ostension is certainly a necessary, but not sufficient condition for language 
acquisition. 
The role of ostension in the process of language acquisition is not always clear in 
specialized literature. Depending on the theoretical approach, ostension may be seen 
as the primary or secondary element in the learning process. Innatists and apriorists 
usually consider ostension as secondary in relation to innate abilities and categories 
or to the supposed “language of thought” for the development of language. Classical 
behaviorism and denotational theories of meaning generally consider ostension as 
primary for language acquisition or learning. In the anti-intellectualist perspective 
supported here, ostension is primary in developing the necessary abilities to 
language acquisition and secondary for the development of language learning. 
There is an important difference between what has been called “ostensive 
training”17 and what is generally conceived of as “ostensive definition.” This 
distinction was evidenced by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations 
(1953), mainly in passages aimed at refusing Augustine’s view of language. 
Recently, however, Meredith Williams recovered this distinction, mainly in Blind 
Obedience (2014), widening the discussion on the process of primitive language 
acquisition and its interface with the representational theories of meaning and with 
the neurosciences as well. 
                                                 
15
 Ostension has been a widely discussed theme (at least since Plato) in the history of 
philosophy and has figured contemporarily as an essential ingredient in the debates on the 
philosophy of language and mind. Generally speaking, the question is whether intentions 
may be manifested (or expressed) or can also be inferred; if it is possible to adequately or 
unequivocally understand an “ostensive gesture.” 
16 ENGELLAND, C. Ostension: Word Learning and the Embodied Mind. Massachusetts: 
MIT, 2015. p. 11.  
17  WILLIAMS, M. Blind Obedience. New York: Routledge, 2014. p. 80. 
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Throughout the 20th century, “ostensive definition” was a widely discussed 
theme within philosophy, mainly in works by Wittgenstein, Quine and Davidson. It 
should be noticed that the first paragraph of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations (1953) specifically questions the role of “ostensive definition” in the 
process of language acquisition (against the denotational view of meaning). Quine 
harshly criticized the notion of ostensive definition, mainly with regard to the 
problem of the ambiguity of the “ostensive gesture,” which is evidently related to the 
problem of “indeterminacy of translation” and of “inscrutability of reference.” 
Davidson sought to solve the problem of “ostensive definition” through the 
“triangulation” process (the triangular process of interaction between two subjects 
and the interaction between each subject and a common set of objects in the world). 
For our own purposes, the central problem of “ostensive definition” is exactly that of 
considering it the primary element in the process of language acquisition. 
Insofar as the classic behaviorist advocates a non-cognitivist or non-
intellectualist perspective, he or she supposes that nothing beyond the ostensive 
gesture is needed for acquiring the first words of a natural language. I believe that 
the behaviorist is right in advocating ostension as primary, since it is assumed that 
nothing beyond training is needed to introduce a learner within the complex universe 
of language and no intelligent operation related to the process of language 
acquisition18 would be explained in terms of previous operations. On the other hand, 
I believe that the behaviorist is wrong, however, insofar as he or she fails to 
distinguish between “ostensive training” and “ostensive definition.” In this sense, 
behaviorism leads to a mistaken image of the “situation of learning,” since it 
presupposes that the learner has the same abilities that are already fully developed in 
the competent user of the language. 
Analogously, denotational theories of meaning usually propose the thesis that the 
object denoted by a word fixates the meaning of this word in providing a pattern for 
the right application of the term to other objects of the same class and in other 
contexts. In this sense, denotational theory is closely associated to that which 
became known as “Augustinian view of language,” which posits that adults name 
individual objects when they point them in the immediate environment of the 
learner. The learner, as a result of ostension, associates the name uttered by the adult 
to the object denoted. After making this association, the learner uses this name to 
                                                 
18 According to Ryle, if the occurrence of any intelligent operation necessarily demands the 
occurrence of a previous theoretical operation and that that be executed intelligently, then 
there would be a logical impossibility to anyone who has never entered this circle and, thus, 
the acquisition of a first natural language would be impossible. If using a natural language is 
an intelligent action, then it should be presumed that in some moment the acquisition of this 
natural language was not the result of a previous theoretical operation. Ryle’s objective is 
showing that some applications of certain rules, principles or norms do not necessarily require 
a previous consultation of these rules, principles or norms. For Ryle, both idealism and 
reductionism are responses to an illegitimate question. Both the ‘reduction’ of the material 
world to mental states and processes and the reduction of mental states to physical processes 
presuppose the legitimacy of exclusive disjunction: either minds or bodies exist (but not both). 
It is perfectly correct to say with a certain logical adjustment that there are minds and to say, 
with another logical adjustment, that there are bodies. Such expressions do not indicate two 
different types of existence. 
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any object that belongs to the same class of the originally named object. The fact is 
that it is not obvious that the simple act of denoting is enough for causing the desired 
association within the learner’s mind and that he or she will make the further 
generalization in relation to the same objects as the competent user of the language. 
The intellectualist posits that the relationship established between word and 
object is not a simple association, but actually an “ostensive definition.”19 The very 
effectiveness of ostensive definition depends on the learner’s cognitive ability in 
understanding that the object baptized by the competent user of the language is the 
exemplar that works as the pattern for the right application of the term uttered. The 
mistake of denotational theory lies in not perceiving that the situation of learning is 
not equal among the competent users of the language and the learners. Actually, as 
we see, the situation of learning is fractioned into two distinct, though 
complementary, domains: the cognitively impoverished domain of the learner and 
the cognitively enriched domain of the competent user of the language.20 
The mistake of treating ostensive definition as the vehicle to fixate meanings lies in 
confusing ostensive definition with ostensive training. Ostensive training is used with 
the beginner learner. Once ostensive training may be characterized as close to 
stimulus-response conditioning, examples of this training may be described in 
relative isolation of any background, social convention or costume. This training 
results in a way of “categorizing” that is not a question of naming and does not 
presuppose a background and conceptual competence by the learner (...).21 
According to Meredith Williams, the “learning situation” is also the 
fundamental element to explain the problem of normativity, that is, the problem 
of reconciling causal determination of ostensive training with logical or 
normative determination for the application of acquired rules or norms.22 This is 
something that behaviorism cannot explain alone. The general idea is that before 
acquiring a natural language, the learner needs to acquire the necessary abilities 
to understand a language.23 The abilities are transmitted in a non-cognitive 
manner, that is, through examples, expressions of approval, expressions of 
disapproval, expressions of encouragement and others.24 A competent user of the 
                                                 
19 WILLIAMS, M. Blind Obedience. New York: Routledge, 2014. p. 81. 
20 Idem, p. 19. 
21 Idem, p. 81. 
22 Idem, pp. 80-83. 
23 WITTGENSTEIN, L. Philosophical Investigations. New York: Blackwell, 2001. §86. 
24 According to Williams, Wittgenstein identifies three stages for the acquisition of a natural 
language: the first is the “stage of configuration,” wherein the learner is submitted to a 
series of examples about what it means “to do the same thing” (following a rule or an 
arithmetic progression, for instance); the second is the “stage of mastering techniques and 
practices” and the third is the “stage of certainty.” Any use of the language demands the 
exercise of techniques to follow in a similar way and a shared minimal sense of what is 
obvious and what is free from doubt. Understanding a language, taking understanding as an 
acquired ability, is to be able to recognize the verbal behavior of a community and be 
disposed to follow its rules (even if blindly). See: WILLIAMS, M. Blind Obedience. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
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language is that who possesses the semantic and cognitive abilities to manipulate 
concepts. As Wittgenstein says in the Philosophical Investigations, those who do 
not have these abilities should be taught through “examples” and “exercises,” 
through “ostensive training.” 
In the course of this teaching I shall shew him the same colours, the same 
lengths, the same shapes, I shall make him find them and produce them and so 
on. I shall, for instance, get him to continue an ornamental pattern uniformly 
when told to do so. — And so to continue progressions. I do it, he does it after 
me; and I influence by expressions of agreement, rejection, expectation, 
encouragement I let him go his way, or hold him back; and so on.25 
Teaching through examples and repetition through exercises, influence through 
expressions of approval or disapproval, expressions of expectation and 
encouragement, letting it continue or preventing it are features of the “ostensive 
training” for the acquisition of the necessary abilities to learn a language. 
“Ostensive training” does not necessarily imply previous theoretical operations 
or the knowledge of true propositions about how to speak a language. Ostensive 
training, from a non-intellectualist standpoint, aims at transmitting a not-yet 
developed ability: the ability to understand and manipulate concepts. 
The learner may not think properly due to not possessing the basic 
conceptual requisites, but also because it is only by observing particular 
examples presented by the instructor that the learner can acquire the sense of 
what is “to follow in one same way” (“sameness judgments,” in Meredith 
Williams’ words). The learner acquires the “tools” to act and judge through 
“examples, practices, and techniques” to participate in language games. 
Wittgenstein advocated that training in the use of rules demands a background (a 
scenario) in the same way as training by the practice of naming (only those who 
can ask the name of things are able to understand an ostensive definition26). 
There must be a background within which training is done and the ostensive 
gesture “and so on” is transmitted. 
Ostensive training explores the causality based on our perceptual sensibilities 
in relation to certain objects and properties in the world, whereas “training in 
normative practices”27 explores the malleability of our behavior and our capacity 
of offering responses to its validation. The malleability in our behavior is 
supported by neural plasticity, that is, through the capacity of our brains to 
develop new synaptic connections among neurons from the person’s experience 
and behavior and from certain stimuli. Obviously none of these causal 
propensities concern the normative structure of language, which is governed by 
correction patterns, not causal laws. Natural dispositions to acquire certain basic 
regularities of use28 are explored in initiating the learner in the normative 
                                                 
25 WITTGENSTEIN, L. Philosophical Investigations. New York: Blackwell, 2001, §208. 
26 Idem, §30. 
27 WILLIAMS, M. Normative Naturalism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies. Nº 
18 (3): pp. 355-375, 2011.  
28 See: HORWICH, P. Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
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regularities of costumes or practices. Differently from intellectualist positions, in 
primitive language acquisition, there are no concepts for the learner, not even a 
grammatical background or articulated environment. The explanations are 
transmitted through examples, encouragement and discouragement to which the 
learner seeks to conform blindly. Once no expression is applied in itself, there is 
no logical circle for the explanations provided to the learner. 
It is only through the mastery of the competent user of the language that the 
words and actions of the learner become correct or incorrect (they count as 
genuine reports or not). The learning situation supposes, on the one hand, the 
cognitive and normative labor division between the learner’s actions and 
judgments and, on the other hand, the background against which the identity of 
actions is fixed and the corrections may be performed.29 It is equally important to 
notice that the learning situation is an initial situation in which the learner must 
perform “judgments” and be engaged in “reasoning” before being able to do it. 
Learners are “calibrated” to judge in conformity with the community, so 
much so that afterwards they become able to think and act independently from 
the community. The learner becomes autonomous insofar as he or she accepts 
the standards sanctioned by the community.30 In this specific sense, we 
understand the importance of ostensive training and the transmission of 
“judgments of normative similarity”: the acceptance of community standards is 
blind and unavoidable, since there are no alternatives available. One way of 
elucidating the stage of calibration is through Wittgenstein’s analogy of the 
standard-meter. There are three fundamental features of the “standard-meter” 
highlighted by Wittgenstein: 
 
(1) It is the use of a device (or its “purpose”) that makes it widely 
recognized as a standard-meter; 
(2) There are certain “material properties” that are necessary for an object to 
work as a one-meter-bar (its rigidity and its capacity to be etched with a 
scale, for instance); 
(3) “Measurement scales” are needed (centimeter, millimeter, and the meter 
mark etched in the bar’s body).31 
 
None of the properties of the one-meter-bar may be considered as inherently 
representational or normative, since anything used as a meter should have the 
material properties needed to perform this role. The one-meter bar defines a 
measurement pattern (a conventional measurement system) due to being used for 
this purpose. The fact that the metal bar may be used for this purpose is a 
function of its physical rigidity and of our attributing this role to the bar. It may 
happen, however, that the material used to build the one-meter-bar is never used 
for this purpose, that is, the metal in itself measures nothing. 
                                                 
29 WILLIAMS, M. Blind Obedience. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. p. 80. 
30 WILLIAMS, M. Normative Naturalism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies. Nº 
18 (3): pp. 355-375, 2011. 
31 WITTGENSTEIN, L. Philosophical Investigations. New York: Blackwell, 2001, §§39-50. 
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Analogously, we can say that we have three essential features of 
conventional measurement standards: purpose, material properties and scale. 
Our sensorial systems and our behavioral malleability (supported by neural 
plasticity) are the material properties that allow us to measure the world. We are 
“calibrated” to measure colors, objects, numeric sequences etc. Normative 
similarity judgments work as the scales that are etched in us for the purpose of 
measuring many aspects of the world. Due to the acquisition of so many 
judgments, we measure the world instinctively for that which is obvious and for 
that which is free from doubt.32 
The most significant difference between the one-meter-bar and our own 
concerns is the purpose of these standards. The use of the one-meter-bar is a 
deliberate action while recognizing colors and objects does not involve a 
deliberate use of ourselves as instruments.33 We simply see colors. We do not 
use our bodies for this purpose. The success in making measurements demands 
that all reach the same measures: where one subject S judges x as something red, 
it is necessary that other users agree with this judgment. This aspect of 
sociability of the pattern is the empirical rigidity demanded to perform 
measurements. The theoreticians of the community concerning what does it 
mean to follow a rule are wrong exactly in this respect, since “This is red” does 
not necessarily mean that “the members of the community call it red.” As is 
highlighted by Williams, taking the fact that “the members of the community 
call it red” as criterion would be the same as taking the table as the measure of 
the ruler, and we would no longer be measuring in terms of “meters,” but 
actually in terms of “tables.”34 
The rigidity of intersubjective conformity about what is a standard-meter is 
the very rigidity of causation. The etchings on the metal-bar are the results of the 
causes operating on the metal’s surface. The fixedness of the etchings is as 
important as the rigidity of the bar itself. Analogously, the “judgments about 
what is to follow the same way” (the sameness judgments) that are constitutive 
of the scale and the conformity in our judgments are the two forms of rigidity 
demanded for us (which reflect our causal situation in the world). Thus, the 
intersubjective sociability concerns a dimension of this rigidity that is necessary 
for us to be able to judge the world. According to Williams, the manners through 
which we are causally incorporated in the world provide the material for our 
normative practices, but we cannot reduce the normativity of our practices to the 
causal events beyond the very rigidity of the metal-bar that constitutes the 
“meter” of length. 
Communitarianism35 and classical behaviorism place human beings as a 
whole in the position of the learner: vulnerable and open to constant assessment. 
The intellectualist (cognitivist) perspective about the learning of the first natural 
                                                 
32 WILLIAMS, M. Blind Obedience. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. p. 3. 
33 WITTGENSTEIN, L. Philosophical Investigations. New York: Blackwell, 2001, §104. 
34 WILLIAMS, M. Normative Naturalism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies. Nº 
18 (3), 2011. pp. 370-75. 
35 I refer specifically to Kripke’s skeptical solution presented in “Wittgenstein on Rules and 
the Private Language”. 
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language places human beings as a whole in the position of the competent user 
of the language. Anyone of these two exclusive manners of understanding our 
situation in the world ends up necessarily obliterating the crucial roles 
performed by what Wittgenstein called “background,”36 and this leads us either 
to a strongly behaviorist image or to a strongly intellectualist image. 
The process of natural language acquisition is, then, a process of 
enculturation within social practices, practices that implement the norms to 
“judge” reality and that allow us to perform movements within the language 
games. The process of learning does not occur within an epistemic context, but a 
context of calibration and adjustment to norms. 
Well, let’s assume the child is a genius and itself invents a name for the 
sensation!—But then, of course, he couldn’t make himself understood when he 
used that word.—So does he understand the name without being able to explain 
its meaning to anyone?—But what does it mean to say that he has ‘named his 
pain’?—How has he done this naming of pain?! And whatever he did, what was 
its purpose?—When one says “He gave a name to his sensation” one forgets that 
a great deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of 
naming is to make sense. And when we speak of someone’s having given a name 
to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word “pain”; 
it shews the post where the new word is stationed. (PI §257) 
What Wittgenstein is showing through his diagnosis of the intellectualist 
positions is exactly that “ostensive training” is a practice of transmitting abilities 
that necessarily precedes the intellectualized process of naming, that is, that it 
precedes the practice of “defining ostensively.” There are no doubts that natural 
language is an acquired activity, but before that happens, it is necessary to 
acquire the semantic and cognitive abilities to understand and follow the rules 
that are socially transmitted. Without developing such abilities, it is not possible 
to acquire a natural language. 
Natural languages generally demand of its users very specific abilities. An 
empirical study conducted by Lera Boroditsky, Stanford University, explored 
the fact that native speakers of English and native speakers of Mandarin have 
different ways of describing time. Boroditsky showed that the abilities 
demanded by different natural languages are directly implied in the ways of 
describing reality. His experiment revealed that native speakers of English in 
general describe the passage of time horizontally (“good times ahead,” “long 
time ago” etc.). In contrast, native speakers of Mandarin usually describe the 
                                                 
36 John Searle also highlights the importance of the term “background” in his “Consciousness 
and Language,” where he explicitly agrees with the position advocated here: “The fact that 
we consider certain acts to constitute the right application of a rule and others not; the fact 
that we consider certain acts to constitute a correct use of addition and others not, all of 
them are simply facts of our conduct, facts referring to the way we were reared and 
educated (…) What fixates the interpretation in the effective practice, in real life, is that 
which I have called ‘background’ elsewhere.” See: SEARLE, J. Consciência e Linguagem. 
São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2010, p. 439. 
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passage of time vertically, using expressions such as “above” and “below” to 
speak of previous or subsequent months.37 
In another recent study, Boroditsky describes the case of a five-year-old girl 
in Pormpuraaw (a small aboriginal community in the west of Cape York, in 
northern Australia) who is able to immediately point to the north with accuracy 
and without hesitation while many renowned scientists cannot do so.38 The 
“cognitive difference” is explained in terms of how a natural language molds 
thought, since the language of the natives of Pormpuraaw has no relative 
cardinal points, only absolute (north, south, east, west) and most expressions 
used necessarily reveal the location of the objects described. This results in the 
natural language of the aboriginal tribe more strongly demanding that its users 
have the cognitive ability of indicating the spatial location of their descriptions 
with accuracy. 
The different abilities become more evident when we observe different ways 
of describing one same fact in different natural languages. To use an example 
based on Boroditsky’s research, suppose that S wants to convey that he has seen 
his aunt in 42nd street. If S is a native speaker of Mian in Papua New Guinea, 
then the verb used should reveal if the event has occurred in the present, in the 
recent past or in the distant past. If S is a native speaker of Bahasa Indonesia, 
then the verb used to perform the description will not reveal if the event has 
already happened or if it is still bound to happen. If S is a native speaker of 
Russian, in describing the situation he should reveal the gender. If S is a native 
speaker of Mandarin, he will have to specify if he is speaking about his maternal 
or paternal aunt (if she is related to him by blood or marriage), since there are 
many different words to all these types of relations. If S is a native speaker of 
Pirahã (a language spoken in Amazonia), he will not be able to say “42nd” since 
there are no words for exact numbers in Pirahã, only relative numbers (many, 
few, some, none). 
3. FINAL REMARKS 
Evidence presented in recent years to support Boroditsky’s thesis, in addition to 
challenging the thesis of the universality of language, also opens new 
perspectives about the origin of knowledge and the construction of reality. The 
fact that different natural languages demand specific abilities of their users also 
reinforces the thesis that these abilities are acquired through “ostensive training” 
in the enculturation process. These skills are acquired only due to our material 
properties (sensorial perception, neural plasticity etc.), which are susceptible to 
calibration. Therefore, material properties are necessary conditions to natural 
language acquisition, even if not sufficient. The ways of life, or even the shared 
social patterns, are the complementary elements to learning a natural language. 
                                                 
37 BORODITSKY, L. Does Language Shape Thought? Mandarin and English Speakers’ 
Conceptions of Time. Cognitive Psychology, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 1-22, Aug. 2001. 
38 BORODITSKY, L. How Language Shape Thought? The Languages We Speak Affect our 
Perceptions of the World. Scientific American, 2011. 
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The distinction between “ostensive training” and “ostensive definition” is 
crucial to explain the process of natural language acquisition, since it evidences 
that the abilities required by the natural language are transmitted through a non-
semantic, or even pre-linguistic, element. If my considerations are correct, 
apriorism and innatism make the same mistake: they confuse “ostensive 
training,” as a non-intellectualized process of ability transmission, with the 
highly intellectualized process of ostensively naming or defining, a stage of 
language development that clearly can only work insofar as semantic and 
cognitive skills are already acquired and developed. 
The notion of “ostensive training” is closely related to our most basic 
conventional patterns of activity. Ostensive training is naturally independent of 
problems of coordination, regular conformities and rational presuppositions. An 
important feature of this way of learning is exactly the fact that learning occurs 
by direct copy of conventional patterns of activity that, instead of rationally 
deliberated, are “blindly reproduced.” This means that cognitive abilities 
required by natural languages do not depend on any intrinsically superior 
mechanism to be acquired or developed. The naturalist perspective of 
explanation of the process of primitive language acquisition, advocated in this 
paper, has the important advantage of harmonizing causal determination of 
ostensive training with logical or normative determination of the enculturation 
process, which is not evidenced in other theoretical perspectives. 
 13 
ON THE PROBABILITY OF THEISM1 
LUIS ROSA 
1. The proposition expressed by ‘God exists’ (G), if it is true or false, is either 
necessarily true/false or not necessarily true/false. In other words, if G is capable 
of having a truth–value v, then it is either necessarily v or contingently v. By 
‘God’ I mean a supernatural being, a powerful and immaterial mind that 
purportedly created the universe. Certainly there are other meanings that are 
attached to that term in certain contexts, but the arguments I will assess here 
only make sense under that interpretation. We can discuss arguments involving 
other meanings attached to the term ‘God’ on another occasion.2 
Suppose that G has truth–value v. Now suppose that G is necessarily v (that 
is, G is necessarily true or G is necessarily false). That means that G cannot be 
v', where v ≠ v' (e.g., v is the value true and v' is the value false). If so, then 
nothing can raise or lower the objective probability of G, Ch(G). For example, if 
G is necessarily true, then not only Ch(G) = 1, but also Ch(G | P) = 1, for any 
proposition P. That alethic status, however, is possessed only by tautologies 
(e.g., Fred is fred), logical or mathematical axioms and theorems (e.g., p → p, (x 
+ y) = (y + x)), and so-called ‘analytical truths’ (e.g., that Every bachelor is an 
unmarried man). Similarly, the contrary alethic status of that status is reached 
only by negations of tautologies, axioms/theorems and analytic truths. 
But G is no tautology/negation of a tautology. And it is neither a 
mathematical or logical axiom/theorem, nor a mathematical or logical 
contradiction. Still, one might be tempted to suggest that G could be an analytic 
truth. Consider typical examples of analytical truths. No one who is a competent 
user of the terms ‘bachelor’, ‘unmarried’, ‘man’, etc. seriously asks whether it is 
true that Every bachelor is an unmarried man. That proposition is sufficiently 
obvious to every such competent speaker. But G is by no means obvious (the 
fact that there is so much controversy around it testifies that), and we seriously 
ask about its truth. 
                                                 
1  Originally published in Dissertation's Journal of Philosophy, Naturalism Dossier 2015. 
2  I often feel like it becomes completely pointless to talk about the existence of God under 
certain interpretations of the term ‘God’. For example, some people say ‘God is everything 
there is’. It is true that God exists in that sense, of course. But this is not what we want to 
know when we ask whether God exists or not––we are not asking whether everything there 
is exists. (Similar observations apply to other cases involving supernatural terms, e.g., when 
we want to know whether spirits or souls exist but some people say that the spirit is a 
physical energy, or something like that). 
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Of course, assuming that there is a substantial distinction between analytic and 
synthetic truths, it might be the case that some analytic truths are not obvious at 
all. Maybe G is one of them. The proponent of that line of thought, however, 
would have to face two challenges. First, it has been pointed out that the relevant 
distinction does not really cut human thought and language at its joints.3 Second, 
purported analytic truths that are somehow discovered or fleshed out are not really 
surprising after they have been discovered or fleshed out. Even when there is 
disagreement between conceptual analysts, they recognize each other’s conceptual 
analyses as being very close to the establishment of necessary and sufficient 
conditions envisioned in their analytical endeavours. But if a conceptual analyst 
were to present us something like: x is God if and only if (i) x exists, (ii) such–and–
such, (iii) so–and–so, etc., although we would probably be surprised, we would 
not accept it as a suitable analysis of ‘God’. 
It follows, then, that whatever truth–value G has, it does not necessarily have 
that value. Let q be the value such that Ch(G) = q (that is, the objective 
probability of G is q). If what we said about the alethic status of G is right, then 
it is possible for there to be certain facts P such that Ch(G | P) < q, and it is also 
possible for there to be certain facts P' such that Ch(G | P') > q. 
Given certain assumptions (involving both the syntax and the semantics of 
the formulas that constitute the arguments of probability functions), we can say 
the same thing about probability functions under other interpretations. In 
particular, we could say the same thing about an epistemic probability function 
Pr. Here, of course, we talk about evidence instead of facts (without implying 
that no evidence is factive, of course): given Pr(G) = q, there may be some piece 
of evidence E such that Pr(G | E) < q, as well as some further piece of evidence 
E' such that Pr(G | E') > q. (From now on, whenever I use the term ‘probability’ 
I mean epistemic probability).4 
So, just as we can say that the hypothesis that God exists is neither 
necessarily true nor necessarily false, so we can say that it is neither certainly 
true nor certainly false conditional on our evidence. This is part of what is 
involved in the claim that G is an empirical hypothesis, or that G is a hypothesis 
about how the world is constituted. 
 
2. If that is right, then we can build inductive arguments pro or con the existence 
of God. Maybe we can find pieces of evidence that raise the probability of G; 
maybe we can find pieces of evidence that lower the probability of G; maybe we 
can find both types of evidence, and these different pieces of evidence will ‘fight’ 
for evidential support. But it may also be the case that there is no evidence 
available to us that has any bearing on the probability of G. 
                                                 
3   E.g., see Quine’s classic (1951) and also Williamson (2007, Ch. 3–4). A good starting point 
for a problematization toward that distinction is to ask: What does it mean to say that a 
sentence or proposition is true ‘solely in virtue of meaning’, and not in virtue of how the 
world is? 
4 Probability functions are functions that obey to the usual Kolmogorov axioms––see Hájek 
(2002). 
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Theists––those who claim that God exists––purportedly have good 
undefeated evidence that gives overall support to G. For any proposition Φ and 
body of evidence Γ, let r be the value such that, if Pr(Φ | Γ) ≥ r, then a subject 
whose total evidence is Γ is entitled to believe that Φ.5 Theists would need to 
possess, then, some body of evidence E such that Pr(G | E) ≥ r, and they would 
need to possess no further piece of evidence E' such that Pr(G | E E') r 
(presumably, the evidence E mentioned here is evidence that theists can share 
with their fellow human beings). 
Atheists––those who claim that God does not exist––purportedly have good 
undefeated evidence that gives overall support to ~G. They would need to 
possess, then, some body of evidence F such that Pr(~G | F) ≥ r, and they would 
need to possess no further piece of evidence F' such that Pr(~G | F  F') < r 
(again, the evidence mentioned here is presumably evidence that atheists can 
share with their fellow human beings). 
While there is just one way to go for the theist and one way to go for the 
atheist, the agnostic––or skeptic if you like––has more than one way to go. The 
agnostic refrains from claiming either that God exists or that God does not exist–
–he/she suspends judgment about G. In order for suspension of judgment to be 
the rational attitude for one to take toward a certain proposition, one’s evidence 
need to be sufficiently neutral as to whether that proposition is true. There are 
two ways in which that might be the case.  
First, one may be in a situation of evidential poverty––a situation, that is, in 
which one possesses no evidence pro or con the truth of a certain proposition. In 
the case at hand, agnostics may possess no body of evidence D such that either 
Pr(G | D) ≥ r or Pr(~G | D) ≥ r. 
Second, one may be in a situation of evidential symmetry––a situation, that 
is, in which one possesses some evidence pro and some evidence con the truth of 
a certain proposition––but each counterbalances the other. Such a situation 
would be modeled as follows. Suppose a subject S possesses some evidence E 
such that Pr(G | E) ≥ r. If S’s total evidence were E, then S would be 
epistemically entitled to believe that G. As it happens, though, S has some 
further body of evidence F such that Pr(~G | F) ≥ r, which is the same as to say 
that Pr(G | F) ≤ 1 – r. 
Now, notice that just as the threshold on Pr(Φ | Γ) for epistemic entitlement 
to believe that Φ is r (assuming that Γ is the total evidence), so the threshold on 
Pr(Φ | Γ) for epistemic entitlement to disbelieve that Φ, or to believe that ~Φ, is 
1 – r (assuming again that Γ is the total evidence), for any proposition Φ and 
body of evidence Γ. So for any value s in the open interval (1 – r, r), if Pr(Φ | Γ) 
= s and Γ is S’s total evidence, then S is entitled to suspend judgment about Φ. 
Just as there are thresholds on epistemic probabilities for epistemic entitlement 
to believe/disbelieve a proposition, so there are thresholds on epistemic 
                                                 
5  In order for that consequent to hold, we should also assume that the subject is capable of 
forming a belief toward Φ on the basis of evidence Γ (no one is entitled to believe 
something that one can only believe in a non-competent way). But this is not particularly 
important now. 
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probabilities for entitlement to doubt or to suspend judgment about a 
proposition. 
Now apply that result to the scenario we have built above (evidential 
symmetry). We assumed that S has some evidence E in support of G and also 
some evidence F in support of ~G. Assuming that E and F are all the relevant 
evidence that S has concerning the truth of G, if 1 – r < Pr(G | E F) < r, then S 
is entitled to suspend judgment about the proposition that God exists. 
So agnostics have two argumentative resources at their disposal: either we 
are in a situation of evidential poverty with respect to the hypothesis that God 
exists, or we are in a situation of evidential symmetry with respect to that 
hypothesis. 
 
3. Some philosophers have explicitly offered probabilistic arguments pro the 
existence of God, using a bayesian framework. Most notably, Richard Swinburne 
(2004) makes use of traditional bayesian criteria for establishing the confirmation 
of hypotheses and the explanation of observable evidence, and argues that we have 
overall good evidence for believing that God exists. Among these criteria, two of 
them will be particularly relevant for the points I want to make. 
First, how much support a certain body of evidence E confers upon a certain 
hypothesis H is dependent on the prior probability of H. This becomes clear as 
we look at Bayes’ Theorem:  
 
Pr(H | E) = Pr(H) × Pr(E | H) ÷ Pr(E).  
 
As we increase the value Pr(H) and maintain the rest, so the value Pr(H | E) 
increases. As Swinburne himself points out (2004: 53), the prior probability of a 
hypothesis––or its probability before we have made some relevant observations 
E––is determined by its fit with our background knowledge B, its simplicity and 
its scope of application. The background knowledge B is our general knowledge 
of how the world works, and it is supposed to figure as follows:  
 
Pr(H | E B) = Pr(H | B) × Pr(E | H B) ÷ Pr(E | B). 
 
Now, a hypothesis H is said to fit the background knowledge B when it 
postulates similar types of entities, properties, relations and laws as the ones 
present in B. Similarly, the simplicity of H is a matter of its not postulating more 
entities, types of entities, properties, relations and laws than the ones present in 
our background knowledge B. So H is supposed to be as concise and economical 
as possible. Finally, the scope of a hypothesis is the range of objects about which 
it has implications. We will get back to these points in a moment. 
Second, how much support a certain body of evidence E confers upon a 
certain hypothesis H is also determined by the explanatory power that H has 
with respect to E. (This again becomes evident when we look at Baye’s 
Theorem: as we increase the value Pr(E | H B) and maintain the rest, so the 
value Pr(H | E B) increases). Explanatory power is a matter of how likely the 
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hypothesis makes the observable evidence. If H entails E, for example, it cannot 
get better than that: the hypothesis makes sure that the evidence occurs. 
So in the case at hand, where we want to determine the probability that God 
exists given our available evidence, we need to answer two crucial questions: (i) 
What is the prior probability of G? (ii) How much explanatory power G has with 
respect to our shared observable evidence? When we address (i), we must check 
how well does G fit with our common background knowledge, how simple G is 
and what the scope of G is. When we address (ii), we must check how likely is 
our shared observable evidence conditional on the existence of God. Let us turn 
to those questions now. 
 
4. Let us consider, first, how well does G fit with our background knowledge B. 
In order to do that, we must at least roughly establish what our background 
knowledge about the world is supposed to be. It will contain, among other 
things: causal information (e.g., normally fire causes smoke),6 temporal 
information (e.g., my parents were born before me), spatial information (e.g., the 
Earth and the Moon occupy and move through different regions of the solar 
system), statistical data (e.g., all observed ravens are black), psychological data 
(e.g., about how things feel and appear to us), conceptual relations (e.g., all 
humans are mortal), logical and mathematical principles (e.g., if P and P → Q 
then Q, if x > y and y > z then x > z). 
That much will suffice for our present purposes.7 The most important point is 
that B is supposed to contain only knowledge that is maximally common between 
us. The more controversial a certain claim is, the more unqualified it is to be 
inserted in B. 
Now, God is supposed to be an immaterial being, a conscious mind with no 
body or matter. God would have, for example, beliefs and intentions, as God is 
supposed to have knowledge of all knowable facts and also to be benevolent. 
But God would not need to have a nervous system, for example. 
In our background knowledge, however, there is not a single example of a 
being with consciousness and intentionality but no such material structure. 
Statistically, every mind we purportedly know to exist has a physical medium (a 
                                                 
6  The inclusion of causal information in B is independent of the fact that we may have a 
deflationary interpretation about causal claims (e.g., to the effect that purported causal 
relations are nothing more than associations or correlations between events/types of events). 
That observation generalizes to the other types of information that are included in B. 
7  This is what we call ‘common background knowledge about the world’. Swinburne suggests 
that we start the probabilistic investigation about G with a background knowledge devoid of 
any substantial content, with nothing but tautologies in it, and then start enriching it. But this 
has at most heuristic value for Swinburne’s purposes, and at the end of the day it does not 
make a probabilistic difference if we start computing the ‘pure’ prior probability of G and 
update it on substantial background knowledge or if we already start computing the prior 
probability of G with that substantial information in B. 
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medium by means of which that very mind manifests itself).8 No cognitive agent 
known to us lacks a brain. And no cognitive agent known to us lacks 
representations, or vehicles of information. How is God supposed to know 
things if God does not represent the world as being a certain way? And, if God 
does process information and handles representational items, how does he do 
that without a brain or something analogue to a brain? 
On the face of that statistical data (all minds known to us have bodies and all 
of them process information), which is part of our background knowledge, it 
turns out that Pr(G | B) = p must be quite low. If we had started with a pure prior 
Pr(G) = 0.5, for example, we would not only have Pr(G | B) < Pr(G), but also 
quite a substantial difference 0.5 – p. Assuming again that r is our upward 
threshold of evidential support that entitles one to believe a proposition, and that 
1 – r is our downward threshold of evidential support that entitles one to 
disbelieve a proposition, it could well be the case that p ≤ 1 – r, in which case 
we would be entitled to disbelieve G. But since we are making pretty coarse 
grained estimations here, it could also be that 1 – r < p < r, in which case we 
would be entitled to suspend judgment about G. Either way, we would not be 
entitled to believe that G conditional on B. As far as B goes, then, theism would 
not be the rational position. 
That would not be the only information in B that lowers the prior probability 
of G. The situation gets worse, at least if we assume that God is supposed to be 
the creator of the universe. Remember that the simplicity of G is supposed to 
have a direct influence on the prior Pr(G | B), and that the simplicity of a 
hypothesis is a matter of its not postulating more entities, types of entities, 
properties, relations and laws than the ones present in B. But if God is supposed 
to be the creator of the universe, then he must have established some causal 
relation with the universe. But God is immaterial and the universe is material. So 
G postulates a type of causal relation that differs from the one present in our 
causal claims in B. 
Consider the causal facts that we ordinarily take ourselves to know. We 
purportedly know that my throwing the ball into the window may cause it to 
break, that the wind may lower the temperature of a certain place, that certain 
drugs may bring about health improvement/decay, etc. In these examples, what 
we have is physical causation: one physical event (or a whole set of physical 
events conjoined) causes a further physical event. In none of these cases we have 
a spiritual substance interacting causally with a material one. 
You may think that mental causation fits the bill, though. You may think, 
that is, that our minds are immaterial substances that interact causally with our 
bodies, e.g. when desires purportedly cause bodily movements––in which case 
you are a substance dualist. That there is causation between a spiritual substance 
and a physical one in our cognition, however, is not itself part of our common 
knowledge (as substance dualism surely is not part of our common knowledge). 
                                                 
8  This is not to say that there is no immaterial substance. So far, we are just pointing out that 
there is no mind unaccompanied by a body in our background knowledge––and this is all 
that is needed for making our point here. 
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For all we know, mental causation might be physical causation as well. It is not 
the case that everybody or almost everybody knows that spirits cause physical 
events––this is quite a controversial matter. 
So claims about immaterial substances maintaining causal relations with 
physical ones is not uncontroversial enough to be inserted in B. As long as G 
postulates a new type of causal relation––an unknown type of relation––the prior 
Pr(G | B) will be even lower, for in that case G does not fit B. 
 
5. In the previous section we made the case that the prior probability of G is 
quite low. In the present one, we will make the case that G does not fare better 
when it comes to explanatory power. The problem concerning the explanatory 
power of theism is also related to problems with substance dualism. 
The so-called mind-body problem was one the main reasons (maybe the main 
reason) for the demise of substance dualism throughout 20th century philosophy. 
What is the relationship between mind and body? If the mind is an immaterial 
substance and the body is a material one, how could they interact causally, if at 
all? Nowadays, we have versions of dualism (e.g. epiphenomenalism and 
parallelism) that try to avoid commitment to the idea that there is causal 
interaction between mind and body. 
The thesis that God is the creator of the universe has ontological 
commitments in common with substance-dualism. Here we have the God-
universe problem: what is the relationship between God and the universe? If 
God is immaterial and the universe is material, how could they interact causally, 
if at all? How could God produce movement and heat, for example? Maybe God 
could use a stick or some sort of dummy member as a tool. That way, we could 
have a bridge between God and the universe. But where did the stick/dummy 
member came from? And how could God interact with something even before 
that thing already exists? So it would seem that the probability that there is a 
material world conditional on the existence of God is very low indeed. Indeed, if 
it is impossible for the spiritual realm to interact causally with the physical 
realm, then that probability is 0. 
But if theism is supposed to have at least some explanatory power with 
respect to the observable evidence (the universe as we perceive it), then it must 
be because God created the universe as it is or, maybe, because God interacts 
with it, influencing the course of history. Could God indeed be the creator of the 
universe that is observable to us? Could God indeed interact causally with the 
universe? 
Given again that we know of no causal relationship between spiritual and 
material substances, both things are unlikely conditional on B. Let C be the 
proposition that God created the universe, or God interacts with the universe (it 
does not really make a difference for the present purposes which one you 
choose). Then, for reasons similar to the ones presented in the previous section, 
we would have a low Pr(C | B) = p. Indeed, we only refrain from assigning Pr(C 
| B) = 0 because there is a bare possibility of causal interaction between spiritual 
and physical substances that is purportedly left open by B. Now, this is not the 
relevant result we want to draw per se––the issue here is the explanatory power 
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of theism. The relevant conclusion to be drawn is the following. Let E be a 
conjunction of evidential claims that can be summed up as The universe exists, 
and it appears to us to be a certain way w (where w describes the natural 
properties/relations we seem to observe in nature). Now, E is actually entailed 
by B, so it would be fruitless to test the explanatory power of theism by 
computing the likelihood Pr(E | G B). For here B ‘trumps’ the relevance of G 
to the truth of E. 
The same applies of course to other hypotheses, e.g., cosmological theories. 
We have in our background knowledge propositions that entail that there is a 
universe, that the universe has such-and-such properties, etc. And what we 
expect from an empirical hypothesis is that is is able to explain the observable 
evidence. Since in the bayesian framework this is a matter of the likelihood of 
the hypothesis, Pr(E | H) or Pr(E | H B) depending on the case, we can test the 
explanatory power of an empirical hypothesis by striping out information from B 
that entails E. In this way we can maintain a smaller set of propositions that are 
part of B and generate a thinner, alternative background set B–. Importantly, we 
can keep generalizations, conceptual relations and logical or mathematical 
claims in B–. So, for example, the claim that All the causal relations that 
apparently manifested themselves so far are physical relations will be 
maintained, and so will x is God if and only if x is immaterial. 
Given that much, if it is right to say that Pr(C | B) is low, then we can also 
conclude that Pr(E | G B–) is low: if it is quite unlikely that God, which is an 
immaterial being, creates or interacts with the universe, then it is quite unlikely 
that there is a universe like the one we seem to observe conditional only on the 
existence of God and the information that ‘survived’ our selection to generate B– 
(what we stripped out from B, remember, is solely a set of propositions that 
entail E). It would follow, then, that the hypothesis that God exists is not able to 
play any explanatory role with respect to E for us. 
6. CONCLUSION 
So far, however, we can only conclude that probably Pr(G | E B) < r, and so 
that we are probably entitled to disbelieve G, that is, to believe that ~G.9 But I 
want to be cautious and I do not want to prematurely jump to conclusions. This 
paper will have a sequence. Until then, I will follow the good old skeptical 
advice of suspending judgment on such complicated matters. 
 
                                                 
9  In this case, ‘probably’ means ‘as far as I can see’ or somesuch. 
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NATURALISM AND REALISM 
MARIO DE CARO 
In the last decades, many version of liberal or non-reductive naturalism have 
been developed. Some of these forms – often Kantian or Wittgensteinian in 
spirit – defend a quietist attitude, by not taking a stance regarding the issues 
normally discussed in the context of the discussions on realism and antirealism. 
Other forms of liberal naturalism, however, take an explicit realist attitude. In 
this article, I will discuss the latter conceptions, arguing that they are the most 
promising ones.  
1. REALISMS AND ANTIREALISMS. 
The problem of realism should not be stated in an “all or nothing” form. In fact, no 
philosopher has ever been a complete realist or a complete antirealist. Take for 
example Alexius Meinong, possibly the most fervent of all realists: even he believed 
that a round square could not be real. Or, on the other hand, take Berkeley, a 
champion of antirealism – but only in regard to matter, since, as to the mind 
(especially the divine mind), he was an arch-realist. All serious philosophers are 
located in the interval between a hypothetical integral realism and an equally 
hypothetical integral antirealism. All attempted solutions of the problem of realism 
are therefore matters of degree. The problem is to determine what is the right dose of 
realism to be taken – and this of course is not an easy task.  
The complication of the issue of realism is also due to other reasons. The first 
is that one can be committed to realism in many different forms. Fortunately, 
however, the forms of realism can be grouped in three main families: 
(i) Ontological realism. The views of this family are based on the thesis that 
things of certain sorts, be they concrete or abstract (such as disembodied minds, 
numbers, witches, electrons, and social facts), be they properties (redness, 
goodness, electric charges, or free will) or events (the Big Bang or 
transubstantiation) are real. Theories of this family can also claim the existence 
of the external world as a whole or specify in what sense time exists (are the past 
and the future real or is the present the only real time?). Moreover, when 
discussing realism from the ontological point of view, one can ask two distinct 
questions. One can ask if a certain thing really exists or, granting that it does, 
one can ask whether it exists independently of the minds that think about it. For 
instance, with regard to atoms it is the first question that standardly arises: do 
atoms truly exist or are they only heuristically useful fictions? Conversely, on 
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the subject of colors it is the second question that arises: do colors exist 
independently of us, out there in the world, or do they exist only – as according 
to Galileo, Locke and many contemporary philosophers –to the extent that a 
mind projects them onto the world?1  
(ii) Semantic realism. According to the views of this family, the meaning of a 
sentence is given by the conditions under which it is true, and this requires the 
reality of the entities to which the terms of that sentence refer. Semantic 
antirealism claims that the meaning of a sentence is instead given by the 
conditions under which speakers are justified in asserting it. 
(iii) Epistemological realism. According to the views of this family, there 
may be facts that are, in principle, unknowable (whereas epistemological 
antirealists deny this possibility).2  
Another reason why this discussion is complicated is that, while it is more or 
less clear what realism (in the three senses described above) amounts to, the 
term “antirealism” labels a much more disparate collection of views. Among the 
different forms of antirealism one should include nominalism, idealism, 
phenomenalism, conventionalism, relativism, radical empiricism, and 
skepticism, almost all of which are brought forward in the various ontological, 
epistemological, and semantic discussions to challenge realism in different and 
often insidious ways.3  
As said above, in all philosophical views there are elements of realism and 
antirealism. This remark is useful in order to analyze the two most general 
versions of realism in vogue today, namely: (i) common sense realism, the view 
that acknowledges as real only the things we can experience (directly, with the 
senses, or indirectly, with the instruments that extend them), and (ii) scientific 
realism, the view that claims that the world contains only the entities and events 
(both observable and unobservable) that are in principle describable by science. 
When taken in their pure forms these are alternative realist conceptions because 
each of them is drastically antirealist in the field in which the other assumes a 
firmly realist attitude. As we will see, however, these views are restatements of 
two traditional (and unsatisfactory forms of realism); consequently they do not 
deserve the title ‘New Realism’, as instead does another form of realism that I 
will discuss in the last part of this article.  
In order to compare the virtues and vices of these two conceptions, it is 
useful to look at how they respectively answer a problem that has afflicted 
                                                 
1 When discussing the independent existence of an entity, the question is not to be posed in 
genetic or causal terms. Obviously the table in front of me exists because someone has built 
it; however, once it is built, the table exists independently of its builder.  
2 The definitions of epistemological and semantic realism given above are inspired by 
Michael Dummett’s (1978) seminal work. A different definition of epistemological realism, 
common in the debate in philosophy of science, is based on the idea that the theoretical 
claims that concern unobservable entities can constitute knowledge of the world (see 
Chakravartty 2007, 9). 
3 See Chakravarty (2007, 9-13) for a taxonomy of the different forms of realism and 
antirealism that – if specifically considered within the realism/antirealism debate regarding 
the natural sciences – can actually be of a general interest. 
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philosophy since the age of the scientific revolution – a problem that Kant 
presented in the most illustrious way in the third antinomy of the Critique of 
Pure Reason. As Kant put it, the problem was that we cannot help believing in 
two contradictory views of the world: one in which we are free and responsible 
agents and another in which everything is ruled by the ubiquitous laws of nature, 
which in his opinion do not leave any room for freedom and responsibility. 
However, Kant’s own ‘transcendental’ solution to this problem has been found 
convincing by very few, and so the discussion has continued until today. Here is 
a reformulation of the problem given by Searle (2007, 4-5):  
How can we square [the] conception of ourselves as mindful, meaning-creating, 
free, rational, etc., agents with a universe that consists entirely of mindless, 
meaningless, unfree, nonrational, brute physical particles? 
Both the common sense and the scientific views of the world have been used in 
the attempt to solve this problem, by opting for the unilateral realistic options that 
they respectively embody. According to the prototypical common-sense realist, 
the real world consists in just what the ordinary view of the world assumes: colors, 
sounds, smells, and perceptible physical bodies; values, too, may be held to have 
an objective reality along with intentional, conscious, and moral properties, which 
all are assumed to be irreducible to scientific properties. Vice versa, common-
sense realism sees the unobservable entities postulated by scientific theories as 
nothing more than fictions – useful for producing explanations and predictions, but 
with no ontological legitimacy. The scientific realist, on the contrary, assumes as 
real only the entities admitted by the natural sciences, while all other alleged 
entities either are reducible to those or are mere fictions.  
In my opinion these views, with their respective versions of unilateralism, 
represent the two main forms of “Old Realism”. Let us consider them briefly, 
before turning to the form that a satisfying New Realism should assume in order 
to overcome the shortcomings of these older realist conceptions.  
2. COMMON SENSE REALISM AND SCIENCE. 
Common sense realism has a long and authoritative history. Among its most 
influential defenders are Aristotle and most of the Aristotelian tradition, Reid, 
William James, Pierre Duhem, G. E. Moore, P.F. Strawson, and J.L. Austin and, 
in some relevant aspects of their thinking, Edmund Husserl, Henri Bergson and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein. Of course, there are differences, and even important ones, 
between the views defended by these philosophers (Husserl’s Lebenswelt is not 
the same as Moore’s commonsensical world or James’s pragmatist reality). 
However, all these stances can be seen as important predecessors of 
contemporary common sense realism, a view that is based on two main thesis.  
The first thesis is that perception tends to give us access to the external world 
as it really is. In this perspective, apart from special cases – such as optical 
illusions or the situations in which perceptual conditions are not optimal – 
observable objects really do have the properties that, on the basis of perception, 
we tend to attribute to them; and this is true of both primary properties such as 
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size and shape and secondary ones such as color and odor. The second thesis of 
common sense realism is that the middle-size objects we perceive have 
properties that are not identical to whatever microphysical properties constitute 
them. Consider the case of a table in front of me: its functional characteristics 
and aesthetic value are neither identical nor be reducible to its constitutive 
microphysical properties. Consequently, no description of the table that only 
mentions its physical properties could account, even in principle, for its 
functional or aesthetic characteristics.  
Precisely because common sense realists attach so much importance to 
perception – by assuming that it is a reliable guide to the nature of the objects and 
properties of the external world – they standardly assume an anti-realistic attitude 
towards the unobservable entities posited by natural science (such as electrons, 
radiation or black holes). This is understandable, since from the point of view of 
common sense these alleged entities exhibit incomprehensible behavior. 
In his The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology 
(1936), Edmund Husserl gave a genealogical account of the antirealist view of 
the common-sense world produced by modern science. In his opinion, Galileo 
was responsible for 
the surreptitious substitution of the mathematically substructured world of 
idealities for the only real world, the one that is actually given through 
perception, that is ever experienced and experienceable – our everyday life-
world. This substitution was promptly passed on to his successors, the physicists 
of all succeeding centuries. (Husserl 1936, 48).  
According to Husserl, the only real world is the “life world”, the world of human 
experience – a world in which value and meaning are real, and the so-called 
secondary qualities do belong to the external objects in which we would 
commonsensically locate them (see Moran 2008). This is the “forgotten meaning-
fundament of natural science” (Husserl 1936, 48), since scientific concepts are 
mere idealizations with practical purposes, such as measurement and prediction, 
but do not refer to any unobservable reality. On this perspective, science can at 
best be interpreted instrumentalistically, that is, in antirealistic terms.4  
Husserl was very explicit in his association of common sense realism with a 
strong antirealistic attitude toward science. Less explicitly, the philosophers of 
the hermeneutic tradition (including Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, and Derrida) 
also took the framework of common sense as the starting point of their analyses, 
trying to re-evaluate its underlying assumptions. In this regard, the hermeneutic 
philosopher Claudio Ciancio convincingly writes that, 
There is no doubt that the topic of common sense plays an important role for the 
thinkers of a hermeneutic orientation, or at least for some of them, although in 
their writings there is a fairly limited mention of it. What attracts hermeneutics to 
the issue of common sense is its antirationalistic and antiscientistic orientation 
                                                 
4 Useful discussions on this issue can be found in Willlard (2002) and Wiltsche (2012).  
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aimed at developing a notion of the concrete universal. (Ciancio 2004, 153; also 
Bunge 2006, ch. 3). 
Therefore, in the case of at least some continental philosophers, the dismissal of 
scientific realism was the product of an ideologically antiscientific attitude. This, 
however, certainly cannot be said of Bas van Fraassen, one of the leading 
contemporary philosophers of science, whose “Constructive Empiricism” is 
another influential example of the conjugation of common sense realism and 
antirealism with respect to science. According to van Fraassen, a scientific 
theory that appeals to unobservable entities and produces sufficiently accurate 
explanations and predictions of observable evidence should not be considered a 
true description of the world, even if its “empirical adequacy” makes it an 
extremely useful heuristic tool.  
It is interesting to note that, in contrast to many other versions of antirealism 
in philosophy of science, van Fraassen’s instrumentalism does not derive from 
the traditional empiricist view according to which our knowledge of the external 
world coincides with the knowledge of our sense data. According to van 
Fraassen, scientific antirealism is rather connected to traditional common sense 
realism and its tenet that we have direct knowledge of the observable world: 
“Constructive empiricism is set squarely within a common sense realism that 
was foreign to much of the empiricist tradition.” In this light “[t]he common 
basis I assume is language in which reference is unproblematic to trees and 
mountains, people and books.” (van Fraassen 2003, 479).5 
Therefore van Fraassen’s view represents one of the most consistent 
expressions of common sense realism, since it limits the scope of the knowable 
to what is directly observable and, accordingly, assumes an antirealist position 
with regard to science precisely insofar as it refers to unobservable entities.  
Husserl and van Fraassen tried to show how to account for what science tells 
us about the world once one has given epistemological and ontological primacy 
to common sense. However, their attempts are not convincing precisely because 
of their unilateralism, that is, their commitment to an antirealistic view of 
science. As a matter of fact, today there are excellent reasons for assuming a 
realist attitude toward science. The first is the famous “no-miracles argument,” 
originally proposed by Hilary Putnam (1975, 73). This argument is based on the 
idea that the only way of explicating the great explanatory and predictive 
success of the best theories of modern science is to acknowledge that these 
theories tell us the truth (or a good approximation to the truth) regarding the 
natural world. If one instead assumes an antirealist perspective, the fact that 
science functions so well – as it offers comprehensive explanations and 
extremely precise predictions – becomes an inexplicable mystery or, as Putnam 
puts it, a miracle. Therefore, it is rational to take our best scientific theories as 
true and, consequently, to welcome the entities these theories presuppose as real, 
even when they are unobservable.  
                                                 
5  A similar view was expressed by another Catholic thinker, Pierre Duhem, who is reported 
to have called himself “the unceasing apostle of common sense” (Martin 1991, 89).  
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Unsurprisingly, antirealists have tried to attack the miracle argument in 
various ways, but these objections can, in my view, be rebutted.6 At any rate, 
even if one is not happy with the no-miracles argument, there are other excellent 
reasons for preferring realism to antirealism in regard to science. First, it has 
been convincingly argued that, even in its most sophisticated versions such as 
that of van Frassen, scientific antirealism leaves one vulnerable to discredited 
views such as solipsism and phenomenalism (Forrest 1994). Second, several 
appealing new versions of realism have been offered in recent years. Arguably, 
the most relevant is structural realism, the view that our best theories do not 
describe the intrinsic nature of the unobservable phenomena to which they refer, 
but rather their structure, i.e., the relations these phenomena enter into (Worrall 
1989; Ladyman 1998, 2014). This is a vague definition, of course, and it has 
been refined in different ways, the most important of which define the 
‘epistemic’ and the ‘ontic’ forms of structural realism. The former view claims 
that we can only know the structural (i.e., relational) aspects of the unobservable 
physical reality but not the intrinsic nature of the objects that are in relation with 
each other; the latter claims, more radically, that there are no unobservable 
objects but only structural features (Chakravartty 2004). Structural realism, in 
both its forms, is widely discussed today and has many advocates.7 Here, 
however, it is sufficient to notice that scientific realism is more alive than ever, 
and it is reasonable to believe that the burden of proof is on those who pretend to 
ignore or even deny it.  
Defending the common sense view of the world is a very commendable 
philosophical goal, but doing that by sacrificing scientific realism is too high a 
price to pay. Nowadays, a satisfying New Realism should give science the 
ontological credit it deserves.  
3. SCIENTIFIC REALISM AND COMMON SENSE. 
As I said, today there are excellent reasons to embrace scientific realism; it is no 
surprise, then, that a vast number of philosophers (perhaps even a majority) have 
done so. Moreover, many of these philosophers take scientific realism as the 
main pillar of a very common metaphilosophical view, ‘strict naturalism’ or 
‘scientific naturalism’, which in my opinion is one the main contemporary 
incarnations of Old Realism.8  
                                                 
6 See Chakravartty (2007). The main charges against the miracle argument are that it is based 
on an inference to the best explanation (which allegedly is either doubtful in itself or not 
applicable at this metaexplanatory level); that different theories can account for the same 
sets empirical data; and that the history of science shows that false theories (such Ptolemaic 
astronomy) can offer excellent predictions. Against these arguments, see Musgrave (1988), 
Psillos (2011), Putnam (2012), De Caro (2011), Alai (2014).  
7 On epistemic structural realism, see Worrall (1989) and Morganti (2004); on ontic structural 
realism, see Psillos (2001, 2006), French (2006), and Chakravartty (2007a, ch. 3). 
8 See De Caro and Macarthur (2004a; 2004b; 2010). In those writings, the preferred name for 
this view was ‘scientific naturalism’, but to avoid confusion with ‘scientific realism’ I will 
instead use the synonymous label ‘strict naturalism’.  
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Strict naturalism rests on four main tenets:  
(i) An ontological tenet, according to which reality consists of nothing more 
than the entities to which the successful explanations of the natural sciences 
commit us;  
(ii) An epistemological tenet, according to which scientific inquiry is our 
only genuine source of knowledge; all other alleged forms of knowledge (e.g., 
ordinary perception, a priori knowledge and introspection) are either reducible 
in principle to scientific knowledge or illegitimate;  
(iii) A semantic tenet according to which no linguistic term can refer to 
entities that are both not acceptable to the natural sciences and irreducible to 
those which are; 
(iv) A metaphilosophical tenet, according to which philosophy must be 
continuous with science as to its contents, methods, and purposes.9  
Not only does this view presuppose the correctness of scientific realism 
(what the best scientific theories tell us about the world has to be taken for true, 
including the existence of the non-observable entities they presuppose), but it 
also assumes that the reality described by science is the only reality there is. 
Unsurprisingly, then, the main problem that strict naturalism has to face is the 
so-called “location problem” (Jackson 1998, 1-5) or “placement problem” (Price 
2004). This problem concerns those features of the common-sense view that, at 
least prima facie, do not fit into the scientific view of the world (features such as 
free will, moral properties, normativity, consciousness, and other elusive 
phenomena such as financial debts or collective intentionality).10 In the 
perspective of strict naturalism, either these features are reducible (perhaps after 
undergoing a ‘revisionary’ treatment) to scientifically acceptable features of the 
world or they are mere fictions, and should be treated as such – that is, either 
taken as helpful but illusory beliefs or should be abandoned (as we did with the 
idea that the Earth does not move), depending on whether they play a useful, and 
perhaps indispensable, social role or not.11  
                                                 
9 In contrast to De Caro and Voltolini (2010), this list of the commitments of scientific 
naturalism also includes a semantic tenet, which I now think is useful to distinguish from 
the others.  
10 Smith (2003) points out that entities belonging to the domain of finance such as electronic 
money and debts are one of the most difficult challenges for the strict naturalist. Another 
complex case is that of mathematical entities (which many mathematicians, it should be 
remembered, take for real). The relation between mathematical realism, on the one side, 
and scientific and commonsense realism, on the other side, is a very complicated issue (see 
Maddy 1990 and Burgess 2008). At any rate, assuming that mathematical entities are real 
abstract entities (as even Quine does), means moving away from orthodox scientific 
naturalism, since this view only accepts the existence of entities located in the spatio-
temporal world studied by the sciences of nature (see Field 1980, for a fictionalist treatment 
of mathematical entities in line with a rigorous version of scientific naturalism).  
11 An example in this sense is offered by the discussion between the authors that claim that 
our belief in free will is illusory. Some (such as Smilansky 2002 and Strawson 2010) argue 
that it would be undesirable and practically impossible for us to abandon that belief, others 
(such as Honderich 2002 and Pereboom 2014) affirm the opposite.  
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The main sources of inspiration for the rise of strict naturalism have arguably 
been the philosophies of Quine and Sellars. Today not every strict naturalist is a 
physicalist,12 but many are, and their debt to Quine is obvious. In a physicalist 
spirit, he famously claimed that philosophy should be methodologically 
continuous with science (“Normative epistemology is a branch of engineering,” 
Quine wrote [1985, 664], in order to stress the point that there is not such thing 
as an irreducibly normative epistemology). Both ontologically and 
epistemologically, microphysics should have the last word:  
Nothing happens in the world, not the flutter of the eyelid, not the flicker of a 
thought, without some redistribution of microphysical states … If the physicist 
suspected that there was any event that did not consist in the redistribution of the 
elementary states allowed for in his physical theory, he would seek a way of 
supplementing his theory. Full coverage in this sense is the very business of 
physics, and only of physics. (Quine 1981, 98). 
Quine still has a significant influence on many strict naturalists also because of 
his famous criterion of ontological commitment, according to which we should 
only accept the existence of the entities that have to exist for our best physical 
theories to be true.13  
What is even more interesting here, however, is the role that Wilfrid Sellars 
played in the development of contemporary naturalism. Sellars’s accounts of the 
relations between the “manifest image” (the world as it is understood by 
common sense) and the “scientific image” (the world as it is understood by 
natural science) is diametrically opposed to that offered by Husserl in the Crisis. 
And this is no coincidence since, when he was a student at Buffalo, Sellars was 
deeply influenced by Marvin Farber, an heterodox phenomenologist who had 
studied with Husserl:  
Marvin Farber... introduced me to Husserl. His combination of utter respect for 
the structure of Husserl's thought with the equally firm conviction that this 
structure could be given a naturalistic interpretation was undoubtedly a key 
influence on my own subsequent philosophical strategy. (Sellars 1975, 283).14  
Like Husserl, Sellars tried to understand the relation between the ways in which 
common sense and science respectively conceive of the world; and, like Husserl, 
he aimed at finding a unified view (a “stereoscopic vision”, he called it). In this 
regard, he wrote that these two images are “pictures of essentially the same order 
of complexity, each of which purports to be a complete picture of man-in-the-
                                                 
12 A scientific naturalist can actually believe at the same time that the natural sciences have 
ontological and epistemological primacy and that some natural sciences (i.e., biology) are 
in principle irreducible to physics.  
13 According to Quine in order to determine the ontological commitments of a scientific 
theory one has to regiment it in first-order predicate logic – which is an expression of 
Quine’s puritanism (on which see below), since in this way no property would ever be 
admitted in our ontology 
14 deVries (2005; 2010). On the influx of Husserl on Sellars, see Moran (2012, 292-93). 
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world which, after separate scrutiny, [philosophers] must fuse into one vision” 
(Sellars 1962, p. 4). And ,again like Husserl, Sellars (1963) also acknowledged 
that, genetically and methodologically, the scientific image of the world depends 
on the manifest image and that the normative concepts of the manifest image are 
not reducible to the descriptive ones that characterize the scientific image (see 
O’Shea 2007). It is from the ontological point of view, however, that the 
unilateralism of Sellars’s view becomes antithetical to the unilateralism of 
Husserl’s view. In fact, while Husserl was a realist about common sense and an 
antirealist about science, Sellars took the opposite stance.  
According to Sellars, in the modern age the scientific image has justifiably 
acquired the monopoly on ontology, while the world of common sense has been 
shown to be unreal (and it is to be remembered that, on this, Sellars was stricter 
than Quine, since Sellars denied also the existence of abstract entities).  
Sellars expresses this point through a now-famous neo-Protagorean motto:  
Speaking as a philosopher, I am quite prepared to say that the common sense 
world of physical objects in Space and Time is unreal – that is, that there are no 
such things. Or, to put it less paradoxically, that in the dimension of describing 
and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, 
and of what is not that it is not. (Sellars 1956, 83; see also DeVries 2012). 
Strict naturalism has inherited from Quine and Sellars a “puritanical” ontological 
attitude, as Stephen Stich (1996, 199) called it, according to which only 
scientifically acceptable phenomena are real. And this attitude explains the 
present multitude of naturalization projects that concern the features of the 
common sense world, such as persons, minds, tables, colors, qualia, free will, 
intentionality, normativity, and responsibility. Sadly enough, however, as 
Putnam (2004, 62) sardonically put it, “none of these ontological reduction gets 
believed by anyone except the proponent of the account and one or two of his 
friends and/or students.”15  
In fact, many strict naturalists acknowledge that the alleged reductions of the 
features of the common sense world do not work. These philosophers have two 
possible ways out. Some (such as Paul and Patricia Churchland or the advocates 
of the so-called “Canberra plan”)16 take the radical step of dismissing the entire 
common sense view of the world as radically wrong. Others (the so-called 
‘mysterians’) claim that we cannot give up beliefs as indispensable as those of 
freedom, responsibility, morality or consciousness; consequently, they conclude 
that the impossibility of naturalizing these notions is, and will always will be, an 
utter mystery for beings like us (McGinn 1999).  
Both these proposals are generated by a certain background ideology that 
they share with all versions of strict naturalism – and New Realism consists, I 
                                                 
15 An interesting case in this regard is offered by Searle, who tries to reconcile the ontological 
puritanism typical of strict naturalism with a defense of an ontology of institutional facts, 
which in his opinion depend on collective intentionality. For a critical analysis of this view, 
see Smith (2003).  
16 P.M. Churchland (1996); P.S. Churchland (2002); Nolan (2010). 
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would suggest, in the view that it is time to abandon this background ideology. 
As Tyler Burge wrote some time ago:  
The flood of projects ... that attempt to fit mental causation or mental ontology 
into a ‘naturalistic picture of the world’ strike me as having more in common 
with political or religious ideology than with a philosophy that maintains 
perspective on the difference between what is known and what is speculated. 
(Burge 1993, p. 117) 
Where common sense realism neglects science in order to solve the apparent 
clash of the two views of the world, strict naturalism is based on a dismissive 
attitude toward common sense that produces very dubious philosophical 
consequences. It is time to ask if there is a way of embracing a serious dual 
realism – one that would take seriously both the scientific and the common sense 
view of the world.  
4. LIBERAL NATURALISM AS THE MOST PROMISING FORM OF REALISM. 
In recent years some philosophers have developed new ideas in order to 
overcome the rigid, and unpalatable, alternative between common sense realism 
and scientific realism. In this light, very interesting proposals have come from 
forms of naturalism that are explicitly based on an egalitarian attitude in regard 
to science and common sense. It is in that direction that, in my opinion, we 
should look for the most promising new forms of realism.  
In general, in the last years two main families of liberal naturalism have been 
developed. The first can be called realist liberal naturalism and its advocates 
attempt at revitalizing ontological pluralism without falling back into 
supernaturalism,17 the conception that claims the existence of entities that are 
incompatible with the scientific worldview.18 The second form can be called 
quietist liberal naturalism and its proponents – inspired by Wittgenstein’s 
quietism or by a naturalized Kantianism or for more substantial reasons – 
assume a quietist attitude in metaphysics and, consequently, tend to conceive of 
both the common sense and the scientific views of the world as indispensable, 
mutually irreducible, and categorically separated ways of conceptualizing the 
world.19 These approaches share the idea that strict naturalism illegitimately 
limits the scope of the term “nature” to the subject studied by the natural 
sciences. In this respect, one can extend Jennifer Hornsby’s view to all forms of 
liberal naturalism: 
                                                 
17 See Audi (2000) for a defense of the thesis that some forms of theism are compatible with 
the scientific worldview and therefore with naturalism.  
18 See, for example, the proposals of Stroud (1996; 2006), Hornsby (1997), Smith and 
Ceusters (2010), Putnam (2012, section I; forthcoming), Baker (2013) defends an 
interesting emergentist conception, “Near-naturalism”, that is compatible with both liberal 
naturalism and supernaturalism. By adding an antisupernaturalist proviso to that 
conception, it could be appealing to many liberal naturalists.  
19 See McDowell (1994; 1995), White (2007), and Macarthur (2008). 
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The world in which the mind is accommodated by [liberal naturalism] is naively 
natural; it contains the objects that we see and we act on; no peculiarly scientific 
method is required to have knowledge of it. (Hornsby 1997, 12) 
However, since quietist liberal naturalism is by definition not concerned with the 
metaphysical issue of realism, this view is not of interest here.20 On the contrary, 
the realist version of liberal naturalism, with its attempt to reconcile common 
sense and scientific realism in a non-Cartesian pluralist ontological perspective, 
is the most promising form of New Realism.  
The tenets of realist liberal naturalism are: 
(i) A liberalized ontological tenet, according to which some real and non-
supernatural entities exist that are irreducible to the entities that are part of 
the coverage domain of a natural science-based ontology; 
(ii) A liberalized epistemological tenet, according to which some legitimate 
forms of understanding (say, a priori reasoning or introspection) are neither 
reducible to scientific understanding nor incompatible with it;  
(iii) A liberalized semantic tenet, according to which there are linguistic 
terms that refer to real non-supernatural entities that do not form part of the 
coverage domain of natural science and are not reducible to those entities 
which do;  
(iv) A liberalized metaphilosophical tenet, according to which there are 
issues in dealing with which philosophy is not continuous with science as to 
its content, method and purpose. 
Unsurprisingly, realist liberal naturalism is not left unchallenged.21 The first 
criticism that this view has to counter is that it is conceptually impossible, 
because there is no logical space between antinaturalism and strict naturalism. 
Ram Neta (2007), for example, wrote:  
What if digestion, or respiration, or reasoning are natural kinds, their nature 
consisting simply in the mechanisms that enable them to occur? Is the liberal 
naturalist committed to denying this possibility? If so, then I confess I can see no 
good reason to accept Liberal Naturalism. And if not, then I confess I do not 
understand just what Liberal Naturalism is.  
Put in this way, this criticism has the form of a dilemma: either liberal 
naturalism is not liberal enough (because it differs only superficially from strict 
naturalism) or it is not a genuine form of naturalism at all (that is, it is a form of 
non-naturalism in disguise). However, both sides of this dilemma seem 
ungrounded.22  
                                                 
20 For an important criticism of metaphysical quietism in general, see Fine (2001).  
21 In the following, for brevity I will refer to realist liberal naturalism as “liberal naturalism” 
simpliciter.  
22 Ram Neta’s dilemma is discussed more in depth in De Caro and Voltolini (2010). 
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Of course, if (like Goetz and Taliaferro 2008, 95) one presupposes that in 
order to be substantially different from strict naturalism a philosophical view 
should admit that the supernatural plays a causal role in the world, then it 
logically follows that liberal naturalism is not substantially different from strict 
naturalism. However, this way of putting the issue is clearly biased in favor of 
supernaturalism. If one takes a more neutral stance, then to see the deep 
differences between liberal and strict naturalism it is enough to look at the very 
different results that – because of their different presuppositions, methods and 
goals – the two versions of naturalism arrive at in dealing with concrete issues, 
from free will to morality, from consciousness to action theory, from the mind-
body problem to the ontological status of secondary properties. In brief, while 
strict naturalists are committed to offering either reductionist or eliminationist 
analyses in regard to each of those issues, liberal naturalists will tend to take 
antireductionist stances (even though, it should be noted, they do not have to be 
antireductionist with regard to all those issues at the same time).  
At this point, a strict naturalist could respond that, by expanding the scope of 
nature beyond the reach of the natural sciences, unavoidably the liberal naturalist 
paves the way to supernatural entities and explanations. In this perspective, 
beyond the reach of the natural sciences there is only the supernatural. Against 
this argument, the liberal naturalist could repeat that they refuse any appeal to 
the supernatural, both in ontology and in epistemology, but this defense is often 
contested. As a matter of fact, while the strict naturalist can easily delimit the 
space of the natural (and, consequently, that of the supernatural) by appealing to 
the scope of the natural sciences, the liberal naturalist seems to have a problem 
in this regard. 23  
Let us take the case of mental causation. Prima facie, it may seem that if one 
claims that it is a real phenomenon but not explainable by the natural sciences, 
one is taking a supernaturalist stance. This, however, is not necessarily the case. 
Certainly, if one defends a strong form of dualism, according to which an 
immaterial mind intervenes in the natural world and breaks its laws, then one is 
prima facie a supernaturalist. But one can instead argue that the mind has causal 
powers that are neither reducible to nor incompatible with the laws investigated 
by the sciences of nature (Lowe 2006; Baker 2013, passim).  
In general, liberal naturalists relax Quine’s ontological criterion, since they 
do not think that one should only accept the existence of the entities that pull 
their weight in the best scientific theories of the natural world. In their opinion, 
one can also accept the entities that are implicit in out other sound and 
successful epistemic practices (such as common sense and the social sciences), 
as long as those entities are not incompatible with the natural science worldview.  
Liberal naturalists conceive of nature as encompassing both the entities 
accepted by the natural sciences and those accepted by common sense. In this 
respect, one can quote Stroud (2006, 350), when he wrote: “[We] need a 
conception of nature that includes a whole world of enduring bodies in space and 
human bodies and human actions in interaction with them and with one another” – 
                                                 
23 I thank Matteo Morganti for bringing this problem to my attention. 
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and add to this also other non-supernatural phenomena that cannot be explained by 
the natural sciences, such as phenomenological properties and debts.  
At this point, a strict naturalist could reformulate his charge and say that, by 
refusing the possibility of a totalizing mechanistic explanation of all reality, 
liberal naturalism, if different from supernaturalism, is still too inclusive, since it 
makes room for some obviously non-naturalistic views, such as cultural 
relativism and deconstructionism. And this would be something that not even the 
advocates of those views would be happy with. 
However, in taking a doubly realist stance that embraces both the scientific 
and the common sense view of the world, liberal naturalism is immune from this 
charge. This view in fact claims that reality limits the scope of the legitimate 
interpretations of reality by determining the objective conditions of truth of our 
scientific and common sense judgments. Certainly, our judgments, both in 
science and common sense, are fallible, and always will be; but that does not 
mean that there are no objective standards of truth, as claimed by cultural 
relativism, deconstructionism and the like (Boghossian 2006). 24 
Another criticism against liberal naturalism grants its conceptual legitimacy 
but claims its implausibility. This criticism has been expressed in different ways. 
One is based on the ‘burden of proof argument’, claiming that strict naturalism is 
the default naturalistic view. In this perspective, liberal naturalists should prove 
that the natural sciences cannot accommodate some parts of the world, as we 
know it – particularly of the human world – otherwise theirs would not be a 
legitimate metaphilosophical option. That is, the liberal naturalist has to prove 
that some of the features of the world are both ineliminable and in principle 
irreducible to features acceptable to natural science (see for example, Macdonald 
2006, 231).  
This argument is also unconvincing however. First of all, it is unfair that the 
strict naturalist, who by definition refuses the possibility of a priori arguments, 
asks the liberal naturalist for an a priori demonstration that some features of the 
world are both ineliminable and irreducible to its scientific features. Moreover, 
by the same token, the liberal naturalist could argue that the burden of proof is 
on those who claim that the recalcitrant features of the world (free will, 
consciousness, debts, and so on) can be reduced to the entities accepted by the 
natural sciences or explained away.  
Another way of putting the charge of implausibility against liberal naturalism 
is based on the so-called ‘Great success of science argument’.25 According to 
this argument, starting with the scientific revolution, the natural sciences have 
progressively explained an astonishing quantity of previously very mysterious-
seeming phenomena, making it possible for us to predict and control many of 
them at will. Therefore, it is rational to infer that also the problems of agency, 
consciousness, morality, and so on one day will also be solved (or, at least, could 
in principle be solved) by the natural sciences.  
                                                 
24 In regard to ethics, for example, Putnam (2004) shows how it can be objective, irreducible 
to non-normative forms of knowledge, and non-supernatural (he takes a stance that is 
epistemically and semantically realist and ontologically antirealist).  
25 This argument is discussed and criticized in more detail in De Caro and Macarthur (2004a). 
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Not even this argument sounds persuasive. First of all, it is far from obvious 
that the induction on which this argument is based is adequate. Moreover, as has 
been noted (for example in Crane and Mellor 1995), it is unclear to what scientific 
theories the Great Success of Science argument refers. Certainly, they cannot be 
present-day theories, since these are unable to solve the problems of agency, 
consciousness etc. But who knows what forms the theories that in principle are 
able to explain those problems might have (granting that such theories do indeed 
exist)? Should we then not confine this kind of speculative reasoning to the 
(already crowded) realm of overambitious philosophical phantasies? Moreover, 
this argument begs the question when it is used against liberal naturalism. The 
latter view is based on the idea that it is rational to believe that some important 
features of the world are ineliminable and not reducible to the features accounted 
for by natural science: just saying that they will be eliminated or reduced because 
science is instrinsically able to do that sounds very much like a mere repetition of 
the thesis that liberal naturalists contest.  
Finally, another way of denying plausibility to liberal naturalism consists in 
insisting on the indubitability of ontological and epistemological monism 
(compare P.M. Churchland1996; Schaffer 2014). From this point of view, all the 
features of the world that presently look ineliminable and irreducible to features 
acceptable to natural science are in principle either eliminable or reducible. At 
the scientific level, this insistence on monism may sometimes be justified as a 
methodological ideal. However, if one takes monism as a restriction on how 
reality should be, then not only is it at odds with common sense, but also with 
scientific practice, since today pluralism is a very common view among the 
natural sciences;26 and it goes without saying that the monistic cause becomes 
even less promising if one takes into account the social sciences as well. Indeed, 
the idea that pluralism represents a menace for the scientific view of the world is 
a heritage of an obsolete positivistic view that it would be time to forget.  
The attempt to reconcile realism about common sense and realism about 
science in a naturalistic spirit thus survives all the charges that have been raised 
against it. The philosophical marsupials may have finally found a new luxurious 
continent to explore.27  
 
                                                 
26 See Kellert et al. 2006. According to an authoritative recent survey, even the possitibility of 
reducing chemistry to physics (traditionally the best showpiece of reductionism) is today 
widely contested: “Most philosophers of chemistry think that a stronger conception of unity 
[between chemistry and physics] is mistaken. Most believe that chemistry has not been 
reduced to physics nor is it likely to be” (Weisenberg et al. 2011).  
27 My thanks to Robert Audi, Lynne Baker, David Macarthur, Maurizio Ferraris, Andrea 
Lavazza, Massimo Marraffa, Matteo Morganti, Hilary Putnam, Barry Smith, Karsten 
Stueber, Alberto Voltolini, Stephen White for many useful discussions on these issues. I 
also thank the audiences of the talks I gave the University of Notre Dame, Oxford 
University, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, College of the Holy Cross, University 
of New Hampshire, Milano San Raffaele, Paris IV-Sorbonne, and Torino for the very 
useful comments on previous versions of this paper.  
 15 
REVISITING THE MIND-BRAIN PICKLE: SWINBURNE’S 
EVENT DUALISM OF  SUBSTANCES AND PROPERTIES 
NYTHAMAR DE OLIVEIRA1 
1. In this brief paper, I would like to confine myself to offering a few comments 
on Professor Richard Swinburne’s seminal contributions to the philosophy of 
mind and language, and to the philosophy of neuroscience, especially in his 
work Mind, Brain, and Free Will, and more particularly on his recasting of the 
mind-brain problem, his critique of physicalism, and his defense of a variant of 
substance/property dualism. Swinburne’s major guiding thesis comes down to 
asserting that physical, material events and conscious, mind events (such as 
beliefs, desires, thoughts, and sensations) are not identical, so that “the mental 
world” cannot be deemed “fully deterministic.” (Swinburne, 2013, p. 202)  
Since I believe that many neuroscientists and philosophers of mind nowadays 
who embrace physicalism are motivated by their correlated refusal of substance 
and property dualisms (I am thinking here of António Damásio and Jesse Prinz) 
without succumbing to determinism or to a reductionist account of naturalism 
(say, like the Churchlands’ eliminativist program), I would like to revisit here 
some of the features of this classical problem which resists any clear-cut 
solution, in light of Swinburne’s recasting of substance and property dualisms. 
(Churchland, 1984, 1995, 1996) I am thus assuming that the brain-mind problem 
is analogous to the nature-nurture pickle, in the sense of a predicament like a 
chicken-egg question, not so much to sort out which one comes first but which 
conditioning is more basic and takes primacy over the other. Even though it 
could seem trivial to realize that there are no mental events without brain 
processes, just like neurobiological evolution (nature) would intuitively seem to 
be prior to social, cultural evolution (nurture), the fact that human cultural and 
civilizational processes have transformed nature throughout the centuries and 
millennia just attest to the difficulties involved in the brain-mind pickle. (Prinz, 
2002) In a US idiomatic expression, if you are in a pickle, you are in a difficult 
position, or have a problem to which no easy answer can be found –so that 
happens to be case with the brain-mind problem, following a neuroscientific turn 
in the recasting of the body-soul problem. 
                                                 
1  Associate Professor of Philosophy, PUCRS; Brazilian National Research Council (CNPq) 
Fellow. I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Richard Swinburne for his highly 
stimulating lectures and for giving us the honor of his visit to our graduate program in Porto 
Alegre. 
REVISITING THE MIND-BRAIN PICKLE 
 197
Professor Swinburne starts from the basic assumption that mental events 
(consisting in the instantiation of mental properties – sensations, thoughts, 
purposes, desires, and beliefs) are distinct from physical events (such as brain 
events), although in causal interaction with them. As expected, ontology is the 
starting point for his mapping of concepts and theoretical framework: “the whole 
history of the world can be told with our familiar system of categories: 
substances, properties, and times. I understand by a substance a particular 
concrete object: my desk, that person, the photon (particle of light) emitted from 
this light source which landed on this screen, and so on. Substances may have 
other substances as parts. My desk has its drawers as parts of it; and it can exist 
(it is logically possible) independently of all other things of its kind (i.e. all other 
substances) apart from its parts; and those parts have very many electrons, 
protons, neutrons, etc. as their parts. Substances exist all-at-once. Whenever they 
exist, they exist totally.” (Swinburne, 2013, p. 4) When I first read these lines, I 
couldn’t help drawing comparisons to Edmund Husserl’s parts-whole formal 
ontology, namely, recasting Leibniz’s monadology as an alternative third way, 
so as to avoid both Descartes’s substance dualism and Spinoza’s holistic 
monism. I think, en passant, that one might spot a neurophenomenological 
deficit in both normative and naturalist theories that fail to account, respectively, 
for neural correlates in first-personish reconstructions of social action (as in 
most critical-theoretical approaches of second and third generations of the so-
called Frankfurt School) or in naturalist theories of sociality that miss the 
irreducibility of semantics to syntax and the former’s pertaining to phenomenal 
consciousness of aboutness and what’s-it-likeness (as in the Churchlands’s 
eliminative materialist research program). Although I won’t pursue this point 
here, we may think of Habermas’s critical, normative reconstruction of 
subjectivity as he conceives of cognitive- and moral-psychological development 
as a rationalization of the structures of consciousness, as the conventional 
perspective can be replaced by the postconventional perspective, for instance, 
when adolescents consciously grow and reflect upon their own justifications of 
moral, normative principles.(De Oliveira, 2014) In the final analysis, it is quite 
understandable that neuroscientists overall and neuropsychologists would refer 
to physical or natural ontology as they deal with real, natural beings, their 
properties and events that can be described and explained as physical 
phenomena –without any resort to supernatural or metaphysical discourse. For 
physicalists, materialists, and naturalists it suffices to take ontology as the real, 
phenomenal realm of beings, entities, phenomena, and events as they appear, 
come into being or exist, necessarily, possibly or contingently, very much as 
traditionally and broadly conceived, as the study of what there is in the sense of 
real, objective existence. Naturalists like John Searle have shown, however, that 
epistemic and ontological takes on objectivity and subjectivity are not as 
straightforward for philosophers, say, when contrasting events or phenomena 
studied by so-called “hard sciences” with the social reality or institutions that are 
examined by social scientists, precisely because of the irreducibility of the 
phenomenal, self-conscious perspective of the first person who experiences pain, 
feels cold or exchanges goods with other human beings in their social 
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dealings.(Searle, 1984, 1995) In this sense, it can be argued that the social, 
intersubjective dimension of human selfhood, in its correlated capabilities of 
conscious reflexivity and autonomy, are the best way to account for the limits 
that humans impose on the treatment-enhancement divide (say, in neuroethics 
and bioethics), as the pursuit of a good life and human flourishing addresses 
questions of how we should lead fulfilling lives, not only to ourselves (self-
fulfilling lives) but also to others (sociability). It has been my working 
hypothesis that by calling into question whether social, cultural conditioning can 
be actually undermined by neurobiological conditioning alone, it remains to be 
seen how positive social feedback drives people to interact on social media and, 
the other way around, whether use of social media ends up changing the way 
positive social feedback is actually processed by the brain. Since most social 
thinkers tend to identify sociality with intersubjectivity (for instance, the fact 
that shared beliefs or social norms are common to individuals belonging to the 
same social group or set of individuals), one may think of social institutions 
(broadly conceived so as to include not only the state, governmental, political, 
economic, and legal structures, but also the family, civil society, organizations, 
associations, and social grouping of all sorts) very much by analogy with the 
way one learns how to function in a natural language (sharing a grammar, 
phonetics etc), usually without paying much attention to it (esp. mother tongue 
for native speakers, as analogous to the way one has been socialized into being 
Amish in Amish country) 
 
2. At any rate, the point being made here is that, according to Swinburne, mental 
events consist in the instantiations of properties in the immaterial substance, 
which has been traditionally termed soul, anima, as the seat par excellence of 
reflexivity, interiority, and self-consciousness. Accordingly, humans and 
nonhuman animals alike (esp. “higher” animals) are said to consist of two parts, 
the essential part (the soul) and a contingent part (their body). Since Aristotle, 
we think of humans as peculiarly distinct vis à vis the higher animals because of 
the former’s ability to speak and reason (logon echon) logically and morally, 
hence the very conception of free will has been an integrated system of beliefs 
and desires. But we must unpack how these categories of substances, properties, 
and times concur to pick out mental events and brain processes. According to 
Swinburne, “an event as either some substance (or substances, or event or 
events) having a certain property (more formally, the instantiation of a property 
in some substance or substances, or event or events) at a certain time, or the 
coming into existence or the ceasing to exist of some substance at some time.” 
(Swinburne, 2013, p. 6) Once we agree that substances, properties, and events 
are basic constituents of the world and once we give in to his principle of 
credulity — i.e., “what seems to us to be the case probably is the case, absent 
any counter-evidence” (Swinburne, 2013, p. 42f) —, Swinburne proceeds to 
persuade us that the soul qua substance is, after all, the essential part of our 
being insofar as it can exercise causal power over the body, and more 
importantly, free from deterministic causes in such a way as to render us morally 
responsible for what we do. It seems quite problematic to assume that by 
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confining ontology to existence (as opposed to, say, being and modes of being), 
Swinburne would succeed in avoiding Platonic realism and its correlated 
semantics, according to which all nouns do refer to existent entities (in a 
transcendent realm of forms), or other variants of general metaphysical or 
ontology that might undermine his contention that substances have properties, as 
opposed to one single substance (monism). Hence, when Swinburne arguably 
points out that “philosophers and scientists have made claims about what is 
‘possible’ in this area, such as ‘it is not possible for a person to exist without a 
body’ or ‘necessarily all mental events supervene on physical events’” to add 
that “whether that is true depends on what is meant by ‘possible’ and 
‘necessarily’,” he seems to be committed to a particular semantic-ontological 
framework.( Swinburne, 2013, p. 4ff) Thus, in order to account for the soul’s 
interaction on the body and material things, Swinburne strategically adopts the 
following extended notion of supervenience: “A-substances supervene on B-
substances iff necessarily for every A-substance x there is a B-substance y, such 
that necessarily if y exists x exists.” (Swinburne, 2013, p. 21) Precisely because 
of his ontological commitments, Swinburne strongly argues against any 
“restriction of the mental to the sensory” (Swinburne, 2013, p. 98), citing David 
Chalmers’s property dualism (akin to his own version of event dualism), 
according to which there are “both physical and non-physical features of the 
world. The falsity of logical supervenience implies that experience is 
fundamentally different in kind from any physical feature.” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 
124) One of the reasons why Swinburne’s case for dualism seem to fail to 
deliver the normative grounds promised by his otherwise highly original and 
critical account of property dualism is, perhaps, to be found in its lack of 
commitment to what Chalmers dubbed “the hard problem of consciousness.” 
(Chalmers, 1995) As R.D. Ellis put so well, “the main point of the hard problem 
is that, even if we could discover the ‘neural correlates of consciousness,’ we 
still would not have answered the ‘harder’ question: Why do those physical 
events exhibit the property of consciousness, whereas other physical events do 
not?” (Giordano and Gordijn, 2010, p. 66) Even though these remarks seem to 
address the naturalist horn of the dilemma, the second horn turns out to render 
problematic the very meaning of normativity caught between the subjectivism of 
first-personal accounts and the absolutism of third-person accounts (esp. 
absolute principles and divine command theories as in the Euthyphro dilemma). 
 
3. To be granted, Swinburne carefully distinguish beliefs and intentions as 
continuing mental states that do not by themselves entail any physical events 
involving the believer or agent, as opposed to, say, desires and dispositions to do 
actions: “In that they exist over periods of time during which they are totally 
absent from my consciousness, they are clearly continuing mental states and 
not—like intentions in action—conscious events.” (Swinburne, 2013, p. 83f) 
Now, physicalists like Damásio and Prinz have convincingly argued that reason, 
emotions, and decision-making processes can be articulated in terms of 
empirical and philosophical language, in that cognitive feelings and a reflective 
level are integrated with noncognitive features of emotions and preferences, 
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particularly the so-called “primary emotions” and “gut reactions.” For one, 
Damásio has decisively contributed to ongoing interdisciplinary research in 
cognitive sciences, neurophilosophy, neurobiology of mind and behavior, 
particularly at the crossroads of emotions, decision-making, memory, 
communication, creativity, and consciousness as neurophysiological phenomena 
that call into question reductionist approaches. Indeed, the publication of his 
Descartes’ Error, in 1994, started off a real turning point not only in neurology, 
psychiatry, neuroscience, and cognitive psychology, but also in the philosophy 
of mind and language, as it undertook a radical critique of Cartesian dualism, 
opposing dichotomies of soul and body, brain and mind, reason and emotion. 
(Damásio, 1994) Since the 1950s and 60s, research in neuroscience has already 
shaken apparently insurmountable problems in various models of dualism and of 
several others that have emerged in the following decades, with alternative 
proposals to patterns of behavior conditioning (behaviorism), theories of identity 
(between mind and brain), the physical states of the brain (physicalism) and their 
causal roles and functions in a complex economy of internal states, mediating 
sensory data inputs and behavioral outputs (functionalism), as well as the 
materialistic reductionisms that supposedly eliminate folk psychology and 
normative accounts that allude to psychological states (eliminative materialism). 
Damásio’s work fostered thus a fruitful dialogue between neuroscientists and 
philosophers of mind, especially within neurophilosophy and cognitive sciences, 
as attest seminal works by Searle, Gazzaniga, and Prinz. Of particular concern is 
their recasting of the “social brain” problem, as Damásio and Prinz assume that 
the philosophical underpinnings of cognitive and moral decisions are at the 
center of discussions about human nature, in that self-conscious morality-cum-
sociality evolves as one of the elements that distinguish humans from superior 
primates and other nonhuman animals. Moral decisions occupy, after all, a 
central place in defining the human being, at the heart of decisions that define us 
in relation to cultural, social problem-solving, relationship issues, and personal 
and political choices that ultimately help us set the “self” in everyday relations 
to ouselves and to the others and within a particular milieu. Damásio establishes 
thus the correlation between practical reason and emotion, combining the 
awareness notion of decision-making and planning at different time scales, 
creating possibilities of interaction with the environment and the selection of 
courses of action, with all processes and steps interconnected. Damásio manages 
thus to articulate the social, intersubjective, and neurobiological processes that 
explain the evolution of the human brain and the emergence of consciousness, 
the “I” –as a first-personish self, a reflected-upon “me” and third-personish 
accounts of other selves—, memory, language, subjectivity, and their 
representations and creative constructions and carriers of meaning. According to 
Damásio, “Both basic homeostasis (which is nonconsciously guided) and 
sociocultural homeostasis (which is created and guided by reflective conscious 
minds) operate as curators of biological value. Basic and sociocultural varieties 
of homeostasis are separated by millions of years of evolution, and yet they 
promote the same goal—the survival of living organisms—albeit in different 
ecological niches. That goal is broadened, in the case of sociocultural 
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homeostasis, to encompass the deliberate seeking of well-being. It goes without 
saying that the way in which human brains manage life requires both varieties of 
homeostasis in continuous interaction. But while the basic variety of 
homeostasis is an established inheritance, provided by everyone’s genome, the 
sociocultural variety is a somewhat fragile work in progress, responsible for 
much of human drama, folly, and hope. The interaction between these two kinds 
of homeostasis is not confined to each individual. There is growing evidence 
that, over multiple generations, cultural developments lead to changes in the 
genome.” (Damásio, 2010, p. 31)  
 
4. Indeed, since Gazzaniga (1985) formulated the problem for the first time in 
the 1980s, the “neural substrates” of social behavior and cognition have not yet 
been completely understood. Moreover, studies in humans and other primates 
have revealed different neural structures that play a decisive role in the 
construction of social behavior: the amygdala, the ventromedial frontal cortices 
and the right somatosensory cortex, among other structures, which seem to 
mediate perceptual representations of socially relevant stimuli. These studies 
made it possible to develop the Social Brain Hypothesis, according to which the 
restrictions on the size of the social group arise from the ability of information 
processing in the brain, especially among primates, so that the neocortex 
eventually play an important role in social evolution that leads us to present 
complex sociality. Thus the Dunbar number was first proposed in the 1990s by 
British anthropologist Robin Dunbar (1998), who found a correlation between 
primate brain size and average social group size.  
However, even such a proposal raises a number of interpretations on how this 
relationship is mediated. For Dewey, who influenced the normative-
reconstructive approach of social thinkers like Rawls, Habermas, and Honneth, 
thought is necessarily symbolic and all social symbolism is necessarily, 
therefore, the mind is always already social: there are sources of expertise 
outside the individual, insofar as we have to live from birth to death in a social 
world of people and artifacts, which is largely the result of what has been done 
and transmitted from previous human activities in concert --in cultural traditions, 
through linguistically and socially mediated contexts of meaning. When this fact 
is ignored, experience is treated as if it were something that happens exclusively 
within the body and mind of a lonely individual or disembodied self. According 
to Dewey, experience does not occur in a vacuum, but it always presupposes an 
intersubjective externality to an individual, which gives rise to the very 
experience itself within a social world. Certainly, not all sociality can be reduced 
to brains, not their conceptualizations can be socially determined. According to 
social epistemology, the emphasis on the primacy of emotions and the 
importance of common notions are not always equally crucial to characterize the 
formation of knowledge, agreement and disagreement between epistemic peers 
in decision-making groups. The social dimension that is being emphasized in 
discussions of social intellect, culminating with the notion of Machiavellian 
intelligence and its presence in the world of primates, is the individual's ability 
to interact successfully with the social groups in order to predict and manipulate 
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the behavior, making and breaking promises, and so on. The energy 
requirements of such a complex situation are ultimately presented as responsible 
for the large size of the primate brain, so that some evolutionary anthropologists 
and researchers in related fields postulated the hypothesis of Machiavellian 
intelligence and the social brain hypothesis. Moreover, the concept of social 
brain is not reducible to the individual manifestations of a social world around 
us because the “brain architecture” reflects rather than forms its social 
organization, language and culture. It is against such a complex semantic context 
that can be investigated the processes of moral decision-making and ethical 
implications that materialize in everyday life and social media, as measured in 
neuroimaging experiments. Beyond the culturalist, rationalist and modular 
approaches to language, this research will thus help us figure out how language 
and cross-cultural identities (including gender, ethnic, social, political etc) 
function in social interactions comprising diverse fields such as pragmatics, 
neurolinguistics, and neurosemantics.  
So the first set of questions that addresses Swinburne’s recasting of 
substance/property dualism can be thus formulated: since a phenomenological 
notion of an embodied mind or of a minded body does not entail an endorsement 
of some kind of Cartesian materialism, as if we were simply getting rid of the 
soul (or the mind, for that matter), how about embracing a more explicit 
phenomenology of mind? As Professor Swinburne interestingly remarks in his 
own criticisms of misleading, reductionist interpretations of Libet’s experiments: 
“In other cases it does not seem to us that we are choosing without being caused 
to choose as we do, and so we should not believe that we are then making an 
uncaused choice. The phenomenology of deciding between rival possible 
actions, ones which are not determined by our mental states (our existing desires 
and beliefs with their relative strengths), is so different from the phenomenology 
of doing the everyday things we do intentionally, that we should expect the 
underlying brain processes to be similarly different.” (Swinburne, 2015, p. 
201f.) After all, an agent has free will, as Swinburne goes on to assert, “insofar 
as the agent acts intentionally without their intentions being fully determined by 
prior causes.” Or as Swinburne put it, “having an intention in making” such and 
such is equivalent to ‘having an intention which the subject believes causes him 
or her to make them’ rather than—as ordinarily—’having an intention which 
causes the subject to make them’.” (Swinburne, 2015, p. 80f.) The irreducibility 
of first-personish accounts of beliefs and actions in response to 
phenomenological, normative challenges (esp. when dealing with intentionality, 
aboutness, and consciousness) that avoid trivial conceptions of normativity and 
naturalism might help us avoid the deterministic attempts to reduce the sense of 
normativity, say, as in Jennifer Hornsby’s conception of Naive Naturalism, 
according to which in order to avoid both physicalist and Cartesian claims about 
the mind-body problem, we ought to return to common sense and folk 
psychology as they implicitly endorse normative and first-personish beliefs. In a 
nutshell, is it the case that supervenience of moral properties on non-moral 
properties must be analogous to supervenience of substances, as Swinburne 
extended Kim’s conception so as to account for natural, physical phenomena 
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without resorting to deterministic approaches such as the identity theory? That 
being the case, how does property or event dualism avoid the criticisms raised 
against functionalism? As Swinburne saw the problem, functionalists claim (to 
use his own terminology) “that what makes any property a property of a kind 
which [Swinburne has] called ‘pure mental property’ is that events with that 
property have a certain function in a person’s life of thought and behavior, and 
in particular tend to have certain kinds of causes and effects (in or outside the 
brain).” (Swinburne, 2015, p. 94) Granted, I can see that this strategy will be 
very helpful in keeping moral normativity separate from naturalism or 
physicalism. As Swinburne put it so bluntly, “Moral beliefs as such, I suggest, 
like all value beliefs and unlike other beliefs, motivate us. I could not believe 
that some action was really morally good to do (as opposed to being what other 
people call ‘morally good’) and yet not see myself as having a reason for doing 
it.” (Swinburne, 2015, p. 178)  
 
5. Now, still relating to property supervenience and causation, we might raise 
the question of how to interpret the correlations between mental and neural 
phenomena discovered by brain science and psychology since their beginnings. 
Brain research suggests that there is a high degree of covariation between mental 
states and brain states. This view, however familiar, raises more questions than it 
tends to be aware of, and we may as well pick out just three of them, following 
Prinz (2002, p. 71ff; 2004a; 2012, p. 168 f):  
 
(1) If causal relations are at all possible in a transphysical context how do 
they have to be conceived?  
(2) How far are “passive” mental events causally dependent on brain 
processes?  
(3) How far are “active” mental events causally relevant to brain events?  
 
Whereas the first question is largely a challenge to philosophical analysis, the 
two other questions are a challenge, and an opportunity, for a coordinated effort 
of all contributing disciplines, including the neurosciences. Since Swinburne 
admits that instead of an event dualism, it could be that the public world (not 
merely our description of it) contains some other dualism (an ‘aspect’-dualism, 
for example) which turns out to be just a different way of describing the same 
feature of the world as does ‘event-dualism’. Now, could we stretch this to go so 
far as to say that perhaps event dualism allows for a perspectivism that avoids an 
ontological dualism, like in Kant’s noumenal-phenomenal dualism understood 
as transcendental perspectives rather than ontological realms? Isn’t the case that 
Kant himself also made room for agent causation, as opposed to inanimate 
events (e.g. the motion of billiard balls), allowing for the first-person account of 
autonomous, self-legislating selves that cannot be reducible to third-person, 
descriptive accounts precisely because of their peculiar practical faculty to 
initiate a series of events in nature? Indeed, for many physicalists, the physical is 
sufficient to generate the mental and that a further causal contribution (say, of 
something supernatural) is not called for. Although the causal sufficiency of the 
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physical cannot rule out a supernatural influence categorically, such an influence 
would be redundant. It would not be needed to explain the existence and 
functioning of the mind. All in all, one cannot speak of naturalist normativity or 
normative naturalism without a certain embarrassment. And yet, as over against 
traditional conceptions that regard naturalism as merely descriptive, as opposed 
to prescriptive accounts of normativity, it has become more and more common 
nowadays to challenge such a clear-cut division of labor, as naturalists like 
Millikan (1989) assign normative force to the biological concept of function and 
normativists like Korsgaard tend to assume that human psychology is naturally 
normative: “whatever confers a normative status on our actions – whatever 
makes them right or wrong – must also be what motivates us to do or avoid them 
accordingly, without any intervening mechanism.” (Korsgaard, 2010, 16) To be 
sure, both views could be regarded as simply recasting the externalist-internalist 
debate over the problems of teleology, intentionality, motivation and carrying 
out an action supposed to be moral. Once again, Damásio’s integrated views of 
emotions and feelings not as “intruders in the bastion of reason” but enmeshed 
in its networks, for worse and for better, are revealing: “The strategies of human 
reason probably did not develop, in either evolution or any single individual, 
without the guiding force of the mechanisms of biological regulation, of which 
emotion and feeling are notable expressions.” Accordingly, empathy is a highly 
flexible, context-dependent response to these networks, ultimately leading to 
cooperation and the evolution of social norms, especially fairness norms. 
Damásio evokes thus the process of a sociocultural homeostasis so as to refer to 
the social and cultural imbalances allowing for the detection of an imbalance at a 
high level of a conscious brain-mind in the stratosphere and not in subcortical 
level. Damásio’s takes on emotions and feelings within an integrated 4EA-view 
of cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, and affective), very 
much like Prinz’s, allow for a homeostatic understanding of the development of 
moral rules, laws, and justice systems (very much like an effect of a wide 
reflective equilibrium), as a response to the detection of imbalances caused by 
social behaviors that make endanger individuals and the group. The cultural 
devices created in response to the imbalance aim to restore the equilibria of 
individuals and the group. So people are capable of social cooperation and 
empathy, but they can be also callous, indifferent and socialized into 
schadenfreude (finding pleasure in others’ pain) –the social, cognitive, and 
neural mechanisms underlying empathy and that may help to alleviate 
humanity’s deepest tragedies and facilitate its greatest triumphs. So this intricate 
connection of the body to emotions is related to homeostasis, which can be 
rethought of as the machinery regulating life that also has to do with the 
development of culture. This development manifests the same goal as the form 
of homeostasis. It reacts to the detection of an imbalance in the process of life 
and seeks to correct it within the limits of human biology and the physical and 
social environment. The contribution of economic and political systems, as well 
as, for example, the development of medicine, are a response to functional 
problems that occur in the social space and require a correction in this space, so 
that will not undermine the regulation of vital individuals that constitute the 
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group. We come thus full circle within a broad understanding of wide reflective 
equilibrium, in sociocultural homeostatic and social-ontological terms, allowing 
for intersubjective and linguistic interactions and co-constitution of meanings. 
 
6. Last but not least, since Professor Swinburne also pursued theology (1959-
60), besides his undergraduate (1954-57) and graduate (1957-59) studies in 
philosophy at the University of Oxford, one wonders what he makes of the 
ongoing science wars and evolution wars in the US, especially those opposing 
the scientific community and fundamentalist and conservative Christian 
theologians and believers. As we all know, this creationism-evolution debate is 
not a real problem in Catholic and moderate, liberal protestant theology (or 
progressive, reform Judaism for that matter). Now, how, within Professor 
Swinburne’s standpoint, the principles of credulity and testimony could be 
evoked to assess the belief, say, in the inerrancy of the Bible when dealing with 
creationism and miracles? Would they go so far as to follow Alvin Plantinga in 
holding that since belief in the theist, personal God is properly basic, then it 
would seem that belief in inerrancy would be, within the circumstances of 
Christian faith, a properly basic belief as well? I am raising these questions, out 
of curiosity but also with a view to testing the coherence of Professor 
Swinburne’s dualism, as many issues relating to the composition of the Hebrew 
Bible and of the New Testament have led to conjectures and documentary 
hypotheses that rely on probability, for instance, that there is new evidence to 
assert, nowadays, that it is more likely (probable) that the Torah was composed 
much later than sooner (conservative traditional chronologies dated back to 
1,200 BCE) and that much of the whole Hebrew Bible was written from the 
seventh through the 5th century BCE (according to many researchers, such as 
Israeli leading archaeologist Israel Finkelstein). So just like creationists who 
stick to a Young Earth hypothesis (between 6,000 and 10,000 years) to oppose 
the Big Bang (over 13.7 billions, with the Earth’s age estimated in about 4.5 
billion years), conservatives and fundamentalists still refuse to accept scientific 
contributions (e.g., archaelogy and innovative methods for dating) in their own 
handling of Scriptures. Couldn’t the principles of credulity and testimony, in this 
case, turn out to be quite misleading? After all, substance dualism could easily 
fall back into some subtle Manicheist doctrine of supernatural powers 
intervening in the natural cosmos, just like property dualists could still hold that 
some of our mental states have immaterial properties, even though we ourselves 
cannot be solely identified with immaterial souls wholly distinct from our bodies 
and natural properties. 
In my own ongoing interdisciplinary research program in normativity and 
naturalism, I have been arguing for a mitigated conception of social 
constructionism that avoids both versions of dualism and still allows for a 
normative reconstruction of the so-called social brain hypothesis, so that 
phenomenal consciousness and first-personish accounts, including beliefs, 
desires, intentions, and propositional attitudes, cannot be ultimately eliminated 
by physicalism. By pursuing an interdisciplinary research in the philosophy of 
neuroscience, neuroethics, and social neurophilosophy, especially by focusing 
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on the relation between naturalism and normativity, one might avoid the 
reduction of either to the other, by stressing the inevitability of bringing in the 
two other poles of the semantic correlation whenever dealing with ontology, 
language, and intersubjectivity. As Jesse Prinz's takes on transformation 
naturalism and concept empiricism allow for an interesting rapprochement 
between social epistemology and critical theory, his critical view of both 
naturism (i.e., reducing the nature-nurture pickle to the former's standpoint) and 
nurturism (conversely reducing it to the latter) not only successfully avoids the 
extremes and reductionisms of (cognitivist) rationalism and (noncognitivist) 
culturalism –such as eliminative materialism and postmodernism—, but turns 
out to offer a better, more defensible account of social epistemic features and 
“social pathologies” than most analytical, social epistemologists (e.g. Goldman, 
Parfit) and critical theorists (Habermas, Honneth) have achieved thus far. I have 
argued that Damásio, Prinz, and Searle, among others, have succeeded in 
showing that the social brain rather than the solipsist mind is what must 
ultimately account for a scientifically informed theory of consciousness, as 
mental representations of a given stimulus located at an intermediate level of 
processing become conscious through attention. The semantic-ontological 
correlation comes thus full circle vis à vis its networking with language and 
subjectivity. As Prinz felicitously put it in his neoempiricist, reconstructive 
theory of emotions: “Moral psychology entails facts about moral ontology, and a 
sentimental psychology can entail a subjectivist ontology.” (Prinz, 2004b, p. 8) 
After all, the descriptive and experimental dimensions of most experiments fail 
to provide for such a moral justification, insofar as causality or causation cannot 
be taken for granted or satisfy ought-like normative claims –since not every 
correlation turns out to be causal.  
 
7. Neuroethics, as I have argued elsewhere, deals with bioethical, moral 
problems both in abstract, theoretical terms (such as in metaethics and normative 
ethics, for instance, to define what is good and what selfhood is all about) and in 
practical, concrete terms (applied and experimental ethics), especially related 
and informed by the empirical sciences and recent findings in neuroscience. (De 
Oliveira, 2013, p. 84) Neuroethics deals precisely with this intersection of 
possible, imaginable uses of neurotechnologies and their moral acceptability, 
desirability, and permissibility: when is it permissible to alter a person's 
psychological conditions, dispositions, memories, to the point of influencing her 
personality traits or “reading” her mind? What can neuroscience tell us about 
free will, self-control, self-deception, conditioning mechanisms and the very 
justification of moral paths to be adopted by one individual or social groups? 
What neuroenhancement and neurotechnological interventions are morally 
acceptable and appropriate to be adopted in public health policies and 
legislation? To be sure, what is properly fearful and innovative in brain design 
enhancement is the ability to change something inherent in “human nature,” 
especially its genetic configuration and the implications of such changes. One 
might think of good examples in the neuropharmacological research and drug 
industry –both for enhancement and therapeutic purposes— as neurotransmitters, 
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such as serotonin, and hormones, such as oxytocin, have been manipulated with the 
aim of reducing anxiety or stimulating empathy and social engagement. That 
would be quite different from using neurotechnologies and nanotechnology to 
change or manipulate the human genome itself, while seeking some cognitive 
and life-quality enhancement, in case it entailed some form of liberal eugenics or 
social Darwinism. Mutations and genetic manipulation itself would not per se be 
morally questionable, but the way they could be managed and implemented, in 
that they could compromise fundamental bioethical principles such as individual 
freedom, social justice, non-maleficence, and beneficence arising from particular 
cases. What one learns from neuroethical theories and conjectures, in the last 
analysis, is that moral dilemmas are not solved once and for all by simply 
resorting to neurotechnologies or to neural correlations supposedly establishing 
causal relationships, as if all desirable effects could be obtained by the 
appropriate changes in the causes without damage or risks –to the patients 
themselves or to third parties. Indeed, one of the first contributions of 
neuroscience to social cognition is how the decision to take action in relation to 
a moral dilemma (say, in the classic dilemma of the runaway railway trolley) is 
associated with additional recruitment, as cortical, neural networks are 
associated with the need to exert cognitive control at a given moment, making 
impossible to reduce a decision to an automatic or procedural process. As 
studies in humans and other primates have revealed, different neural structures 
play a decisive role in the construction of social behavior and the so-called 
social brain: the amygdala, the ventromedial frontal cortices, and the right 
somatosensory cortex, among other structures, which seem to mediate 
perceptual representations of socially relevant stimuli, being reflexively 
sedimented in social, cultural codifications. In effect, the restrictions on the size 
of the social group arise from the ability of information processing in the brain, 
especially among primates, so that the neocortex eventually plays an important 
role in social evolution that leads us to our present complex sociality. The 
“Event-Feature-Emotion” complex or EFEC developed by Jorge Moll et alii 
suggests that moral, cognitive phenomena emerge from the interplay between 
three main components associated with the recruitment of specific brain centers: 
knowledge of structured events (contextual representations in prefrontal 
regions), social traits and functional features (stored in the temporal cortex, such 
as perceptual memories), and central, basic emotional states, such as 
aggressiveness, sexual arousal, attachment, and sadness (represented in limbic 
and paralimbic structures). Models such as EFEC can generate hypotheses about 
the neural bases associated with different moral dilemmas from what might be 
the motivation and cognitive processes that underlie the decisions made. These 
hypotheses can be tested from the association of specific situations and 
dilemmas with specific networks whose functions (say, providing the basis for 
central emotional states) are well established. The social implications of this 
neuropsychological complex have been explored in neuroethics, neurolaw, 
bioethics, and applied ethics overall: “Moral cognitive neuroscience researchers 
have developed innovative paradigms for the scientific exploration of unique 
forms of human social behaviour.”(Moll, 2005, p. 801f) Thus an 
NYTHAMAR DE OLIVEIRA 
 208
interdisciplinary research project on “Social Media and Decision Making: 
Reason and Emotion in Social Relations” has been implemented at the Brain 
Institute in Porto Alegre, Brazil, revisiting the so-called problem of the social 
brain from an intercultural, multidisciplinary perspective, including experiments 
in partnership with counterparts in Norway (University of Bergen) and the U.S. 
(University of Miami).2 According to social epistemology, the emphasis on the 
primacy of emotions and the importance of common notions are not always 
equally crucial to characterize the formation of knowledge, agreement and 
disagreement between epistemic peers, and decision-making in social groups. In 
effect, the social dimension that is often emphasized in discussions about the 
social intellect, culminating with the notion of a Machiavellian intelligence and 
its presence in the world of primates, is the individual’s ability to interact 
successfully with social groups in order to predict and manipulate the behavior, 
the making and breaking of promises, and so on. The energy requirements of 
such a complex situation are deemed responsible for the large size of the primate 
brain, so that some evolutionary anthropologists, biologists, and colleagues in 
related fields postulated the hypothesis of a Machiavellian intelligence and the 
social brain hypothesis. And yet, the concept of social brain is not reducible to 
the individual manifestations of a social world around someone simply because 
the brain’s architecture rather reflects forms of social organization, language, 
and culture. On the other hand, one must actually avoid speaking of “social 
brain” to evoke the positivist idea that social behavior can be solely explained by 
brain functioning, as if the brain were the biological substrate that determines 
sociability and human psychology, without taking into account reflexivity and 
social, cultural conditionings. The neurobiological and sociocultural 
evolutionary variables do seem to interact both ways, rendering the task of 
reconstructing the social brain even more complex and challenging. It is against 
such a complex semantic context that processes of moral decision-making that 
materialize in everyday life (instantiated in day-to-day, off-line activities and 
social interactions) and social media (which instantiate online, particularly in 
Facebook users and social behavioral games, such as Ultimatum and Dictator) 
can be measured in neuroimaging experiments. These processes are thus 
investigated from the standpoint of the neural basis of decision-making, 
combining both empirical findings and theoretical assumptions, as one of the 
most intriguing tasks of neuroethics lies on the very level of its normative 
grounds, namely, whatever accounts for the moral justification of doing the right 
thing in given circumstances that can be described with the aid of 
neurotechnologies. The descriptive and experimental dimensions of most 
experiments fail to provide for such a moral justification, insofar as causality or 
causation cannot be taken for granted or satisfy ought-like normative claims – 
after all, not every correlation turns out to be causal.  
                                                 
2  MCTI/CNPq N º 405998/2012-0, MEC/CAPES N º 18/2012, Researchers: C. Borges, A. 
Buchweitz, J. da Costa, N. de Oliveira, A. Franco, F. Karasek, N. Madarasz, C. Nahra, F. 
Pontin, M. Portuguez. 
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Let me offer in closing a few remarks on the fate of neuroethics in Brazil and 
elsewhere in Latin America. Just as it happens in other areas of cutting-edge, 
interdisciplinary research in Latin America, most research in bioethics and 
neuroethics in this part of the world has been conducted in cooperation with U.S. 
and European institutions through joint research programs, exchange initiatives, 
and international events that receive support or intellectual inspiration from 
major universities and programs in the Northern Hemisphere. With the evolution 
of neuroscience and neuroethics, models of human social cognition that are 
grounded in a new range of neuroimaging data also emerged. Given the fast-
growing interest in neurotechnologies and neuroscientific research in Latin 
America, especially in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, neuroethics will certainly 
become one of the most important areas of interdisciplinary, cutting-edge 
research in the next decades. The tremendous potential for human empowerment 
and social impact brought about by neuroethics attests such an optimistic 
prognosis, without invoking any utopian ideal of trans-human or post-human 
scenarios. In effect, the conjugation of the “social brain” with neuro-
enhancement tends to be rather regarded as part of strategic investments and 
improvements in public health, so as to make biotechnologies more accessible to 
larger segments of society. Most brain research centers are thus somewhat 
committed to this social dimension of public health, as life expectancy and the 
population of aged people continue to grow in most South American countries 
and the neuroscientific study of the aging brain, especially the development of 
Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s diseases and aging-related dementias, seek to 
investigate how sensory, motor, sleep, cognitive, and emotional functioning 
ultimately influence the quality of life of older individuals. Neuroenhancement –
even when primarily conceived in terms of cognitive and social-behavioral 
enhancement for healthy individuals without mental illness—tends to be more 
and more broadly conceived with a view to improving the processes of aging 
and minimizing age-related cognitive decline. It is indeed a salient feature of 
ongoing research in cognitive neuroscience and neuroethics to stress the “social 
brain” intertwining of emotion, memory, consciousness, and rational decision-
making processes in both individual and collective existence. Another feature 
that remains salient in ongoing research in neuroethics – in Latin American and 
elsewhere— is that many active groups, centers and researchers are linked to 
confessional institutions, notably Catholic universities, and this is very important 
as we consider the impact of neuroscience on worldwide reception of new 
technologies, particularly those that seem to defy traditional conceptions of 
human nature. It is thus very interesting to take into account the conjugated 
processes of democratization and secularization which shaped most Latin 
American societies, constitutions, and legislations after the several decades of 
military dictatorship that haunted almost all parts of the subcontinent, following 
the Cuban Revolution of 1959. Although most Latin American societies can be 
regarded as postsecular, constitutional democracies, one can observe varying 
degrees of liberal pluralism and remarkable contrasts between religious 
institutions that are clearly more secularized and those which remain more 
conservative and resistant to biotechnological and neurotechnological 
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innovations, including the spousal of neuroethics. Thus, in order to fare well 
between Scylla and Charybdis, long-term perspectives for the ongoing, 
promising research in neuroethics in Brazil and Latin America must 
systematically avoid these two major extremes: necessitarian thought control 
and lack of scientific rigor in their research programs. 
 
 16 
NATURALIZING INTENTIONALITY1 
RUTH GARRETT MILLIKAN 
Brentano introduced the term "intentionality" into our modern philosophical 
vocabulary to denote the property which, as he thought, distinguished the mental 
from all other things. This property is sometimes informally called the "ofness" 
or "aboutness" of perceptions, thoughts, sentences and so forth. Brentano 
equated intentionality with the capacity to bear a real relation to something 
nonexistent, for example, the capacity of a belief to bear a correspondence 
relation to a nonexistent fact, hence to be false. Similarly, when our intentions 
are not fulfilled, they seem to bear relations to nonexistent facts. Call this 
problematic relation "Brentano's relation." 
Brentano was surely mistaken, however, in thinking that bearing a relation to 
something nonexistent marks only the mental. Given any sort of purpose, it 
might not get fulfilled, hence might exhibit Brentano's relation, and there are 
many natural purposes, such as the purpose of one's stomach to digest food or 
the purpose of one's protective eye blink reflex to keep out the sand, that are not 
mental, nor derived from anything mental. Nor are stomachs and reflexes "of" 
or"about" anything. A reply might be, I suppose, that natural purposes are 
"purposes" only in an analogical sense hence "fail to be fulfilled" only in an 
analogical way. They bear an analogy to things that have been intentionally 
designed by purposive minds, hence can fail to accomplish the purposes they 
analogically have. As such they also have only analogical "intentionality". Such 
a response begs the question, however, for it assumes that natural purposes are 
not purposes in the full sense exactly because they are not mental. It also fails to 
explain why this supposedly merely analogical intentionality should be 
unaccompanied by any analogical "aboutness." Surely one's stomach and one's 
reflexes are not "about" anything, even analogically. Brentano's relation seems, 
in these cases, to have come apart from aboutness, another mark usually taken to 
characterize the mental. 
There is another, more positive, way of thinking of natural purposes--one on 
which a naturalistic theory of intentionality can be built. I will talk about a few 
of the more interesting features of this response as I have come to understand it. 
One thing that the example of natural purposes shows is that although being 
subject to Brentano's relation may be necessary to intentionality, if we take 
                                                 
1   Originally published in Philosophy of Mind, Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress 
of Philosophy Volume 9, Bernard Elevitch, Editor, Philosophy Documentation Center, 
2000, pp.83-90 (kindly provided by author). 
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intentionality to imply aboutness it is not sufficient. Aboutness is associated with 
a purpose only when the purpose is explicitly represented. On the other hand, for 
there to be an explicit representation of a purpose, there must first be a purpose 
to represent. The naturalist challenge here is to show, first, that the phenomenon 
of natural purposiveness can fulfill this second requirement, that a natural 
purpose may, equally naturally, be a represented purpose. Second, it needs to 
show how the same kind of analysis can be used also to naturalize intentionality 
in cases where facts are represented rather than purposes or ends. It must be 
shown, for example, how this way of naturalizing Brentano's relation can apply 
to the intentionality of beliefs, and of sentences that state facts. It needs to be 
shown in every case that what creates the appearance of Brentano's relation is 
merely an underlying natural purpose. 
The job of articulating the notion of a natural purpose so that it will do what 
is required of it here, it must be emphasized, is NOT that of analyzing anyone's 
conception of natural purpose, but rather of producing a notion that will organize 
certain natural phenomena for us in a way that casts light on the apparently 
paradoxical nature of intentionality. A definition designed to capture such a 
sense of natural purpose was proposed in (Millikan 1984). I called natural 
purposes of this sort "proper functions," meaning by "proper" a thing's "own" 
functions (Latin proprius, as in "property"). A thing's proper functions are effects 
which, in the past, have accounted for selection of its ancestors for reproduction, 
or accounted for selection of things from which it has been copied, or for 
selection of ancestors of the mechanisms that produced it according to their own 
relational proper functions, it being their function to be guided by certain 
variable aspects of the environment in this production. Whatever has proper 
functions must have had predecessors that historically effected such functions, 
thus helping to account for its existence or presence.2 Because a thing's proper 
functions are such relative to its history and do not arise from its current 
dispositions, it is possible that it may not currently serve, indeed, may not even 
be capable of serving, all or any of its proper functions.3 This possible gap 
between a thing's proper functions and what it actually effects or can effect is a 
naturalized version of Brentano's relation. A thing's proper functions may 
correspond to states of affairs that never become existent. (There may also be 
other ways of characterizing natural purposes that will do the same job, but I 
know of none that has been successful so far.) A great many different kinds of 
things get reproduced or copied because of the effects that they have. For this 
reason there are many different kinds of things with proper functions. Genes can 
have proper functions. Any of the various things that genes have as their 
functions to produce, either absolutely or relationally (that is, as a function of 
variable environmental input) also can have proper functions. For example, body 
organs and any other inherited traits can have proper functions. Inner states, such 
as the perceptual and cognitive states of organisms, can have proper functions 
                                                 
2 This very rough characterization of the notion "proper function" is filled out in 
detail in the first two chapters of (Millikan 1984). 
3 More exactly how this can happen is explained in (Millikan 1984) Chapter 1. 
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that vary as a function of environmental input to the genetically programed 
systems responsible for producing them. Unlearned behaviors can have proper 
functions that are either variant or invariant with respect to environmental input. 
There are also very many kinds of proper functions that are not determined 
through genetic reproduction. Artifacts that are copied from earlier exemplars 
because these exemplars had certain effects can have proper functions. Behaviors 
learned by trial and error, hence copied from earlier behaviors, can have proper 
functions. Behaviors learned by copying others' behaviors can have proper 
functions. Especially important, conventional behaviors, including production of 
specific language forms, as well as other kinds of customs, fads, and so forth, 
can all have proper functions. What these latter functions are may or may not be 
understood by those who reproduce the relevant behaviors, for unconscious 
reproduction or reproduction for unconscious reasons is common. 
But a proper function, a natural purpose, I have said, only becomes associated 
with intentionality when the purpose is explicitly represented. The notion of 
representation that we need here is, I believe, kin to the mathematical notion of 
representation. According to the mathematical notion, a structure consisting of a 
set of abstract entities along with certain designated relations among them is said 
to represent another such structure if it can be mapped onto it one-one. Similarly, 
an intentional representation corresponds to the affair it represents as one 
member of a whole set of possible representations. These bear certain relations 
to one another such that, ideally, the whole structure maps one-one onto a 
corresponding structure of possible representeds. When it is a natural purpose 
that is represented, this correspondence relation correlates the representation 
with a state of affairs that it is its proper function to guide a cooperating 
mechanism to bring about. "Cooperating mechanisms" are ones that have been 
selected or tuned to cooperate with one another to perform a certain function or 
functions. The forms of the representations in the system vary systematically 
according to the forms of the affairs it is their proper function to bring about, 
more exactly, to guide cooperating interpreting mechanisms to bring about. The 
explicitness of these representations of natural purposes results from contrast 
contrast with alternative purposes that could have been represented instead by 
contrasting representations in the same representational system. 
This explains the intentionality of explicitly represented purposes or goals. 
Discussing this kind of intentionality before that of representations of facts 
departs widely from the contemporary tendency which is, often, to ignore the 
intentionality of explicit purposes and goals completely. Indeed, a common 
assumption seems to be that the intentionality of single words or concepts can be 
explained first, next the ways these are combined to express full propositions, 
and only then an analysis of the how the various sentential moods and 
propositional attitudes function can be given. On the present analysis there are 
two fundamental varieties of intentionality, two basic "directions of fit"4 for 
intentional entities, the goal- representing direction and fact-representing 
direction, and there is no intentionality at all without direction of fit. There is no 
                                                 
4 Compare Anscomb (1957). 
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intentionality without reference to full truth-conditional or satisfaction-
conditional content. The intentionality of words and concepts is abstracted from 
their appearance in more complete functional representations. 
The intentionality of representations of fact is not determined by their proper 
functions. That it represent a fact is a matter of HOW the fact-representation 
performs whatever functions it happens to have. Every device that has a proper 
function is backed by a history of devices like it that have actually performed 
that function, or is produced by a device (concept forming mechanism, belief 
forming mechanism) with a relational proper function backed by such a history, 
and so forth. Typically there will be a univocal general causal explanation of 
how performance of the relevant function was effected in these historical cases, 
the same explanation for each instance, or close enough. In the case of a fact 
representation, this explanation makes reference to a certain kind of initial 
condition. Namely, an aspect of the representation bears a specified mapping 
relation to a certain condition, typically, a condition in the environment, which 
relation helps account for the fact that cooperating mechanisms guided by the 
representation are enabled to perform their proper function or functions under 
that condition. The mapping is of the sort referred to earlier, correlating a set of 
possible representations with a set of possible represented conditions, where any 
such correlated pair would have caused performance of the same proper 
function(s) in accordance with the same general causal explanation. 
This way of naturalizing intentionality has several effects on the analysis of 
language that are of interest. 
Notice first that the analysis applies not merely to the intentionality of 
perception, thought and conventional language forms, but also to that of other 
reproduced artifacts such as conventionalized pictures, diagrams, charts, and 
other notational systems. It also applies to animal signals, such as the dance of 
the honey bee and the danger thump of the rabbit. Clearly the analysis does not 
derive the intentionality of thought from that of language. Just as clearly, it does 
not derive the intentionality of language and other conventional representational 
forms from that of thought. As the proper function of the nectar-locating dance 
of a honey bee is not to transmit an intentional attitude from bee to bee,4 the 
proper function of a conventional representation need not be transmission of an 
intentional attitude either. I have argued, for example, that it is not a proper 
function of sentences asserting identity, asserting existence, or sentences of the 
form "x means y" to impart intentional attitudes. Their functions are, rather, to 
alter the inner representational systems of hearers. These sentences do have truth 
conditions, however. Their truth conditions concern words. But it is not their 
function to produce thoughts about words, but rather, to alter the ways in which 
these words are handled or reacted to by hearers Can entirely different matter. 
This analysis of language agrees with Wittgenstein's insight that language 
forms, like tools, have jobs to do and that these jobs don't always require them to 
contribute to truth conditions. On the other hand, it denies that there are any such 
things as rules of language. Thus it avoids the need to explain the status of 
language rules, so puzzled over in the post-Wittgensteinian literature. Language 
forms have only proper functions. They have effects that have helped account for 
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their continued reproduction, for their repeated use, in a given language 
community, and they have, of course, typical ways of producing those effects. 
The forces of selection that proliferate a specific language device, such as the 
English imperative mood form, along with a symbiotic hearer response to it, are 
comparable to the forces that proliferate mating displays, territory-marking 
behaviors, danger signals, and so forth, behaviors specific to the various non-
human animal species. Of course the underlying mechanisms of reproduction 
and selection are quite different. But in both cases, the reproduction of a pairing 
between stereotyped advances by one partner and stereotyped responses by the 
other depends on the fact that benefits sometimes accrue to both partners. 
Consider the imperative mood as an example. There must be a high enough 
proportion of cases in which hearers gain from complying with imperatives, 
along with enough cases in which speakers also gain by hearer compliance, to 
keep the form from dieing out of the language. Similarly, producing true beliefs 
in hearers is a proper function of standard indicatives. It is because they have 
often acquired true beliefs this way that hearers continue to decode the language 
as they do and, often enough, to believe what they hear. And it is only when 
hearers believe what they hear that speakers are encouraged to continue to use 
indicative forms. It does not follow that there is a rule somewhere, or a 
sanctioned prescription, to the effect that hearers must comply with imperatives. 
Nor is there a rule that speakers must intend them to comply, or a rule that 
speakers must speak the truth, and so forth--any more than there are rules or 
prescriptions for peacock mating displays. Of course, if one is trying to display 
like a peacock, then one succeed or fail, and if one is trying to speak like an 
English speaker, one can also succeed or fail. 
Proper functions do not concern norms in any evaluative or prescriptive 
sense. They do not concern norms in a statistical sense either. On the contrary, 
there are many items that usually fail to perform their proper functions. Although 
the function of the protective coloring on small animals of many species is to 
prevent them from being seen by predators hence from being eaten, most 
members of most small species are eaten anyway. Similarly, consider how few 
times one has to give in to a child who teases for things to keep the teasing from 
dieing out. It is not because imperatives are usually complied with that causing 
compliance is one of their proper functions. There are, of course, such things as 
linguistic norms or standards, but they are such only in the non-evaluative, non-
prescriptive and also non-statistical sense in which preventing it from being 
eaten is a standard or norm for the mouse's protective coloring. 
I'll mention one last result of this naturalist analysis of intentionality. When 
fully spelled out, the description of proper functions implies that every artifact 
produced for a purpose has that purpose as one of its proper functions.5 An 
utterance produced with a purpose is such an artifact. The purpose or intention 
with which a speaker utters her words endows these words with a proper 
function. But if the speaker speaks a public language, then the history of the 
language forms she uses also endows her words with a proper function. These 
                                                 
5 Millikan 1984. 
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two sources of functions may be consonant, or they may conflict, as in cases of 
insincerity. When the speaker purpose and the public function of the words fail 
to coincide, the speaker may or may not intend that the hearer fulfil the speaker's 
purpose knowingly. In lying, for example, the speaker does not intend this, but in 
the case of Gricean implicature, the speaker does. One reasonable conception of 
pragmatics places it where these two sources of function intersect, contrasting it 
with semantics, which studies the conventional, and studies what I have called 
the "proper" functions of language forms.6 
 
 
                                                 
6 For a parallel description of language conventions see (Millikan 1998). 
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MENTAL ELEMENTS AS PART OF A SCIENTIFIC 
ARCHITECTURE 
SOFIA INÊS ALBORNOZ STEIN 
1. THE ISSUE 
In this article, I want to explore the possibility of seeing private phenomenal 
experiences along the line with Russell’s thought: as having objectivity, which 
would allow seeing them as objects of scientific research. Or, in other words, to 
ask if it would be possible to speak scientifically about mental events usually 
called impressions. Although some philosophers still consider this problem to be 
inscrutable —the so-called explanatory gap that leads to all the complex and 
extense debate about qualia, my hypothesis is, as Sellars indicated, that it is 
highly probable that only errors or limitations in our use of vocabulary impede 
us in finding a solution according to Russell’s intention. 
According to McDowell (1996 [1994], 1998, 2009, 2011), sensory impressions 
are impingements of the world on a possessor of rational capacities. But for him, 
following the footsteps of Sellars, the empirical content should not be seen only as 
a kind of "responsiveness to impressions." He maintains, beyond that, that in order 
to explain the differences between our empirical knowledge and "primitive" 
imprints, it is not necessary to create a dichotomy between the normative of our 
rational capacities, which organize empirical material, and the natural. The natural, 
in turn, should not be viewed as being equivalent to the material, external or 
corporeal causes, resulting in imprints [or impressions]. 
How can we maintain empiricism, McDowell questions, given the fact of the 
different natures of our rational capacities and of our perceptual abilities? The 
latter seem inseparable from a context governed by physical laws explaining 
causal networks in a world we call material. And we have no evidence for a 
specific causal chain between sensory impressions and some of our rational 
operations. We do have, obviously, and this agrees with Davidson (2001), 
scientific knowledge about the simultaneity of rational operations and 
physicochemical events, but this does not suffice as evidence of causal links 
between them. 
A further crucial point of McDowell's argument is his attempt to preserve the 
empiricist belief in a court of experience, but in its kind not contradictory to the 
conceptual way of human knowledge, already naturally prone to "be 
conceptual". In human experience, we would not find anything contradictory to 
the conceptual and propositional mode of expression of human knowledge; on 
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the contrary, experience, from its origin, would already be, in the impressions, 
harmonized with the propositional form of expression of experienced contents. 
Thus, McDowell's claim that there is no real dichotomy between the normative 
and the natural seems sound; expressed only in this very simple way, it is also 
“ecumenical” in the sense that it can be accepted by naturalists from very 
diverse strains. 
Contemporary naturalism – as can be also seen in McDowell's neo-Hegelian 
lines of thoughts – carries with it the virtue of seeking to pacify the relationship of 
human sciences with those of natural sciences. However, the dichotomous 
discourse with which we express the path from impressions to propositions does 
not favor the explanation of the natural process developing from one to the other. 
Moreover, seen in its rationalist bias, modern philosophy is a force initially 
antagonistic to contemporary naturalism. For in most naturalist tradition, one 
presumes human beings and all their capacities as part of the natural world; and 
a transcendental proof is no longer required. So McDowell’s question on how 
we respond to the empirical world shown us by means of the imprint is not, 
strictly speaking, the same question as Kant’s, because it presumes our insertion 
in the natural world; it does not try to prove it. Of course, McDowell appeals to 
Hegel in his rejection of the dichotomy of phenomena versus things in 
themselves; but that is a polite way of saying that our empirical nature is 
presupposed. 
Minimal empiricism proposed by McDowell, which he presents in Mind and 
World (1996 [1994]), follows, as I mentioned, the steps of Sellars, who in 
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (1956) had sought to disprove one of 
the main theses of classical empiricism, the Myth of the Given; there he showed, 
however, how to continue admitting the truth of ordinary discourse on 
impressions and thoughts. 
From this theoretical landscape, I want to show why Bertrand Russell’s 
neutral monism already presents naturalistic arguments conciliating third-person 
causal, scientific and physicalist explanation [on the one hand] with 
phenomenalistic first-person perspective [on the other]. So my argumentative 
trajectory will not focus exclusively on Sellarsian criticism of the Myth of the 
Given of empiricist tradition, but will seek to show that there is, in this tradition, 
a sign of reconciliation between naturalism and phenomenalistic first-person 
perspective. This, perhaps complemented by Sellars’ criticism against first 
person discourse about sensory data, of Wittgensteinian inspiration, and against 
ontological dogmatic claims, may help investigating human mind, as several 
philosophers have tried to do. 
Keeping the philosophical and scientific discourse about sensations or 
sensory data by means of its naturalization, of course, as we shall see, does not 
respond completely to Sellars’ criticism, because the emphasis on naturalization 
does not dissolve the critique of the semantic problem involved in empiricist 
descriptions of first and third person, Sellars’ critical focus on the Myth of the 
Given. But here we try to safeguard the importance of Russell’s neutral monism 
for the contemporary philosophy of mind reinterpreted by Sellars within a bias 
of philosophy of language. My analysis aims then to agree with McDowell in his 
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claim to defend the empiricist tradition, from an epistemological point of view, 
without, however, and now no longer in line with McDowell, to give up showing 
the possibility of using this same tradition to support a kind of metaphysics of 
first person experiences, which, in the philosophies of Sellars and McDowell, 
are circumscribed by transcendental and semantic frames.1  
The rescue of empiricist metaphysics in philosophy of mind has the potential to 
bring the latter to the current disciplinary scenario of neuroscience, which is of 
scientistic nature. Limiting the knowledge of the mind to our semantic ability to 
describe it (cf. Sellars) or to think it (cf. McDowell) is undoubtedly part of the 
truth about our cognition, because it points to an essential feature of any language, 
natural or scientific, namely, that any ontology depends on the way we 
conceptualize. Nevertheless, the realism we presume in the philosophy of mind 
must not, as I understand it, be a Hegelian rationalistic realism, which establishes a 
link between objects and concepts, or between facts and thoughts (as in Frege 
[1986] and McDowell). Realism must be, in a sense, weaker than this: it should 
assume rational and conceptual limitations of empirical knowledge. 
Simultaneously, however, it must assume that it is possible, by scientific advances, 
to achieve greater insight into the human mind, and that is not only an 
ontologically relative attempt to describe mental phenomena, but envisages 
advances toward more reliable descriptions of human mental processes. 
2. RUSSELLIAN NEUTRAL MONISM: ITS GOALS AND CONCEPTUAL 
TRANSFORMATIONS 
We have already a huge amount of literature about the gap between the ordinary 
point of view on perceptual experience and the scientific point of view on how 
the perceptual system operates. No discussion to date has resulted in the 
unification of these perspectives, neither through complete reduction, nor by 
means of a comprehensive theory that could show the interactions between 
objects established by both points of view. On the one hand, [we have] the 
objects of subjective experience mediated by inter-subjective language learning: 
impressions, sensations, perceptions, etc. And on the other hand, the objects of 
anatomical and physiological theories: tissues, nerves, electrical impulses etc. 
Today, the neurosciences seem to be showing that "subjective" impressions 
are generated from a causal network that can be traced scientifically. This does 
not prove that there are sensory data, similar to those described by Russell, but it 
corroborates the kind of causal theory of perception that Russell was working on 
between 1910 and 1930. 
Scientism as drawn up by Russell in the 1920s leads him, for example, to 
deny the existence of nominal entities such as the "subject": 
The subject, however, appears to be a logical fiction, like mathematical points 
and instants. It is introduced, not because observation reveals it, but because it is 
linguistically convenient and apparently demanded by grammar. Nominal entities 
                                                 
1   I presuppose here, in my use of the expression ‘metaphysics’, that I will be speaking about 
a phenomenon that is real, but not immediately know by scientific and empirical methods. 
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of this sort may or may not exist, but there is no good ground for assuming that 
they do. The functions that they appear to perform can always be performed by 
classes or series or other logical constructions, consisting of less dubious entities. 
If we are to avoid a perfectly gratuitous assumption, we must dispense with the 
subject as one of the actual ingredients of the world. But when we do this, the 
possibility of distinguishing the sensation from the sense-datum vanishes; at least 
I see no way of preserving the distinction. Accordingly the sensation that we 
have when we see a patch of colour simply is that patch of colour, an actual 
constituent of the physical world, and part of what physics is concerned with. 
(Russell, 1921, p. 142) 
For our inquiry it is important to ask why Russell eliminates the subject, when 
he assumes the perspective of neutral monism, in 1921, while maintaining the 
sense-data, now equivalent to sensations, neither purely mental nor purely 
physical? We can venture an answer: because to him it seems right and 
necessary, based on the principle of epistemological atomism in which he 
operates, that sensations are something real and, in a sense, physical. Without 
this assumption, the causal link between objects and perception would be 
jeopardized. But to do so, he does not think it necessary to state that sensations 
are determined, in their content and nature, by a relationship with an intentional 
and conscious subject.2 As Hatfield explains: 
As developed by James and Russell, neutral monism avoided the mind-body 
problem by positing only one “stuff”, the allegedly neutral “stuff” of momentary 
particulars, or pure experiences, or Machian elements. Mach, James, and Russell 
could then point to two sets of laws to be found empirically in the successive 
states of this stuff: psychological laws governing successions of perceptions and 
other mental states considered as mental, and physical laws governing 
successions of perceptions and posited sensibilia, or unexperienced pure 
experiences, considered as physical. The mind-body relation then became a 
matter of tracing connections between physical sequences and intersecting 
psychological sequences of momentary particulars (as in Russell, 1921, ch. 15). 
(Hatfield, 2002, p.222) 
Thus, despite the differences in the explanatory laws of the exclusively physical 
and the so called psychological, the momentary individuals, or elements, in 
Mach vocabulary, need not be called strictly physical or psychological. They 
would be "neutral" and could be explained by laws both physicalist and 
psychological.3 
                                                 
2  I will not deal here with the many questions that this statement raises, for example, if there 
is a unity of mental representations, if there is a point of convergence of representations, 
which would be a consciousness without a subject or an "I", as the mind could be 
intentional without the assumption of an "I", who would be the agent of intent, etc. 
3  Hatfield, in his analysis, maintains an ontological dualism when he says that the discourse 
about the neutral stuff (neutral elements) could be both a discourse about psychological or 
physical states.  
MENTAL ELEMENTS AS PART OF A SCIENTIFIC ARCHITECTURE 
 221
Today, the neurosciences do not prove the existence of sense data, nor of 
sensations that would be both the sense experience and the sensory data 
themselves –depending on the perspective from which these were explained; yet 
[neurosciences] preserve Russell's aim of finding the causal net ranging from 
physical objects to their "mental" perception. And that network must include 
various forms of "representations" of object properties. The observation of 
neuronal activation in the process of perceiving physical objects led to the 
conclusion that perception goes through several stages and that, in a broad sense, 
the objects really are gradually built up in our brain, through the inter-
relationships being established between different parts of it, each performing a 
different function. 
Obviously the access to one's own perceptions and sensations is still of first-
person only, which shows that Russell's statement (1921) is still quite present 
[which says] that sensations are the intersection between mental (first person) 
and physical (third-person). It is also obvious that the search for the causal 
network bringing objects to their perception does not exempt from inquiring 
about what we call "representation", a concept still extremely controversial both 
in philosophy and neuroscience. And once this is the case, methods and testing 
must take into account the first person report on representational "subjective" 
experiences. 
We are now facing a widespread dilemma in the scientific community: we 
either accept the common descriptions made by humans about their own 
subjective experiences (their "talk about impressions") and correlate them to 
physical changes we can scientifically observe, like parallel events, or we try to 
investigate, in a behaviorist approach, what is happening physically and in terms 
of their behavior when they are in a given position of perception, and discard the 
first-person mental description, linking initial physical behavior to resulting 
physical behavior. In any case, the link between mental or psychological 
experiences and starting or ending physical behavior is yet to be discovered. 
This link Russell thought he had found in the "sense data", redefined as 
"sensations" in 1921. 
According to Savage (1989), the terminological change wrought by Russell 
in 1921 could really be considered as redefining the concept of sense-data. What 
some considered to be an abandonment of the sense-data concept as such, is seen 
by Savage as abandoning the allocation of certain sense-data properties: 
…we may say that before abandonment sense data were held to be the absolutely 
certain (indubitable, infallible), immediate (uninferred, self-evident), precise 
(analyzed, simple) data of empirical knowledge; and after abandonment were 
held to be only relatively certain, immediate, and precise, i.e. certain, immediate, 
and precise to some degree. (Savage, 1989, pp. 138-139) 
Like Savage, Tully (1988) believes there is continuity from Russell's thought of 
2014 until the publication of "The Analysis of Matter" (1927), through "The 
Analysis of Mind" (1921). And that therefore terminological changes were not 
radical conceptual changes, but were redefinitions of concepts already used from 
the beginning. Initially, in 1914, Russell is still critical of the new realists, like 
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William James and Ernst Mach, considering their positions a throwback, a 
rapprochement to an idealism of sensations, according to which sensations were 
reduced to ideas, which thus would become the only element of reality, an 
idealism that he himself tried to overcome by the notion of familiarity 
("acquaintance") between the subject and the data coming from the senses. 
However, as Tully points out (1988), contrary to Russell's criticism, the New 
Realists did seem aware of the challenge to find exactly those entities that could be 
considered both mental (psychological) and physical (or, maybe, material) as well: 
Interestingly, the New Realists appear to have been aware of the problem and, 
officially at least, designated neutral items as “qualities”; but he paid no attention 
to this when he accused their theory of being tainted with idealism. Whether a 
word like “quality” would in fact achieve what is wanted may be questioned, just 
as it may be wondered whether Russell’s own use of the expression “sense-
datum” could ensure the degree of objectivity and independence he required for 
the construction of physical objects. The problem of basic descriptions is a 
common one for empiricists, not just for those who defend neutral monism. 
(Tully, 1988, p. 214) 
Thus it is not surprising to his interpreters that Russell, at the end of the 1910s, 
has begun to find attractive the notion of "neutral element", coined by Mach, an 
element neither merely psychological nor merely physical, strictly speaking. 4 
From 1921 Russell began to use the word "sensation" instead of "sense-
datum", but this terminological shift did not mean exactly a withdrawal from 
certain russellian empiricist philosophical trends, which had as one of its lines of 
thought the search for an empirical basis for explaining mental phenomena. This 
interpretation of Russell's philosophical development in the philosophy of mind 
is partly justified because he changed terminology on several occasions. It was 
not, according to Tully (1988), the neutral monism that led him to choose the 
expression "sensation" to replace "sense-datum", but apparently he was looking 
                                                 
4  According to Banks (2010), based on his analysis of the discussions of the first decades of 
the twentieth century, the three versions of neutral monism, William James’, Ernst Mach’s 
and Bertrand Russell’s, can be roughly summarized by four theses: “This historical climate 
of ideas … left its stamp on the following theses about the nature of elements. I do not say 
that these theses are articulated by every classic neutral monist, but they are implicit in all 
three of them: 
 1. Monism: the mental and physical domains are part of a greater natural domain of 
elements and their functional variations. 
 2. Neutralism: elements are neither mental nor physical; rather minds and physical bodies 
are functionally related complexes of elements. Certain functional variations of the 
elements are called ‘mental’ and others are called ‘physical’, but there is no underlying 
duality of variations. 
 3. Psychophysical Identity: every sensation, such as green, is also a physical element (s/e), a 
neural energy in the brain. Not every element is a sensation, or even a possible sensation. 
 4. Powers: elements are powers with causal force. They are concrete qualities and 
dispositional ways of affecting things in their various causal, or functional, roles. The 
concrete quality instantiates the dispositional, relational role. Every element is naturally 
embedded in its functional role.” (Banks, 2010, p.177) 
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for the most appropriate term to describe something not strictly speaking 
psychological, and which should be possible to describe from a science of the 
human mind. Soon after employing the word "sensation" replacing "sense-
datum", in 1921, Russell replaced it by the words "percept" ["percepto"] and 
"quality". The decreasing emphasis on the introspective method and on the 
concept of acquaintance in writings prior to "The Analysis of Mind" (1921), like 
in "The Relation of Sense-data to Physics" (1914b) and "On Propositions: What 
They Are and How They Mean" (1919), seems to have contributed to Russell's 
becoming closer to the understandings of the new realists of mind, such as James 
and Mach. Russell says in "On Propositions" that James' neutral monism was 
making more sense, as he was realizing the importance of linking the physical 
objects of scientific research, particularly the brain, to the investigation of 
mental activities. According to Tully: 
It is clear that Russell thought of neutral monism as a corrective to the other two 
varieties of monism which suffer from quite different but equally severe 
limitations, the one because it refuses to recognize the powerful role of 
inferential knowledge in science, the other because it fails to provide a 
systematic account of the ultimate dependency which such knowledge has on 
first-person experience. (Tully, 1988, p. 222) 
Tully (1993) tries to explain Russell's shift in 1914 towards neutral monism, 
after criticisms he made in the same year (1914a) to the new realists – which 
includes his criticism on belief as formulated by them, and on the absence of a 
satisfactory explanation of the first-person (subjective) experience; this shows 
the importance given by Russell to the unification of the discourses of physics 
and psychology, which until 1914 were considered irreconcilable: 
In treating sensory particulars as the common subject matter of both physics and 
psychology, Russell was adopting one of the tenets of the New Realism (or neutral 
monism, as the doctrine soon came to be called). In fact, the list of criticisms of 
neutral monism which he published in 1914 omitted this tenet; what he objected to 
rather was the neutral monists’ account of belief and their tendency to dismiss the 
importance of first-person experience. Unobjectionable on other grounds, the 
hypothesis must have satisfied his desire for logical economy, but if Russell wanted 
to classify sense-data (or sensibilia) as physical, whatever qualitative familiarity they 
were allowed to have, how did he think these particulars become part of first-person 
experience? What kind of relation occurs when a sense-datum is experienced? 
Evidently, it takes more than a sense-datum plus the presence of a human body with 
functioning sense organs and a brain, for such things are themselves physical 
constructs whose ultimate constituents (in the eyes of physics) would mostly be 
sensibilia (or “ideal” appearances). The existence of a brain might be necessary for 
the experience of sense-data but is hardly sufficient. To this question Russell offered 
a forthright answer: “If —per impossibile— there were a complete human body with 
no mind inside it, all those sensibilia would exist, in relation to that body, which 
would be sense-data if there were a mind in the body. What the mind adds to 
sensibilia, in fact, is merely awareness: everything else is physical or physiological” 
(“The Relation of Sense-data to Physics”, p. 8). (Tully, 1993, p. 12-13) 
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From 1914 to 1921, when he published "The Analysis of Mind", Russell 
reworks his ideas about the sense-data, adapting them to the positions of the new 
realists. But despite the conceptual and terminological changes, and the 
substitution of "sense-data" by "sensations" in 1921, as Tully says, this 
substitution is less substantial than it appears: "Sensations have now been 
installed in place of sense-data, as required by the new thinking, though 
ironically their status (as particulars) was virtually identical to what had been 
previously accorded to sense-data." (Tully, 1993, p. 34) 
Also Gary Hatfield (2002) warns against a hasty understanding of Russell's 
position in 1921, prompted by claims of Russell himself in "The Analysis of 
Mind", thus agreeing with Savage and Tully. To justify the terminology 
replacement operated by Russell, [Hatfield] links this with the aforementioned 
refusal of maintaining a subject to which the sense-data would be presented. The 
subject would be unnecessary in the case of "sensations", which would be 
sequences of momentary particulars, not needing to be particular "to a subject": 
When Russell became a neutral monist he also came to reject sense-data (1919/1956, 
p. 306; 1921, pp. 141-2; 1959, p. 135). Care must be taken in interpreting this change. 
In rejecting sense-data, he did not reject sequences of momentary particulars. Rather, 
he came to reject the distinction between such particulars and a subject who senses 
them. The particulars were no longer to be regarded as “data” for a subject, because 
the subject itself was denied. Or, to put it another way, the experience had by a 
certain subject is now regarded simply as a specific sequence from among the various 
sequences of momentary particulars that constitute everything, and which are the 
only particulars whose existence is explicitly allowed. (As we shall see, Russell did 
not flatly deny that the subject exists. but he took the theoretical attitude that its 
existence was not needed and should not be posited.) Russell’s immediate particulars 
are now to be equated with the “elements” of James and Mach (as noted in Russell, 
1919/1956, p. 305; 1914a/1956, p. 140). (Hatfield, 2002, p.208) 
Quine (1966) condemns Russell's (1921) maintaining of a speech on "neutral 
particulars" which, in his point of view, resembles the talk about sense-data from 
previous works, but praises the strengthening of naturalism in the fact that 
Russell assumes neutral monism: 
Russell meanwhile was warping his logical atomism over from its frankly 
phenomenalistic form to what, influenced by Perry and Holt, he called “neutral 
monism” (Cf. Analysis of Mind, p. 25; Analysis of Matter, ch. 37). Neutrality 
here has a bias, as it often has in politics; Russell’s neutral particulars are on the 
side of sense data. Still, a drift has begun, and it continues. It does not reach the 
physicalistic pole, even in Human Knowledge; but there is an increasing 
naturalism, an increasing readiness to see philosophy as natural science trained 
upon itself and permitted free use of scientific findings. Russell had stated the 
basis for such an attitude already in 1914: “There is not any superfine brand of 
knowledge, obtainable by the philosopher, which can give us a standpoint from 
which to criticize the whole of the knowledge of daily life. The most that can be 
done is to examine and purify our common knowledge by an internal scrutiny,  
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assuming the canons by which it has been obtained” (Our Knowledge of External 
World, p.71). (Quine, 1966, p. 667) 
Neutral monism, in the hands of Russell, gained new empiricist and physicalist 
contours, benefiting from years of theoretical experience of one of the masters of 
logic and epistemology of the twentieth century. His determination to avoid 
idealism was not enough to take him closer to a more extreme naturalist position 
as coveted by Quine, but his choice of neutral monism avoided his adherence to 
behaviorism and eliminativism, which hampered Quinean philosophy getting 
closer to neuroscience at the end of the last century. 
3. RUSSELL'S THEORY OF PERCEPTION: OSCILLATING BETWEEN 
PHENOMENALISM AND PHYSICALISM 
In "The Analysis of Mind" (1921), Russell says that "we perceive things more or 
less, but always with a very considerable amount of vagueness and confusion" 
(p. 135). From his theory of perception is not possible to derive a strong realist 
position about perceived physical objects. Russell oscillates between the 
classical empiricist position and physicalism. For him, if we can explain the 
causal relationship between the object, the environment and the human body, it 
is possible to establish whether the perception is true or not. Russell says: 
When a mental occurrence can be regarded as an appearance of an object 
external to the brain, however irregular, or even as a confused appearance of 
several such objects, then we may regard it as having for its stimulus the object 
or objects in question, or their appearances at the sense-organ concerned. When 
… a mental occurrence has not sufficient connection with objects external to the 
brain to be regarded as an appearance of such objects, then its physical causation 
(if any) will have to be sought in the brain. In the former case it can be called a 
perception; in the latter it cannot be so called. (Russell, 1921, p. 136)  
Russell's description of perception events shows the oscillation between 
empiricism and physicalism in his philosophy of mind of 1921. And besides, we 
could say, it shows that Russell already espoused a sort of physicalist, non-
idealist or solipsist naturalism, because although speaking of appearances and 
the obscurity of perception content as appearances, he did not hesitate to affirm 
the sovereignty of physical science to establish the causal links between objects 
and phenomenal experiences. 
In Russell there is not a mere parallel between physical and mental. 
Appearances should be explainable by physical laws. However, despite this 
physicalism in his perception theory, there remains a gap between the causative 
process of perception and the form of appearances. And that is why, as we have 
seen above, Russell's neutral monism puts the sensations at the heart of 
reflection on the contents of empirical knowledge: 
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Sensations are what is common to the mental and physical worlds; they may be 
defined as the intersection of mind and matter. This is by no means a new view; it 
is advocated, not only by the American authors I have mentioned (ex: William 
James], but by Mach in his Analysis of Sensations, which was published in 1886. 
… It [sensation] is not itself knowledge, but it supplies the data for our knowledge 
of the physical world, including our own bodies. (Russell, 1921, p. 144) 
Russell does not start the discourse on the contents of human mind from the 
perspective of the first person only, gradually unfolding in an explanation of 
correlation between contents of the mind and what they designate or should 
designate, as in the Carnapian attempt (1928) to demonstrate the correlation 
between the human world as experienced, and scientific-conceptual knowledge. 
The classical tradition, rationalist as much as empiricist, presupposes certainty 
about the first person's perspective and "builds" the world and / or the 
knowledge about it from that perspective. This always happens with the help of 
cognitive contents that this perspective makes available, that is: when they 
explain how we reach knowledge from phenomenal content, they presume that 
the knowledge resulting from this process is already known. Thus, Carnap, for 
example, shows that it is possible to explain how we feel and perceive already 
presupposing knowledge we have about the physical process of sensation and 
perception. For Carnap therefore philosophical explanation should not just start 
from facts described from a third person, but should show how the process 
evolves internally in the person who is feeling and sensing. However, there is 
obviously circularity in the expositive method that no anti-naturalist statement 
can avoid. So the accusation that could be made to the neo-empiricists, of falling 
into an idealist or solipsist position for starting the description of the contents of 
the human mind from a first person point of view does not hold if we bear in 
mind that every description of first person uses knowledge we call the third 
person knowledge of the relationship between subject and environment, which 
only science provides. 
This means that the analysis of first person discourse depends on the 
assumption of third-person knowledge. This in turn means that the discussion 
about the sensations, participating in perceptions of objects, is a third person 
discussion which looks like a first person discussion. 
4. SCIENCE OF MIND AND ORDINARY DISCOURSE: MICRO- AND MACRO-
THEORIES 
To a certain extent, Sellars also demonstrates the first-person / third-person 
relationship, but only to the point of denying that the discussion of sensations is 
useful in explaining empirical knowledge, whilst identifying fallacies in the 
empiricist way of upholding the Myth of the Given. This is partly because the 
empiricist affirms the existence of particular entities, sense-data, which are, in 
fact, the result of a theory concerning perception. Sensory data cannot be 
detected either from the perspective of the first or of the third person. They are 
therefore arbitrary stipulations (or postulations) of empiricist philosophy, and are 
treated by the empiricist as if they themselves constituted a form of evidence. 
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Sellars makes use of the Myth of Jones to explain how the Myth of the Given 
originated, and how the theory concerning sense-data derives from the attempt to 
explain the logic of ordinary language when it speaks about immediate visual 
experiences (Sellars 1997 [1956]: 109): 
From this standpoint it is sufficient to suppose that the hero of my myth 
postulates a class of inner —theoretical— episodes which he calls, say, 
impressions, and which are the end results of the impingement of physical 
objects and processes on various parts of the body, and, in particular, to follow 
up the specific form in which I have posed our problem, the eye. (Sellars, 1997 
[1956]: 109) 
Although Sellars’ criticism to the Myth of the Given is well-founded and can’t 
be disregarded, I wouldn’t say that it is a categorical illusion to claim that 
sensory data are first and foremost the content of empirical knowledge, as long 
as third-person knowledge could prove (direct or indirectly) that sense-data do, 
in fact, exist. In this context, it is interesting to consider the following passage 
from Sellars: 
…some philosophers have thought it obvious that we can expect that in the 
development of science it will become reasonable to identify all the concepts of 
behavior theory with definable terms in neurophysiological theory, and these, in 
turn, with definable terms in theoretical physics. It is important to realize that the 
second step of this prediction, at least, is either a truism or a mistake. […]  
To ask how impressions fit together with electromagnetic fields, for example, is 
to ask a mistaken question. It is to mix the framework of molar behavior theory 
with the framework of the micro-theory of physical objects. The proper question 
is, rather, ‘What would correspond in a micro-theory of sentient organisms to 
molar concepts pertaining to impressions?’ And it is, I believe, in answer to this 
question that one would come upon the particulars which sense-datum theorists 
profess to find (by analysis) in the common-sense universe of discourse (cf. 
Section 23). (Sellars 1997 [1956]: 113-114) 
We can see from the above quotation that Sellars does not reject a description of 
sense-data which is part of a scientific theory concerning human perceptions. 
"Sense-data" may be part of the technical vocabulary used to describe how 
sentient organisms react internally to external forces. However, this does not 
mean that the sensory data provide the specific reference for expressions such as 
"red" or "triangle". Impressions of redness or of a triangular form may be part of 
a micro-theory, which can explain the reaction of sentient organisms to the 
environment, even though it would be fallacious to deduce that ordinary 
language is incorrect to attribute properties to external objects which are 
inherent to the impressions resulting from our sentient relationship with these 
objects. So, it would be correct to conclude that the micro-theory can explain the 
relationship between physical objects and the perceptive qualities they induce in 
us, and that, in line with the micro-theory, common sense could be wrong to 
attribute to objects any qualities which may belong to perception. However, this 
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should not lead us to "correct" ordinary language, since in this case we would 
merely be substituting one theory for another, or substituting the physicalist 
argument concerning the qualities of external objects for a third-person 
phenomenalistic argument concerning perceived qualities attributed to the 
external objects which cause them. 
If we interpret the philosophy of perception propounded by Russell in 1921 
as a kind of scientificism which does not completely reduce sensations to 
physical events, but which allows us to think of sensations as having a 
phenomenal or mental aspect, which would be still part of the world that is the 
object of the sciences, then Sellars’ criticism of the Myth of the Given does not 
run entirely counter to Russell’s perspective. This perspective does not use only 
introspection as a methodology, but relies, rather, on evidence from physical 
science to explain perception. Nevertheless, Russell could still be criticized by 
Sellars for giving pride of place to the physicalist perspective, to the detriment of 
the perspective of common sense, and for not seeing that both perspectives are 
essentially just two different languages and theories with different pragmatic 
goals, where one is no truer than the other. 
If we analyze Sellars’ claims about the differences between ordinary 
language and scientific language, we can conclude that what happens in both 
cases is that each of them must refer to distinct objects. Ordinary language must 
refer to physical objects as both its aim and its function; scientific language 
(which investigates the process resulting in the attribution of sensible qualities to 
physical objects) focuses on describing the process of perception, and not on the 
intersubjective process of speaking about perceived physical objects. Scientific 
language wishes to explain the process of perception, even though this process 
may not be clear to the subject who perceives, whilst ordinary language allows 
the sentient subject to communicate what is happening in the physical world to 
her interlocutors, including, in some cases, what is happening in her body or in 
her mind. The fact that in ordinary language the subject attributes to objects 
qualities which appear to her in a unique form does not, obviously, mean that 
she knows which process led to her singular perception of these qualities, or to 
the attribution of specific words for describing them. Learning how to associate 
words with specific experiences does not require the ratification of a theory of 
sensory impressions, which a naturalized philosophy of perception would seek 
to conceive with the assistance of the sciences. From a pragmatic perspective, 
the really central question seems to be in which sense scientific explanations of 
the process of perception (or of other psychophysical processes) are relevant for 
everyday intersubjective discourse and practices. It is pretty obvious that from a 
scientific point of view knowing about the psychophysical process is essential 
for establishing psychological or physical treatments, but it isn’t obvious that a 
scientific discourse could be useful to everyday discursive practices, as a 
reductionist eliminativism in philosophy of mind could advocate. 
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SOME METAETHICAL PROBLEMS FOR PRAGMATIC 
NATURALISM 
SUSANA NUCCETELLI 
This essay looks closer at Philip Kitcher’s 2011 view of the so-called ethical 
project, which creatively combines elements of both American pragmatism and 
philosophical naturalism to make up the distinctive metaethical perspective he 
dubs ‘pragmatic naturalism’. As a normative doctrine, pragmatic naturalism 
proposes an egalitarian conception of the good and a method for ethical 
decisionmaking meant to be of help in resolving some contemporary moral 
dilemmas arising from current resource scarcity and global inequalities. As a 
metaethical doctrine, pragmatic naturalism is an anti-realist doctrine that Kitcher 
believes can avoid the skeptical consequences affecting other forms of anti-
realism. Here I will first look closely at the genealogy of morality that pragmatic 
naturalism was devised to accommodate. Then, I will explain why pragmatic 
naturalism falls short of meeting some metaethical challenges facing it. 
I. KITCHER’S MORAL GENEALOGY  
Pragmatic naturalism amounts to dynamic view of folk morality which assumes 
an‘ethical-project thesis.’ Given this thesis, morality, rather than a static result of 
natural selection, is an evolving social enterprise. It is an ongoing social project 
that has been in the making ever since an “ability to apprehend and obey 
commands changed the preferences and intentions of some ancestral hominids, 
leading them to act in greater harmony with their fellows and thus creating a 
more smoothly cooperative society.”1 Because social life always presents new 
difficulties, the ethical project is per force in constant development and therefore 
unfinished. The main reason for this thesis is its consistence with a plausible 
reconstruction of the origin and evolution of human morality. The pragmatic 
naturalist finds evidence from evolutionary psychology and behavioral studies of 
the Great Apes for the existence of a rudimentary form of normative guidance 
among our hominid ancestors, which arose in response to their need to work out 
how to live together. Normative guidance later took stable roots among early 
humans, who expanded and refined it in response to their social needs. Since the 
ethical project relies heavily on these hypotheses about the origin and evolution 
                                                 
1 Kitcher, Ethical Project, 74. Further references to Kitcher’s book will be given in 
parentheses in the body of the text. 
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of morality concerning the role of natural and, principally, cultural selection in 
its emergence, let’s first have a closer look at them.  
Appealing to historical facts and plausible conjectures, Kitcher articulates a 
credible evolutionary story of morality that is generally consistent with other 
genealogies of morality currently on offer. Yet unlike some of these accounts, 
his story emphasizes the evolutionary role the social environment, something 
often neglected in narratives focused exclusively on natural selection. In 
previous work, Kitcher has sought to avoid telling a story that confuses morality 
with “nice behavior” or relies on the existence of an alleged moral instinct. 2 
According to his historical narrative, normative guidance first appeared among 
our hominid ancestors as a result of social pressures to regulate their conduct in 
order to improve social cohesion. Organized in small, mixed groups, these 
hominids often faced injury, disease, and death caused by extreme scarcity of 
resources and their own tendency to engage in violent behavior toward each 
other. But the capacity for normative guidance then evolved through 
amplification and refinement of norms in response to the increasing demands of 
their larger societies, and this capacity was later passed on to early humans. Here 
Kitcher’s narrative helps itself to an evolutionary hypothesis commonly found in 
the literature, which links the emergence of morality to the possession by the 
original moral agents of a strong, stable (i.e., not episodic) tendency to engage in 
altruistic behavior. That tendency is taken to have led, through natural and 
cultural selection, to the development of rudimentary normative guidance. In 
Kitcher’s version of this hypothesis, groups of non-human ancestors in which 
altruistic behavior had a wider scope (i.e., appeared in more species) and range 
(i.e., manifested itself in more types of activity) were better than other groups at 
maintaining the social cohesion needed for responding more efficiently to 
resource scarcity and violence. Groups with more of such individuals then did 
better than other hominids from an evolutionary standpoint. It is also likely that 
the hominids with altruistic tendencies were better disposed to be motivated by 
rudimentary norms of conduct and to have some co-evolved reactive attitudes 
(e.g., guilt and resentment) than those who lacked those tendencies.  
So, normative guidance was a feature that first appeared among our hominids 
ancestors, who introduced it to boost social cooperation and punish altruism-
failures. These hominids’ altruistic capacity is likely to have been inherited by 
our early human ancestors. In their case, Kitcher’s story has it that life in larger 
groups required more sophisticated normative guidance that could serve to 
prevent and punish altruism-failures in a wider and more severe way (2011: 74-
96). Cultural selection then played a major role in the human expansion and 
refinement of normative guidance – and thus also in getting the ethical project 
off the ground. 
A crucial hypothesis in this historical narrative is that the original function of 
ethics was remedying altruism-failures. Support for it is offered by analogy and 
                                                 
2 In “Biology and Ethics,” Kitcher explicitly objects to appeals to a moral instinct 
(e.g., Hauser, Moral Minds). For a recent discussion of the analogy between innate 
language and morality, see Harman, “Naturalism in Moral Philosophy.” 
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evidence. The fossil record attests to our hominid ancestors’ having had a social 
arrangement of small groups, of the sort explained above. To support his 
reconstruction of the challenges they must have faced, Kitcher invokes 
primatologists’ observations of chimpanzees and bonobos, whose social life is 
regularly strained by similar violence and scarcity of resources. These animals 
too have a tendency to altruistic behavior, suggests Kitcher, which they exhibit 
toward their “friends” (i.e., other members of their coalitions and sub-
coalitions). But since those tendencies are weak, episodic, and often overridden 
by the animals’ strong tendencies to aggression, their group’s cohesion is 
commonly undermined by eruptions of violence. As may be observed in the 
behavior of chimps – whose grooming activities extend far beyond the animals’ 
hygienic needs (up to six hours a day) – restoration of peace after a period of 
violence is a time-consuming, energy inefficient process. By comparison, the 
rudimentary normative guidance of our primate ancestors represents a 
considerable improvement in efficiency at the remedying of altruism failures. 
Kitcher also appeals to game-theoretic models that have been instrumental in 
evolutionary explanations of observed altruistic behaviors among some non-
human animals. According to those models, cooperation among parties comes 
out as the strategy that maximizes outcome. This has been taken to explain the 
evolutionary advantage of certain types of altruism – specially, the seemingly 
altruistic behavior of some animals toward the non-kin. Now called ‘reciprocal 
altruism,’ altruistic behavior of that sort has been claimed to be compatible with 
evolutionary theory by construing it as a variation of ‘I rub your back if you rub 
mine’ – a strategy that pays for the giver in the long run, whether or not a 
particular receiver of the altruistic behavior returns the favor. On the other hand, 
the compatibility of kin altruism with evolutionary theory was made clear once 
technology showed the genetic material shared by givers and receivers of this 
kind of altruistic behavior (observed especially among bees, wasps, and other 
insects). But neither of these types of biological altruism can account for the 
emergence of normative guidance and the beginning of the ethical project, both 
of which require beings with a capacity to be motivated by moral norms and 
related psychological attitudes. What is needed is psychological altruism, shown 
by organisms capable of adjusting their psychological states and feelings so that 
they become more favorable to others’ fulfilling of their own wants, plans and 
intentions. Sensitive to the desires, plans, and intentions of others, the 
psychological altruist modifies her own psychological states so that they can 
contribute to the satisfaction of desires, plans, and intentions of others – and this 
is the only factor that explains that modification.  
Kitcher holds that our pre-ethical ancestors had altruistic tendencies of 
precisely this sort. Those tendencies predisposed them to work out agreements 
on rudimentary norms of conduct. “Very probably,” hypothesizes Kitcher, “they 
began with precepts about sharing scant resources and not initiating violence” 
(6). The ability to regulate conduct with precepts, inherited by early humans 
from their primate ancestors, made possible the ethical project at its initial 
stages, long before revisions were introduced to accommodate novel challenges 
to social life. Arguably, the proto-ethical project of our remote ancestors had 
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scant core norms concerning what we would now regards as distributive justice 
and cooperation, whose function was the amelioration of altruism-failures within 
their group, especially the failures that resulted in outbreaks of violence. Ethics 
had, then, the instrumental function of responding to a certain “problem 
background,” which relates to Kitcher’s main historical hypotheses as follows: 
(1) The problem background consists in social instability and conflict caused by 
altruism failure. (2) The original function of ethics is to promote social harmony 
through the remedying of altruism failures. (3) Our ethically pioneering ancestors 
had only a dim appreciation of the problem background, responding to the 
difficulties and discomforts of a tense and fragile social life. (4) We know more 
about the problem background than they did and offer partial and incomplete 
diagnoses of the types of altruism failures to be remedied….(5) Even with 
respect to the original function, the project of refining the codes we have 
continues (2011: 225). 
For Kitcher, the positive normative theory consistent with these hypotheses that 
should be preferred is ‘dynamic consequentialism,’ a view that stands in contrast 
with traditional deontology and classical utilitarianism. Unlike Kantian 
deontology, dynamic consequentialism avoids the mistake of prescribing 
conduct according to rules not well adapted to producing good outcomes, which 
he finds irresponsible on the basis of familiar counterexamples to the Kantian 
rule against lying (2011: 288). On the other hand, he criticizes classical 
utilitarianism for being a static theory of the good and for arriving at its 
conception of the good by a series of reductionist moves. As a result, classical 
utilitarianism mistakenly holds that “the value of a world will always consist in 
the sum of the value of the lives of the individuals we consider one by one” 
(2011: 292). Kitcher finds this claim questionable on the grounds that it fails to 
take into account distribution and fails to consider the moral relevance of past 
events, each of which – argues Kitcher – matters morally. To show how 
dynamic consequentialism accounts for some issues of applied normative ethics, 
Kitcher focuses on hard cases, such as accounting for the wrongness of cruelty 
to animals, or the problem of how to respond to Derek Parfit’s Repugnant-
Conclusion puzzle for consequentialism. In addition, he gives details of a 
rational procedure for moral deliberation (2011: 334 ff.), which builds on the 
reflective equilibrium method developed by John Rawls (1971). 
II. SOME METAETHICAL CONCERNS 
For Kitcher, his pragmatic naturalism is the metaethical doctrine that best 
accommodates this moral genealogy and normative theory. On his view, 
pragmatic naturalism avoids all major problems faced by both moral skepticism 
and moral realism, including those raised by G. E. Moore’s open question 
argument and David Hume’s Is-Ought gap. According to pragmatic naturalism, 
moral norms are entirely explicable in terms of natural and cultural selection. 
But if so, unless pragmatic naturalism can invoke a suitable conception of moral 
truth, it would seem committed to a conclusion it is thought to avoid: namely, 
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that morality is nothing more than a series of changes in normative guidance, 
with no changes amounting to improvements in any robust sense of ‘moral 
progress.’ Furthermore, in spite of its anti-skeptical promises, absent a suitable 
conception of moral truth, pragmatic naturalism would seem unable to account 
for the authority moral judgment. In fact, pragmatic naturalism would appear to 
provide grounds for a qualified evolutionary debunking of morality. The 
argument to show this is primarily epistemic: it starts out by noting that our 
moral beliefs result from forces, such as natural and cultural selection, that are 
irrelevant to their truth. It then concludes that there are no reasons for the 
justification of moral beliefs beyond their contribution to social cohesion. 
Clearly, since a moral belief might be conducive to social cohesion whether it is 
true or false, being so conducive may count as a reason for having it, but not as 
an epistemic reason. If this is correct, pragmatic naturalism provides the grounds 
for a quasi-debunking (i.e., qualified) argument for morality. 
Compare a straightforward debunking argument, offered by skeptics who 
think that normative guidance can be explained completely as a result of 
evolution by natural or cultural selection in ways irrelevant to their truth. It 
typically runs this way: 3  
 
1. Given the theory of evolution, our moral beliefs have arisen in ways 
irrelevant to their being true. 
2. If (1), then our moral beliefs are not justified. 
3. Therefore, our moral beliefs are not justified. 
4. Thus, theory of evolution debunks morality. 
 
Premise 1 invokes the role of natural and cultural selection in shaping our 
moral beliefs, a claim that, under some interpretation, no one wants to deny. The 
plausibility of the conditional in premise 2 depends upon a number of epistemic 
assumptions. First, its antecedent would imply its consequent, provided there are 
no reasons independent of moral beliefs’ etiology to think that at least some 
moral beliefs are true. Second, for the implication to obtain, either the epistemic 
externalist’s claim (i), or the epistemic internalist’s claim (ii) must be true: 
There is no reason to think that evolution (by natural and/or cultural selection) 
has endowed us with a reliable moral belief-forming mechanism. 
If you know that your moral beliefs have been produced in a ways irrelevant to 
their truth, then unless you have independent reasons for taking them to be true, 
that knowledge would defeat their justification.  
Although a defense of at least one of these assumptions would be needed for 
premise 2 of the debunking argument to be problem-free, I’ll ignore this 
complication henceforth, granting that either (i) or (ii) is acceptable. In addition, 
note that I am casting the evolutionary debunking argument in terms of moral 
                                                 
3 For example, Richard Joyce, in The Evolution of Morality, 171-219, offers an 
evolutionary debunking argument along these lines. 
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belief, although this concept is absent in the account offered by the pragmatic 
naturalist, who might have omitted it to avoid begging any questions or to show 
its affinity with certain versions of moral skepticism. Be that as it may, he does 
invoke instead the ‘descriptive counterparts of norms’ in a context where truth 
bearers associated with moral norms are at issue. Since this talk is unnecessarily 
cumbersome, however, hereafter I’ll take truth bearers to be the content of moral 
beliefs, construing these broadly as to refer to whatever psychological attitude 
underlines the acceptance of the content of a moral norm. I now want to suggest 
that pragmatic naturalism fuels the following parallel, quasi-debunking 
argument: 
1. Given pragmatic naturalism, our moral beliefs have arisen to fulfill the 
original function of ethics (i.e., the remedying of altruism failures). 
2. If our moral beliefs have arisen to fulfill the original function of ethics, then 
they have arisen in ways irrelevant to their being true. 
3. If (1) and (2), then our moral beliefs may be justified in terms of their role at 
fulfilling the original function of ethics, but they are not epistemically 
justified. 
4. Therefore, our moral beliefs may be justified in terms of their role at fulfilling 
the original function of ethics, but they are not epistemically justified 
5. Thus, pragmatic naturalism quasi-debunks morality. 
Since the argument is valid, whether pragmatic naturalism is committed to 
endorsing it depends on whether it has the resources to doubt its premises – 
which, as I’ll now show, is by no means clear. First, given the pragmatic 
naturalist’s moral genealogy and his rejection of moral truth in the realist, 
representational sense, he cannot make the case that some of our moral beliefs 
were selected in ways relevant to their being true independently of their role at 
fulfilling the original function of ethics. The sense of ‘truth’ that creates 
problems for the pragmatic naturalist here is that invoked by moral realists. 
After all, as argued by Sharon Street (2006) all scientific evidence points to the 
conclusion that our moral beliefs are the result of evolution by natural selection, 
whether they are true or not. But the pragmatic naturalist maintains that some 
moral beliefs are true in a more idiosyncratic, non-representational sense that’s 
dependent on a prior notion of moral progress. Here is his strategy:  
[W]e can make enough sense of ethical progress, prior to any conception of truth, 
to combat the thought that the evolution of ethics is a history of mere changes. 
Once ethical progress is understood, the concept allows for a constructive 
development of ethical truth, one useful in enabling us to characterize inexact core 
statements we take to be shared among ethically progressive traditions. (249) 
Since truth must then be understood in terms of moral progress, we need to look 
more closely at the latter notion. The pragmatic naturalist does not model moral 
progress on scientific progress, which he takes to consist in the accumulation of (or, 
I would say, approximation to) truths. The paradigm is instead technological 
progress, taken to occur whenever there is a modification leading to an improvement 
in either function or functional refinement – for example, when a modification 
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causes an artifact to perform with a lower error rate, or more quickly, cheaply, 
reliably, etc. (2011: 218). In short, the mark of technological progress is not truth but 
better performance. Similarly, normative guidance is a social technology with a 
function that originally was, and still is, the remedying of altruism-failures (2011: 
221). Normative guidance, after all, seems to have emerged as a way of responding 
to the “background problem”: namely, the social instability and conflict caused by 
altruism-failures confronting early humans. Progress in morality can be measured 
only in relation to a norm’s performance at fulfilling that original function. It is rare 
but does take place whenever stable improvements in satisfying that function are 
introduced. A progressive ethical transition occurs in a society whenever there is a 
change in moral norms resulting in a better performance, over a period of time, in 
the remedying altruism-failures. A regressive transition occurs whenever a change 
results in worse performance at that function over a period of time. Whenever a 
norm change results in the same level of performance at the original function of 
ethics, then neither a progressive, nor a regressive, transition has occurred. 
Derivatively, we can say some moral beliefs are progressive and others regressive or 
neutral, depending on their performance in the remedying of altruism-failures over a 
period of time.  
Now the pragmatic naturalist has expounded a conception ethical progress 
consistent with his historical narrative, one he thinks sufficient to counter the 
skeptical claim that the evolution of ethics is a history of mere changes. He thereby 
has the basis for a construal of moral truth in the following non-representational 
sense: “descriptive counterparts of ethical rules count as true just in case those rules 
would be adopted in ethical codes as the result of progressive transitions and would 
be retained through an indefinite sequence of further progressive transitions” (2011: 
246). The pragmatic naturalist seems thus in a position to claim that, unlike moral 
skeptics, he can accommodate moral progress, and, unlike moral realists, he does so 
without appealing to a notion of moral truth that requires correspondence with moral 
facts. So it appears that pragmatic naturalism is not vulnerable to the objections that 
plague either rival.  
But pragmatic naturalism still needs to show that, in the end, it is not a quasi-
debunking account. For suppose that morality is an evolving social enterprise 
invented by early humans that was selected by evolution in the way outlined above. 
A narrative of this sort points to moral truths’ having been neither discovered nor 
revealed. If so, then neither naturalist (2011: 181 ff.) nor non-naturalist forms of 
realism (2011: 269-71) can be right, since there aren’t, and never were, any external 
moral truths waiting to be discovered by humans. The anti-realist reasons offered 
here by the pragmatic naturalist are familiar ones: like the rare episodes of luckily 
stumbling onto a desired object while sleepwalking, it would be an incredible 
coincidence that our ancestors somehow stumbled onto certain mind- and language-
independent moral truths, so that some of their moral norms turned out to convey 
true beliefs. Furthermore, given the ethical-project hypothesis, morality is 
permanently evolving in response to social pressures. So, not only do we continue in 
the business of inventing moral truths, but (contrary to what some philosophers now 
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think4) there is no hope of ever arriving at a mature folk morality. Moreover, there 
are no experts who can achieve moral knowledge or determine morality’s course of 
development (2011: 207, 285-86). With the exception of cognitively-impaired 
people, we are all engaged in the ethical project, though we don’t know it. The role 
of philosophers is merely that of facilitating the conversation about “how we should 
continue the project of living together” (286).  
Given his hypotheses about the evolution and nature of morality, it is quite 
clear that the pragmatic naturalist thinks moral norms can be completely explain in 
terms of evolution by natural – and principally cultural (i.e., social) – selection. 
Yes, he is equipped with a notion of moral truth that, as we saw, is contingent on 
the more central notion of moral progress. But, unsurprisingly, he cannot invoke 
the truth of moral beliefs, together with some conception of epistemic moral 
justification, to claim that we can know whether some of our moral norms are true, 
in the sense of getting things right, independently of their aptitude for the 
remedying of altruism-failures. All he can say about moral knowledge reduces to 
this: in light of a plausible evolutionary story, we do know that normative 
guidance resulted from social pressures. And we do know that some of our moral 
beliefs are true, in the sense that they perform better than other beliefs in the 
remedying altruism-failures—though we do not know whether they are going to 
continue to do so, given that ethics is an evolving project (2011: 247-49). But the 
pragmatic naturalist cannot say that we are justified in thinking that some of moral 
beliefs are getting things right in the stronger sense needed to amount to moral 
knowledge if they are also justified. In fact, a discussion of moral knowledge is a 
glaring omission in this book but entirely consistent with its general skeptical 
remarks about the impossibility of our ever having it.  
To see how pragmatic naturalism does after all amount to an evolutionary 
quasi-debunking account of morality, consider what it says about moral 
prescriptions widely accepted across “progressive traditions” such as the norm that 
one must be honest (i.e., avoid lying, cheating, and the like). Pragmatic naturalism 
offers an explanation of this norm entirely in terms of its contribution to social 
cooperation, and thus to the fulfillment of the original function of ethics. Now if 
that is all there is to explain about ‘One must be honest,’ the norm can fulfill its 
evolutionary function, whether it is getting things right (i.e., it is true) or not. 
Compare the following debunking account of religion, entailed by an evolutionary 
story holding that religious beliefs have been selected by evolution in ways 
irrelevant to their getting things right. Our simplified evolutionary story says that 
theism was evolutionarily selected because of its function in generating positive 
feelings that help humans cope with existential anxieties created by such factors as 
the inevitability of death and the constant threat of deception by others. 5 Those 
                                                 
4 For example, Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics, and Smith, “Moral Realism.” 
5 I owe this way of presenting the analogy with evolutionary debunking of religion 
to Derek Parfit (NYU seminar, fall 2012).[This short-form note citation to the 
seminar needs also to appear as a full citation in the bibliography.] My imaginary 
story about the evolution of religion is broadly inspired by Atran, “Religion’s Innate 
Origins.” 
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who believe that God exists are better able to come to terms with such existential 
questions, and thus have, on the whole, lives happier than those of non-believers. 
Suppose that’s the background problem religious belief is responding to, and the 
belief that God exists is performing well at remedying existential anxieties. 
Further suppose that this is the best explanation of why religious beliefs and 
practices have developed in all cultures and why people often devote extraordinary 
time and emotional-energy resources to them. Clearly, if the belief that God exists 
was selected by evolution for its tendency to help us cope with such existential 
anxieties, humans would tend to have that belief whether or not the belief is 
getting things right – i.e., whether or not it is true in a stronger sense, which is the 
one that matters for the evolutionary debunking argument. I submit that the 
pragmatic naturalist account of ‘One ought to be honest’ is quasi-debunking in a 
similar way, for on that account, the adoption of this norm could have amounted to 
a progressive transition (and be true in the pragmatic naturalist sense), whether or 
not it is true in the stronger sense of getting things right. In the end, the illusion 
that pragmatic naturalism can avoid a quasi-debunking conclusion is created by its 
idiosyncratic notion of truth. But now perhaps that illusion is dispelled. In the 
upshot, pragmatic naturalism is revealed as only another form of moral skepticism. 
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NATURALISM IN PHILOSOPHY OF CHEMISTRY OR: WHY 
DOES METAPHYSICS OF NATURE MATTER? 
THOMAS SUKOPP 
First of all, it seems rather tricky to relate naturalism to an important field of 
science which is still philosophically underrated. Although chemistry has long 
been in the shadow of “guiding sciences” such as physics and biology, it plays a 
more important role nowadays in the much-fragmented philosophy of science. It 
is, however, still mostly considered a stepchild of much more respected sciences, 
such as physics. The aim of this article is to sketch the manifold dimensions of 
naturalism (Section 1) in connection with the philosophy of chemistry. Second, I 
will explore how naturalistic accounts in the philosophy of chemistry can be 
understood by considering that this particular field of science in some cases is 
special as well as different in comparison with other scientific fields (Section 2). 
Finally, this article will elaborate a view that tries to reconcile naturalism and 
culturalism (Section 3).  
1. NATURALISM, HISTORY OF SCIENCE, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
At first it may seem puzzling to relate issues of naturalism to the philosophy of 
chemistry, but some salient questions relating to the latter are closely connected 
with naturalism (and, of course, to other “isms”). Questions like “Can chemistry 
be ontologically reduced to physics?” “What is the epistemological status of the 
chemical concept of elements?” (Paneth, 2003/1962, 113) or “Are chemical laws 
natural laws in the same notion of ‘law’ like laws in physics?” and others rely 
more or less on naturalistic or anti-naturalistic assumptions such as scientific 
realism or the notion of experiments as inventions to discover and extend natural 
processes.1  
                                                 
1 For an overview of topics relating to the philosophy of chemistry, see van Brakel (2014), 
Scerri (1997, 2013), and Schummer (2006, 2010). For more detailed companions to the 
philosophy of chemistry, see especially Woody, Findlay, and Needham (Eds.) (2012) and 
Llored (Ed.) 2013. The neglect or at least underestimation of the philosophy of chemistry in 
comparison with the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of biology is remarkable 
and rather strange, since chemists produce much more scientific output in terms of papers 
than all other scientists. The institutionalization of the philosophy of chemistry is getting 
better, but it has remained relatively ignored in big conferences on the philosophy of 
science.  
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I have to focus on a few topics, especially on the nature of chemical elements 
and substances, but it might be instructive for the reader to frame an area of 
research. This broad area encompasses different and sometimes quite distinct 
disciplines such as the history of science (especially chemistry), the philosophy 
of science, the sociology of science, the history of philosophy, and various 
philosophical sub-disciplines. Though it sounds like a truism, a proper 
culmination of such issues is only to be expected if scholars from these and other 
disciplines collaborate and rethink traditional concepts. To put it in the words of 
Bensaude-Vincent, the philosophy of chemistry deserves more attention because 
it helps to “[...] undermine and more importantly to diversify our metaphysical 
views of nature and reality” (2014, 60). Again, assuming that there is something 
to be said in this regard, we can clarify our positions and arguments if we refer 
to naturalism (see section 1.3). We shall take a closer look at the direct relations 
between naturalism and prevalent topics in the philosophy of chemistry (Section 
1.1), thereby opting for a much closer relation and relevance of the history of 
science in relation to the philosophy of science (Section 1.2).  
1.1 NATURALISM AND ITS RELATIONS WITH PREVALENT TOPICS IN 
PHILOSOPHY OF CHEMISTRY  
According to Putnam (2004, 59), a “[…] very common feature is that, as a rule, 
‘naturalism’ is not defined [italics in original; TS].” Here, naturalism is—as a 
working thesis—understood as a philosophical position that asserts a continuous 
exchange between science and philosophy. This continuity implies that 
ontological, metaphysical, and methodological questions can partly be answered 
with references made to science. Maybe—this is one reigning creed of 
naturalists—there is not a priori philosophy. My own position does not stress 
that every question relating to the broad field of the philosophy of chemistry 
should be answered with a naturalistic stance simply because I do not adopt even 
moderate naturalistic positions regarding relevant topics like “Why is chemistry 
much more creative than physics?” or “Is chemistry inclined to follow a ethical 
norms?” (the public image of chemistry carries serious negative connotations 
relating to pollution and other negative environmental consequences) or “What 
is the nature of chemical experiment in comparison with experiments in other 
natural sciences?” 
The philosophy of chemistry is one of the recent branches stemming from the 
philosophy of science, albeit the first book on philosophical issues concerning 
chemistry is 2,400 years old (see Aristotle for “De generatione et corruptione” 
(in Latin)—“On generation and corruption” [English translation]—which means 
composition and decomposition of compounds, mixtures etc.).2 Nevertheless, for 
a long time, chemistry had to play second fiddle to physics, biology, and other 
                                                 
2 See Buchheim (2011) (German translation) or Joachim (no date) for an English translation 
of this first book that explicitly deals with the philosophy of chemistry. Also, see H.H. 
Joachim (n. date): On Generation and Corruption, Provided by The Internet Classics 
Archive, see http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/gener_corr.html).  
THOMAS SUKOPP 
 240
so-called “leading” or “guiding” sciences. Naturalism frequently seconds the 
claim of science X to be a guiding or leading science (see radical versions of 
naturalism in Section 1.3. Also, see Dawkins or Kutschera for a recent example 
of the hegemonic attempts of science in a rather ideological way). We might 
concede that naturalism actually is one reigning creed in the philosophy of 
physics (see Callebaut 1993, or, more recently, MacArthur and De Caro (Eds.), 
2004; Gasser (Ed.), 2007; and Papineau 2015, section 2), but it has not attracted 
sufficient attention in the philosophy of chemistry. To relate naturalism to the 
philosophy of chemistry or vice versa does not call for any judgment on 
naturalism. But it does make sense to argue that the following topics can be dealt 
with in a naturalistic manner. Questions about homologies and analogous 
compounds as well as about classificatory division of substances are numerous 
and cover a wide area. More than this: According to Schummer (2004, 4), s of 
chemistry should be revised because new, rather exotic species are 
synthesized—for example, the molecule fragments trapped in argon matrices.  
Quite different to physics, chemistry is a classificatory discipline. It creates 
new compounds, but chemistry does not simply produce new compounds, 
mixtures, and substances. Its ontology is rich, and encompasses molecules and 
short-living transitional states, fragments of molecules in mass spectroscopy, or 
molecule states in argon matrices. The classical nomenclature of chemistry rests 
on the assumption of a strict correlation between pure substances and molecule. 
This system needs to be revised because of the above- mentioned rather exotic 
chemical species. Also, questions about hierarchies of classification are to be 
reformulated because of such shifts in the meaning of nomenclature.  
 
Epistemological questions: There is no “great unifying theory” in 
chemistry—for example, as quantum physics in physics. But chemical 
synthesis—as the chemical and more or less exclusive chemical methods—
raises epistemological questions regarding the predictability of the features of 
new compounds. Since, in contrast to physics, chemistry deals with real 
substances, and since chemical systems are much more complex than physical 
systems, chemical models and theories have only medium ranges and scopes.  
Further epistemological tasks in the philosophy of chemistry are to analyze the 
role of experiments and experimentation, and to gain insights into different types of 
model construction and the corresponding thinking styles (Hacking). In a nutshell, 
one naturalistic approach is to reconstruct how experiments are really conducted and 
to assume a robust scientific realism (see Section 2.1 for further details).  
 
Methodological questions: Since the philosophy of science in a narrow sense 
deals with methodological questions like reconstruction, description, modeling 
and evaluation of scientific methods, and since chemistry is sometimes regarded 
as the “physics of the outer atomic shell,” reductionist programs have to be 
analyzed. A reductionist program without doubt makes ambitious naturalistic 
assumptions (more recently Lombardi and Labarca 2005; van Brakel 2003). One 
famous locus classicus is Dirac’s dictum: “The underlying physical laws 
necessary for the mathematical theory of a large part of physics and the whole of 
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chemistry [are] completely known from quantum mechanics” (Dirac, 1929, 
p.714; cf. Lombardi and Labarca 2005, 126). Another is Rutherford’s harsh view 
of the priority of physics: “Science, that is either physics or collecting stamps.” 
It would be rather myopic to simply judge whether reductionism is either 
definitely successful or a failure (for a brief look at ontological reductionism, see 
Section 1.3). Quantum chemistry has made enormous progress to explain 
properties of atoms (see Scerri 1991, 126 and 2004, 94ff.). But quantum physics 
and quantum chemistry are still far away from being able to explain and to 
predict the properties and the reaction mechanism of complex chemical systems.  
 
Philosophy of Nature: Should we assume a dichotomy of “natural” vs. 
“artificial?” The dichotomy of “natural” versus “synthetic” or “artificial” seems 
to be a descriptive distinction based on ontological considerations. But this is not 
true. Rather, this separation serves for pseudo-moral reasons or at least for 
normative reasons to dignify “the natural” and to devaluate the “artificial.” Apart 
from questions of purity, a synthetically created natural flavoring, for example, 
cannot be distinguished from a flavoring that has been extracted from a plant 
(Schummer 2003, 728ff.). Now, what does “natural” actually mean? The 
connection between “natural” and “nature” is tricky, but we should speak about 
nature (see Section 2.3), and naturalism should not remain silent about nature 
since it is an “-ism” of nature.  
 
Ethical aspects of philosophy of chemistry and naturalism: In the 19th century 
the public image of chemistry is fraught with accusations of amorality or anti-
morality of chemists. Opinion-makers frequently blamed chemists to act like 
atheists. It was alleged that chemists preached materialism and were 
megalomaniacs. Such accusations are overdone, though cum grano salis there is 
something to be said for this argument: chemists are really creators. They use 
synthesis (and analysis) as the essential and prevalent methods to produce new 
compounds and somehow extend the natural range of substances.3 
 
History of chemistry, philosophy of chemistry, and naturalism: Historical 
demarcations lines of chemistry and physics (not to mention demarcation lines 
of chemistry and biology) (Nye 1993, 34ff.) shape the formation of chemistry as 
a scientific discipline, in contrast to the idea of chemistry as an art, as téchne, 
and as an auxiliary science (e.g., for pharmacy and medicine). Historical 
formation of research paradigms in chemistry evolved within a socio-cultural 
setting of scientific communities; it influenced laboratory settings and thinking 
styles (Hacking and Fleck). A naturalistic account aims to reconstruct how 
scientists in specific historical situations really carried out experiments and how 
they dealt with ordinary problems faced by chemists such as impure substances 
and improper instruments. 
                                                 
3 According to Nikolaus Korber (chair of the department of inorganic chemistry, University 
of Regensburg) each day 15,000 new compounds are synthesized and added to the CAS-
registry (Chemical Abstracts Service) in Columbus, Ohio, USA. 
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1.2 NATURALISM, HISTORY OF SCIENCE, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
Another prerequisite for further argumentation is the link between naturalism, 
the history of science, and the philosophy of science. Independent of this if we 
favor or refuse naturalism, it has its own history that cannot always be separated 
from its systematic claims—for example, any reference to materialism points to 
a long philosophical tradition, beginning with pre-Socratic answers to questions 
about the ultimate constituents of the universe or about the basic principle 
underlying nature (Greek: phýsis). We shall not confound ancient materialism 
with modern materialism, but there is a line of argumentation from Democritus 
(and Leukipp) to the first known philosophers speaking of atoms to materialism 
in the 18th Century. It is seemingly trivial to revert to many criticisms of an 
ahistorical view of the philosophy of science, but my argument is that we do not 
study the history of science just for a better understanding of, for example, 
Stahl’s views on Phlogiston. Systematic and historical questions are intertwined; 
they are mutually dependent and quite often cannot be properly separated.  
Why does the history of science matter for the philosophy of science?  
Philip Kitcher’s4 (2012, 505-524) statement that “[e]pistemology without 
history is blind” is of some value for our deliberations. Analogously, at least for 
heuristic purposes, it will be fruitful for understanding the entirely changing 
views in the philosophy of chemistry to state: “Philosophy of science without 
history is blind.” In a nutshell, Kitcher states a threefold blindness relating to the 
ahistorical or anti-historical concepts in epistemology: first, the historical roots 
of philosophical problems are neglected or misconceived; second, to decline the 
fact that knowledge bearers (scientists and other persons) belong to society (at 
least to a scientific community) and that knowledge is, at least in part, socially 
construed or distributed by social concepts; and third, to understand 
paradigmatic changes in establishment and growth of knowledge, the status quo 
of knowledge at a given time has to be kept in mind.  
The general line of argumentation for a closer systematic linkage of these 
two disciplines with respect to naturalism follows recent insights into history 
and philosophy of science-studies (HPS) (Richardson 2014; Stadler 2012; Ash 
2012; Giere 1973). But it is also motivated by my conviction of classical 
philosophical analysis. As Richardson points out, HPS does well in mixing the 
history of science with the philosophy of science. Of course, the history of 
science is much more descriptive, while the philosophy of science is partly 
normative. Since Richardson analyses Carnap’s “scientific philosophy,” and 
since Carnap could be called a naturalist (he has a deeply skeptical attitude 
towards metaphysics), a reconstruction of logical positivism as part of the 
cultural history of science illuminates its philosophical ambitions. “Second, that 
understanding the scientific ambitions of logical empiricist philosophy of 
science can give historians a way of thinking about philosophy of science as 
something other than a dialectical opponent in the enterprise of understanding 
                                                 
4 I am indebted to Fabian Burt for his insightful summary of Kitcher’s paper.  
NATURALISM IN PHILOSOPHY OF CHEMISTRY 
 243
science” (Richardson 2008, 89). This concept can quite easily be transferred to 
other naturalistic programs and elucidates the close relation between the history 
of science and the philosophy of science. Analyses like Richardson’s (see also 
Cahn 2002; Ash 2012; Stadler 2012, 231, footnote 63) show that historians and 
philosophers of science mutually benefit from each other.  
This estimation is perhaps too optimistic, but I favor it because it can be 
supported by many case studies in both the history and the philosophy of 
chemistry (see Section 2.1). 
1.3 NATURALISM: AN OVERVIEW 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to elucidate all common naturalistic positions 
regarding various topics of the philosophy of chemistry. One main line of 
argumentation in favor of naturalistic assumptions in the philosophy of 
chemistry is as follows: if we favor a naturalistic ontology, i.e., argue that real 
atoms and real molecules exist, and then macroscopic characteristics of these 
molecules can be related to secondary qualities and be understood in terms of 
naturalistic epistemology. (What do we know about natural things in a 
framework of naturalistic epistemology? The methodology asks for the 
significance of natural-scientific methods. This shows, in a nutshell, a relation 
between ontology, epistemology, and methodology.) 
As mentioned above, the dictum of Hilary Putnam can be regarded as a 
provocation. He states: “A very common feature is that, as a rule, ‘naturalism’ is 
not defined” (Putnam 2004, 59). We will make an attempt to classify different 
versions of naturalism. Its claims are to be found on different levels of 
discussion. I do not comment on any kind naturalism here but rather differentiate 
between the ontological, methodological and epistemological versions of 
naturalism like many others. Within these levels radical versions are put first, 
followed by moderate varieties.5  
ONTOLOGICAL NATURALISM: REDUCTIVE AND NON-REDUCTIVE VERSIONS  
Reductive ontological naturalism—as the designation “reductive” denotes—
claims that every entity, be it a mental or an immaterial concept or idea, can be 
reduced to physical or even material objects, things, or corresponding processes. 
One prominent version is called Eliminate Materialism. According to Pauen 
(1996, 77ff.), it can be summarized by three statements: (1) we have no direct 
access to our mental states—e.g., the conscious mental state of reading this text; 
(2) we talk about mental states within folk psychology, which should be 
replaced by a way of speaking that does not pretend to speak about anything 
mental; and (3) when folk psychology disappears, we will finally recognize and 
describe mental states as their true form, namely neural states (this view has 
                                                 
5 For more elaborated surveys on naturalism, see Callebaut (1993), Kornblith (1994); 
Haaparanta (1999). Also, more recently see contribution by Sukopp (2006, 2007), Lewens 
(2012), and Papineau (2015). 
THOMAS SUKOPP 
 244
been put forward in early works of Richard Rorty and Paul K. Feyerabend, while 
the works of Paul and Patricia Churchland also endorse this view). 
For our purpose, physicalism is understood as the ontological thesis, which 
implies that our world (the one and only universe) is a physical world, “and that all 
inhabitants of our world, all things that are existing as real things, are ‘nothing 
else’ than physical things” (Stich 2000, 105) or everything that exists has a 
physical nature (in German: “ist physischer Natur”) (Beckermann 2000). Again, 
we put physicalism into three statements: (1) all things are physical things; (2) all 
properties are physical properties; and (3) from the first two statements, all events 
are physical events. Exponents of this position are members of the “Vienna 
Circle,” such as Rudolf Carnap and Moritz Schlick. In fact, early works of Richard 
Rorty and Paul K. Feyerabend also support this position. 
Materialism is the view that “solely concrete or material things are existing” 
(Bunge and Mahner 2004, 18), which means that any other entity is at utmost 
existing fictively. “The world consists solely of things, i. e., concrete or material 
objects” (Bunge and Mahner, 2004, 21). The exponents of this theory are Mario 
Bunge, Martin Mahner, and David Armstrong. 
Let us briefly discuss non-reductive ontological naturalism. Weak 
emergentism is compatible with reductionist accounts; it combines physical 
monism (1), the existence of systemic properties (2) with the thesis of 
synchronous determinacy (3). This sounds rather complicated and thus I will 
comment propositions 1 to 3. Here, 1 means that the “substrate” of emergent 
properties or structure consists solely of material components, while 2 restricts 
the type of properties that are candidates for emergent properties. Again, 3 says 
that the properties and dispositions of how the system will act are determined 
synchronous—i. e., they depend nomologically on its microstructure. Exponents 
are Mario Bunge, Francisco Varela, and Gerhard Vollmer.6 
Ontological naturalism matters for the philosophy of chemistry, since most 
ontological naturalists regard physics as “the” science that tells us what exists. 
But chemical ontology is much richer and also contributes to problems like 
reductionism in and of chemistry, the relation between theories of chemical 
bonds and atomism, and concepts of substance (Scerri 2005).  
METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM  
Naturalism is often primarily understood as methodological naturalism: “Naturalistic 
epistemology is an approach to the theory of knowledge that emphasizes the 
application of methods, results, and theories from the empirical sciences. It contrasts 
which approaches that emphasize a priori conceptual analysis or insist on a theory 
of knowledge that is independent of the particular scientific details of how mind-
brains work” (Wrenn 2005, 1). 
                                                 
6 It is beyond the scope of this contribution to discuss further varieties of ontological 
naturalism with reference to the mind-body problem, such as anomalous monism, theories 
of supervenience, strong and weak emergentism, and functionalism (Löffler 1999).  
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Dirk Koppelberg (2000, 82f.) formulates this species of naturalism as a package 
of three theses. The first one suggests that philosophy is no adequate basis for 
science; it rejects any a priori philosophy or “prima philosophia”. The second says 
that philosophy “has no epistemically privileged point of view compared with 
science (and humanities)” (Koppelberg 2000). The third formulates and demands the 
application of scientific investigation and results in philosophy. 
Depending on different interpretations of these three statements, we distinguish 
between three versions of methodological naturalism. The strongest account is called 
“eliminative naturalism” and is closely related with the famous replacement thesis: 
philosophy has no epistemically privileged point of view. Philosophy has not only to 
abandon its a priori distinction but should be seen as part of empirical psychology. In 
this respect, Quine (1969, 293) writes: “Epistemology […] is only science self-
applied.” Further advocates of this theory are Paul and Patricia Churchland.  
The cooperation thesis is much more moderate: although philosophy has no 
epistemically privileged point of view, and methodologically starts with everyday 
concepts of epistemic terms and ideas (Koppelberg 2000, 83), epistemologists “use 
terms and norms and formulate principles and aims that are not completely included 
in science” (Koppelberg 2000, 84). 
The following externalistic epistemologies are quite influential and are sketched 
out in the following. First, evolutionary epistemology supposes that our epistemic 
ability is part of our evolution, and can be explained by evolutionary processes and 
principles. We gain knowledge about the world, at least partly, because structures of 
knowledge have been evolved in adaptation to real structures (of the world). Both 
efforts and limitations of our cognitive system can be explained in such a way. 
Exponents of this theory are Donald Campbell and in the German-speaking 
academic community Rupert Riedl, Gerhard Vollmer, and Franz Wuketits.  
Reliabilism (“substantive naturalism”) advances the view that a belief is justified 
(correct or true) if it is generated from a correct working cognitive system, which has 
“so far has yielded true beliefs, i. e. successful representations of our environment” 
(Löffler 1999, 56). In other words: a belief is justified by means of its generation. 
True beliefs can be true beliefs independent of the fact if the believer knows 
something about the processes actually generating a certain belief (Flonta 2000, 
168). The most prominent reliabilist is Alvin I. Goldman. 
Finally, normative naturalism deals with normative questions without referring 
to traditional philosophy (of course, normative elements cannot sometimes be 
neglected in different notions of naturalism. But this is beyond the scope of this 
essay). The crucial question here is why normative naturalism need not rely only on 
traditional philosophy. One simple answer is: we can prove empirically whether or 
not given norms are—in relation to given ends—the appropriate instrument 
(Hartmann and Lange 2000, 152). This view has been expounded by Larry Laudan, 
Ronald N. Giere, and Harald I. Brown.  
Methodological naturalism is important for understanding its relations with the 
philosophy of chemistry, since “the” methods of science do just as little exist as it 
would be a failure to confound the status of experiments in physics with the status of 
experiments in chemistry in particular, or any other suitable methods of physics and 
chemistry in general.  
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STRONG AND WEAK VERSIONS OF NATURALISM: METHODOLOGICAL, 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL, AND METAPHILOSOPHICAL  
I will finally give a brief outline of the programmatic accounts of naturalism 
situated on the above-mentioned levels.  
Radical naturalism vs. Moderate naturalism: According to radical 
naturalism, traditional projects and problems have to be repudiated. In contrast 
to this, moderate naturalism (Tetens 2000, 275) states: “With everything, what 
human beings are, do and with all their abilities, they are part of the empirically 
accessible world. This one world is investigated by the single (empirical 
oriented) sciences.” Exponents of radical naturalism are Willard Van Quine, and 
Paul and Patricia Churchland. Robert Almeder, Holm Tetens, and Gerhard 
Vollmer are moderate naturalists.  
Expanding Naturalism vs. Integrative Naturalism: Do naturalists work on 
projects that are not discussed by traditional epistemology? When projects and 
problems are supplemented [by naturalists], Koppelberg (1996, 75) calls it 
expanding naturalism; when they are modified, he calls it integrative naturalism. 
Expanding naturalists are Hilary Kornblith and Willard Van Quine, while Robert 
Almeder is an integrative naturalist. 
Scientific Naturalism vs. Scientistic Naturalism: How do we proceed to solve 
problems raised by traditional epistemology? On the one hand philosophers who 
adopt scientific methods and solutions to solve epistemological problems prefer 
scientific naturalism. On the other hand philosophers holding the view that 
epistemological questions can exclusively be solved by science advance the 
notion of scientistic naturalism (Koppelberg 1996, 76). Most methodological 
naturalists are scientific naturalists. Again, Willard Van Quine opts for the more 
radical version—i.e., for scientistic naturalism (“Science itself teaches us”).  
Unlimited Naturalism vs. Limited Naturalism: How many traditional projects 
and questions are still relevant topics to be dealt with? (Grundmann 2001, 9f.) 
Traditional epistemology advocates the following theses: every person who raises 
knowledge claims can defend such claims by referring to internal processes such 
as intuition, memory contents, self-reflection, etc. Furthermore, we have a priori 
knowledge, and knowledge cannot be reduced to brain processes etc. Unlimited 
naturalism rejects all theses of traditional epistemology but still carries out 
research on all of its questions. Limited naturalism, however, works on some 
projects under a naturalistic perspective. Willard Van Quine favors unlimited 
naturalism, while Robert Almeder is an advocate of limited naturalism.  
Within these maps of naturalism topics relating to the philosophy of 
chemistry can be understood as more or less naturalistically. We will now 
outline some of these topics. 
2. CHEMISTRY: LET’S STUCK TO THINGS? METAPHYSICS, NATURE, AND 
NATURALISM  
This section has three goals: while physics deals with mass points and much 
more abstract entities than chemistry, it is argued how a naturalistic approach to 
metaphysics might look like (Section 2.1) by supporting and modifying the 
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concept of Fritz F. Paneth. Second, we argue why naturalists—assuming that 
naturalism is not a failure at all—should not abandon metaphysics with respect 
to the fact that science has to talk about nature (Section 2.2). Finally, what 
chemistry has to tell us about nature is outlined in Section 2.3.  
2.1 WHAT IS NATURALISTIC METAPHYSICS? PANETH ON “BASIC 
SUBSTANCES” AND “SIMPLE SUBSTANCES” 
Science or so-called natural sciences describe, analyze, and predict idealized 
parts of nature. With respect to chemistry, we favor a notion that thinks of 
molecules as scientifically accessible parts or components of the real world. We 
will put forward one concept that has been found in the broad field of the 
philosophy of chemistry. But first, we have to explain what we understand as 
“metaphysics.” For this, we first assume that there are at least two different 
notions of metaphysics: 1) what is existence? Or, what is being? 2) what types of 
things exist?  
To be more precise, Metaphysics is a broad area of philosophy marked out 
by two types of inquiry. The first aims to be the most general investigation 
possible into the nature of reality: are there principles applying to everything 
that is real, to all that is? – if we abstract from the particular nature of existing 
things that which distinguishes them from each other, what can we know 
about them merely in virtue of the fact that they exist? The second type of 
inquiry seeks to uncover what is ultimately real, frequently offering answers 
in sharp contrast to our everyday experience of the world. Understood in 
terms of these two questions, metaphysics is very closely related to ontology, 
which is usually taken to involve both ‘what is existence (being)?’ and ‘what 
(fundamentally distinct) types of thing exist?’ […] (Craig 1998) 
For the purposes of this contribution it is sufficient enough to keep in mind that 
science tries to solve the puzzles that nature gives us and tries to figure out 
which natural entities, forces, natural laws, among others, exist. One assumption 
is that the nature of reality can be understood in scientific terms. But even if we 
define the scope of science vs. the scope of metaphysics or religion, one main 
point remains: how can nature be separated from a supernatural realm or from 
any non-scientifically accessible sphere? Furthermore, we can separate different 
types of metaphysics which, at least from our point of view, indicate the 
inevitability of metaphysics (Vollmer 2004, 68): 
1) the metaphysics of transcendence (primarily occupied with non-empirical 
terms and non-empirical propositions—see, e.g., Kant’s claim of synthetic a 
priori judgments); 2) the metaphysics of immanence (approximately dealing 
with ontology, working with empirical and non-empirical terms; Bunge speaks 
of “exact metaphysics”); and 3) the metaphysics of presuppositions (scrutinizing 
the operations and results of sciences, and trying to understand its underlying 
assumptions—i.e., scientific realism); 4) speculative metaphysics (engaged with 
heuristically valuable speculations). 
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With respect to chemical entities like molecules, we think that scientific 
realism is a sound metaphysical view. But, unlike Sankey’s conclusion, we do 
not think that scientific realism is a bundle theory. He thinks that:  
[S]cientific realism […] involve[s] four main tenets: (a) axiological 
realism: the aim of science is truth, and scientific progress consists in 
advance on that aim; (b) anti-instrumentalism: the unobservable entities 
postulated by scientific theories are conceived as real entities rather than 
mere predictive devices; (c) correspondence truth: truth consists in 
correspondence between what a statement says about the world and the way 
the world in fact is; (d) metaphysical realism: the world investigated by 
scientists is an objective reality, the existence and nature of which are 
independent of human mental activity. (Sankey 2000, 213, footnote vi) 
We would like to focus only on the last notion: scientific realism is one kind of 
metaphysical realism. With respect to the existence of molecules, we argue that 
‘[c]hemistry is a science in which interest is directed towards the secondary 
qualities of substances” (Paneth 2003/1962, 119). Molecules are manifestations 
of substances—this is a very old concept that begins with Aristotle. For the 
moment it is sufficient to think of the Greek word “ousia” as a permanent 
substratum, “but not with reference to our world of appearance” (Paneth 
2002/1963, 122), and rather as formed and determined by chemical laws (think 
of bonding angles in a molecule or affinities). Laws of nature entirely refer or 
point to an objective world that is trans-perceptional and trans-empirical. We 
have to think about this world not in terms of science. Thus, molecules are 
entities existing in reality; their changes and their recombination to other 
molecules—through chemical reactions—and their generation and corruption, as 
mentioned by Aristotle, can be explained in terms of re-arrangement of 
permanent atoms. According to Paneth, “The secondary qualities exist only in 
our perceptions, the primary ones pertain to the atoms themselves; in their realm 
only size, shape, and motion exist” (Paneth 2002/1963, 122). 
2.2 WHY NATURALISM IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE SHOULD NOT 
ABANDON METAPHYSICS 
In short, the answer is: no. To abandon metaphysics would be a metaphysical 
position, since it would have to be argued why metaphysics should be 
abandoned. So, it would have to argued metaphysically why metaphysics is 
useless, superfluous, or simply nonsense. We will outline a revival of substance 
in relation to elements or the German term “Grundstoff” and try to give reasons 
as to how to understand the difference between “basic substance” and “simple 
substance”. This parlance shows how scientific realism is somehow akin to 
naturalistic metaphysics that assumes a real world out there. This real world is, 
of course, not completely independent of my subjective thinking. “Subjective” 
here simply means that I am the subject that thinks. This thinking has to refer to 
something, and this “something” is the structure of the real world. Is there any 
proof that this world exists? No, but it is highly plausible. An argument for such 
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plausibility is as follows: most chemists have a stance that they adopt a kind of 
robust scientific realism.  
Now, to come back to our account of a chemical element and the notion of 
substance: in the words of the eminent chemist-philosopher Paneth:  
Nature is assumed to be without qualities, and the properties of colour, 
sound, taste, smell, etc., are applicable only to our sense representations. The 
objective prerequisites of the last two qualities are still almost totally obscure; 
but since even today, as formerly, these qualities play an important part in 
chemistry, in characterising substances (Paneth 2002/1963, 116). 
One naturalistic assumption in the development of the old Greek concept 
“element” was put forward by Lavoisier (1743–1794), one of the founders of 
modern chemistry (Bensaude-Vincent 1994). His elements are not “sort of 
metaphysical causes of the behaviour of bodies, as with the alchemists, but 
visible and tangible substances with quite definite observable properties” 
(Paneth 2002/1963 ibid.). 
The conceptual change of “element” can easily be understood when we 
compare e.g. Geber’s answer to the question “What is the element sulphur?” to 
Lavoisier’s answer. Geber would have answered something like: “It is the carrier 
of mutability by fire.” The advance of Lavoisier’s account of element lies, 
according to Paneth, in inferring the existence of a basic substance from each 
simple substance found experimentally. An accompanying disadvantage is that, 
in the eyes of many, the meaning of “basic substance” was completely hidden by 
that of “simple substance.” 
The contemporary chemist—quite in line with Lavoisier—would answer that 
sulfur is an element with certain properties such as yellow solid stuff at room 
temperature, colorless, and without taste and smell. And it would also be 
mentioned that sulfur cannot be decomposed by chemical methods. The crucial 
question is:  
“[W]hat sense at all is there in saying that the element sulphur is preserved 
unchanged in its compounds, such as the gaseous, colourless, pungently 
smelling sulphur dioxide?” (Paneth 2002/1963, 129). The parlance of the 
element sulfur has a clear meaning when we refer to the element of sulfur as a 
transcendental principle underlying the phenomena. Hence, the naive-realistic 
and erroneous assumption is that the properties of sulfur are just those properties 
which it exhibits to us when it is not combined with other basic substances. We 
might speak of the properties of a specific substance, as we perceive it. To argue 
for a modification of Paneth’s view, we quote a longer passage: 
But Lavoisier’s definition must not mislead us into applying this 
simplification to the concept of element, which is used in two different 
senses. I have already attempted to keep apart these different meanings in the 
above discussion by using the two terms “basic substance” and “simple 
substance”. I have referred throughout to “basic substance” whenever the 
indestructible substance present in compounds and simple substances was to 
be denoted, and to “simple substance” whenever that form of occurrence was 
meant in which an isolated basic substance uncombined with any other 
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appears to our senses. We cannot ascribe specific properties to an element in 
the sense of basic substance, since the latter contributes to the generation of 
the infinitely diverse properties which it exhibits, by itself and in combination 
with other basic materials; as simple substance it can be characterized by the 
statement of its properties without prejudice to scientific exactness, as we 
have earlier shown in general for any substance. In the case of the concept of 
“simple substance” we may remain naive realists; but in the case of “basic 
substance”, if we are not to get involved at once in contradictions, we must 
not overlook the fact that it belongs to a transcendental world devoid of 
qualities. Even to this day the customary definition follows Lavoisier: “an 
element is a substance that cannot be decomposed into simpler ones by any 
chemical procedure”. Thus, to be sure, the assumed criterion for an element 
is that it may be obtained as a simple substance which cannot be decomposed 
further. But the great significance of elements for the whole body of chemical 
theory lies in the assumption that the substances which produce the 
phenomenon of “simple substances” serve in the quality-less, objectively real 
sphere of nature as “basic substances” for the construction not only of simple 
but also of composite substances. (Paneth 2002/1963, 129f.) 
So, a simple substance refers to our phenomenologically and empirically accessible 
world, whereas the basic substance belongs to a quality-less, objectively real sphere 
of nature and refers to the substratum, an entity that is persistent in time. 
One remaining problem is how to understand the meaning of “substratum” and 
of “element” in the notion of an eternal entity. Does this lead to Platonism? Not 
necessarily, since the concept of “element” can be understood without reference to 
an objective world, where elements exist devoid of any properties. Kripke and 
Putnam have argued “names connect with the world through one single criterion 
provided by modern chemistry, namely atomic number accompanied by a causal 
chain from the initial act of baptism” (Scerri 2005, 133). 
2.3. HOW CAN “NATURE” BE RELATED TO CHEMISTRY?  
Science or natural science deals in many respects with nature, but it often 
remains silent when we ask how exactly we can grasp a notion of nature—e.g., 
in physics. The success of science is owed to the fact that many aspects of nature 
are neglected and can be abandoned simply because of the level of abstraction of 
modeling and theorizing about nature. Among the big scientific approaches to 
nature we find a mechanistic, a holistic, and an organizational view of nature.  
We restrict ourselves to a brief sketch of the most influential, i.e., the 
mechanistic, paradigm of nature (Gloy 1996, 99-106). Then, we ask what 
“nature” actually means in chemistry.7  
The mechanistic model of nature (abbreviated as MMO) has emerged from 
early modern science. 
                                                 
7  For a more detailed view on metaphysical views of nature in early modern chemistry see 
Sukopp (2013a, 2013b)  
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The distinction between artificial vs. natural within the paradigm of MMO is in 
flux, since a physicist, e.g., can only detect elementary particles as particles that 
are nonexistent in nature (and thus are somehow artificial). “Nature” is getting a 
more and more abstract model of selected parts of the world. Owing to complex 
chemical equipment, chemists can detect radioactive elements, and synthesize 
pesticides and synthetics. These compounds are rather artificial than natural.  
Biologists create “artificial beings”—creatures that do not exist in nature. 
The existence of compounds, phenomena, creatures’ and other such things is 
entirely enabled by experimental settings. Thus, “nature” is abstraction-enabled 
in comparison with the phenomenological-corporal-social8 experience of nature. 
The MMO reduces and restricts “nature” to the parlance of atoms, molecules, 
and genes as concretes entities. These entities are ontologically and 
epistemologically reliable as far as they can be described by means of natural 
laws. The MMO makes the following assumptions:  
First, MMO relies on the subject-object dichotomy. Thus, “nature” is “the 
other,” “the alien,” which has to be subjugated. At least, “Nature” is opposed to 
the researcher and the experimenter.  
Second, “nature” is understood as a (mechanical or biochemical) machine in 
terms of mechanisms. The machine metaphor allows us to think that “nature” 
can be described and predicted by mathematics, and that it is ontologically 
reducible to basic entities.  
Third, experiments are designed and carried out to create a non-natural 
situation in the sense of setting up a certain aspect or feature of nature.  
Fourth, “nature” is seen in the dimension of a ruling/serving relation. I 
cannot elaborate this ethical aspect within this contribution.  
Now, what does “nature” mean in chemistry? 
First, the term “chemical“, is usually understood as the non-natural and the 
artificial, especially against the background of an ecological-holistic worldview. 
The “natural” is more or less value-loaded in a positive sense. The following 
views on nature from the perspective of pharmaceutical chemistry illustrate a 
complex web of concepts about nature, which mirror the creative power of 
chemistry as a discipline that is literally creative (Schummer 2003, 724f.): the 
molecular design of pharmaceutical substances relies on both experimental 
synthesis of compounds and computer- simulated design of molecules. In this 
context, “nature” can be grasped in the following seven dimensions that reflect 
different notions of nature:  
1. Nature is described in the sense that chemistry figures out the possible 
features of pharmaceutically active substances.  
2. Nature is reproduced either a) by extracting substances from natural 
compounds (plants, animals, or soils) (natural material) or b) compounds are 
synthesized, i.e., as “artificial” products. “Artificial” here simply means that 
these compounds are non-natural in the sense that we do not find them in nature. 
3. Chemistry learns from nature by isolation of substances (e.g., from 
extracts of plants).  
                                                 
8 The German term “lebensweltlich” would fit better here.  
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4. Chemistry imitates nature, e.g., by a total synthesis of a substance, which 
we can also find in extracts of plants.  
5. Chemistry improves nature by optimizing a natural compound—i.e., 
chemists isolate and modify substances. 
6. Chemists rival nature by total synthesis of compounds, which does not 
include chemical reactions of natural extracts, but completely works with non-
natural substances.  
7. Chemistry controls nature by biosynthesis of genetically-manipulated 
bacteria.  
 
Some of these views understand that nature can easily be regarded as more or 
less naturalistically. Reproduction of nature would a kind of ideal. “Nature” in 
most of the above-mentioned concepts is closely related to a realistic world-view 
of chemists. Realism, as we have argued, is one of the prevalent naturalistic 
accounts in the philosophy of chemistry, and it could be argued that everything 
is nature is exact in the sense in which the chemist deals with nature.  
3. CONCLUSION: RECONCILING NATURALISM AND CULTURALISM 
So far, we have not really judged naturalism very much. Our conclusion argues 
that there is a reasonable account that reconciles naturalism and culturalism to 
understand some of the prevalent topics in the philosophy of chemistry. To 
avoid common misunderstandings, I do not opt for relativism such as “science as 
a whole is a construction that can only be judged by one culture” or “science is 
one of the big narratives,” but I opt for perspectivism that includes a culture-
sensitive view. Other disciplines, such the sociology of science, the history of 
science, or science and technology studies, are more inclined to favor a view that 
encompasses cultural settings as relevant for theoretical argumentation. Now, 
why should there be a cultural turn in the philosophy of chemistry? Different 
academic cultures in different scientific communities located in different 
countries—within a specific historical setting—shape chemical theories. For 
example, the vocational and educational practice and the corresponding 
organizational structures in France and in England from the late 17th century to 
the climax of the chemical revolution in the 1780s have been analyzed as being 
crucial for theory formation.  
The difference between Lavoisier’s corporative view of knowledge and 
Priestley’s individualistic epistemology highlights the difference between the 
institutional organization of French and British science in the late eighteenth 
century. In the highly organized and centralized community of France, the 
pressures of formal education, centralized learned societies, employment 
opportunities, and a competitive system of reward and recognition meant that 
aspiring French chemist had little choice but to follow the intellectual lead of 
the academicians in Paris […] (McEvoy 1988, 210f., cited in. Thagard, 
“Growth of knowledge”, 5).  
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Chemistry is much more concerned with substances than other so-called leading 
sciences such as physics. The metaphysics of scientific realism seems to be the 
best way to understand what chemistry is all about. The seemingly most 
scientific science, physics, is much more abstract, and ontologically and 
methodologically much more distant from nature than chemistry. Scientific 
realism is akin to helpful metaphysics. Like good metaphysics, scientific realism 
cannot be proved but can be criticized. Although metaphysics in terms of 
ontology can be understood as naturalistic, the practice (laboratory work and 
nomenclature) is more intensely culturally shaped and more than this: theory 
constructions and the evaluations of correct scientific methods are culturally 
embedded. Chemistry has always been a laboratory science, and we should keep 
in mind the word “labor” in “laboratory” to understand that chemistry has 
evolved as an art and as something much more related to craftsmanship than to 
science. The thinking style of chemists, to revert to Ian Hacking, is deeply 
influenced by the socio-cultural setting of laboratories. The problems and 
objects of the study of chemistry have been provided by and limited by the 
operations that could be performed on materials in a chemical laboratory. As 
theoretical structures changed and new objectives supplemented or displaced 
older ones, the stable setting of the chemical laboratory both identifies chemists 
and distinguishes them from other natural philosophers who dealt with 
phenomena (as objects and part of nature) in a much more theoretical and 
abstract way. The practice of chemistry is as only a physical but also a mental 
exercise. As chemistry is first and foremost concerned with making individual 
compounds, it is quite closely connected with culturally influenced parts of 
science such as laboratory styles and technical equipment. Even if we think that 
chemistry deals with the transformation of substances, its ontology rests on quite 
robust assumptions on realism (van Brakel 1997, 253f. und Scerri, 2001). 
On the basis of concrete reality, individual substances have led to the view 
that chemistry is an “impure science.” So, in terms of its relevance to the 
philosophy of science, chemistry has played second fiddle to physics and other 
leading or guiding sciences. Paradoxically, its ontology, as outlined above, 
namely the aspects of the theory of science, leads to no good reputation (see e.g., 
chemistry as an “impure science” (Bensaude-Vincent 2014, 73, endnote 1) 
because chemists do not claim to discover the inner secrets of matter. To put it 
poetically, we may resort to Goethe’s Faust:  
Chemistry does not claim to know what the world contains in its innermost 
heart and finer veins.  
But the naturalistic core of chemical ontology is based on the distinction 
between a “simple substance” built by one chemical element like chlorine (Cl2). 
Chemists stick to properties, for example, Chlorine is a green gas with a 
penetrating smell. But the element chlorine as a basic substance has no 
perceptible properties like color or smell. The naïve realistic notion can only be 
applied to chlorine as a simple substance, but as empirically transcendent when 
we refer to chlorine as a “basic substance.”  
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In a few words, this is our view of reconciling naturalism with culturalism in 
an interdisciplinary framework9, where we need much more collaboration than 
so far has been the case.  
 
                                                 
9 One last remark that certainly needs further elaboration points to the relevance of 
(naturalized) social epistemology. If knowledge bearers are not individuals but groups of 
scientists or scientific communities interacting with each other and accepting each other 
more or less as experts, then knowledge certainly is entirely cultural in terms of thinking 
styles, evaluating knowledge, and accepting or rejecting theories. 
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